sixth assignment error in Oregon

2025Cite as 341 Or App 674 (2025) 677 I.

2025Cite as 341 Or App 674 (2025) 677 I.

2025“Generally, an issue not preserved in the trial court will not be considered on appeal.” State v. Wyatt, 331 Or 335, 341 , 15 P3d 22 (2000).

2025“Generally, an issue not preserved in the trial court will not be considered on appeal.” State v. Wyatt, 331 Or 335, 341 , 15 P3d 22 (2000).

2024In the seventh, defen- dant argues that the trial court erred when it overruled his objection to a statement that the prosecutor made in clos- ing arguments that he contends constituted burden shifting, and, finally, in the eighth assignment, defendant argues that the court plainly erred by permitting the prosecutor to make other statements in closing arguments that he contends mis- stated the jury’s function and the burden of proof.1 In light of our disposition on the sixth assignment of error, and the Supreme Court’s recent decision in State v. Davis, 372 Or 618 , ___ P3d ___ (2024), we do n

2024In the seventh, defen- dant argues that the trial court erred when it overruled his objection to a statement that the prosecutor made in clos- ing arguments that he contends constituted burden shifting, and, finally, in the eighth assignment, defendant argues that the court plainly erred by permitting the prosecutor to make other statements in closing arguments that he contends mis- stated the jury’s function and the burden of proof.1 In light of our disposition on the sixth assignment of error, and the Supreme Court’s recent decision in State v. Davis, 372 Or 618 , ___ P3d ___ (2024), we do n

2026Nonprecedential Memo Op: 350 Or App 139 (2026) 143 by allowing child support to be based on unverified and inac- curate childcare payment[s], accepting childcare bills from [wife’s] personal friend rather than proof of childcare pay- ments.” Again, husband invited the error by agreeing to the child support terms, so the invited-error doctrine applies, and we reject the sixth assignment of error.

2025Cite as 342 Or App 682 (2025) 685 In the superintendent’s sixth assignment of error, he contends that the post-conviction court erred in granting petitioner’s motion to preclude imposition of a life without parole sentence.

2025It also acknowledged that there were “typographical errors and inadvertent omissions” in the superintendent’s answer, that the superintendent would “seek this court’s leave to file an amended answer correcting them,” and “reiterate[d] that [the superintendent] does not admit any deficient per- formance by petitioner’s counsel and * * * superintendent denies that petitioner is entitled to post-conviction relief, except for the vacation of the death sentence.” On April 13, 2023, the superintendent filed his motion for leave to file an amended answer, acknowledging 3 As explained in our discussio

2025It also acknowledged that there were “typographical errors and inadvertent omissions” in the superintendent’s answer, that the superintendent would “seek this court’s leave to file an amended answer correcting them,” and “reiterate[d] that [the superintendent] does not admit any deficient per- formance by petitioner’s counsel and * * * superintendent denies that petitioner is entitled to post-conviction relief, except for the vacation of the death sentence.” On April 13, 2023, the superintendent filed his motion for leave to file an amended answer, acknowledging 3 As explained in our discussio

2019As for the sixth assignment of error, the state con- cedes that, under State v. Hillman, 293 Or App 231, 232-33 , 426 P3d 249 (2018), the trial court erred when it imposed a probation violation fee without announcing that it was going to do so in open court at sentencing.

2019As for the sixth assignment of error, the state con- cedes that, under State v. Hillman, 293 Or App 231, 232-33 , 426 P3d 249 (2018), the trial court erred when it imposed a probation violation fee without announcing that it was going to do so in open court at sentencing.

2015The Supreme Court interpreted ORS 138.050(1)(a) in State v. Cloutier, 351 Or 68 , 261 P3d 1234 (2011).

2015The Supreme Court interpreted ORS 138.050(1)(a) in State v. Cloutier, 351 Or 68 , 261 P3d 1234 (2011).

2013In a sixth assignment of error, defendant urges us to overrule a recent precedent, State v. Stamper, 197 Or App 413 , 106 P3d 172 , rev den, 339 Or 230 (2005).

2013In a sixth assignment of error, defendant urges us to overrule a recent precedent, State v. Stamper, 197 Or App 413 , 106 P3d 172 , rev den, 339 Or 230 (2005).

2013In a sixth assignment of error, defendant urges us to overrule a recent precedent, State v. Stamper, 197 Or App 413 , 106 P3d 172 , rev den, 339 Or 230 (2005).

2011See, e.g., Shields v. Dept. of Rev., 266 Or 461, 464-66 , 513 P2d 784 (1973) (where no comparable sales for regional shopping center were available, and income and expenses of shopping center had not stabilized, cost approach was the proper method of determining property’s fair market value); PP&L v. Dept. of Rev., 308 Or 49 , 775 P2d 303 (1989) (deriving fair market value of utility from cost approach and income approach).

2011See, e.g., Shields v. Dept. of Rev., 266 Or 461, 464-66 , 513 P2d 784 (1973) (where no comparable sales for regional shopping center were available, and income and expenses of shopping center had not stabilized, cost approach was the proper method of determining property’s fair market value); PP&L v. Dept. of Rev., 308 Or 49 , 775 P2d 303 (1989) (deriving fair market value of utility from cost approach and income approach).

2010The majority concludes that the alleged error was preserved, but concludes that, even assuming Cameron's statement was evidence of bias, the trial court did not err in refusing to admit the evidence. 349 Or. at 189-95 , 243 P.3d at 41-44 .

2010The majority concludes that the alleged error was preserved, but concludes that, even assuming Cameron's statement was evidence of bias, the trial court did not err in refusing to admit the evidence. 349 Or. at 189-95 , 243 P.3d at 41-44 .

1957(People v. Conroy, 97 N. Y. 62, 68, 69 ; People v. Giblin, 115 N. Y. 196 .)” We conclude that a conviction of felony murder under the form of indictment employed here can be sustained, and we are brought to a consideration of the second exception to the court’s instruction on second degree murder in the commission of a felonious assault, namely, that there could be “no transferred intent in the crime of assault unless the assault is accompanied by a battery or attempted battery on the person being assaulted, and, therefore, there would be no transferred assault with a dangerous weapon, or othe