15 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1987–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Lupoe v. Stategreen2 sentences2019See, e.g., Lupoe v. State , 284 Ga. 576 , 577, n.2, 669 S.E.2d 133 (2008) (a claim of insufficient evidence to support a conviction that has been merged into another conviction is moot). 2. 2019See, e.g., Lupoe v. State , 284 Ga. 576 , 577, n.2, 669 S.E.2d 133 (2008) (a claim of insufficient evidence to support a conviction that has been merged into another conviction is moot). 2. | 2 | 2 |
Reilly v. Alcan Aluminum Corp.green2 sentences2017See Reilly v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 272 Ga. 279 (1) ( 528 SE2d 238 ) (2000); Jellico v. Effingham County, 221 Ga. App. 252, 253 ( 471 SE2d 36 ) (1996). 2017See Reilly v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 272 Ga. 279 (1) ( 528 SE2d 238 ) (2000); Jellico v. Effingham County, 221 Ga. App. 252, 253 ( 471 SE2d 36 ) (1996). | 2 | 2 |
Jellico v. Effingham Countygreen2 sentences2017See Reilly v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 272 Ga. 279 (1) ( 528 SE2d 238 ) (2000); Jellico v. Effingham County, 221 Ga. App. 252, 253 ( 471 SE2d 36 ) (1996). 2017See Reilly v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 272 Ga. 279 (1) ( 528 SE2d 238 ) (2000); Jellico v. Effingham County, 221 Ga. App. 252, 253 ( 471 SE2d 36 ) (1996). | 2 | 2 |
Katz v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2026See Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 358-359 ( 88 SCt 507 , 19 LE2d 576) (1967) (establishing reasonable expectation of privacy test). 2026See Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 358-359 ( 88 SCt 507 , 19 LE2d 576) (1967) (establishing reasonable expectation of privacy test). | 1 | 1 |
Braithwaite v. Stategreen1 sentence2023Braithwaite, 275 Ga. at 885 (2) (b). | 1 | 1 |
Ellis v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2022OCGA § 9-11-24 (c) requires, inter alia, that a motion to intervene “shall state the grounds therefor and shall be accompanied by a pleading setting forth the claim or defense for which intervention is sought.”7 The motion itself does not constitute the pleading that must accompany the motion to intervene.8 7 OCGA § 9-11-24 (c) (emphasis supplied). 8 Ellis v. Johnson, 291 Ga. 127, 133 (5) ( 728 SE2d 200 ) (2012) (holding that, in a case where any objection to the intervenor’s standing had been waived, the motion to intervene was not a “pleading” triggering the deadline for a jury trial demand) 2022OCGA § 9-11-24 (c) requires, inter alia, that a motion to intervene “shall state the grounds therefor and shall be accompanied by a pleading setting forth the claim or defense for which intervention is sought.”7 The motion itself does not constitute the pleading that must accompany the motion to intervene.8 7 OCGA § 9-11-24 (c) (emphasis supplied). 8 Ellis v. Johnson, 291 Ga. 127, 133 (5) ( 728 SE2d 200 ) (2012) (holding that, in a case where any objection to the intervenor’s standing had been waived, the motion to intervene was not a “pleading” triggering the deadline for a jury trial demand) | 1 | 1 |
Cameron v. Mooregreen2 sentences2022Thus, the trial court abused its discretion in finding 12 But see Fitzpatrick v. Harrison, 300 Ga. App. 672 , 673 n. 1 ( 686 SE2d 322 ) (2009) (“[B]efore a trial court may take judicial notice of any fact, it must first announce its intention to do so on the record, and afford the parties an opportunity to be heard regarding whether judicial notice should be taken.”) (citation and punctuation omitted). 13 See generally Cameron v. Moore, 199 Ga. App. 800, 802 (2) ( 406 SE2d 133 ) (1991) (“A solemn admission in judicio is conclusive as a matter of law on the matter stated and cannot be contradic 2022Thus, the trial court abused its discretion in finding 12 But see Fitzpatrick v. Harrison, 300 Ga. App. 672 , 673 n. 1 ( 686 SE2d 322 ) (2009) (“[B]efore a trial court may take judicial notice of any fact, it must first announce its intention to do so on the record, and afford the parties an opportunity to be heard regarding whether judicial notice should be taken.”) (citation and punctuation omitted). 13 See generally Cameron v. Moore, 199 Ga. App. 800, 802 (2) ( 406 SE2d 133 ) (1991) (“A solemn admission in judicio is conclusive as a matter of law on the matter stated and cannot be contradic | 1 | 1 |
Baker v. Lankfordgreen2 sentences2022In response, 2 See OCGA § 53-2-1 (c) (2), (5), (7). 3 OCGA § 9-11-24 (a), (b). 4 Kroger v. Taylor, 320 Ga. App. 298 ( 739 SE2d 767 ) (2013). 5 In the Interest of Baby Girl N., 362 Ga. App. 253 , 254 (1) ( 867 SE2d 853 ) (2022) (motion for permissive intervention); Baker v. Lankford, 306 Ga. App. 327, 328 (1) ( 702 SE2d 666 ) (2010) (motion to intervene as of right). 6 In re Haney, 355 Ga. App. 658 ( 845 SE2d 380 ) (2020). 3 the Petitioners and Respondents (collectively, the “Appellees”) contend, inter alia, that the trial court properly denied West’s motion because he failed to meet the requir 2022In response, 2 See OCGA § 53-2-1 (c) (2), (5), (7). 3 OCGA § 9-11-24 (a), (b). 4 Kroger v. Taylor, 320 Ga. App. 298 ( 739 SE2d 767 ) (2013). 5 In the Interest of Baby Girl N., 362 Ga. App. 253 , 254 (1) ( 867 SE2d 853 ) (2022) (motion for permissive intervention); Baker v. Lankford, 306 Ga. App. 327, 328 (1) ( 702 SE2d 666 ) (2010) (motion to intervene as of right). 6 In re Haney, 355 Ga. App. 658 ( 845 SE2d 380 ) (2020). 3 the Petitioners and Respondents (collectively, the “Appellees”) contend, inter alia, that the trial court properly denied West’s motion because he failed to meet the requir | 1 | 1 |
Fitzpatrick v. Harrisongreen2 sentences2022Thus, the trial court abused its discretion in finding 12 But see Fitzpatrick v. Harrison, 300 Ga. App. 672 , 673 n. 1 ( 686 SE2d 322 ) (2009) (“[B]efore a trial court may take judicial notice of any fact, it must first announce its intention to do so on the record, and afford the parties an opportunity to be heard regarding whether judicial notice should be taken.”) (citation and punctuation omitted). 13 See generally Cameron v. Moore, 199 Ga. App. 800, 802 (2) ( 406 SE2d 133 ) (1991) (“A solemn admission in judicio is conclusive as a matter of law on the matter stated and cannot be contradic 2022Thus, the trial court abused its discretion in finding 12 But see Fitzpatrick v. Harrison, 300 Ga. App. 672 , 673 n. 1 ( 686 SE2d 322 ) (2009) (“[B]efore a trial court may take judicial notice of any fact, it must first announce its intention to do so on the record, and afford the parties an opportunity to be heard regarding whether judicial notice should be taken.”) (citation and punctuation omitted). 13 See generally Cameron v. Moore, 199 Ga. App. 800, 802 (2) ( 406 SE2d 133 ) (1991) (“A solemn admission in judicio is conclusive as a matter of law on the matter stated and cannot be contradic | 1 | 1 |
Sharpe v. Mathewsgreen2 sentences2016West appeals the partial denial of its motion. grantor.”); Sharpe v. Mathews, 123 Ga. 794, 797-798 (2) ( 51 SE 706 ) (1905) (The relation of landlord and tenant arises when a party occupies the land or premises of another in subordination to the other’s title and with his assent, express or implied.). 8 NW Parkway’s reliance on American Med. 2016West appeals the partial denial of its motion. grantor.”); Sharpe v. Mathews, 123 Ga. 794, 797-798 (2) ( 51 SE 706 ) (1905) (The relation of landlord and tenant arises when a party occupies the land or premises of another in subordination to the other’s title and with his assent, express or implied.). 8 NW Parkway’s reliance on American Med. | 1 | 1 |
Georgia Dermatologic Surgery Centers, P.C. v. Pharisgreen2 sentences2016Georgia Dermatologic Surgery Centers, P.C. v. Pharis, 323 Ga. App. at 184 (3); Hewitt Assocs., LLC v. Rollins, Inc., 308 Ga. App. at 853 (3). 6. 2016Georgia Dermatologic Surgery Centers, P.C. v. Pharis, 323 Ga. App. at 184 (3); Hewitt Assocs., LLC v. Rollins, Inc., 308 Ga. App. at 853 (3). 6. | 1 | 1 |
HEWITT ASSOCIATES, LLC v. Rollins, Inc.green2 sentences2016Georgia Dermatologic Surgery Centers, P.C. v. Pharis, 323 Ga. App. at 184 (3); Hewitt Assocs., LLC v. Rollins, Inc., 308 Ga. App. at 853 (3). 6. 2016Georgia Dermatologic Surgery Centers, P.C. v. Pharis, 323 Ga. App. at 184 (3); Hewitt Assocs., LLC v. Rollins, Inc., 308 Ga. App. at 853 (3). 6. | 1 | 1 |
McKiernan v. Stategreen2 sentences2011See also McKiernan v. State, 286 Ga. 756, 757 ( 692 SE2d 340 ) (2010) (“[T]he trial court loses jurisdiction if the motion to withdraw the plea is not made within the term in which the plea is entered and the defendant sentenced.”). 2 Here, West pled guilty and was sentenced during the trial court’s August 2009 term of court. 3 That term had expired before West filed his motion to withdraw his guilty plea on August 3, 2010. 2011See also McKiernan v. State, 286 Ga. 756, 757 ( 692 SE2d 340 ) (2010) (“[T]he trial court loses jurisdiction if the motion to withdraw the plea is not made within the term in which the plea is entered and the defendant sentenced.”). 2 Here, West pled guilty and was sentenced during the trial court’s August 2009 term of court. 3 That term had expired before West filed his motion to withdraw his guilty plea on August 3, 2010. | 1 | 1 |
Paige v. Jurgensengreen2 sentences2011Accord Paige v. Jurgensen, 204 Ga. App. 524, 525 (1) ( 419 SE2d 722 ) (1992). 14 (Emphasis supplied.) 15 West’s claim for conversion of accounts receivable and her claim for assault and battery and punitive damages thereon are no longer pending and will not be heard at the retrial of this case. 2011Accord Paige v. Jurgensen, 204 Ga. App. 524, 525 (1) ( 419 SE2d 722 ) (1992). 14 (Emphasis supplied.) 15 West’s claim for conversion of accounts receivable and her claim for assault and battery and punitive damages thereon are no longer pending and will not be heard at the retrial of this case. | 1 | 1 |
MAGISTRATE COURT DEKALB COUNTY v. Fleminggreen1 sentence2008Harris v. State, 284 Ga. at 457. | 1 | 1 |
Byers v. Caldwellgreen2 sentences2007Slone and Ebron objected to West’s motion, and “a timely objection to the motion is sufficient to preclude a waiver.” MacDonald v. Harris, 266 Ga. App. 287, 288 ( 597 SE2d 125 ) (2004). 15 Green v. McCart, 273 Ga. 862, 863 (1) ( 548 SE2d 303 ) (2001). 16 See id.; Smith v. Hardeman, 281 Ga. App. 402, 406 (2) ( 636 SE2d 106 ) (2006). 17 See Byers v. Caldwell, 273 Ga. 228, 229 ( 539 SE2d 141 ) (2000) (“[construction of a judgment requires consideration of the entirety of its provisions”). 18 See Munoz v. American Lawyer Media, 236 Ga. App. 462, 465 (2) ( 512 SE2d 347 ) (1999). 19 We note that Slo 2007Slone and Ebron objected to West’s motion, and “a timely objection to the motion is sufficient to preclude a waiver.” MacDonald v. Harris, 266 Ga. App. 287, 288 ( 597 SE2d 125 ) (2004). 15 Green v. McCart, 273 Ga. 862, 863 (1) ( 548 SE2d 303 ) (2001). 16 See id.; Smith v. Hardeman, 281 Ga. App. 402, 406 (2) ( 636 SE2d 106 ) (2006). 17 See Byers v. Caldwell, 273 Ga. 228, 229 ( 539 SE2d 141 ) (2000) (“[construction of a judgment requires consideration of the entirety of its provisions”). 18 See Munoz v. American Lawyer Media, 236 Ga. App. 462, 465 (2) ( 512 SE2d 347 ) (1999). 19 We note that Slo | 1 | 1 |
Bullock v. Sandgreen2 sentences2007Blackburn, P. J., and Bernes, J., concur. 1 In January 2006, Slone and Ebron had served a “Motion to Amend Counterclaims” on West, characterizing him as a “counter-defendant.” 2 West’s motion to dismiss was granted on November 27, 2006 and the remaining defendants were dismissed on December 5, 2006. 3 See OCGA §5-6-35 (a)(1). 4 See OCGA § 9-2-61; Douglas v. Kelley, 116 Ga. App. 670 (1) ( 158 SE2d 441 ) (1967) (renewal allowed where dismissal of original action was hy the court on a basis other than the merits). 5 Compare Bullock v. Sand, 260 Ga. App. 874, 875 ( 581 SE2d 333 ) (2003) (applicati 2007Blackburn, P. J., and Bernes, J., concur. 1 In January 2006, Slone and Ebron had served a “Motion to Amend Counterclaims” on West, characterizing him as a “counter-defendant.” 2 West’s motion to dismiss was granted on November 27, 2006 and the remaining defendants were dismissed on December 5, 2006. 3 See OCGA §5-6-35 (a)(1). 4 See OCGA § 9-2-61; Douglas v. Kelley, 116 Ga. App. 670 (1) ( 158 SE2d 441 ) (1967) (renewal allowed where dismissal of original action was hy the court on a basis other than the merits). 5 Compare Bullock v. Sand, 260 Ga. App. 874, 875 ( 581 SE2d 333 ) (2003) (applicati | 1 | 1 |
Munoz v. American Lawyer Media, L.P.green2 sentences2007Slone and Ebron objected to West’s motion, and “a timely objection to the motion is sufficient to preclude a waiver.” MacDonald v. Harris, 266 Ga. App. 287, 288 ( 597 SE2d 125 ) (2004). 15 Green v. McCart, 273 Ga. 862, 863 (1) ( 548 SE2d 303 ) (2001). 16 See id.; Smith v. Hardeman, 281 Ga. App. 402, 406 (2) ( 636 SE2d 106 ) (2006). 17 See Byers v. Caldwell, 273 Ga. 228, 229 ( 539 SE2d 141 ) (2000) (“[construction of a judgment requires consideration of the entirety of its provisions”). 18 See Munoz v. American Lawyer Media, 236 Ga. App. 462, 465 (2) ( 512 SE2d 347 ) (1999). 19 We note that Slo 2007Slone and Ebron objected to West’s motion, and “a timely objection to the motion is sufficient to preclude a waiver.” MacDonald v. Harris, 266 Ga. App. 287, 288 ( 597 SE2d 125 ) (2004). 15 Green v. McCart, 273 Ga. 862, 863 (1) ( 548 SE2d 303 ) (2001). 16 See id.; Smith v. Hardeman, 281 Ga. App. 402, 406 (2) ( 636 SE2d 106 ) (2006). 17 See Byers v. Caldwell, 273 Ga. 228, 229 ( 539 SE2d 141 ) (2000) (“[construction of a judgment requires consideration of the entirety of its provisions”). 18 See Munoz v. American Lawyer Media, 236 Ga. App. 462, 465 (2) ( 512 SE2d 347 ) (1999). 19 We note that Slo | 1 | 1 |
MacDonald v. Harrisgreen2 sentences2007Slone and Ebron objected to West’s motion, and “a timely objection to the motion is sufficient to preclude a waiver.” MacDonald v. Harris, 266 Ga. App. 287, 288 ( 597 SE2d 125 ) (2004). 15 Green v. McCart, 273 Ga. 862, 863 (1) ( 548 SE2d 303 ) (2001). 16 See id.; Smith v. Hardeman, 281 Ga. App. 402, 406 (2) ( 636 SE2d 106 ) (2006). 17 See Byers v. Caldwell, 273 Ga. 228, 229 ( 539 SE2d 141 ) (2000) (“[construction of a judgment requires consideration of the entirety of its provisions”). 18 See Munoz v. American Lawyer Media, 236 Ga. App. 462, 465 (2) ( 512 SE2d 347 ) (1999). 19 We note that Slo 2007Slone and Ebron objected to West’s motion, and “a timely objection to the motion is sufficient to preclude a waiver.” MacDonald v. Harris, 266 Ga. App. 287, 288 ( 597 SE2d 125 ) (2004). 15 Green v. McCart, 273 Ga. 862, 863 (1) ( 548 SE2d 303 ) (2001). 16 See id.; Smith v. Hardeman, 281 Ga. App. 402, 406 (2) ( 636 SE2d 106 ) (2006). 17 See Byers v. Caldwell, 273 Ga. 228, 229 ( 539 SE2d 141 ) (2000) (“[construction of a judgment requires consideration of the entirety of its provisions”). 18 See Munoz v. American Lawyer Media, 236 Ga. App. 462, 465 (2) ( 512 SE2d 347 ) (1999). 19 We note that Slo | 1 | 1 |
Ibrahim v. Talley & Associates, P. C.green2 sentences2007Blackburn, P. J., and Bernes, J., concur. 1 In January 2006, Slone and Ebron had served a “Motion to Amend Counterclaims” on West, characterizing him as a “counter-defendant.” 2 West’s motion to dismiss was granted on November 27, 2006 and the remaining defendants were dismissed on December 5, 2006. 3 See OCGA §5-6-35 (a)(1). 4 See OCGA § 9-2-61; Douglas v. Kelley, 116 Ga. App. 670 (1) ( 158 SE2d 441 ) (1967) (renewal allowed where dismissal of original action was hy the court on a basis other than the merits). 5 Compare Bullock v. Sand, 260 Ga. App. 874, 875 ( 581 SE2d 333 ) (2003) (applicati 2007Blackburn, P. J., and Bernes, J., concur. 1 In January 2006, Slone and Ebron had served a “Motion to Amend Counterclaims” on West, characterizing him as a “counter-defendant.” 2 West’s motion to dismiss was granted on November 27, 2006 and the remaining defendants were dismissed on December 5, 2006. 3 See OCGA §5-6-35 (a)(1). 4 See OCGA § 9-2-61; Douglas v. Kelley, 116 Ga. App. 670 (1) ( 158 SE2d 441 ) (1967) (renewal allowed where dismissal of original action was hy the court on a basis other than the merits). 5 Compare Bullock v. Sand, 260 Ga. App. 874, 875 ( 581 SE2d 333 ) (2003) (applicati | 1 | 1 |
Nairon v. Landgreen2 sentences2007Blackburn, P. J., and Bernes, J., concur. 1 In January 2006, Slone and Ebron had served a “Motion to Amend Counterclaims” on West, characterizing him as a “counter-defendant.” 2 West’s motion to dismiss was granted on November 27, 2006 and the remaining defendants were dismissed on December 5, 2006. 3 See OCGA §5-6-35 (a)(1). 4 See OCGA § 9-2-61; Douglas v. Kelley, 116 Ga. App. 670 (1) ( 158 SE2d 441 ) (1967) (renewal allowed where dismissal of original action was hy the court on a basis other than the merits). 5 Compare Bullock v. Sand, 260 Ga. App. 874, 875 ( 581 SE2d 333 ) (2003) (applicati 2007Blackburn, P. J., and Bernes, J., concur. 1 In January 2006, Slone and Ebron had served a “Motion to Amend Counterclaims” on West, characterizing him as a “counter-defendant.” 2 West’s motion to dismiss was granted on November 27, 2006 and the remaining defendants were dismissed on December 5, 2006. 3 See OCGA §5-6-35 (a)(1). 4 See OCGA § 9-2-61; Douglas v. Kelley, 116 Ga. App. 670 (1) ( 158 SE2d 441 ) (1967) (renewal allowed where dismissal of original action was hy the court on a basis other than the merits). 5 Compare Bullock v. Sand, 260 Ga. App. 874, 875 ( 581 SE2d 333 ) (2003) (applicati | 1 | 1 |
LaSonde v. Chase Mortgage Co.green2 sentences2007Co., 259 Ga. App. 772, 774 (2) ( 577 SE2d 822 ) (2003) (notice of abusive litigation claim required where underlying litigation was dispossessory action). 12 See id. 13 Compare Allstate Ins. 2007Co., 259 Ga. App. 772, 774 (2) ( 577 SE2d 822 ) (2003) (notice of abusive litigation claim required where underlying litigation was dispossessory action). 12 See id. 13 Compare Allstate Ins. | 1 | 1 |
| Smith v. Hardemangreen | 1 | 1 |
Griffiths v. Rowe Propertiesgreen2 sentences2007Blackburn, P. J., and Bernes, J., concur. 1 In January 2006, Slone and Ebron had served a “Motion to Amend Counterclaims” on West, characterizing him as a “counter-defendant.” 2 West’s motion to dismiss was granted on November 27, 2006 and the remaining defendants were dismissed on December 5, 2006. 3 See OCGA §5-6-35 (a)(1). 4 See OCGA § 9-2-61; Douglas v. Kelley, 116 Ga. App. 670 (1) ( 158 SE2d 441 ) (1967) (renewal allowed where dismissal of original action was hy the court on a basis other than the merits). 5 Compare Bullock v. Sand, 260 Ga. App. 874, 875 ( 581 SE2d 333 ) (2003) (applicati 2007Blackburn, P. J., and Bernes, J., concur. 1 In January 2006, Slone and Ebron had served a “Motion to Amend Counterclaims” on West, characterizing him as a “counter-defendant.” 2 West’s motion to dismiss was granted on November 27, 2006 and the remaining defendants were dismissed on December 5, 2006. 3 See OCGA §5-6-35 (a)(1). 4 See OCGA § 9-2-61; Douglas v. Kelley, 116 Ga. App. 670 (1) ( 158 SE2d 441 ) (1967) (renewal allowed where dismissal of original action was hy the court on a basis other than the merits). 5 Compare Bullock v. Sand, 260 Ga. App. 874, 875 ( 581 SE2d 333 ) (2003) (applicati | 1 | 1 |
Kendrick v. Funderburkgreen2 sentences2007Blackburn, P. J., and Bernes, J., concur. 1 In January 2006, Slone and Ebron had served a “Motion to Amend Counterclaims” on West, characterizing him as a “counter-defendant.” 2 West’s motion to dismiss was granted on November 27, 2006 and the remaining defendants were dismissed on December 5, 2006. 3 See OCGA §5-6-35 (a)(1). 4 See OCGA § 9-2-61; Douglas v. Kelley, 116 Ga. App. 670 (1) ( 158 SE2d 441 ) (1967) (renewal allowed where dismissal of original action was hy the court on a basis other than the merits). 5 Compare Bullock v. Sand, 260 Ga. App. 874, 875 ( 581 SE2d 333 ) (2003) (applicati 2007Blackburn, P. J., and Bernes, J., concur. 1 In January 2006, Slone and Ebron had served a “Motion to Amend Counterclaims” on West, characterizing him as a “counter-defendant.” 2 West’s motion to dismiss was granted on November 27, 2006 and the remaining defendants were dismissed on December 5, 2006. 3 See OCGA §5-6-35 (a)(1). 4 See OCGA § 9-2-61; Douglas v. Kelley, 116 Ga. App. 670 (1) ( 158 SE2d 441 ) (1967) (renewal allowed where dismissal of original action was hy the court on a basis other than the merits). 5 Compare Bullock v. Sand, 260 Ga. App. 874, 875 ( 581 SE2d 333 ) (2003) (applicati | 1 | 1 |
Green v. McCartgreen2 sentences2007Slone and Ebron objected to West’s motion, and “a timely objection to the motion is sufficient to preclude a waiver.” MacDonald v. Harris, 266 Ga. App. 287, 288 ( 597 SE2d 125 ) (2004). 15 Green v. McCart, 273 Ga. 862, 863 (1) ( 548 SE2d 303 ) (2001). 16 See id.; Smith v. Hardeman, 281 Ga. App. 402, 406 (2) ( 636 SE2d 106 ) (2006). 17 See Byers v. Caldwell, 273 Ga. 228, 229 ( 539 SE2d 141 ) (2000) (“[construction of a judgment requires consideration of the entirety of its provisions”). 18 See Munoz v. American Lawyer Media, 236 Ga. App. 462, 465 (2) ( 512 SE2d 347 ) (1999). 19 We note that Slo 2007Slone and Ebron objected to West’s motion, and “a timely objection to the motion is sufficient to preclude a waiver.” MacDonald v. Harris, 266 Ga. App. 287, 288 ( 597 SE2d 125 ) (2004). 15 Green v. McCart, 273 Ga. 862, 863 (1) ( 548 SE2d 303 ) (2001). 16 See id.; Smith v. Hardeman, 281 Ga. App. 402, 406 (2) ( 636 SE2d 106 ) (2006). 17 See Byers v. Caldwell, 273 Ga. 228, 229 ( 539 SE2d 141 ) (2000) (“[construction of a judgment requires consideration of the entirety of its provisions”). 18 See Munoz v. American Lawyer Media, 236 Ga. App. 462, 465 (2) ( 512 SE2d 347 ) (1999). 19 We note that Slo | 1 | 1 |
| Bigley v. Lawrencegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Kroger v. Taylor
green
2 sentences2022In response, 2 See OCGA § 53-2-1 (c) (2), (5), (7). 3 OCGA § 9-11-24 (a), (b). 4 Kroger v. Taylor, 320 Ga. App. 298 ( 739 SE2d 767 ) (2013). 5 In the Interest of Baby Girl N., 362 Ga. App. 253 , 254 (1) ( 867 SE2d 853 ) (2022) (motion for permissive intervention); Baker v. Lankford, 306 Ga. App. 327, 328 (1) ( 702 SE2d 666 ) (2010) (motion to intervene as of right). 6 In re Haney, 355 Ga. App. 658 ( 845 SE2d 380 ) (2020). 3 the Petitioners and Respondents (collectively, the “Appellees”) contend, inter alia, that the trial court properly denied West’s motion because he failed to meet the requir 2022In response, 2 See OCGA § 53-2-1 (c) (2), (5), (7). 3 OCGA § 9-11-24 (a), (b). 4 Kroger v. Taylor, 320 Ga. App. 298 ( 739 SE2d 767 ) (2013). 5 In the Interest of Baby Girl N., 362 Ga. App. 253 , 254 (1) ( 867 SE2d 853 ) (2022) (motion for permissive intervention); Baker v. Lankford, 306 Ga. App. 327, 328 (1) ( 702 SE2d 666 ) (2010) (motion to intervene as of right). 6 In re Haney, 355 Ga. App. 658 ( 845 SE2d 380 ) (2020). 3 the Petitioners and Respondents (collectively, the “Appellees”) contend, inter alia, that the trial court properly denied West’s motion because he failed to meet the requir | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Nw Parkway, LLC v. Lemser
green
2 sentences2016Based on this Court’s holding in NW Parkway, LLC v. Lemser, 309 Ga. App. 172 , the trial court granted NW Parkway’s motion for summary judgment on its Count 1, as to liability only, concluding as a matter of law that West breached the lease by failing to repair or replace the roofs. 2016NW Parkway, 309 Ga. App. at 174-175 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Curry v. State
green
2 sentences2011The denial of West’s motion was required since it was filed *522 untimely. 1 “It is well settled that when the term of court has expired in which a defendant was sentenced pursuant to a guilty plea the trial court lacks jurisdiction to allow the withdrawal of the plea.” (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Curry v. State, 274 Ga. App. 19 ( 616 SE2d 225 ) (2005). 2011The denial of West’s motion was required since it was filed *522 untimely. 1 “It is well settled that when the term of court has expired in which a defendant was sentenced pursuant to a guilty plea the trial court lacks jurisdiction to allow the withdrawal of the plea.” (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Curry v. State, 274 Ga. App. 19 ( 616 SE2d 225 ) (2005). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Doggett v. United States
green
1 sentence2008Instead, West’s claim of prejudice rests entirely on the premise that, because “the presumption that pretrial delay has prejudiced the accused intensifies over time,” the State bore the burden of persuasively rebutting a presumption that he was prejudiced by the extensive pretrial delay, citing Doggett v. United States, 505 U. S. 647 . 7 West fails, however, to identify a single controlling *19 decision in which a defendant who demonstrated no specific impairment to his defense from a delay as short as 34 months prevailed on a Sixth Amendment speedy trial claim. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Douglas v. Kelley
green
2 sentences2007Blackburn, P. J., and Bernes, J., concur. 1 In January 2006, Slone and Ebron had served a “Motion to Amend Counterclaims” on West, characterizing him as a “counter-defendant.” 2 West’s motion to dismiss was granted on November 27, 2006 and the remaining defendants were dismissed on December 5, 2006. 3 See OCGA §5-6-35 (a)(1). 4 See OCGA § 9-2-61; Douglas v. Kelley, 116 Ga. App. 670 (1) ( 158 SE2d 441 ) (1967) (renewal allowed where dismissal of original action was hy the court on a basis other than the merits). 5 Compare Bullock v. Sand, 260 Ga. App. 874, 875 ( 581 SE2d 333 ) (2003) (applicati 2007Blackburn, P. J., and Bernes, J., concur. 1 In January 2006, Slone and Ebron had served a “Motion to Amend Counterclaims” on West, characterizing him as a “counter-defendant.” 2 West’s motion to dismiss was granted on November 27, 2006 and the remaining defendants were dismissed on December 5, 2006. 3 See OCGA §5-6-35 (a)(1). 4 See OCGA § 9-2-61; Douglas v. Kelley, 116 Ga. App. 670 (1) ( 158 SE2d 441 ) (1967) (renewal allowed where dismissal of original action was hy the court on a basis other than the merits). 5 Compare Bullock v. Sand, 260 Ga. App. 874, 875 ( 581 SE2d 333 ) (2003) (applicati | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| McDuffie v. Jones green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Brown v. Galloway green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Smith v. State green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.