Kansas rule in Kansas

1940In Markham v. Waterman, 105 Kan. 93, 95 , 181 Pac. 621 , it was stated: “The old rule that a seemingly unqualified devise in an independent and prior clause of a will cannot be diminished by separate, subsequent clauses of the will (McNutt v. McComb, 61 Kan. 25 , 58 Pac. 965 , 4 Kent, Comm. 270), has been largely superseded by the modern Kansas rule, that the testator’s intention is to be gleaned ‘from the four corners of the instrument’ — from the entire text of the document.” In the Kinkead case the court refused to follow the ruling of the trial court that “the subsequent paragraph has the

1940In Markham v. Waterman, 105 Kan. 93, 95 , 181 Pac. 621 , it was stated: “The old rule that a seemingly unqualified devise in an independent and prior clause of a will cannot be diminished by separate, subsequent clauses of the will (McNutt v. McComb, 61 Kan. 25 , 58 Pac. 965 , 4 Kent, Comm. 270), has been largely superseded by the modern Kansas rule, that the testator’s intention is to be gleaned ‘from the four corners of the instrument’ — from the entire text of the document.” In the Kinkead case the court refused to follow the ruling of the trial court that “the subsequent paragraph has the

1928Some of our earlier cases foreshadow the coming of this doctrine (Williams v. McKinney, 34 Kan. 514, 519 , 9 Pac. 265 ; Ernst v. Foster, 58 Kan. 438 , 47 Pac. 527 ), and this court was fully committed to it in Bullock v. Wiltberger, 92 Kan. 900 , 142 Pac. 950 , and has followed it consistently in all the later cases [citations].” (p. 95.) In Pearson v. Orcutt, 106 Kan. 610, 612 , 189 Pac. 160 , it was said: “The defendants place much reliance upon McNutt v. McComb, 61 Kan. 25 , 58 Pac. 965 . . . .

1924Some of our earlier cases foreshadow the coming of this doctrine (Williams v. McKinney, 34 Kan. 514, 519 , 9 Pac. 265 ; Ernst v. Foster, 58 Kan. 438 , 47 Pac. 527 ), and this court was fully committed to it in Bullock v. Wiltberger, 92 Kan. 900 , 142 Pac. 950 , and has followed it consistently in all the later cases.

1928Some of our earlier cases foreshadow the coming of this doctrine (Williams v. McKinney, 34 Kan. 514, 519 , 9 Pac. 265 ; Ernst v. Foster, 58 Kan. 438 , 47 Pac. 527 ), and this court was fully committed to it in Bullock v. Wiltberger, 92 Kan. 900 , 142 Pac. 950 , and has followed it consistently in all the later cases [citations].” (p. 95.) In Pearson v. Orcutt, 106 Kan. 610, 612 , 189 Pac. 160 , it was said: “The defendants place much reliance upon McNutt v. McComb, 61 Kan. 25 , 58 Pac. 965 . . . .

1924Some of our earlier cases foreshadow the coming of this doctrine (Williams v. McKinney, 34 Kan. 514, 519 , 9 Pac. 265 ; Ernst v. Foster, 58 Kan. 438 , 47 Pac. 527 ), and this court was fully committed to it in Bullock v. Wiltberger, 92 Kan. 900 , 142 Pac. 950 , and has followed it consistently in all the later cases.

1928Some of our earlier cases foreshadow the coming of this doctrine (Williams v. McKinney, 34 Kan. 514, 519 , 9 Pac. 265 ; Ernst v. Foster, 58 Kan. 438 , 47 Pac. 527 ), and this court was fully committed to it in Bullock v. Wiltberger, 92 Kan. 900 , 142 Pac. 950 , and has followed it consistently in all the later cases [citations].” (p. 95.) In Pearson v. Orcutt, 106 Kan. 610, 612 , 189 Pac. 160 , it was said: “The defendants place much reliance upon McNutt v. McComb, 61 Kan. 25 , 58 Pac. 965 . . . .

1928Some of our earlier cases foreshadow the coming of this doctrine (Williams v. McKinney, 34 Kan. 514, 519 , 9 Pac. 265 ; Ernst v. Foster, 58 Kan. 438 , 47 Pac. 527 ), and this court was fully committed to it in Bullock v. Wiltberger, 92 Kan. 900 , 142 Pac. 950 , and has followed it consistently in all the later cases [citations].” (p. 95.) In Pearson v. Orcutt, 106 Kan. 610, 612 , 189 Pac. 160 , it was said: “The defendants place much reliance upon McNutt v. McComb, 61 Kan. 25 , 58 Pac. 965 . . . .

2017But "neither the Kansas Constitution, the Kansas death penalty statutes, nor Kansas case law requires that a defendant's sentence be subjected to a proportionality review which compares the defendant's sentence with those imposed on other Kansas defendants for the same or similar crimes." State v. Kleypas, 272 Kan. 894, 1033 , 40 P.3d 139 (2001) (Kleypas I), cert. denied 537 U.S. 834 (2002), abrogated in part Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163 , 126 S. Ct. 2516 , 165 L.

2016State v. Kleypas, 272 Kan. 894, 1033 , 40 P.3d 139 (2001) (Kleypas I) ("We hold that neither the Kansas Constitution, the Kansas death penalty statutes, nor Kansas case law requires that a defendant's sentence be subjected to a proportionality review which compares the defendant's sentence with those imposed on other Kansas defendants for the same or similar crimes."), cert. denied 537 U.S. 834 (2002), abrogated in part by Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163 , 126 S. Ct. 2516 , 165 L.

2017But "neither the Kansas Constitution, the Kansas death penalty statutes, nor Kansas case law requires that a defendant's sentence be subjected to a proportionality review which compares the defendant's sentence with those imposed on other Kansas defendants for the same or similar crimes." State v. Kleypas, 272 Kan. 894, 1033 , 40 P.3d 139 (2001) (Kleypas I), cert. denied 537 U.S. 834 (2002), abrogated in part Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163 , 126 S. Ct. 2516 , 165 L.

2017But "neither the Kansas Constitution, the Kansas death penalty statutes, nor Kansas case law requires that a defendant's sentence be subjected to a proportionality review which compares the defendant's sentence with those imposed on other Kansas defendants for the same or similar crimes." State v. Kleypas, 272 Kan. 894, 1033 , 40 P.3d 139 (2001) (Kleypas I), cert. denied 537 U.S. 834 (2002), abrogated in part Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163 , 126 S. Ct. 2516 , 165 L.

1999K.S.A. 22-2402(1) provides that "[w]ithout making an arrest, a law enforcement officer may stop any person in a public place whom such officer reasonably suspects is committing, has committed or is about to commit a crime and may demand ... the name [and] address of such suspect and an explanation of such suspect's actions." In Hopper , the court stated that "K.S.A. 22-2402(1), the Kansas stop and frisk statute, is a codification of the Fourth Amendment search and seizure principles expressed in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 20 L.

1999K.S.A. 22-2402(1) provides that "[w]ithout making an arrest, a law enforcement officer may stop any person in a public place whom such officer reasonably suspects is committing, has committed or is about to commit a crime and may demand ... the name [and] address of such suspect and an explanation of such suspect's actions." In Hopper , the court stated that "K.S.A. 22-2402(1), the Kansas stop and frisk statute, is a codification of the Fourth Amendment search and seizure principles expressed in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 20 L.

1940In Markham v. Waterman, 105 Kan. 93, 95 , 181 Pac. 621 , it was stated: “The old rule that a seemingly unqualified devise in an independent and prior clause of a will cannot be diminished by separate, subsequent clauses of the will (McNutt v. McComb, 61 Kan. 25 , 58 Pac. 965 , 4 Kent, Comm. 270), has been largely superseded by the modern Kansas rule, that the testator’s intention is to be gleaned ‘from the four corners of the instrument’ — from the entire text of the document.” In the Kinkead case the court refused to follow the ruling of the trial court that “the subsequent paragraph has the

1940In Markham v. Waterman, 105 Kan. 93, 95 , 181 Pac. 621 , it was stated: “The old rule that a seemingly unqualified devise in an independent and prior clause of a will cannot be diminished by separate, subsequent clauses of the will (McNutt v. McComb, 61 Kan. 25 , 58 Pac. 965 , 4 Kent, Comm. 270), has been largely superseded by the modern Kansas rule, that the testator’s intention is to be gleaned ‘from the four corners of the instrument’ — from the entire text of the document.” In the Kinkead case the court refused to follow the ruling of the trial court that “the subsequent paragraph has the

2018K.S.A 22-2402(1), the Kansas stop and frisk statute is a codification of the Fourth Amendment search and seizure principles expressed in Terry . " State v. Slater , 267 Kan. 694 , 696-97, 986 P.2d 1038 (1999).

2018K.S.A 22-2402(1), the Kansas stop and frisk statute is a codification of the Fourth Amendment search and seizure principles expressed in Terry . " State v. Slater , 267 Kan. 694 , 696-97, 986 P.2d 1038 (1999).

2017But "neither the Kansas Constitution, the Kansas death penalty statutes, nor Kansas case law requires that a defendant's sentence be subjected to a proportionality review which compares the defendant's sentence with those imposed on other Kansas defendants for the same or similar crimes." State v. Kleypas, 272 Kan. 894, 1033 , 40 P.3d 139 (2001) (Kleypas I), cert. denied 537 U.S. 834 (2002), abrogated in part Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163 , 126 S. Ct. 2516 , 165 L.

2017But "neither the Kansas Constitution, the Kansas death penalty statutes, nor Kansas case law requires that a defendant's sentence be subjected to a proportionality review which compares the defendant's sentence with those imposed on other Kansas defendants for the same or similar crimes." State v. Kleypas, 272 Kan. 894, 1033 , 40 P.3d 139 (2001) (Kleypas I), cert. denied 537 U.S. 834 (2002), abrogated in part Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163 , 126 S. Ct. 2516 , 165 L.

2016For example, in [Kleypas I], we explained that, although the language is 'somewhat different' from that used in Chapman, the 'standard is essentially the same.' See also State v. Brown, 280 Kan. 65, 76 , 118 P.3d 1273 (2005) (citing Kleypas [I] for recognition that Kansas' standard, although different from Chapman, was essentially the same).

2016For example, in [Kleypas I], we explained that, although the language is 'somewhat different' from that used in Chapman, the 'standard is essentially the same.' See also State v. Brown, 280 Kan. 65, 76 , 118 P.3d 1273 (2005) (citing Kleypas [I] for recognition that Kansas' standard, although different from Chapman, was essentially the same).

2016Similarly, in State v. Cosby, 285 Kan. 230 , 169 P.3d 1128 (2007), we reiterated that our use of '"little, if any, likelihood of changing the result of the trial"' is equivalent to Chapman's '"willingness to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."' Cosby, 285 Kan. at 252 .

2016Similarly, in State v. Cosby, 285 Kan. 230 , 169 P.3d 1128 (2007), we reiterated that our use of '"little, if any, likelihood of changing the result of the trial"' is equivalent to Chapman's '"willingness to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."' Cosby, 285 Kan. at 252 .

1991(Emphasis added.) See In re Estate of Adair, 237 Kan. 773 , 703 P.2d 793 (1985).

1991(Emphasis added.) See In re Estate of Adair, 237 Kan. 773 , 703 P.2d 793 (1985).

1991Thomas Pickrell and his wife appealed, contending: (1) where there is a conflict between a will and a trust indenture, the will controls and the contrary instructions in the trust indenture are ineffective; (2) the district court’s decision allows the federal estate tax burden to be altered or shifted by an apportionment clause of an inter vivos trust, even though the trust indenture has not been executed with the testamentary requirements or safeguards required for a will; and (3) the district court’s decision is contrary to the Kansas rule that “in the absence of anything in the ioill to the

1991Thomas Pickrell and his wife appealed, contending: (1) where there is a conflict between a will and a trust indenture, the will controls and the contrary instructions in the trust indenture are ineffective; (2) the district court’s decision allows the federal estate tax burden to be altered or shifted by an apportionment clause of an inter vivos trust, even though the trust indenture has not been executed with the testamentary requirements or safeguards required for a will; and (3) the district court’s decision is contrary to the Kansas rule that “in the absence of anything in the ioill to the

1985State v. Crossman, 229 Kan. 384, 389 , 624 P.2d 461 (1981); State v. Nemechek, 223 Kan. 766 , Syl. ¶ 3, 576 P.2d 682 (1978); and State v. Blosser, 221 Kan. 59 , Syl. ¶ 1, 558 P.2d 105 (1976).

1985State v. Crossman, 229 Kan. 384, 389 , 624 P.2d 461 (1981); State v. Nemechek, 223 Kan. 766 , Syl. ¶ 3, 576 P.2d 682 (1978); and State v. Blosser, 221 Kan. 59 , Syl. ¶ 1, 558 P.2d 105 (1976).

1985State v. Crossman, 229 Kan. 384, 389 , 624 P.2d 461 (1981); State v. Nemechek, 223 Kan. 766 , Syl. ¶ 3, 576 P.2d 682 (1978); and State v. Blosser, 221 Kan. 59 , Syl. ¶ 1, 558 P.2d 105 (1976).

1985State v. Crossman, 229 Kan. 384, 389 , 624 P.2d 461 (1981); State v. Nemechek, 223 Kan. 766 , Syl. ¶ 3, 576 P.2d 682 (1978); and State v. Blosser, 221 Kan. 59 , Syl. ¶ 1, 558 P.2d 105 (1976).

1985State v. Crossman, 229 Kan. 384, 389 , 624 P.2d 461 (1981); State v. Nemechek, 223 Kan. 766 , Syl. ¶ 3, 576 P.2d 682 (1978); and State v. Blosser, 221 Kan. 59 , Syl. ¶ 1, 558 P.2d 105 (1976).

1985State v. Crossman, 229 Kan. 384, 389 , 624 P.2d 461 (1981); State v. Nemechek, 223 Kan. 766 , Syl. ¶ 3, 576 P.2d 682 (1978); and State v. Blosser, 221 Kan. 59 , Syl. ¶ 1, 558 P.2d 105 (1976).

1984We stated in Blazer v. Black, 196 F.2d 139 (10th Cir.), that the Kansas rule was somewhat different from that elsewhere prevailing.

1984We stated in Blazer v. Black, 196 F.2d 139 (10th Cir.), that the Kansas rule was somewhat different from that elsewhere prevailing.

1984Proc. § 60-256 (1977 Supp.): “ ‘Although the procedure has seemed to be plain under the Kansas rule with respect to the use of affidavits to support a motion for summary judgment, particularly in the light of the federal precedents, any lingering doubts have now been resolved by the decision in Ebert v. Mussett, 214 K 62, 519 P.2d 687 .

1984Proc. § 60-256 (1977 Supp.): “ ‘Although the procedure has seemed to be plain under the Kansas rule with respect to the use of affidavits to support a motion for summary judgment, particularly in the light of the federal precedents, any lingering doubts have now been resolved by the decision in Ebert v. Mussett, 214 K 62, 519 P.2d 687 .

1928Some of our earlier cases foreshadow the coming of this doctrine (Williams v. McKinney, 34 Kan. 514, 519 , 9 Pac. 265 ; Ernst v. Foster, 58 Kan. 438 , 47 Pac. 527 ), and this court was fully committed to it in Bullock v. Wiltberger, 92 Kan. 900 , 142 Pac. 950 , and has followed it consistently in all the later cases [citations].” (p. 95.) In Pearson v. Orcutt, 106 Kan. 610, 612 , 189 Pac. 160 , it was said: “The defendants place much reliance upon McNutt v. McComb, 61 Kan. 25 , 58 Pac. 965 . . . .

1928Some of our earlier cases foreshadow the coming of this doctrine (Williams v. McKinney, 34 Kan. 514, 519 , 9 Pac. 265 ; Ernst v. Foster, 58 Kan. 438 , 47 Pac. 527 ), and this court was fully committed to it in Bullock v. Wiltberger, 92 Kan. 900 , 142 Pac. 950 , and has followed it consistently in all the later cases [citations].” (p. 95.) In Pearson v. Orcutt, 106 Kan. 610, 612 , 189 Pac. 160 , it was said: “The defendants place much reliance upon McNutt v. McComb, 61 Kan. 25 , 58 Pac. 965 . . . .

2025See, e.g., Tucker, 253 Kan. 373 , Syl. ¶¶ 4-5; Pray, 233 Kan. at 353 .

2025See, e.g., Tucker, 253 Kan. 373 , Syl. ¶¶ 4-5; Pray, 233 Kan. at 353 .

2024State v. Smith: Extension of the Fifth Amendment privilege postsentence In his petition, Hutto focused exclusively on Smith, which was decided in the same year as Mitchell and appeared to extend the Kansas privilege rule "until there is a final judgment in a case and a right to appeal has expired." 268 Kan. at 235 (citing State v. Aldape, 14 Kan.

2024State v. Smith: Extension of the Fifth Amendment privilege postsentence In his petition, Hutto focused exclusively on Smith, which was decided in the same year as Mitchell and appeared to extend the Kansas privilege rule "until there is a final judgment in a case and a right to appeal has expired." 268 Kan. at 235 (citing State v. Aldape, 14 Kan.

2024Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 , 84 S. Ct. 1489 , 12 L.

2024Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 , 84 S. Ct. 1489 , 12 L.

2024See, e.g., State v. George, 311 Kan. 693 , 708, 466 P.3d 469 (2020) (the privilege "'protects any disclosures which the witness may reasonably apprehend could be used in a criminal prosecution or which could lead to other evidence that might so be used'"); Delacruz, 307 Kan. at 534 ("a witness who has no reasonable cause to fear incrimination cannot invoke the right"); Green, 254 Kan. at 679 ("The Fifth Amendment operates only where a witness is asked to incriminate himself or herself; that is, to give testimony which could possibly expose the witness to a criminal charge."); State v. Larry, 2

2024See, e.g., State v. George, 311 Kan. 693 , 708, 466 P.3d 469 (2020) (the privilege "'protects any disclosures which the witness may reasonably apprehend could be used in a criminal prosecution or which could lead to other evidence that might so be used'"); Delacruz, 307 Kan. at 534 ("a witness who has no reasonable cause to fear incrimination cannot invoke the right"); Green, 254 Kan. at 679 ("The Fifth Amendment operates only where a witness is asked to incriminate himself or herself; that is, to give testimony which could possibly expose the witness to a criminal charge."); State v. Larry, 2