prove-up hearing in Nevada

2016Following argument on Simao's motion to strike Rish's answer, the district court entered a written order analyzing the factors in Young v. ...continued 655, 656 (D.C. 1963); Cancio v. White, 697 N.E.2d 749, 756 (Ill.

2016Following argument on Simao's motion to strike Rish's answer, the district court entered a written order analyzing the factors in Young v. ...continued 655, 656 (D.C. 1963); Cancio v. White, 697 N.E.2d 749, 756 (Ill.

2023Hamlett v. Reynolds, 114 Nev. 863, 866, 963 P.2d 457, 459 (1998); see also Kelly Broad.

2023Hamlett v. Reynolds, 114 Nev. 863, 866, 963 P.2d 457, 459 (1998); see also Kelly Broad.

2022Co., 114 Nev. 1176, 1181, 969 P.2d 938, 941 (1998) (reaffirming the applicability of Young's heightened standard of review to cases involving “abusive litigation practices’); see also Irox, Nos. 80668 & 81212, 2021 WL 4205697, at *2 (veversing and remanding where the district court failed to weigh the Young factors when it dismissed appellant’s complaint with prejudice after finding that appellant engaged in misconduct by impermissibly influencing witnesses and that appellant was vexatious).

2022Co., 114 Nev. 1176, 1181, 969 P.2d 938, 941 (1998) (reaffirming the applicability of Young's heightened standard of review to cases involving “abusive litigation practices’); see also Irox, Nos. 80668 & 81212, 2021 WL 4205697, at *2 (veversing and remanding where the district court failed to weigh the Young factors when it dismissed appellant’s complaint with prejudice after finding that appellant engaged in misconduct by impermissibly influencing witnesses and that appellant was vexatious).

2023During the prove-up hearing, the district court considers the allegations in the pleadings deemed admitted in determining "whether the nonoffending party has established a prima facie case for liability." Id. at 67 , 227 P.3d at 1049-50 .

2023During the prove-up hearing, the district court considers the allegations in the pleadings deemed admitted in determining "whether the nonoffending party has established a prima facie case for liability." Id. at 67 , 227 P.3d at 1049-50 .

2023Cf. Matsushima v. Rego, 696 P.2d 843, 845-46 (Haw. 1985) (concluding under Hawau’s Rule 54(c) that judgment as to quieting title was void because it was not requested in the pleadings); In re Marriage of Hughes, 116 P.3d 1042, 1043, 1046 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted) (determining under Washington’s Rule 54(c) that “a court has no jurisdiction to grant relief beyond that sought in the complaint” and must “vacate the default to the extent it differed from the original [complaint]” when the plaintiff alleged she was not pregnant yet changed her pregnancy status and deni

2023Cf. Matsushima v. Rego, 696 P.2d 843, 845-46 (Haw. 1985) (concluding under Hawau’s Rule 54(c) that judgment as to quieting title was void because it was not requested in the pleadings); In re Marriage of Hughes, 116 P.3d 1042, 1043, 1046 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted) (determining under Washington’s Rule 54(c) that “a court has no jurisdiction to grant relief beyond that sought in the complaint” and must “vacate the default to the extent it differed from the original [complaint]” when the plaintiff alleged she was not pregnant yet changed her pregnancy status and deni

2014Cf. Salman v. Newell, 110 Nev. 1333, 1336 , 885 P.2d 607, 608 (1994) SUPREME COURT OF continued on next page...

2014Cf. Salman v. Newell, 110 Nev. 1333, 1336 , 885 P.2d 607, 608 (1994) SUPREME COURT OF continued on next page...

2012Cf. Aldabe v. Adams, 81 Nev. 280, 284-85 , 402 P.2d 34, 36-37 (1965) (refusing to credit a sworn statement made in opposition to summary judgment that was in direct conflict with an earlier sworn statement of the same party), overruled on other grounds by Siragusa v. Brown, 114 Nev. 1384, 1393 , 971 P.2d 801, 807 (1998).

2012Cf. Aldabe v. Adams, 81 Nev. 280, 284-85 , 402 P.2d 34, 36-37 (1965) (refusing to credit a sworn statement made in opposition to summary judgment that was in direct conflict with an earlier sworn statement of the same party), overruled on other grounds by Siragusa v. Brown, 114 Nev. 1384, 1393 , 971 P.2d 801, 807 (1998).

2012Cf. Aldabe v. Adams, 81 Nev. 280, 284-85 , 402 P.2d 34, 36-37 (1965) (refusing to credit a sworn statement made in opposition to summary judgment that was in direct conflict with an earlier sworn statement of the same party), overruled on other grounds by Siragusa v. Brown, 114 Nev. 1384, 1393 , 971 P.2d 801, 807 (1998).

2012Cf. Aldabe v. Adams, 81 Nev. 280, 284-85 , 402 P.2d 34, 36-37 (1965) (refusing to credit a sworn statement made in opposition to summary judgment that was in direct conflict with an earlier sworn statement of the same party), overruled on other grounds by Siragusa v. Brown, 114 Nev. 1384, 1393 , 971 P.2d 801, 807 (1998).

1998Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by striking Hamlett’s answer and entering default against him. *866 Hamlett next argues that the district court erred in allowing Reynolds to amend her complaint to conform to the evidence presented at the prove-up hearing, in violation of NRCP 54(c). 1 In Kelly Broadcasting v. Sovereign Broadcasting, 96 Nev. 188, 193 , 606 P.2d 1089, 1092 (1980), this court noted that a party ordinarily is not entitled to amend a complaint once default judgment has been entered.

1998Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by striking Hamlett’s answer and entering default against him. *866 Hamlett next argues that the district court erred in allowing Reynolds to amend her complaint to conform to the evidence presented at the prove-up hearing, in violation of NRCP 54(c). 1 In Kelly Broadcasting v. Sovereign Broadcasting, 96 Nev. 188, 193 , 606 P.2d 1089, 1092 (1980), this court noted that a party ordinarily is not entitled to amend a complaint once default judgment has been entered.

1994We conclude that Rivera violated this statute by not providing McNair with three days’ notice of the prove-up hearing, thus rendering the default judgment void (Christy v. Carlisle, 94 Nev. 651, 654 , 584 P.2d 687, 689 (1978)), and subject to a motion for relief under NRCP 60(b)(3).

1994We conclude that Rivera violated this statute by not providing McNair with three days’ notice of the prove-up hearing, thus rendering the default judgment void (Christy v. Carlisle, 94 Nev. 651, 654 , 584 P.2d 687, 689 (1978)), and subject to a motion for relief under NRCP 60(b)(3).