homicide rule in Florida

2025The court ruled that "no double jeopardy violation occurred and therefore [Glaubius]'s plea was not involuntary." Section 775.021(4)(a), Florida Statutes (2021), which codifies the Blockburger2 test, states that "offenses are separate if each offense requires proof of an element that the other does not." A person who, "in the course of one criminal transaction or episode, commits an act or acts which constitute one or more separate criminal offenses, upon conviction 1 See Houser v. State, 474 So. 2d 1193, 1197 (Fla. 1985) (establishing the single homicide rule which prohibits dual convictions

2024The single homicide rule was first established in Houser v. State, 474 So. 2d 1193 (Fla. 1985).

2021Appellant relied on McCullough v. State, 230 So. 3d 586 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017), where the Second District found that the defendant’s convictions for vehicular homicide and fleeing or attempting to elude an officer causing serious bodily injury or death violated the single homicide rule.

2021The elements of each crime cannot merge with one another because one requires the intent to commit premeditated murder without killing the victim and the other does not require intent but does require killing the victim. §§ 777.04, 782.04(1)(a)(1), 782.07, Fla. Stat. The doctrine simply does not apply. • Single Homicide Rule The single homicide rule is “a judicially created extension of the constitutional and statutory double jeopardy bar.” McCullough, 230 So. 3d at 589 .

2018The single homicide rule "is based on notions of fundamental fairness which recognize the inequity that inheres in multiple punishments for a singular killing." Gordon v. State , 780 So.2d 17 , 25 (Fla. 2001), receded from on other grounds by Valdes v. State , 3 So.3d 1067 (Fla. 2009). "[P]hysical injury and physical injury causing death, merge into one and it is rationally defensible to conclude that the legislature did not intend to impose cumulative punishments." Id. (quoting Carawan v. State , 515 So.2d 161 , 173 (Fla. 1987) (Shaw, J., dissenting) ).

2018The single homicide rule "is based on notions of fundamental fairness which recognize the inequity that inheres in multiple punishments for a singular killing." Gordon v. State , 780 So.2d 17 , 25 (Fla. 2001), receded from on other grounds by Valdes v. State , 3 So.3d 1067 (Fla. 2009). "[P]hysical injury and physical injury causing death, merge into one and it is rationally defensible to conclude that the legislature did not intend to impose cumulative punishments." Id. (quoting Carawan v. State , 515 So.2d 161 , 173 (Fla. 1987) (Shaw, J., dissenting) ).

2020Specifically, the Second District noted that this Court’s decision in State v. Cooper, 634 So. 2d 1074 (Fla. 1994), which held that a defendant could not be convicted of both DUI manslaughter and DWLS enhanced for causing death under the single homicide rule, was indistinguishable from the present case and concluded that Marsh’s dual convictions were similarly prohibited.

2019See Cooper, 634 So. 2d at 1074-75 (holding that a defendant convicted of DUI manslaughter may not also be convicted of driving with a suspended license and carelessly or negligently causing death, but he may also be convicted of a lesser included offense of the latter crime); Linton v. State, 212 So. 3d 1100, 1103 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017) (vacating defendant’s first-degree fleeing or eluding conviction under the single homicide rule where the defendant was also convicted of felony murder and remanding for entry of a judgment convicting 3 We recognize that in McKinney v. State, 51 So. 3d 645 (Fla. 1

2021STATE, 474 SO. 2D 1193 (FLA. 1985), PRECLUDE SEPARATE CONVICTIONS OF VEHICULAR HOMICIDE AND FLEEING AND ELUDING CAUSING SERIOUS INJURY OR DEATH THAT INVOLVE THE SAME VICTIM? 1In Houser, the supreme court formally adopted the single homicide rule. 474 So. 2d at 1197 . 2 In Chapman, the supreme court determined that the 1988 amendment to section 775.021, Florida Statutes, did not supersede Houser and that the single homicide rule was still the law in Florida. 625 So. 2d at 839 . 3 Id. at *1.

2020ANALYSIS Because the statutory language of section 775.021, Florida Statutes (2010), clearly states the intent of the Legislature to punish each available offense and does not provide an exception for offenses arising from a single death, we conclude that section 775.021 supersedes our decisions establishing the single homicide rule and that our decision holding otherwise, State v. Chapman, 625 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 1993), -3- was wrongly decided. 2 Accordingly, we recede from Chapman, answer the certified question in the negative, and quash the Fifth District’s decision in Maisonet-Maldonado.

2019See Cooper, 634 So. 2d at 1074-75 (holding that a defendant convicted of DUI manslaughter may not also be convicted of driving with a suspended license and carelessly or negligently causing death, but he may also be convicted of a lesser included offense of the latter crime); Linton v. State, 212 So. 3d 1100, 1103 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017) (vacating defendant’s first-degree fleeing or eluding conviction under the single homicide rule where the defendant was also convicted of felony murder and remanding for entry of a judgment convicting 3 We recognize that in McKinney v. State, 51 So. 3d 645 (Fla. 1

2017Florida courts have repeatedly recognized that the legislature did not intend to punish a single homicide under two different statutes.”); Linton v. State, 212 So.3d 1100 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017) (holding that convictions for fleeing or eluding a law enforcement officer causing serious bodily injury or death and driving without a valid license causing serious bodily injury or death violate the single homicide rule where they were based on the same homicide); Ivey v. State, 47 So.3d 908, 911 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010) (reaffirming “the well-settled principle that a single death cannot give rise to dual homi

2018In Cooper, the supreme court applied the single homicide rule to hold that dual convictions for DUI manslaughter and DWLS causing death violate double jeopardy when there is only a single death. 634 So. 2d at 1075.

2018In Cooper , the supreme court applied the single homicide rule to hold that dual convictions for DUI manslaughter and DWLS causing death violate double jeopardy when there is only a single death. 634 So.2d at 1075.

2018We agree with Mr. Martinez that his convictions for counts one and two violate Florida's "single homicide rule." See McCullough v. State, 230 So. 3d 586, 589 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) ("[The single homicide rule] provides that although a defendant can be charged and convicted under multiple criminal statutes for conduct causing another's death during one criminal episode, that criminal defendant can only be punished once for that death." (citing State v. Cooper, 634 So. 2d 1074, 1074-75 (Fla. 1994); Houser v. State, 474 So. 2d 1193, 1197 (Fla. 1985); Rodriguez v. State, 875 So. 2d 642, 645 (Fla. 2d D

2017See State v. Chapman, 625 So.2d 838, 839-40 (Fla. 1993) (explaining that the.legislature’s codification of the Blockburger test did not affect its jurisprudence on the single homicide rule, holding that sentences for both DUI manslaughter and vehicular homicide violated the single homicide rule, and determining that section 775.021(4) did not abrogate Houser); Rodriguez, 875 So.2d at 645 (explaining that the single homicide “rule retains viability today”); Ivey v. State, 47 So.3d 908, 911 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010) (“Although the defendant’s criminal charges stem from two separate statutes, as stated

2021The state relied on McKinney v. State, 51 So. 3d 645 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011), and argued that fleeing or attempting to elude an officer causing serious bodily injury or death is a non-homicide offense, and therefore, it could not be a crime that violated the single homicide rule.

2020The state relied on McKinney v. State, 51 So. 3d 645 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011), and argued that fleeing or attempting to elude an officer causing serious bodily injury or death is a non-homicide offense, and therefore, it could not be a crime that violated the single homicide rule.

2025The court ruled that "no double jeopardy violation occurred and therefore [Glaubius]'s plea was not involuntary." Section 775.021(4)(a), Florida Statutes (2021), which codifies the Blockburger2 test, states that "offenses are separate if each offense requires proof of an element that the other does not." A person who, "in the course of one criminal transaction or episode, commits an act or acts which constitute one or more separate criminal offenses, upon conviction 1 See Houser v. State, 474 So. 2d 1193, 1197 (Fla. 1985) (establishing the single homicide rule which prohibits dual convictions

2020The Second District concluded that this Court’s precedents made clear that the single homicide rule “applies even in circumstances where the double jeopardy analysis set forth in -2- Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932), may not grant relief.” Marsh, 253 So. 3d at 676-77 .

2018The single homicide rule "is based on notions of fundamental fairness which recognize the inequity that inheres in multiple punishments for a singular killing." Gordon v. State, 780 So. 2d 17, 25 (Fla. 2001), receded from on other grounds by Valdes v. State, 3 So. 3d 1067 (Fla. 2009). "[P]hysical injury and physical injury causing death, merge into one and it is rationally defensible to conclude that the legislature did not intend to impose cumulative punishments." Id. (quoting Carawan v. State, 515 So. 2d 161, 173 (Fla. 1987) (Shaw, J., dissenting)).

2018The single homicide rule "is based on notions of fundamental fairness which recognize the inequity that inheres in multiple punishments for a singular killing." Gordon v. State , 780 So.2d 17 , 25 (Fla. 2001), receded from on other grounds by Valdes v. State , 3 So.3d 1067 (Fla. 2009). "[P]hysical injury and physical injury causing death, merge into one and it is rationally defensible to conclude that the legislature did not intend to impose cumulative punishments." Id. (quoting Carawan v. State , 515 So.2d 161 , 173 (Fla. 1987) (Shaw, J., dissenting) ).

2019We agree with this argument based on Crusaw v. State, 195 So. 3d 422 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016), in which we held that the single homicide rule precludes dual convictions for vehicular homicide and careless driving causing death or great bodily injury where both offenses involved the same victim. 3 Accord McCullough v. State, 230 So. 3d 586, 593 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) (holding that the single homicide rule bars dual convictions for vehicular homicide and fleeing or eluding when the offenses involve the same victim).

2017See, e.g., Crusaw v. State, 195 So.3d 422, 422 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (holding that convictions for vehicular homicide and careless driving with a suspended license causing death or great bodily injury violated the single homicide rule when “[tjhe information listed the same victim for both crimes”); Linton, 212 So.3d at 1102-03 .

2018The single homicide rule "is based on notions of fundamental fairness which recognize the inequity that inheres in multiple punishments for a singular killing." Gordon v. State, 780 So. 2d 17, 25 (Fla. 2001), receded from on other grounds by Valdes v. State, 3 So. 3d 1067 (Fla. 2009). "[P]hysical injury and physical injury causing death, merge into one and it is rationally defensible to conclude that the legislature did not intend to impose cumulative punishments." Id. (quoting Carawan v. State, 515 So. 2d 161, 173 (Fla. 1987) (Shaw, J., dissenting)).

2018The single homicide rule "is based on notions of fundamental fairness which recognize the inequity that inheres in multiple punishments for a singular killing." Gordon v. State , 780 So.2d 17 , 25 (Fla. 2001), receded from on other grounds by Valdes v. State , 3 So.3d 1067 (Fla. 2009). "[P]hysical injury and physical injury causing death, merge into one and it is rationally defensible to conclude that the legislature did not intend to impose cumulative punishments." Id. (quoting Carawan v. State , 515 So.2d 161 , 173 (Fla. 1987) (Shaw, J., dissenting) ).

2024Moreover, in Martone v. State, 921 So. 2d 879, 880 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006), we “question[ed] the continued viability of Hooper and Carinda, based on” Rogers, 532 U.S. 451 , but based on our above analysis, we need not reach that question here.

2021The State responds the convictions and sentences do not violate double jeopardy, the merger doctrine, or the single homicide rule because the charges had separate essential elements and attempted murder is not a homicide crime. • Double Jeopardy “Determining whether double jeopardy is violated based on undisputed facts is a purely legal determination, so the standard of review is de novo.” Finkley v. State, 16 So. 3d 329, 329 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (quoting Binns v. State, 979 So. 2d 439, 441 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008)).

2021The State responds the convictions and sentences do not violate double jeopardy, the merger doctrine, or the single homicide rule because the charges had separate essential elements and attempted murder is not a homicide crime. • Double Jeopardy “Determining whether double jeopardy is violated based on undisputed facts is a purely legal determination, so the standard of review is de novo.” Finkley v. State, 16 So. 3d 329, 329 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (quoting Binns v. State, 979 So. 2d 439, 441 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008)).

2021The State responds the convictions and sentences do not violate double jeopardy, the merger doctrine, or the single homicide rule because the charges had separate essential elements and attempted murder is not a homicide crime. • Double Jeopardy “Determining whether double jeopardy is violated based on undisputed facts is a purely legal determination, so the standard of review is de novo.” Finkley v. State, 16 So. 3d 329, 329 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (quoting Binns v. State, 979 So. 2d 439, 441 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008)).

2021The State responds the convictions and sentences do not violate double jeopardy, the merger doctrine, or the single homicide rule because the charges had separate essential elements and attempted murder is not a homicide crime. • Double Jeopardy “Determining whether double jeopardy is violated based on undisputed facts is a purely legal determination, so the standard of review is de novo.” Finkley v. State, 16 So. 3d 329, 329 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (quoting Binns v. State, 979 So. 2d 439, 441 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008)).

2020See Thomas v. State, 837 So. 2d 443, 447 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); Pierce v. State, 718 So. 2d 806, 810 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997).

2020See Thomas v. State, 837 So. 2d 443, 447 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); Pierce v. State, 718 So. 2d 806, 810 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997).

2020Relying on its decision in Kelly v. State, 987 So. 2d 1237, 1238 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008), the Second District held that Marsh’s convictions violated the single homicide rule, which prohibited multiple convictions arising from a single killing.

2020A. Double Jeopardy Principles and the Single Homicide Rule “As this Court has explained, both the United States and Florida Constitutions contain double jeopardy clauses that ‘prohibit[ ] subjecting a person to multiple prosecutions, convictions, and punishments for the same criminal offense.’ ” State v. Shelley, 176 So. 3d 914, 917 (Fla. 2015) (alteration in original) (quoting Valdes v. State, 3 So. 3d 1067, 1069 (Fla. 2009)).

2018We agree with Mr. Martinez that his convictions for counts one and two violate Florida's "single homicide rule." See McCullough v. State, 230 So. 3d 586, 589 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) ("[The single homicide rule] provides that although a defendant can be charged and convicted under multiple criminal statutes for conduct causing another's death during one criminal episode, that criminal defendant can only be punished once for that death." (citing State v. Cooper, 634 So. 2d 1074, 1074-75 (Fla. 1994); Houser v. State, 474 So. 2d 1193, 1197 (Fla. 1985); Rodriguez v. State, 875 So. 2d 642, 645 (Fla. 2d D

2017See State v. Chapman, 625 So.2d 838, 839-40 (Fla. 1993) (explaining that the.legislature’s codification of the Blockburger test did not affect its jurisprudence on the single homicide rule, holding that sentences for both DUI manslaughter and vehicular homicide violated the single homicide rule, and determining that section 775.021(4) did not abrogate Houser); Rodriguez, 875 So.2d at 645 (explaining that the single homicide “rule retains viability today”); Ivey v. State, 47 So.3d 908, 911 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010) (“Although the defendant’s criminal charges stem from two separate statutes, as stated

2017Florida courts have repeatedly recognized that the legislature did not intend to punish a single homicide under two different statutes.”); Linton v. State, 212 So.3d 1100 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017) (holding that convictions for fleeing or eluding a law enforcement officer causing serious bodily injury or death and driving without a valid license causing serious bodily injury or death violate the single homicide rule where they were based on the same homicide); Ivey v. State, 47 So.3d 908, 911 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010) (reaffirming “the well-settled principle that a single death cannot give rise to dual homi

2017See Phillips v. State, 289 So.2d 769, 770-71 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974) (reversing manslaughter by culpable negligence conviction because defendant was also convicted and sentenced for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, stating “[i]n any case, only one judgment and sentence is appropriate”); Carr v. State, 338 So.2d 267, 267 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976) (“[Ajppellant could be adjudged guilty of only the one manslaughter which the jury found he committed by both of the two means specified.”); Stewart v. State, 184 So.2d 489, 491 (Fla. 4th DCA 1966) (“[T]he jury found the defendant guilty in one count

2017See Phillips v. State, 289 So. 2d 769, 770-71 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974) (reversing manslaughter by culpable negligence conviction because defendant was also convicted and sentenced for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, stating "[i]n any case, only one judgment and sentence is appropriate"); Carr v. State, 338 So. 2d 267, 267 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976) ("[A]ppellant could be adjudged guilty of only the one manslaughter which the jury found he committed by both of the two means specified."); Stewart v. State, 184 So. 2d 489, 491 (Fla. 4th DCA 1966) ("[T]he jury found the defendant guilty in one cou

2017See Phillips v. State, 289 So.2d 769, 770-71 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974) (reversing manslaughter by culpable negligence conviction because defendant was also convicted and sentenced for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, stating “[i]n any case, only one judgment and sentence is appropriate”); Carr v. State, 338 So.2d 267, 267 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976) (“[Ajppellant could be adjudged guilty of only the one manslaughter which the jury found he committed by both of the two means specified.”); Stewart v. State, 184 So.2d 489, 491 (Fla. 4th DCA 1966) (“[T]he jury found the defendant guilty in one count

2017See Phillips v. State, 289 So. 2d 769, 770-71 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974) (reversing manslaughter by culpable negligence conviction because defendant was also convicted and sentenced for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, stating "[i]n any case, only one judgment and sentence is appropriate"); Carr v. State, 338 So. 2d 267, 267 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976) ("[A]ppellant could be adjudged guilty of only the one manslaughter which the jury found he committed by both of the two means specified."); Stewart v. State, 184 So. 2d 489, 491 (Fla. 4th DCA 1966) ("[T]he jury found the defendant guilty in one cou

2017See Chapman, 625 So.2d at 839-40 ; Rodriguez, 875 So.2d at 644 -45 (citing Lawrence v. State, 801 So.2d 293, 294-95 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (en banc)).

2017See Lawrence, 801 So. 2d at 295 (affirming convictions for DUI manslaughter and leaving the scene of a crash with death under the single homicide rule and reasoning that "although the offense of leaving the scene of an accident involving death requires a showing that the defendant was involved in an accident resulting in death, it does not require a showing that the defendant actually caused the death").

2017I write to discuss the proper application of the Blockburger test as set forth in section 775.021(4). - 16 - Under Blockburger, "[a] defendant is placed in double jeopardy where based upon the same conduct the defendant is convicted of two offenses, each of which does not require proof of a different element." Pizzo v. State, 945 So. 2d 1203, 1206 (Fla. 2006).