Industrial Commission hearing in Illinois

1997Saldana v. Wirtz Cartage Co. , 74 Ill. 2d 379, 388 , 385 N.E.2d 664 (1978).

1997Saldana v. Wirtz Cartage Co. , 74 Ill. 2d 379, 388 , 385 N.E.2d 664 (1978).

2001Concomitantly, the court construed an Industrial Commission rule stating that further fees in excess of the standard 20% contingent fee may be awarded when the attorney provides “extraordinary services.” DeSalvo, 307 Ill.

2001Concomitantly, the court construed an Industrial Commission rule stating that further fees in excess of the standard 20% contingent fee may be awarded when the attorney provides “extraordinary services.” DeSalvo, 307 Ill.

2002Dissenting Opinions Upon Denial of Rehearing JUSTICE FITZGERALD, dissenting: The Marion school district petitioned for rehearing in this case, arguing that, based on our decision in Daniels v. Industrial Comm’n, 201 Ill. 2d 160 (2002), it was entitled to a new Industrial Commission hearing because two of the commissioners that heard Baggett’s claim— Kane and Reichart — were unlawfully appointed.

2002Dissenting Opinions Upon Denial of Rehearing JUSTICE FITZGERALD, dissenting: The Marion school district petitioned for rehearing in this case, arguing that, based on our decision in Daniels v. Industrial Comm’n, 201 Ill. 2d 160 (2002), it was entitled to a new Industrial Commission hearing because two of the commissioners that heard Baggett’s claim— Kane and Reichart — were unlawfully appointed.

1993The Gotter court stated: “Although the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and the supreme court rules are inapplicable to procedures regulated by section 19 of the Workers’ Compensation Act [citation], section 19 does not authorize the entry of a decision by the Industrial Commission in violation of the principles of due process.” ( 152 Ill.

1987(Interstate Contractors v. Industrial Com. (1980), 81 Ill. 2d 434, 438 , 410 N.E.2d 837, 839 .) Although we are unable to ascertain whether claimants raised the alleged due process violation in a timely manner (see Head-On Collision Line, Inc. v. Kirk (1976), 36 Ill.

1987App.3d 891, 893 , 478 N.E.2d 498, 499 ), section 19 does not authorize the entry of a decision by the Industrial Commission in violation of the principles of due process. ( Interstate Contractors v. Industrial Com. (1980), 81 Ill.2d 434, 438 , 410 N.E.2d 837, 839 .) Although we are unable to ascertain whether claimants raised the alleged due process violation in a timely manner (see Head-On Collision Line, Inc. v. Kirk (1976), 36 Ill.

1987App. 3d 891, 893 , 478 N.E.2d 498, 499 ), section 19 does not authorize the entry of a decision by the Industrial Commission in violation of the principles of due process.

1987App.3d 891, 893 , 478 N.E.2d 498, 499 ), section 19 does not authorize the entry of a decision by the Industrial Commission in violation of the principles of due process. ( Interstate Contractors v. Industrial Com. (1980), 81 Ill.2d 434, 438 , 410 N.E.2d 837, 839 .) Although we are unable to ascertain whether claimants raised the alleged due process violation in a timely manner (see Head-On Collision Line, Inc. v. Kirk (1976), 36 Ill.

1987App.3d 891, 893 , 478 N.E.2d 498, 499 ), section 19 does not authorize the entry of a decision by the Industrial Commission in violation of the principles of due process. ( Interstate Contractors v. Industrial Com. (1980), 81 Ill.2d 434, 438 , 410 N.E.2d 837, 839 .) Although we are unable to ascertain whether claimants raised the alleged due process violation in a timely manner (see Head-On Collision Line, Inc. v. Kirk (1976), 36 Ill.

1987App.3d 891, 893 , 478 N.E.2d 498, 499 ), section 19 does not authorize the entry of a decision by the Industrial Commission in violation of the principles of due process. ( Interstate Contractors v. Industrial Com. (1980), 81 Ill.2d 434, 438 , 410 N.E.2d 837, 839 .) Although we are unable to ascertain whether claimants raised the alleged due process violation in a timely manner (see Head-On Collision Line, Inc. v. Kirk (1976), 36 Ill.

1985(De Bartolo v. Industrial Com. (1940), 375 Ill. 103, 106 , 30 N.E.2d 677, 679 .) U.S. Steel contends that by modifying the award for partial permanent disability under section 8(e) to an award for total permanent disability under section 8(f), the Industrial Commission has exceeded its authority merely to determine whether Bray’s disability has increased.

1985(De Bartolo v. Industrial Com. (1940), 375 Ill. 103, 106 , 30 N.E.2d 677, 679 .) U.S. Steel contends that by modifying the award for partial permanent disability under section 8(e) to an award for total permanent disability under section 8(f), the Industrial Commission has exceeded its authority merely to determine whether Bray’s disability has increased.

1940(Cuneo Press, Inc. v. Industrial Com. 361 Ill. 172 .) Sending Salahub to the Industrial Commission with the waiver and leaving his time card in the machine until November 30 tend to show he was not discharged on November 27.

1933(Lumbermen’s Casualty Co. v. Industrial Com. 303 Ill. 364 .) The respondents by motion asked the superior court to dismiss the writ of certiorari on the ground that the transcript of the additional evidence taken before the Industrial Commission at the hearing on review was never authenticated by. the attorneys for the petitioner and the respondents and was not authenticated by one of the members of the commission, as required by statute.

1920The agreement of settlement recited that jurisdiction had been lost under the Workmen’s Compensation act and that the settlement was purely voluntary on the part of the employer, but it was held, following Wabash Railway Co. v. Industrial Com. 286 Ill. 194 , that any settlement or agreement made between an employer operating under the act and an injured ■ employee must be considered as having been made under the act, and is a submission to the jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission and a waiver as to any question of time limitation then existing, even though the agreement stated to the - co

1919(Stubbs v. Industrial Board, supra.) Upon the cause being remanded to the Industrial Commission and the hearing of further testimony an award was entered in the same sum, although the finding and award of the commission specified that the award was for serious and permanent disfigurement, only, and it is here complained by plaintiff in error that such an award was not in accordance with the mandate of this court.