Schwartz factors in Nevada

2022And NRS 1250.007 essentially codified factors the supreme court had already required district courts to consider when determining whether to grant relocation, particularly those established in Schwartz. 107 Nev. at 383 , 812 P.2d at 1271 (announcing the Schwartz factors based in part on the D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio, 365 A.2d 27, 30 (N.J. 1976), standard).

2022And NRS 1250.007 essentially codified factors the supreme court had already required district courts to consider when determining whether to grant relocation, particularly those established in Schwartz. 107 Nev. at 383 , 812 P.2d at 1271 (announcing the Schwartz factors based in part on the D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio, 365 A.2d 27, 30 (N.J. 1976), standard).

2022See Jones, 110 Nev. at 1260 , 885 P.2d at 568 (concluding that a relocating parent need not demonstrate "tangible benefit[sl" under the actual advantage threshold requirement, precursor to the threshold relocation test, because they should be considered under the Schwartz factors "after the custodial parent makes a threshold showine).

2022See Jones, 110 Nev. at 1260 , 885 P.2d at 568 (concluding that a relocating parent need not demonstrate "tangible benefit[sl" under the actual advantage threshold requirement, precursor to the threshold relocation test, because they should be considered under the Schwartz factors "after the custodial parent makes a threshold showine).

2015See Trent v. Trent, 111 Nev. 309, 315-16 , 890 P.2d 1309, 1313 (1995) (providing that once a custodial parent establishes a good faith basis for the move, the court should consider the Schwartz factors, "focusing on the availability of adequate, alternate visitation").

2015See Trent v. Trent, 111 Nev. 309, 315-16 , 890 P.2d 1309, 1313 (1995) (providing that once a custodial parent establishes a good faith basis for the move, the court should consider the Schwartz factors, "focusing on the availability of adequate, alternate visitation").

2022And NRS 1250.007 essentially codified factors the supreme court had already required district courts to consider when determining whether to grant relocation, particularly those established in Schwartz. 107 Nev. at 383 , 812 P.2d at 1271 (announcing the Schwartz factors based in part on the D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio, 365 A.2d 27, 30 (N.J. 1976), standard).

2022And NRS 1250.007 essentially codified factors the supreme court had already required district courts to consider when determining whether to grant relocation, particularly those established in Schwartz. 107 Nev. at 383 , 812 P.2d at 1271 (announcing the Schwartz factors based in part on the D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio, 365 A.2d 27, 30 (N.J. 1976), standard).

2016See Ogawa v. Ogawa, 125 Nev. 660, 668 , 221 P.3d 699 , 704 SUPREME COURT (2009) (providing that this court will not set aside the district court's OF NEVADA (0) 1947A 4rirgir factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous or not supported by substantial evidence).

2016See Ogawa v. Ogawa, 125 Nev. 660, 668 , 221 P.3d 699 , 704 SUPREME COURT (2009) (providing that this court will not set aside the district court's OF NEVADA (0) 1947A 4rirgir factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous or not supported by substantial evidence).

2014See Druckman, 130 Nev. at , 327 P.3d at 515; see also Wallace v. Wallace, 112 Nev. 1015, 1019-20 , 922 P.2d 541, 543 (1996) (providing that this court reviews a child custody decision for an abuse of discretion).

2014See Druckman, 130 Nev. at , 327 P.3d at 515; see also Wallace v. Wallace, 112 Nev. 1015, 1019-20 , 922 P.2d 541, 543 (1996) (providing that this court reviews a child custody decision for an abuse of discretion).

2005Therefore, we reverse the district court’s order and remand this case so that the district court can determine whether it is in the child’s best interest to live in California with Svetlana as the primary custodian or to live in Nevada with Thomas as the primary physical custodian. 16 Rose, Maupin, Gibbons, Douglas, Hardesty and Parraguirre, JJ., concur. 1 Because the district court applied the wrong statute and standard in evaluating Svetlana’s petition, we do not address the evidence presented, as it has no bearing on the legal issue presented to us. 2 107 Nev. 378 , 812 P.2d 1268 (1991). 3

2005Therefore, we reverse the district court’s order and remand this case so that the district court can determine whether it is in the child’s best interest to live in California with Svetlana as the primary custodian or to live in Nevada with Thomas as the primary physical custodian. 16 Rose, Maupin, Gibbons, Douglas, Hardesty and Parraguirre, JJ., concur. 1 Because the district court applied the wrong statute and standard in evaluating Svetlana’s petition, we do not address the evidence presented, as it has no bearing on the legal issue presented to us. 2 107 Nev. 378 , 812 P.2d 1268 (1991). 3

2005Ct., 120 Nev. 575, 582 , 97 P.3d 1132, 1137 (2004). 8 Blaich v. Blaich, 114 Nev. 1446, 1449 , 971 P.2d 822, 824 (1998). 9 See Hearing on A.B. 544 Before the Senate Comm, on Judiciary, 70th Leg., at 10 (Nev., April 27, 1999). 10 Hearing on A.B. 544 Before the Assembly Comm, on Judiciary, 70th Leg., at 3 (Nev., April 5, 1999). 11 Id. at 3-4. 12 Any undecided petition for relocation in a joint custody case pending before the district court as of the date of this opinion should be treated as though the party had moved for primary custody, regardless of the form or title of the document. 13 110 Nev

2005Ct., 120 Nev. 575, 582 , 97 P.3d 1132, 1137 (2004). 8 Blaich v. Blaich, 114 Nev. 1446, 1449 , 971 P.2d 822, 824 (1998). 9 See Hearing on A.B. 544 Before the Senate Comm, on Judiciary, 70th Leg., at 10 (Nev., April 27, 1999). 10 Hearing on A.B. 544 Before the Assembly Comm, on Judiciary, 70th Leg., at 3 (Nev., April 5, 1999). 11 Id. at 3-4. 12 Any undecided petition for relocation in a joint custody case pending before the district court as of the date of this opinion should be treated as though the party had moved for primary custody, regardless of the form or title of the document. 13 110 Nev

2005Ct., 120 Nev. 575, 582 , 97 P.3d 1132, 1137 (2004). 8 Blaich v. Blaich, 114 Nev. 1446, 1449 , 971 P.2d 822, 824 (1998). 9 See Hearing on A.B. 544 Before the Senate Comm, on Judiciary, 70th Leg., at 10 (Nev., April 27, 1999). 10 Hearing on A.B. 544 Before the Assembly Comm, on Judiciary, 70th Leg., at 3 (Nev., April 5, 1999). 11 Id. at 3-4. 12 Any undecided petition for relocation in a joint custody case pending before the district court as of the date of this opinion should be treated as though the party had moved for primary custody, regardless of the form or title of the document. 13 110 Nev

2005Ct., 120 Nev. 575, 582 , 97 P.3d 1132, 1137 (2004). 8 Blaich v. Blaich, 114 Nev. 1446, 1449 , 971 P.2d 822, 824 (1998). 9 See Hearing on A.B. 544 Before the Senate Comm, on Judiciary, 70th Leg., at 10 (Nev., April 27, 1999). 10 Hearing on A.B. 544 Before the Assembly Comm, on Judiciary, 70th Leg., at 3 (Nev., April 5, 1999). 11 Id. at 3-4. 12 Any undecided petition for relocation in a joint custody case pending before the district court as of the date of this opinion should be treated as though the party had moved for primary custody, regardless of the form or title of the document. 13 110 Nev

2005Therefore, we reverse the district court’s order and remand this case so that the district court can determine whether it is in the child’s best interest to live in California with Svetlana as the primary custodian or to live in Nevada with Thomas as the primary physical custodian. 16 Rose, Maupin, Gibbons, Douglas, Hardesty and Parraguirre, JJ., concur. 1 Because the district court applied the wrong statute and standard in evaluating Svetlana’s petition, we do not address the evidence presented, as it has no bearing on the legal issue presented to us. 2 107 Nev. 378 , 812 P.2d 1268 (1991). 3

2005Therefore, we reverse the district court’s order and remand this case so that the district court can determine whether it is in the child’s best interest to live in California with Svetlana as the primary custodian or to live in Nevada with Thomas as the primary physical custodian. 16 Rose, Maupin, Gibbons, Douglas, Hardesty and Parraguirre, JJ., concur. 1 Because the district court applied the wrong statute and standard in evaluating Svetlana’s petition, we do not address the evidence presented, as it has no bearing on the legal issue presented to us. 2 107 Nev. 378 , 812 P.2d 1268 (1991). 3

2005Ct., 120 Nev. 575, 582 , 97 P.3d 1132, 1137 (2004). 8 Blaich v. Blaich, 114 Nev. 1446, 1449 , 971 P.2d 822, 824 (1998). 9 See Hearing on A.B. 544 Before the Senate Comm, on Judiciary, 70th Leg., at 10 (Nev., April 27, 1999). 10 Hearing on A.B. 544 Before the Assembly Comm, on Judiciary, 70th Leg., at 3 (Nev., April 5, 1999). 11 Id. at 3-4. 12 Any undecided petition for relocation in a joint custody case pending before the district court as of the date of this opinion should be treated as though the party had moved for primary custody, regardless of the form or title of the document. 13 110 Nev

2005Ct., 120 Nev. 575, 582 , 97 P.3d 1132, 1137 (2004). 8 Blaich v. Blaich, 114 Nev. 1446, 1449 , 971 P.2d 822, 824 (1998). 9 See Hearing on A.B. 544 Before the Senate Comm, on Judiciary, 70th Leg., at 10 (Nev., April 27, 1999). 10 Hearing on A.B. 544 Before the Assembly Comm, on Judiciary, 70th Leg., at 3 (Nev., April 5, 1999). 11 Id. at 3-4. 12 Any undecided petition for relocation in a joint custody case pending before the district court as of the date of this opinion should be treated as though the party had moved for primary custody, regardless of the form or title of the document. 13 110 Nev

2005Therefore, we reverse the district court’s order and remand this case so that the district court can determine whether it is in the child’s best interest to live in California with Svetlana as the primary custodian or to live in Nevada with Thomas as the primary physical custodian. 16 Rose, Maupin, Gibbons, Douglas, Hardesty and Parraguirre, JJ., concur. 1 Because the district court applied the wrong statute and standard in evaluating Svetlana’s petition, we do not address the evidence presented, as it has no bearing on the legal issue presented to us. 2 107 Nev. 378 , 812 P.2d 1268 (1991). 3

2005Therefore, we reverse the district court’s order and remand this case so that the district court can determine whether it is in the child’s best interest to live in California with Svetlana as the primary custodian or to live in Nevada with Thomas as the primary physical custodian. 16 Rose, Maupin, Gibbons, Douglas, Hardesty and Parraguirre, JJ., concur. 1 Because the district court applied the wrong statute and standard in evaluating Svetlana’s petition, we do not address the evidence presented, as it has no bearing on the legal issue presented to us. 2 107 Nev. 378 , 812 P.2d 1268 (1991). 3

2001Corman, Limitation of Actions § 7.2.1 (1991)); see also Union Sugar Co. v. Hollister Estate Co., 47 P.2d 273, 276 (Cal. 1935). 8 See Clayton v. Gardner, 107 Nev. 468 , 471 n.3, 813 P.2d 997 , 999 n.3 (1991). 9 Because the district court concluded that the six-year statute of limitations had run, it never formally ruled on Ms. Schwartz’s motion to substitute.

2001Corman, Limitation of Actions § 7.2.1 (1991)); see also Union Sugar Co. v. Hollister Estate Co., 47 P.2d 273, 276 (Cal. 1935). 8 See Clayton v. Gardner, 107 Nev. 468 , 471 n.3, 813 P.2d 997 , 999 n.3 (1991). 9 Because the district court concluded that the six-year statute of limitations had run, it never formally ruled on Ms. Schwartz’s motion to substitute.

2001However, the order below unequivocally states: “The Court also finds that if this matter is appealed, and the Nevada Supreme Court disagrees with this Court’s conclusion, then the substitution of [Ms.] Schwartz as Executrix of the Estate of Les Schwartz would relate back under NRCP 15(c) so that she would be the proper party plaintiff.” 10 See Rickards v. Hutchinson, 18 Nev. 215, 223-24 , 4 P. 702 , 702-03 (1884). 11 See Schwartz v. Stock, 26 Nev. 155, 156-57 , 65 P. 357, 357-58 (1901).

2001However, the order below unequivocally states: “The Court also finds that if this matter is appealed, and the Nevada Supreme Court disagrees with this Court’s conclusion, then the substitution of [Ms.] Schwartz as Executrix of the Estate of Les Schwartz would relate back under NRCP 15(c) so that she would be the proper party plaintiff.” 10 See Rickards v. Hutchinson, 18 Nev. 215, 223-24 , 4 P. 702 , 702-03 (1884). 11 See Schwartz v. Stock, 26 Nev. 155, 156-57 , 65 P. 357, 357-58 (1901).

2001Corman, Limitation of Actions § 7.2.1 (1991)); see also Union Sugar Co. v. Hollister Estate Co., 47 P.2d 273, 276 (Cal. 1935). 8 See Clayton v. Gardner, 107 Nev. 468 , 471 n.3, 813 P.2d 997 , 999 n.3 (1991). 9 Because the district court concluded that the six-year statute of limitations had run, it never formally ruled on Ms. Schwartz’s motion to substitute.