104 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1966–2014 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Jackson v. Virginiared2 sentences1985She said that Larry gave appellant a gun and said, “Make sure you do it good,” and Leroy added, “I want you to do it good for me, too.” When appellant re-entered the car, he said, with a smile on his face, “Well, Larry, he went night night.” The evidence was sufficient to meet the standards of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979), and the first enumeration of error is without merit. 2. 1982The test of the sufficiency of the evidence set out in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979), is “ ... whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Applying this test, we find that the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict and that the first enumeration of error is without merit. 2. | 2 | 4 |
Hosch v. Stategreen2 sentences1982In Hosch v. State, 246 Ga. 417, 419-420 (3) ( 271 SE2d 817 ), the Supreme Court of Georgia considered a somewhat similar charge in the light of Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U. S. 510 , supra, but determined that in view of the trial court’s charges on the presumption of innocence, the burden of proof, reasonable doubt, and intent as a jury question and the fact that the jury was instructed that the presumption may be rebutted “the jury could not have interpreted the charge as shifting the burden of persuasion to the defendant,” citing Lackey v. State, 246 Ga. 331 ( 271 SE2d 478 ). 1982In Hosch v. State, 246 Ga. 417, 419-420 (3) ( 271 SE2d 817 ), the Supreme Court of Georgia considered a somewhat similar charge in the light of Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U. S. 510 , supra, but determined that in view of the trial court’s charges on the presumption of innocence, the burden of proof, reasonable doubt, and intent as a jury question and the fact that the jury was instructed that the presumption may be rebutted “the jury could not have interpreted the charge as shifting the burden of persuasion to the defendant,” citing Lackey v. State, 246 Ga. 331 ( 271 SE2d 478 ). | 2 | 2 |
Ridley v. Stategreen2 sentences1978"On appeals from findings of guilt, the presumption of innocence no longer prevails, the fact finders have determined the credibility of witnesses, the fact finders have been convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, and the appellate courts review the evidence only to determine if there is any evidence sufficient to authorize the fact finder to return the verdict of guilty. [Cits.] "In considering the . . . general grounds on appeal, the defendant’s testimony and that of his witnesses can be disregarded by the appellate court if the fact finders’ verdict shows that such testimony was not believed. 1978"On appeals from findings of guilt, the presumption of innocence no longer prevails, the fact finders have determined the credibility of witnesses, the fact finders have been convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, and the appellate courts review the evidence only to determine if there is any evidence sufficient to authorize the fact finder to return the verdict of guilty. [Cits.] "In considering the . . . general grounds on appeal, the defendant’s testimony and that of his witnesses can be disregarded by the appellate court if the fact finders’ verdict shows that such testimony was not believed. | 2 | 2 |
BASHLOR v. Walkergreen2 sentences2014To recover under this theory of negligence, therefore, a plaintiff must prove that the vehicle owner gave the allegedly incompetent driver permission to drive the vehicle.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Bashlor v. Walker, 303 Ga. App. 478, 480 (1) (a) ( 693 SE2d 858 ) (2010); see also (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Jones v. Cloud, 119 Ga. App. 697, 699 ( 168 SE2d 598 ) (1969) (“Knowledge of the driver’s incompetency is an essential element of the rule which holds an owner liable for furnishing his automobile to an incompetent driver and such knowledge must be actual rather than co 2014To recover under this theory of negligence, therefore, a plaintiff must prove that the vehicle owner gave the allegedly incompetent driver permission to drive the vehicle.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Bashlor v. Walker, 303 Ga. App. 478, 480 (1) (a) ( 693 SE2d 858 ) (2010); see also (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Jones v. Cloud, 119 Ga. App. 697, 699 ( 168 SE2d 598 ) (1969) (“Knowledge of the driver’s incompetency is an essential element of the rule which holds an owner liable for furnishing his automobile to an incompetent driver and such knowledge must be actual rather than co | 1 | 1 |
Jones v. Cloudgreen2 sentences2014To recover under this theory of negligence, therefore, a plaintiff must prove that the vehicle owner gave the allegedly incompetent driver permission to drive the vehicle.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Bashlor v. Walker, 303 Ga. App. 478, 480 (1) (a) ( 693 SE2d 858 ) (2010); see also (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Jones v. Cloud, 119 Ga. App. 697, 699 ( 168 SE2d 598 ) (1969) (“Knowledge of the driver’s incompetency is an essential element of the rule which holds an owner liable for furnishing his automobile to an incompetent driver and such knowledge must be actual rather than co 2014To recover under this theory of negligence, therefore, a plaintiff must prove that the vehicle owner gave the allegedly incompetent driver permission to drive the vehicle.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Bashlor v. Walker, 303 Ga. App. 478, 480 (1) (a) ( 693 SE2d 858 ) (2010); see also (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Jones v. Cloud, 119 Ga. App. 697, 699 ( 168 SE2d 598 ) (1969) (“Knowledge of the driver’s incompetency is an essential element of the rule which holds an owner liable for furnishing his automobile to an incompetent driver and such knowledge must be actual rather than co | 1 | 1 |
Dunn v. Kirstengreen2 sentences2006(State Farm).” This argument is controlled adversely to the Patels by Dunn v. Kirsten, 273 Ga. App. 27, 28 ( 614 SE2d 156 ) (2005). 2006(State Farm).” This argument is controlled adversely to the Patels by Dunn v. Kirsten, 273 Ga. App. 27, 28 ( 614 SE2d 156 ) (2005). | 1 | 1 |
Chilivis v. Backusgreen2 sentences2003See also Garrett v. Bamford, 538 F.2d 63, 71 (3rd Cir.1976) (where a state remedy requires repetitive suits, resort may be had to federal courts). [10] The majority opinion does not address the first enumeration of error, which challenged this finding by the trial court, because it ruled that the complaint should have been dismissed on procedural grounds. [11] 243 Ga.App. 458 , 533 S.E.2d 101 (2000). [12] 236 Ga. 88 , 222 S.E.2d 371 (1976). 2003See also Garrett v. Bamford, 538 F.2d 63, 71 (3rd Cir.1976) (where a state remedy requires repetitive suits, resort may be had to federal courts). [10] The majority opinion does not address the first enumeration of error, which challenged this finding by the trial court, because it ruled that the complaint should have been dismissed on procedural grounds. [11] 243 Ga.App. 458 , 533 S.E.2d 101 (2000). [12] 236 Ga. 88 , 222 S.E.2d 371 (1976). | 1 | 1 |
Donald F. Garrett v. James B. Bamford, Chairmangreen1 sentence2003See also Garrett v. Bamford, 538 F.2d 63, 71 (3rd Cir.1976) (where a state remedy requires repetitive suits, resort may be had to federal courts). [10] The majority opinion does not address the first enumeration of error, which challenged this finding by the trial court, because it ruled that the complaint should have been dismissed on procedural grounds. [11] 243 Ga.App. 458 , 533 S.E.2d 101 (2000). [12] 236 Ga. 88 , 222 S.E.2d 371 (1976). | 1 | 1 |
Dillard v. Densongreen2 sentences2003See also Garrett v. Bamford, 538 F.2d 63, 71 (3rd Cir.1976) (where a state remedy requires repetitive suits, resort may be had to federal courts). [10] The majority opinion does not address the first enumeration of error, which challenged this finding by the trial court, because it ruled that the complaint should have been dismissed on procedural grounds. [11] 243 Ga.App. 458 , 533 S.E.2d 101 (2000). [12] 236 Ga. 88 , 222 S.E.2d 371 (1976). 2003See also Garrett v. Bamford, 538 F.2d 63, 71 (3rd Cir.1976) (where a state remedy requires repetitive suits, resort may be had to federal courts). [10] The majority opinion does not address the first enumeration of error, which challenged this finding by the trial court, because it ruled that the complaint should have been dismissed on procedural grounds. [11] 243 Ga.App. 458 , 533 S.E.2d 101 (2000). [12] 236 Ga. 88 , 222 S.E.2d 371 (1976). | 1 | 1 |
Nix v. Long Mountain Resources, Inc.green2 sentences2003The complaint in Chilivis apparently did not invoke the Declaratory Judgment Act. [13] Id. at 90 , 222 S.E.2d 371 . [14] See generally Acree v. Walls, 240 Ga. 778, 790 , 243 S.E.2d 489 (1978) (rights of individual taxpayers are protected by notice and opportunity to be heard). [15] Nix v. Long Mountain Resources, 262 Ga. 506, 509 (3), 422 S.E.2d 195 (1992), citing Citizens' & Contractors' Bank v. Maddox, 175 Ga. 779, 784-785 , 166 S.E. 227 (1932). 2003The complaint in Chilivis apparently did not invoke the Declaratory Judgment Act. [13] Id. at 90 , 222 S.E.2d 371 . [14] See generally Acree v. Walls, 240 Ga. 778, 790 , 243 S.E.2d 489 (1978) (rights of individual taxpayers are protected by notice and opportunity to be heard). [15] Nix v. Long Mountain Resources, 262 Ga. 506, 509 (3), 422 S.E.2d 195 (1992), citing Citizens' & Contractors' Bank v. Maddox, 175 Ga. 779, 784-785 , 166 S.E. 227 (1932). | 1 | 1 |
Miller v. Georgia Ports Authoritygreen2 sentences1996Miller v. Ga. Ports Auth., 217 Ga.App. 876, 878 (2), 460 S.E.2d 100 (1995). 2. 1996Miller v. Ga. Ports Auth., 217 Ga.App. 876, 878 (2), 460 S.E.2d 100 (1995). 2. | 1 | 1 |
Reeves v. Stategreen2 sentences1996The only authority cited by defendant is merely an approval of an instruction which contains the phrase “unless and until” rather than the single word “until.” See Reeves v. State, 241 Ga. 44, 48 (4) ( 243 SE2d 24 ). 1996The only authority cited by defendant is merely an approval of an instruction which contains the phrase “unless and until” rather than the single word “until.” See Reeves v. State, 241 Ga. 44, 48 (4) ( 243 SE2d 24 ). | 1 | 1 |
Gentry v. Stategreen2 sentences1994Gentry v. State, 213 Ga. App. 24, 25 (2) ( 443 SE2d 667 ). 1994Gentry v. State, 213 Ga. App. 24, 25 (2) ( 443 SE2d 667 ). | 1 | 1 |
Gates v. Stategreen2 sentences1993However, "[a]t trial, the court has discretion in requiring a defendant to be handcuffed or shackled for security reasons. [Cit.]" Gates v. State, 244 Ga. 587, 593 (2) ( 261 SE2d 349 ) (1979). 1993However, "[a]t trial, the court has discretion in requiring a defendant to be handcuffed or shackled for security reasons. [Cit.]" Gates v. State, 244 Ga. 587, 593 (2) ( 261 SE2d 349 ) (1979). | 1 | 1 |
Jones v. Hutchinsgreen2 sentences1991“Expert testimony as to annuities which could be purchased with the settlement proceeds is irrelevant as it is antithetical to the requirement stated in Jones v. Hutchins, 101 Ga. App. 141, 149 ( 113 SE2d 475 ), that future pecuniary damages are to be reduced by the jury to the present value. 1991“Expert testimony as to annuities which could be purchased with the settlement proceeds is irrelevant as it is antithetical to the requirement stated in Jones v. Hutchins, 101 Ga. App. 141, 149 ( 113 SE2d 475 ), that future pecuniary damages are to be reduced by the jury to the present value. | 1 | 1 |
Davis v. Davidsongreen2 sentences1990While double recovery is not permitted for one injury, that principle has no application here because there were two injuries (Davis v. Davidson, 175 Ga. App. 451, 452 ( 333 SE2d 648 )); Count I under state law for not awarding Jones the contract as required (see Hilton Constr. 1990While double recovery is not permitted for one injury, that principle has no application here because there were two injuries (Davis v. Davidson, 175 Ga. App. 451, 452 ( 333 SE2d 648 )); Count I under state law for not awarding Jones the contract as required (see Hilton Constr. | 1 | 1 |
| Prophecy Corp. v. Charles Rossignol, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Powell v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Summer-Minter & Associates, Inc. v. Giordanogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Campbell v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bragg v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Smith v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lipsey v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Walker v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| McDaniel v. Greengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Auerbach v. Padgettgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Illinois v. Allengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Jackson v. Smithgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Foster v. Sikesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bramblett v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Balkcom v. McDanielgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Glenn v. Trust Co. of Columbusgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Wong v. Aluminum Supply Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Gosnell v. Waldripgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Sabel v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Whitaker v. Whitakergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Megar v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Brand v. Brandgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Driggers v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Scoggins v. WHITFIELD FINANCE COMPANYgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Smith v. State
green
2 sentences1991The trial court allowed the question except for the last clause: “and that she shot the deceased in order to defend herself.” Appellant argues that under Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 612 ( 277 SE2d 678 ) (1981), this part of the question should have been allowed. 1991The trial court allowed the question except for the last clause: “and that she shot the deceased in order to defend herself.” Appellant argues that under Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 612 ( 277 SE2d 678 ) (1981), this part of the question should have been allowed. | 2 | 1982–1991 |
Phillips v. Abel
green
2 sentences1982The first enumeration of error contends that the trial court erred in denying appellant’s motion for summary judgment. “ ‘After verdict and judgment, it is too late to review a judgment denying a summary judgment, for that judgment becomes moot when the court reviews the evidence upon the trial of the case.’ Phillips v. Abel, 141 Ga. App. 291 (1) ( 233 SE2d 384 ) (1977). 1982The first enumeration of error contends that the trial court erred in denying appellant’s motion for summary judgment. “ ‘After verdict and judgment, it is too late to review a judgment denying a summary judgment, for that judgment becomes moot when the court reviews the evidence upon the trial of the case.’ Phillips v. Abel, 141 Ga. App. 291 (1) ( 233 SE2d 384 ) (1977). | 2 | 1978–1982 |
Talmadge v. Talmadge
green
2 sentences1982The first enumeration of error involves the failure of the trial judge to grant the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment. “ ‘After verdict and judgment, it is too late to review a judgment denying a summary judgment, for that judgment becomes moot when the court reviews the evidence upon the trial of the case.’ ” Talmadge v. Talmadge, 241 Ga. 609 (1) ( 247 SE2d 61 ). 1982The first enumeration of error involves the failure of the trial judge to grant the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment. “ ‘After verdict and judgment, it is too late to review a judgment denying a summary judgment, for that judgment becomes moot when the court reviews the evidence upon the trial of the case.’ ” Talmadge v. Talmadge, 241 Ga. 609 (1) ( 247 SE2d 61 ). | 2 | 1982–1982 |
Citizens & Contractors Bank v. Maddox
green
2 sentences2003The complaint in Chilivis apparently did not invoke the Declaratory Judgment Act. [13] Id. at 90 , 222 S.E.2d 371 . [14] See generally Acree v. Walls, 240 Ga. 778, 790 , 243 S.E.2d 489 (1978) (rights of individual taxpayers are protected by notice and opportunity to be heard). [15] Nix v. Long Mountain Resources, 262 Ga. 506, 509 (3), 422 S.E.2d 195 (1992), citing Citizens' & Contractors' Bank v. Maddox, 175 Ga. 779, 784-785 , 166 S.E. 227 (1932). 2003The complaint in Chilivis apparently did not invoke the Declaratory Judgment Act. [13] Id. at 90 , 222 S.E.2d 371 . [14] See generally Acree v. Walls, 240 Ga. 778, 790 , 243 S.E.2d 489 (1978) (rights of individual taxpayers are protected by notice and opportunity to be heard). [15] Nix v. Long Mountain Resources, 262 Ga. 506, 509 (3), 422 S.E.2d 195 (1992), citing Citizens' & Contractors' Bank v. Maddox, 175 Ga. 779, 784-785 , 166 S.E. 227 (1932). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Acree v. Walls
green
2 sentences2003The complaint in Chilivis apparently did not invoke the Declaratory Judgment Act. [13] Id. at 90 , 222 S.E.2d 371 . [14] See generally Acree v. Walls, 240 Ga. 778, 790 , 243 S.E.2d 489 (1978) (rights of individual taxpayers are protected by notice and opportunity to be heard). [15] Nix v. Long Mountain Resources, 262 Ga. 506, 509 (3), 422 S.E.2d 195 (1992), citing Citizens' & Contractors' Bank v. Maddox, 175 Ga. 779, 784-785 , 166 S.E. 227 (1932). 2003The complaint in Chilivis apparently did not invoke the Declaratory Judgment Act. [13] Id. at 90 , 222 S.E.2d 371 . [14] See generally Acree v. Walls, 240 Ga. 778, 790 , 243 S.E.2d 489 (1978) (rights of individual taxpayers are protected by notice and opportunity to be heard). [15] Nix v. Long Mountain Resources, 262 Ga. 506, 509 (3), 422 S.E.2d 195 (1992), citing Citizens' & Contractors' Bank v. Maddox, 175 Ga. 779, 784-785 , 166 S.E. 227 (1932). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Lee Street Auto Sales, Inc. v. Warren
green
2 sentences2000To state a cause of action for negligence in Georgia, the following elements are essential: “(1) A legal duty to conform to a standard of conduct raised by the law for the protection of others against unreasonable risks of harm; (2) a breach of this standard; (3) a legally attributable causal connection between the conduct and the resulting injury; and, (4) some loss or damage flowing to the plaintiff’s legally protected interest as a result of the alleged breach of the legal duty.” Lee Street Auto Sales v. Warren, 102 Ga. App. 345 (1) ( 116 SE2d 243 ) (1960). 2000To state a cause of action for negligence in Georgia, the following elements are essential: “(1) A legal duty to conform to a standard of conduct raised by the law for the protection of others against unreasonable risks of harm; (2) a breach of this standard; (3) a legally attributable causal connection between the conduct and the resulting injury; and, (4) some loss or damage flowing to the plaintiff’s legally protected interest as a result of the alleged breach of the legal duty.” Lee Street Auto Sales v. Warren, 102 Ga. App. 345 (1) ( 116 SE2d 243 ) (1960). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Fudge v. COLONIAL BAKING COMPANY OF ATLANTA
green
2 sentences1998See OCGA § 9-11-56 (a); Fudge v. Colonial Baking Co. of Atlanta, 186 Ga. App. 582 (1) ( 367 SE2d 814 ). 2. 1998See OCGA § 9-11-56 (a); Fudge v. Colonial Baking Co. of Atlanta, 186 Ga. App. 582 (1) ( 367 SE2d 814 ). 2. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Gauker v. Eubanks
green
2 sentences1996Although appellants assert that the deeds in evidence establish the boundaries of the disputed property and that acquiescence will not establish a divisional line in disregard of definite boundaries fixed by deeds, see Gauker v. Eubanks, 230 Ga. 893 ( 199 SE2d 771 ) (1973), the arbitrator found that neither of the extensive chain of deeds that the parties presented at the hearing conclusively established a boundary line for the disputed property. 1996Although appellants assert that the deeds in evidence establish the boundaries of the disputed property and that acquiescence will not establish a divisional line in disregard of definite boundaries fixed by deeds, see Gauker v. Eubanks, 230 Ga. 893 ( 199 SE2d 771 ) (1973), the arbitrator found that neither of the extensive chain of deeds that the parties presented at the hearing conclusively established a boundary line for the disputed property. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Bloodworth v. State of Georgia
green
2 sentences1996Miller v. Ga. Ports Auth., 217 Ga. App. 876, 878 (2) ( 460 SE2d 100 ) (1995). 2.1 concur because, even without the hearsay evidence from the informant to which the property owner objected, the evidence supported the trial court’s finding of fact that, by a preponderance, the real property was used, and in fact was being used at the time of the search, “to manufacture and store marijuana for distribution.” See Bloodworth v. State of Ga., 185 Ga. App. 880 ( 366 SE2d 324 ) (1988), regarding burden of proof. 1996Miller v. Ga. Ports Auth., 217 Ga. App. 876, 878 (2) ( 460 SE2d 100 ) (1995). 2.1 concur because, even without the hearsay evidence from the informant to which the property owner objected, the evidence supported the trial court’s finding of fact that, by a preponderance, the real property was used, and in fact was being used at the time of the search, “to manufacture and store marijuana for distribution.” See Bloodworth v. State of Ga., 185 Ga. App. 880 ( 366 SE2d 324 ) (1988), regarding burden of proof. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Sarver v. State
green
2 sentences1996Defendant’s argument is predicated on an incorrect reading of Sarver v. State, 206 Ga. App. 459 (2) ( 426 SE2d 48 ) which notes that the statute provides alternative and separate ways by which the crime may be committed. 1996Defendant’s argument is predicated on an incorrect reading of Sarver v. State, 206 Ga. App. 459 (2) ( 426 SE2d 48 ) which notes that the statute provides alternative and separate ways by which the crime may be committed. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Department of Transportation v. Hudson
green
1 sentence1995Citing Dept. of Transp. v. Hudson, 179 Ga. App. 842 ( 34 SE2d 106 ) (1986), the condemnees contend that the City abused its discretion in failing to consider less burdensome alternatives. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Kennedy v. State
green
2 sentences1995The recent panel decision in Kennedy v. State, 217 Ga.App. 18 , 456 S.E.2d 288 (1995) illustrates another problem of remand when the claim is not made below despite opportunity therefor. 1995The recent panel decision in Kennedy v. State, 217 Ga.App. 18 , 456 S.E.2d 288 (1995) illustrates another problem of remand when the claim is not made below despite opportunity therefor. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Bruton v. United States
green
1 sentence1994The first enumeration of error alleges violations of the holding Bruton v. United States, 391 U. S. 123 (88 SC 1620, 20 LE2d 476) permitting two police detectives to testify concerning statements ven by co-defendant Earl, who was tried along with defendant but lose not to testify at trial. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Thompson v. State
green
2 sentences1994The charge given by the trial court in this case was framed in terms of permissible inferences, not presumptions, and the charge was in accord with *581 this court’s holding in Thompson v. State, 257 Ga. 481 ( 361 SE2d 154 ) (1987). 3. 1994The charge given by the trial court in this case was framed in terms of permissible inferences, not presumptions, and the charge was in accord with *581 this court’s holding in Thompson v. State, 257 Ga. 481 ( 361 SE2d 154 ) (1987). 3. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Brown v. Nutter green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Batson v. Kentucky green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Drope v. Missouri green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Blackburn v. Alabama green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Williams v. State green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Hagar v. State green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Jordan v. State neutral | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Robson v. Shelnutt green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Hall v. State green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Taylor v. State green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Wright Body Works, Inc. v. Columbus Interstate Insurance Agency green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Sandstrom v. Montana green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Lackey v. State green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Carter v. State green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Glenn v. State green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Fraser v. Martin green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Turnipseed v. State green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Redmond v. Blau green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Sanders v. State green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Fisher v. State green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| University Cab, Inc. v. Fagan neutral | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Doyle v. Ohio green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| University Cab, Inc. v. Fagan green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Hagin v. Powers green | 1 | 1980–1980 |