prospective rule in Illinois

1988Ed. 2d 399 , 205 S. Ct. 509 , the Ninth Circuit stated that the decision to grant immunity to a prospective defense witness “is left to the discretion of the executive branch” and that “a district court has neither the power to grant use immunity to individuals the defendant seeks to call as witnesses, nor the power to force the government to grant such immunity.” In United States v. Brutzman (9th Cir. 1984), 731 F.2d 1449, 1451-52 , that same court stated that “[t]his court has emphatically rejected the argument that the sixth amendment provides a defendant with a right to demand use immunity

1981App. 3d 375, 381 , 342 N.E.2d 110, 115 .) In Pantoja the court relied upon language in United States v. Ramsey (7th Cir. 1974), 503 F.2d 524 , where the court stated that a defendant does not have a constitutional right to compel the State to confer immunity upon a defense witness who has exercised his privilege against self-incrimination.

2020Stand in her shoes on that morning ***.’ ” Id.

1995However, because defendant's sentencing occurred prior to the decision in Gacho , it did not apply to his case. ( Coleman, 129 Ill.2d at 348 , 135 Ill.Dec. 834 , 544 N.E.2d 330 .) This court further held that the Gacho rule was not of constitutional dimension, and thus rejected the argument that under the principles of Griffith v. Kentucky (1987), 479 U.S. 314 , 107 S.Ct. 708 , 93 L.Ed.2d 649 , Gacho applied retroactively to cases pending on direct review when it was announced. ( Coleman, 129 Ill.2d at 349 , 135 Ill.Dec. 834 , 544 N.E.2d 330 .) Defendant currently attempts to offer slightly di

1995However, because defendant's sentencing occurred prior to the decision in Gacho , it did not apply to his case. ( Coleman, 129 Ill.2d at 348 , 135 Ill.Dec. 834 , 544 N.E.2d 330 .) This court further held that the Gacho rule was not of constitutional dimension, and thus rejected the argument that under the principles of Griffith v. Kentucky (1987), 479 U.S. 314 , 107 S.Ct. 708 , 93 L.Ed.2d 649 , Gacho applied retroactively to cases pending on direct review when it was announced. ( Coleman, 129 Ill.2d at 349 , 135 Ill.Dec. 834 , 544 N.E.2d 330 .) Defendant currently attempts to offer slightly di

1995(People v. Coleman (1989), 129 Ill. 2d 321, 348-49 .) The court noted that in People v. Gacho (1988), 122 Ill. 2d 221 , a prospective rule was announced requiring jurors to be informed of the mandatory natural life sentence for offenders convicted of multiple murders who do not receive the death penalty.

1995Dec. 834 , 544 N.E.2d 330 .) The court noted that in People v. Gacho (1988), 122 Ill.2d 221 , 119 Ill.Dec. 287 , 522 N.E.2d 1146 , a prospective rule was announced requiring jurors to be informed of the mandatory natural life sentence for offenders convicted of multiple murders who do not receive the death penalty.

1995(People v. Coleman (1989), 129 Ill. 2d 321, 348-49 .) The court noted that in People v. Gacho (1988), 122 Ill. 2d 221 , a prospective rule was announced requiring jurors to be informed of the mandatory natural life sentence for offenders convicted of multiple murders who do not receive the death penalty.

1995Dec. 834 , 544 N.E.2d 330 .) The court noted that in People v. Gacho (1988), 122 Ill.2d 221 , 119 Ill.Dec. 287 , 522 N.E.2d 1146 , a prospective rule was announced requiring jurors to be informed of the mandatory natural life sentence for offenders convicted of multiple murders who do not receive the death penalty.

1994King, 154 Ill. 2d at 226 .

1993(Webb, 409 U.S. at 97 , 34 L.

1993Ed. 2d at 333 , 93 S. Ct. at 353 .) Similarly, in King, an appellate court reversed and remanded a defendant's conviction where the circuit judge drove a prospective defense witness from the stand by threatening to revoke an earlier plea bargain made before that court if it believed the witness was lying.

1993(King, 228 Ill.

1990Defendant relies upon Haring v. Chicago North Western Transportation Co. (1984), 103 Ill.2d 530 , 83 Ill.Dec. 330 , 470 N.E.2d 288 , to support this proposition.

1990Defendant relies upon Haring v. Chicago & North Western Transportation Co. (1984), 103 Ill. 2d 530 , to support this proposition.

1988Ed. 2d 399 , 205 S. Ct. 509 , the Ninth Circuit stated that the decision to grant immunity to a prospective defense witness “is left to the discretion of the executive branch” and that “a district court has neither the power to grant use immunity to individuals the defendant seeks to call as witnesses, nor the power to force the government to grant such immunity.” In United States v. Brutzman (9th Cir. 1984), 731 F.2d 1449, 1451-52 , that same court stated that “[t]his court has emphatically rejected the argument that the sixth amendment provides a defendant with a right to demand use immunity

1988Ed. 2d 399 , 205 S. Ct. 509 , the Ninth Circuit stated that the decision to grant immunity to a prospective defense witness “is left to the discretion of the executive branch” and that “a district court has neither the power to grant use immunity to individuals the defendant seeks to call as witnesses, nor the power to force the government to grant such immunity.” In United States v. Brutzman (9th Cir. 1984), 731 F.2d 1449, 1451-52 , that same court stated that “[t]his court has emphatically rejected the argument that the sixth amendment provides a defendant with a right to demand use immunity

1988Ed. 2d 405 , 95 S. Ct. 1136 .) Furthermore, as stated in our discussion of Illinois law, the courts of this State have never accepted the proposition advanced by the Third Circuit in the Virgin Islands case.

1983(People v. Bracey (1981), 93 Ill.

1982Of further importance was the court’s statement that “[t]he record establishes that Silvani [the prospective witness] was present at the court largely throughout the trial and was thus available as a witness for either the defense or the State.” 46 Ill. 2d 383, 393 , 263 N.E.2d 869, 875 .

1982Of further importance was the court’s statement that “[t]he record establishes that Silvani [the prospective witness] was present at the court largely throughout the trial and was thus available as a witness for either the defense or the State.” 46 Ill. 2d 383, 393 , 263 N.E.2d 869, 875 .

1982Ed. 2d 136 , 91 S. Ct. 1657 , wherein our supreme court dealt with the issue of allegations of intimidation of a prospective defense witness raised initially in defendant’s motion for new trial, the court held that the trial court was not in error in denying defendant’s motion for new trial based upon the disputed testimony of the witness and the prosecution witnesses on the nature of the alleged threats.

1981Levin v. Ogilvie (1967), 36 Ill. 2d 566 , 224 N.E.2d 247 .) The issues of the prospective violation of relator’s constitutional rights and the authority of the named agent of Alabama to receive relator are not among them and, therefore, are not properly raised or considered in this appeal.

1981Levin v. Ogilvie (1967), 36 Ill. 2d 566 , 224 N.E.2d 247 .) The issues of the prospective violation of relator’s constitutional rights and the authority of the named agent of Alabama to receive relator are not among them and, therefore, are not properly raised or considered in this appeal.

1981Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 106 — 1.) However, there is no obligation on the part of the State to offer immunity to a prospective defense witness “in order to gain relevant evidence for the defendant on direct examination.” (People v. Pantoja (1976), 35 Ill.

1981App. 3d 375, 381 , 342 N.E.2d 110, 115 .) In Pantoja the court relied upon language in United States v. Ramsey (7th Cir. 1974), 503 F.2d 524 , where the court stated that a defendant does not have a constitutional right to compel the State to confer immunity upon a defense witness who has exercised his privilege against self-incrimination.

1977We note that the Illinois Supreme Court, in People v. George (1971), 49 Ill. 2d 372, 379 , 274 N.E.2d 26 , stated: “It is reasonable to say that a defendant may not interject an issue into his case and then contend that the bringing of it to the attention of the jury was erroneous.

1977We note that the Illinois Supreme Court, in People v. George (1971), 49 Ill. 2d 372, 379 , 274 N.E.2d 26 , stated: “It is reasonable to say that a defendant may not interject an issue into his case and then contend that the bringing of it to the attention of the jury was erroneous.