egregious conduct exception in Rhode Island

2022Id.; see Georges v. State, 249 A.3d 1261 , 1265, 1266 (R.I. 2021) (noting that “[t]his Court previously has held that government decisions about roadway design, construction, and maintenance constitute discretionary governmental action and therefore fall within the domain of the public duty doctrine” and holding that “repairing potholes * * * is part and parcel of the state’s responsibility for roadway maintenance and falls squarely within the protections of the public duty doctrine”); see also Verity v. Danti, 585 A.2d 65 , 66- 67 (R.I. 1991) (determining that the public duty doctrine and the

2007For the egregious conduct exception to apply, a plaintiff must show the state knows "that it has created a circumstance that *Page 12 forces an individual into a position of peril and subsequently chooses not to remedy the situation." Verity v. Danti , 585 A.2d 65 (R.I. 1991).

2022A trial justice may determine the applicability of the egregious conduct exception as a matter of law only “if the facts are not genuinely disputed[.]” Id. at 926 (brackets omitted) (quoting Kuzniar v. Keach, 709 A.2d 1050, 1056 (R.I. 1998)).

2006Therefore, it is "only after a determination that the activity at issue `could not ordinarily be performed by a private person' does the public-duty doctrine and its two exceptions — the special-duty exception and the egregious-conduct exception — become considerations." Martinelli v. Hopkins, 787 A.2d at 1167 (quoting Haley v. Town of Lincoln, 611 A.2d 845 , 849 (R.I. 1992)).

2003This Court has held that “the public-duty doctrine will not shield a municipality that has engaged in ‘egregious conduct’ where it ‘has knowledge that it has created a circumstance that forces an individual into a position of peril and subsequently chooses not to remedy the situation.’ ” Martinelli v. Hopkins, 787 A.2d 1158, 1168 (R.I.2001) (quoting Kashmanian v. Rongione, 712 A.2d 865, 867 (R.I.1998)).

2001With respect to the egregious conduct exception, “the public-duty doctrine will not shield a municipality that has engaged in ‘egregious conduct’ where it ‘has knowledge that it has created a circumstance that forces an individual into a position of peril and subsequently chooses not to remedy the situation.’” Kashmanian v. Rongione, 712 A.2d 865, 867 (R.I.1998) (quoting Houle, 643 A.2d at 826 ).

2022A trial justice may determine the applicability of the egregious conduct exception as a matter of law only “if the facts are not genuinely disputed[.]” Id. at 926 (brackets omitted) (quoting Kuzniar v. Keach, 709 A.2d 1050, 1056 (R.I. 1998)).

2005When these facts genuinely are in dispute, *926 a determination of the applicability of the egregious conduct exception as a matter of law amounts to the judicial assumption of fact-finding responsibilities that concerned this Court in Kuzniar, 709 A.2d at 1056 .

2010Super. 2006) (quoting Martinelli , 787 A.2d at 1167 ). 3 In O'Brien v. State , 555 A.2d 334 (R.I. 1989), our Supreme Court held that *Page 9 [T]he state as a landowner or an owner of motor vehicles, to mention only two of its activities, performs the identical function that a private person might perform or which a private person might well parallel, and therefore, the duties of the state as landowner or owner or operator of motor vehicles should be the same as that of any private person or corporation as the Legislature has ordained in § 9-31-1 .

2006Therefore, it is "only after a determination that the activity at issue `could not ordinarily be performed by a private person' does the public-duty doctrine and its two exceptions — the special-duty exception and the egregious-conduct exception — become considerations." Martinelli v. Hopkins, 787 A.2d at 1167 (quoting Haley v. Town of Lincoln, 611 A.2d 845 , 849 (R.I. 1992)).

2022I acknowledge that we have stated in Tedesco v. Connors, 871 A.2d 920 (R.I. 2005), that the egregious conduct exception to the public duty doctrine is a “fact- 2 The trial justice specifically stated that “viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, this Court must start with the premise that the City only placed a wooden pallet on top of an otherwise exposed manhole, and without the additional safeguard of a traffic cone or barrel as required by City policy.” She also opined that she was “constrained to view the evidence as if there had been no barrel placed [on

2022I acknowledge that we have stated in Tedesco v. Connors, 871 A.2d 920 (R.I. 2005), that the egregious conduct exception to the public duty doctrine is a “fact- 2 The trial justice specifically stated that “viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, this Court must start with the premise that the City only placed a wooden pallet on top of an otherwise exposed manhole, and without the additional safeguard of a traffic cone or barrel as required by City policy.” She also opined that she was “constrained to view the evidence as if there had been no barrel placed [on

2002In Houle v. Galloway School Lines, Inc., 643 A.2d 822 , 825-26 (R.I. 1994), the Court stated "[o]nly after a determination that the activity at issue could not ordinarily be performed by a private person does the public duty doctrine and its two exceptions — the special duty exception and the egregious conduct exception — become considerations." The aforementioned language suggests that the private/proprietary consideration is more of a threshold issue than an actual exception to the public duty doctrine.

2001Thus, it is “[o]nly after a determination that the activity at issue ‘could not ordinarily be performed by a private person’ does the public-duty doctrine and its two exceptions — the special-duty exception and the egregious-conduct exception — become considerations.’ ” Houle v. Galloway *1168 School Lines, Inc., 643 A.2d 822, 826-26 (R.I.1994) (quoting Haley v. Town of Lincoln, 611 A.2d 845, 849 (R.I.1992)).

2001“When the state engages in an activity that a private individual typically would not perform, such as the maintenance of state highways or the issuance of state drivers’ licenses, the public duty doctrine will shield the state from liability.” Longtin v. D’Ambra Construction Co., 588 A.2d 1044, 1046 (R.I.1991).