Wilkerson factors in Tennessee

2021See State v. Lane, 3 S.W.3d 456, 461 (Tenn. 1999) (stating that the Wilkerson factors are confined to cases involving consecutive sentencing under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-115(b)(4)).

2021See State v. Lane, 3 S.W.3d 456, 461 (Tenn. 1999) (stating that the Wilkerson factors are confined to cases involving consecutive sentencing under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-115(b)(4)).

2025Before imposing consecutive sentences based upon this classification, the trial court must find that “an extended sentence is necessary to protect the public against further criminal conduct by the defendant and that the consecutive sentences must reasonably relate to the severity of the offenses committed.” State v. Wilkerson, 905 S.W.2d 933, 939 (Tenn. 1995); see Pollard, 432 S.W.3d at 863 (holding that the Wilkerson factors still apply after adoption of the abuse of discretion standard).

2025Before imposing consecutive sentences based upon this classification, the trial court must find that “an extended sentence is necessary to protect the public against further criminal conduct by the defendant and that the consecutive sentences must reasonably relate to the severity of the offenses committed.” State v. Wilkerson, 905 S.W.2d 933, 939 (Tenn. 1995); see Pollard, 432 S.W.3d at 863 (holding that the Wilkerson factors still apply after adoption of the abuse of discretion standard).

2025Before imposing consecutive sentences based upon this classification, the trial court must find that “an extended sentence is necessary to protect the public against further criminal conduct by the defendant and that the consecutive sentences must reasonably relate to the severity of the offenses committed.” State v. Wilkerson, 905 S.W.2d 933, 939 (Tenn. 1995); see Pollard, 432 S.W.3d at 863 (holding that the Wilkerson factors still apply after adoption of the abuse of discretion standard).

2025Before imposing consecutive sentences based upon this classification, the trial court must find that “an extended sentence is necessary to protect the public against further criminal conduct by the defendant and that the consecutive sentences must reasonably relate to the severity of the offenses committed.” State v. Wilkerson, 905 S.W.2d 933, 939 (Tenn. 1995); see Pollard, 432 S.W.3d at 863 (holding that the Wilkerson factors still apply after adoption of the abuse of discretion standard).

2025Additionally, consecutive sentencing is guided by general sentencing principles providing that the length of the sentence be “justly deserved in relation to the seriousness of the offense” and “no greater than that deserved for the offense committed.” State v. Imfeld, 70 S.W.3d 698, 708 (Tenn. 2002) (quoting T.C.A. §§ 40-35-102(1) and -103(2)).

2025Additionally, consecutive sentencing is guided by general sentencing principles providing that the length of the sentence be “justly deserved in relation to the seriousness of the offense” and “no greater than that deserved for the offense committed.” State v. Imfeld, 70 S.W.3d 698, 708 (Tenn. 2002) (quoting T.C.A. §§ 40-35-102(1) and -103(2)).

2022Relevant to this case, the trial court found that the Appellant was “a dangerous offender whose behavior indicates little or no regard for human life and no hesitation about committing a crime in which the risk to human life is high.” However, in order to impose consecutive sentencing based upon finding that a defendant is a dangerous offender, a court must also find the so-called “Wilkerson factors,” namely that “(1) the sentences are necessary in order to protect the public from further misconduct by the defendant and [that] (2) ‘the terms are reasonably related to the severity of the offens

2019Conclusion Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. _________________________________ NORMA MCGEE OGLE, JUDGE 1 In order to impose consecutive sentencing based upon finding that a defendant is a dangerous offender, a court must also find the so-called “Wilkerson factors,” namely that “(1) the sentences are necessary in order to protect the public from further misconduct by the defendant and [that] (2) ‘the terms are reasonably related to the severity of the offenses.’” State v. Moore, 942 S.W.2d 570, 574 (Tenn. Crim.

2021The State concedes that the trial court failed to make the necessary findings to impose consecutive sentences based upon the dangerous offender category but asks this court to “conduct a de novo review because the record clearly demonstrates the existence of both Wilkerson factors.” Our supreme court has adopted an abuse of discretion standard of review for sentencing and has prescribed “a presumption of reasonableness to within-range sentencing decisions that reflect a proper application of the purposes and principles of our Sentencing Act.” State v. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682, 707 (Tenn. 2012).

2016Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 705 & n.41; see also Pollard, 432 S.W.3d at 864 (remanding the case is the better course for consideration of fact-intensive inquiry about Wilkerson factors).

2013The trial court noted that the defendant’s criminal activity spanned 24 years and that “the only thing that stops [the defendant] from committing crimes is when he is in prison.” With respect to the dangerous offender category, the trial court found that the defendant continued to carry firearms “when he knows he has no legal ability to do so” and noted that the only reason the defendant appeared to have shot Mr. Edwards was that the victim “apparently [was] not moving quickly enough when [the defendant] demanded property from Mr. Edwards.” The trial court examined the Wilkerson factors and fo

2013The trial court noted that the defendant’s criminal activity spanned 24 years and that “the only thing that stops [the defendant] from committing crimes is when he is in prison.” With respect to the dangerous offender category, the trial court found that the defendant continued to carry firearms “when he knows he has no legal ability to do so” and noted that the only reason the defendant appeared to have shot Mr. Edwards was that the victim “apparently [was] not moving quickly enough when [the defendant] demanded property from Mr. Edwards.” The trial court examined the Wilkerson factors and fo

2018See Wilkerson, 905 S.W.2d at 939 (Tenn. 1995), see also Arroyo v. State, 434 S.W.3d 555, 557 (Tenn. 2014).

2018See Wilkerson, 905 S.W.2d at 939 (Tenn. 1995), see also Arroyo v. State, 434 S.W.3d 555, 557 (Tenn. 2014).

2014Dickson, 413 S.W.3d at 748 (citing State v. Mickens, 123 S.W.3d 355, 394 (Tenn. Crim.

2014Dickson, 413 S.W.3d at 748 (citing State v. Mickens, 123 S.W.3d 355, 394 (Tenn. Crim.

2013State v. Imfeld, 70 S.W.3d 698, 708 (Tenn. 2002); Wilkerson, 905 14 S.W.2d at 939.