void judgment rule in Illinois

2017But Castleberry abolished the void judgment rule, reasoning that “whether a circuit court complies with a statutory sentencing requirement in a criminal proceeding is irrelevant to the question of jurisdiction.” Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916, ¶ 16 ; see People v. Reed, 2016 IL App (1st) 140498 , ¶ 13 (“Defendant asserts that his fees are void, and may therefore be challenged at any time [citation].

2017But Castleberry abolished the void judgment rule, reasoning that “whether a circuit court complies with a statutory sentencing requirement in a criminal proceeding is irrelevant to the question of jurisdiction.” Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916, ¶ 16 ; see People v. Reed, 2016 IL App (1st) 140498 , ¶ 13 (“Defendant asserts that his fees are void, and may therefore be challenged at any time [citation].

2018See, e.g., Reed, 2016 IL App (1st) 140498 , ¶ 13; People v. Ramones, 2016 IL App (3d) 140877, ¶ 17 (imposition of successive DNA analysis fee did not create a void judgment subject to challenge at any time); Buffkin, 2016 IL App (2d) 140792, ¶ 6 (same).

2017See, e.g. , Reed , 2016 IL App (1st) 140498 , ¶ 13, 400 Ill.Dec. 341 , 48 N.E.3d 290 ; People v. Ramones , 2016 IL App (3d) 140877 , ¶ 17, 410 Ill.Dec. 1005 , 72 N.E.3d 391 (imposition of successive DNA analysis fee did not create a void judgment subject to challenge at any time); Buffkin , 2016 IL App (2d) 140792 , ¶ 6, 403 Ill.Dec. 860 , 55 N.E.3d 47 (same).

2018Buffkin, 2016 IL App (2d) 140792, ¶ 6 . ¶ 12 Grigorov cites People v. McCray, 2016 IL App (3d) 140554, ¶ 20 , for the proposition that Castleberry’s abolition of the void judgment rule had no effect on his challenge to his fees, which he argues are not part of the sentence but merely a “collateral consequence of conviction.” McCray’s essential holding is that, notwithstanding Castleberry, a fee (as opposed to a fine) imposed without statutory authority is void.

2017Buffkin , 2016 IL App (2d) 140792 , ¶ 6, 403 Ill.Dec. 860 , 55 N.E.3d 47 . *395 ¶ 12 Grigorov cites People v. McCray , 2016 IL App (3d) 140554 , ¶ 20, 407 Ill.Dec. 951 , 64 N.E.3d 750 , for the proposition that Castleberry 's abolition of the void judgment rule had no effect on his challenge to his fees, which he argues are not part of the sentence but merely a "collateral consequence of conviction." McCray 's essential holding is that, notwithstanding Castleberry , a fee (as opposed to a fine) imposed without statutory authority is void.

2020Elmo, 376 Ill. 450, 456-57 (1941), our supreme court found that a void-judgment claim was barred by laches.

2020Elmo, 376 Ill. 450, 456-57 (1941), our supreme court found that a void-judgment claim was barred by laches.

2020Similarly, in James v. Frantz, 21 Ill. 2d 377, 383 (1961), the court explained: “The appellees attempt to meet the charge of laches by asserting that a void decree may be attacked collaterally at any time, without regard to laches.

2020Similarly, in James v. Frantz, 21 Ill. 2d 377, 383 (1961), the court explained: “The appellees attempt to meet the charge of laches by asserting that a void decree may be attacked collaterally at any time, without regard to laches.

2026We agree with the State. ¶ 10 “We review de novo a section 2-1401 petition that was denied or dismissed on legal grounds.” People v. Abdullah, 2019 IL 123492, ¶ 13 (citing People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 25 ).

2024See Sundance Homes, 195 Ill. 2d at 284 ; see also Tims v. Black Horse Carriers, Inc., 2023 IL 127801, ¶ 21 ; Raintree Homes, Inc. v. Village of Long Grove, 209 Ill. 2d 248, 260 (2004).

2024The Sundance Homes court may not have used the term “void,” but, as explained above, the operative language for our purposes directly addressed the core tension between time limits on one hand and the void judgment rule on the other and ruled in favor of imposing time limits in the context of refund claims. “[S]tatutes of limitation are valid procedural restrictions which may be invoked to bar an otherwise meritorious claim for a refund, even when that claim is based upon a tax statute that has been held unconstitutional.” (Emphasis added.) Sundance Homes, 195 Ill. 2d at 270 . ¶ 31 Plaintiffs

2024See Sundance Homes, 195 Ill. 2d at 284 ; see also Tims v. Black Horse Carriers, Inc., 2023 IL 127801, ¶ 21 ; Raintree Homes, Inc. v. Village of Long Grove, 209 Ill. 2d 248, 260 (2004).

2024See People v. Ellis, 2020 IL App (1st) 190774, ¶ 26 (only the Illinois Supreme Court may modify a declaration of law made in one of its opinions).

2024See Sundance Homes, 195 Ill. 2d at 284 ; see also Tims v. Black Horse Carriers, Inc., 2023 IL 127801, ¶ 21 ; Raintree Homes, Inc. v. Village of Long Grove, 209 Ill. 2d 248, 260 (2004).

2024See Stone Street, 2017 IL 117720 ; Price, 2016 IL 118613 ; LVNV Funding, LLC v. Trice, 2015 IL 116129 .

2021Thus, unlike the cases cited by defendant, he had already received a collateral attack raising the very same void judgment claim, and the judgment was found not to be void. ¶ 20 In Stolfo, 2016 IL App (1st) 142396, ¶¶ 28, 30 , the reviewing court rejected the plaintiff’s argument res judicata could not apply to a void judgment argument and found the dismissal of the plaintiff’s section 2-1401 petition was warranted based on res judicata.

2020Rather, citing to Steinbrecher v. Steinbrecher, 197 Ill. 2d 514 (2001), Belleville Toyota, Inc., v. Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Inc., 199 Ill. 2d 325, 335-37 (2002), and People v. Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916, ¶ 12 , the State argued that the void judgment rule, or the “inherent power idea of jurisdiction” had been abolished in Illinois.