psychologist-patient privilege in Arizona

2022In Bain v. Superior Court (Mills), 148 Ariz. 331 (1986), the court wrote: The Arizona statutes relating to the psychologist-patient privilege and the attorney-client privilege are unique by containing express provisions specifying the conduct which will be deemed a waiver of the privilege.

2022And a patient may impliedly waive the psychologist-patient privilege by “pursu[ing] a course of conduct inconsistent with observance of the privilege.” See Bain, 148 Ariz. at 334 .

2020The purposes behind the physician-patient privilege and the psychologist-patient privilege are also similar in that they seek to ensure “that a person requiring professional attention will not be deterred by fear that his physical or mental condition may become public, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment or humiliation.” See Bain, 148 Ariz. at 334 n.1; see also Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10 (1996) (“Effective psychotherapy . . . depends upon an atmosphere of confidence and trust in which the patient is willing to make a frank and complete disclosure of facts, emotions, memories, and fe

2020The purposes behind the physician-patient privilege and the psychologist-patient privilege are also similar in that they seek to ensure “that a person requiring professional attention will not be deterred by fear that his physical or mental condition may become public, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment or humiliation.” See Bain, 148 Ariz. at 334 n.1; see also Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10 (1996) (“Effective psychotherapy . . . depends upon an atmosphere of confidence and trust in which the patient is willing to make a frank and complete disclosure of facts, emotions, memories, and fe

2022Cf. Clements v. Bernini, 249 Ariz. 434, 438, ¶ 1 (2020) (recognizing that attorney-client privilege is waived if the record has reasonable evidence to support a good faith belief that an exception to the privilege applies). ¶31 For starters, Father provided no transcripts of either evidentiary hearing, leaving an unknown chasm of evidence.

2022To this end, the majority cites Hays v. Gama, 205 Ariz. 99, 102, ¶ 18 (2003) and Kelly v. Kelly, 252 Ariz. 371, 375, ¶ 18 (App. 2021).

2022If such were the law, no psychiatrist could ever assure his patient of confidentiality.” Roper v. Roper, 336 So.2d 654, 656 (Fla. App. 1976). ¶27 Even so, we cannot deny the tension between Arizona child custody laws, which hinge on a child’s best interest, and a parent’s privacy interest under the psychologist-patient privilege.

2007No. 501, 74 Wash.App. 49 , 871 P.2d 1106, 1115 (1994) (holding that records of student’s evaluation by school psychologist were not subject to the psychologist-patient privilege because the student and his mother did not expect the communications to remain confidential and because “the purpose of the interview was to ... assess[ ] [the student’s] need for special education services,” not “for the purpose of treatment or counseling”). ¶ 15 Accordingly, we hold that special education records are not protected in their entirety by the medical records privilege.

2007No. 501, 74 Wash.App. 49 , 871 P.2d 1106, 1115 (1994) (holding that records of student’s evaluation by school psychologist were not subject to the psychologist-patient privilege because the student and his mother did not expect the communications to remain confidential and because “the purpose of the interview was to ... assess[ ] [the student’s] need for special education services,” not “for the purpose of treatment or counseling”). ¶ 15 Accordingly, we hold that special education records are not protected in their entirety by the medical records privilege.

1989State v. Stotts, 144 Ariz. 72, 86 , 695 P.2d 1110, 1124 (1985); State v. Santeyan, 136 Ariz. 108, 110 , 664 P.2d 652, 654 (1983).

1989State v. Stotts, 144 Ariz. 72, 86 , 695 P.2d 1110, 1124 (1985); State v. Santeyan, 136 Ariz. 108, 110 , 664 P.2d 652, 654 (1983).

1989State v. Stotts, 144 Ariz. 72, 86 , 695 P.2d 1110, 1124 (1985); State v. Santeyan, 136 Ariz. 108, 110 , 664 P.2d 652, 654 (1983).

1989State v. Stotts, 144 Ariz. 72, 86 , 695 P.2d 1110, 1124 (1985); State v. Santeyan, 136 Ariz. 108, 110 , 664 P.2d 652, 654 (1983).

1986In the case of the attorney-client privilege, the conduct constituting consent to disclosure and thereby waiver of the privilege is defined as “offering] himself as a witness and voluntarily testifying] with reference to the [privileged] communications.” A.R.S. § 12-2236; Tripp v. Chubb, 69 Ariz. 31, 35 , 208 P.2d 312, 314 (1949).

1986In the case of the attorney-client privilege, the conduct constituting consent to disclosure and thereby waiver of the privilege is defined as “offering] himself as a witness and voluntarily testifying] with reference to the [privileged] communications.” A.R.S. § 12-2236; Tripp v. Chubb, 69 Ariz. 31, 35 , 208 P.2d 312, 314 (1949).

1985See State v: Nowlin, 244 N.W.2d 596, 602-603 (Iowa 1976) (doctor who examined defendant at defendant’s request was allowed to express an opinion on the defendant’s sanity despite contention that physician-patient privilege existed).