scope of judicial inquiry in Illinois

2017According to the rule set forth in Lewis, the first question would fall within the scope of judicial inquiry and the second question would not.” Id. at 980-81, 469 N.E.2d at 266 (quoting Department of Public Works & Buildings v. Lewis, 411 Ill. 242, 245-46 , 103 N.E.2d 595, 597-98 (1952)).

2016According to the rule set forth in Lewis, the first question would fall within the scope of judicial inquiry and the second ques- tion would not.” Id. at 980-81, 469 N.E.2d at 266 (quoting Department of Public Works & Buildings v. Lewis, 411 Ill. 242, 245-46 , 103 N.E.2d 595, 597-98 (1952)).

1991(Walsh v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners (1983), 96 Ill. 2d 101 , 449 N.E.2d 115 ; Basketfield v. Police Board (1974), 56 Ill. 2d 351 , 307 N.E.2d 371 .) While an agency’s findings are considered prima facie true and correct, they must be based upon facts established by competent evidence.

1991(Walsh v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners (1983), 96 Ill. 2d 101 , 449 N.E.2d 115 ; Basketfield v. Police Board (1974), 56 Ill. 2d 351 , 307 N.E.2d 371 .) While an agency’s findings are considered prima facie true and correct, they must be based upon facts established by competent evidence.

1991(Walsh v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners (1983), 96 Ill. 2d 101 , 449 N.E.2d 115 ; Basketfield v. Police Board (1974), 56 Ill. 2d 351 , 307 N.E.2d 371 .) While an agency’s findings are considered prima facie true and correct, they must be based upon facts established by competent evidence.

1991(Walsh v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners (1983), 96 Ill. 2d 101 , 449 N.E.2d 115 ; Basketfield v. Police Board (1974), 56 Ill. 2d 351 , 307 N.E.2d 371 .) While an agency’s findings are considered prima facie true and correct, they must be based upon facts established by competent evidence.

1974Brown v. Jackson (1971), 49 Ill.2d 209 ), and in light of our earlier decisions limiting the scope of judicial inquiry in an extradition proceeding.

1972Brown v. Jackson (1971), 49 Ill.2d 209 ), and in light of our earlier decisions limiting the scope of judicial inquiry in an extradition proceeding.

1991In Dougherty, the trial court instructed the jury, insofar as relevant here, “If you find that the Government has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that one or more of the defendants committed each of the elements comprising the crimes [charged], then I must instruct you further that the law does not recognize as a defense to *** these charges that the defendants were motivated to commit their acts by sincere political, religious or moral convictions or in obedience to some higher law.” (Dougherty, 473 F.2d at 1138 n.54.) The Dougherty defendants argued, similarly to defendant here, that this i

1987The question of title, therefore, cannot be litigated. ( Kitzer v. Rice (1967), 90 Ill.

1986(Deerfield Park District v. Progress Development Corp. (1961), 22 Ill. 2d 132, 140 , 174 N.E.2d 850 .) The plaintiffs’ assertion does not illuminate the objective of the ordinance but rather directs judicial inquiry into the possible motives of the city council in passing the ordinance.

1986(Deerfield Park District v. Progress Development Corp. (1961), 22 Ill. 2d 132, 140 , 174 N.E.2d 850 .) The plaintiffs’ assertion does not illuminate the objective of the ordinance but rather directs judicial inquiry into the possible motives of the city council in passing the ordinance.

1986The United States Supreme Court defined the scope of judicial immunity very broadly in Stump v. Sparkman (1978), 435 U.S. 349 , 55 L.

1986The United States Supreme Court defined the scope of judicial immunity very broadly in Stump v. Sparkman (1978), 435 U.S. 349 , 55 L.

1986(City of Springfield v. Board of Election Commissioners (1985), 105 Ill. 2d 336, 340-41 , 473 N.E.2d 1313 .) Collateral purposes or motives behind the passage of the ordinance are beyond the scope of judicial inquiry.

1986(City of Springfield v. Board of Election Commissioners (1985), 105 Ill. 2d 336, 340-41 , 473 N.E.2d 1313 .) Collateral purposes or motives behind the passage of the ordinance are beyond the scope of judicial inquiry.

1976(Bruce v. Department of Registration & Education, 26 Ill. 2d 612 , 187 N.E.2d 711 .) The scope of judicial inquiry concerning factual determinations of the administrative agency is limited to ascertaining whether the agency’s findings of fact are contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.

1976(Bruce v. Department of Registration & Education, 26 Ill. 2d 612 , 187 N.E.2d 711 .) The scope of judicial inquiry concerning factual determinations of the administrative agency is limited to ascertaining whether the agency’s findings of fact are contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.

1976Kerr v. Police Board, 59 Ill. 2d 140 , 319 N.E.2d 478 .

1976Kerr v. Police Board, 59 Ill. 2d 140 , 319 N.E.2d 478 .

1974The implementation of the intent that the extradition procedure be expeditious and summary would appear to dictate that the question of probable cause be decided in the demanding, rather than in the asylum State.” The scope of the judicial hearing in an extradition case was thoroughly considered and discussed in an earlier case, that of People ex rel Gilbert v. Babb (1953), 415 Ill. 349 , where the relator raised the issue of the constitutionality of her indictment in the light of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

1967Reid v. Arceneaux, 63 Ill App2d 113, 211 NE2d 24 (1965); Ill Rev Stats (1965) chapter 57, pars 2 and 5.

1927Whether the enactment is wise or unwise; whether it is based on sound economic theory; whether it is the best means to achieve the desired result; whether, in short, the legislative discretion, within its prescribed limits, should be exercised in a particular manner, are matters for the judgment of the legislature, and the earnest conflict of serious opinion does not suffice to bring them within the range of judicial cognizance.” Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railway Co. v. McGuire, 219 U. S. 549 .