15 Pennsylvania opinions name it 4 courts 1980–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Gleason v. Borough of Moosicgreen2 sentences2021See Gleason v. Borough of Moosic, 15 A.3d 479 (Pa. 2011). 4 An earlier argument was held before the common pleas judge who issued the December 18, 2018 Order, but that judge determined that he should not hear the Post-Trial Motion due to a conflict. 2020The applicability of the discovery rule may be resolved “at the summary judgment stage where reasonable minds could not differ on the subject.” Wilson v. El- Daief, 964 A.2d 354, 361-62 (Pa. 2009) (emphasis added); see also Gleason v. Borough of Moosic, 15 A.3d 479, 485 (Pa. 2011). | 4 | 4 |
Wilson v. El-Daiefgreen2 sentences2020The applicability of the discovery rule may be resolved “at the summary judgment stage where reasonable minds could not differ on the subject.” Wilson v. El- Daief, 964 A.2d 354, 361-62 (Pa. 2009) (emphasis added); see also Gleason v. Borough of Moosic, 15 A.3d 479, 485 (Pa. 2011). 2019See Wilson v. El-Daief, 600 Pa. 161 , 964 A.2d 354, 361-62 (2009) (holding the applicability of the discovery rule may be resolved "at the summary judgment stage where reasonable minds could not differ on the subject") (quotation marks and quotations omitted)); Cochran v. GAF Corp., 542 Pa. 210, 216 , 666 A.2d 245, 248 (1995) ("[Me have not hesitated to find as a matter of law that a party has not used reasonable diligence in 13 The Clarks contend the Supreme Court's holding in Nicolaou, supra, "clarified" that whether the plaintiff met the discovery rule is "a jury question." The Clark's Brie | 3 | 3 |
Cochran v. GAF Corp.green2 sentences2019Nevertheless, the applicability of the discovery rule may be resolved “at the summary judgment stage where reasonable minds could not differ on the subject.” Id.; see also Cochran v. GAF Corp., 542 Pa. 210, 216 , 666 A.2d 245, 248 (Pa. 1995) (“[W]e have not hesitated to find as a matter of law that a party has not used reasonable diligence in ascertaining the cause of an injury thus barring the party from asserting their claim under the discovery rule.”). 2019Nevertheless, the applicability of the discovery rule may be resolved “at the summary judgment stage where reasonable minds could not differ on the subject.” Id.; see also Cochran v. GAF Corp., 542 Pa. 210, 216 , 666 A.2d 245, 248 (Pa. 1995) (“[W]e have not hesitated to find as a matter of law that a party has not used reasonable diligence in ascertaining the cause of an injury thus barring the party from asserting their claim under the discovery rule.”). | 2 | 2 |
Fine v. Checciogreen2 sentences2011In Fine v. Checcio, 582 Pa. 253 , 870 A.2d 850 (2005), our Supreme Court affirmed the applicability of the discovery rule in cases involving latent injuries or instances where the causal connection between an injury and another’s conduct was not apparent. 2011In Fine v. Checcio, 582 Pa. 253 , 870 A.2d 850 (2005), our Supreme Court affirmed the applicability of the discovery rule in cases involving latent injuries or instances where the causal connection between an injury and another’s conduct was not apparent. | 1 | 3 |
Nicolaou, N., h/w, Aplts. v. J. Martin M.D.green2 sentences2020Importantly here, this Court, interpreting Nicolaou, supra, recently observed that the Supreme “Court emphasized the jury’s prerogative, under the discovery rule, to decide whether a plaintiff’s efforts to investigate a defendant were sufficiently reasonable to toll the statute of limitations.” Rice v. Diocese of Altoona-Johnstown, 212 A.3d 1055, 1059 (Pa. Super. 2019); see also Nicolaou, 195 A.3d at 894 (stating that the determination of whether a plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence relevant to the application of the discovery rule is generally a question for the jury); Fine v. Checcio, 2019See Wilson v. El-Daief, 600 Pa. 161 , 964 A.2d 354, 361-62 (2009) (holding the applicability of the discovery rule may be resolved "at the summary judgment stage where reasonable minds could not differ on the subject") (quotation marks and quotations omitted)); Cochran v. GAF Corp., 542 Pa. 210, 216 , 666 A.2d 245, 248 (1995) ("[Me have not hesitated to find as a matter of law that a party has not used reasonable diligence in 13 The Clarks contend the Supreme Court's holding in Nicolaou, supra, "clarified" that whether the plaintiff met the discovery rule is "a jury question." The Clark's Brie | 1 | 2 |
Baumgart v. Keene Building Products Corp.green1 sentence2025Corp., 633 A.2d 1189, 1192 (Pa. Super. 1993) (noting that the discovery rule tolls the commencement of the statute of limitation to the date on which the plaintiff, through the exercise of diligence, first learned of the fact of a cause of action), affirmed, 666 A.2d 238 (Pa. 1995). 2 The correspondence from the sheriff’s office was attached to Appellant’s March 1, 2024 response to Appellee’s request for production of documents. 3 “Except as provided in subdivisions (b) and (c) and in Rules 400.1 and 1930.4, original process shall be served within the Commonwealth only by the sheriff.” Pa.R.Ci | 1 | 1 |
Rice, R. v. Diocese of Altoona-Johnstowngreen1 sentence2020Importantly here, this Court, interpreting Nicolaou, supra, recently observed that the Supreme “Court emphasized the jury’s prerogative, under the discovery rule, to decide whether a plaintiff’s efforts to investigate a defendant were sufficiently reasonable to toll the statute of limitations.” Rice v. Diocese of Altoona-Johnstown, 212 A.3d 1055, 1059 (Pa. Super. 2019); see also Nicolaou, 195 A.3d at 894 (stating that the determination of whether a plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence relevant to the application of the discovery rule is generally a question for the jury); Fine v. Checcio, | 1 | 1 |
Ford, E. v. Oliver, J.green1 sentence2019“The standard of reasonable diligence is an objective one.” Ford v. Oliver, 176 A.3d 891, 904-05 (Pa. Super. 2017) (quoting Mariner Chestnut Partners L.P. v. Lenfest, 152 A.3d 265, 279 (Pa. Super. 2016)). | 1 | 1 |
Mariner Chestnut Partners, L.P. Ex Rel. Lamm v. Lenfestgreen1 sentence2019“The standard of reasonable diligence is an objective one.” Ford v. Oliver, 176 A.3d 891, 904-05 (Pa. Super. 2017) (quoting Mariner Chestnut Partners L.P. v. Lenfest, 152 A.3d 265, 279 (Pa. Super. 2016)). | 1 | 1 |
Barshady v. Schlossergreen2 sentences1987See Barshady v. Schlosser, 226 Pa. Super. 260 , 313 A.2d 296 (1973) (per curiam affirmance of trial court’s nonsuit of plaintiff’s claim based on defendant’s invocation of statute of limitations — equally divided court). 1987See Barshady v. Schlosser, 226 Pa. Super. 260 , 313 A.2d 296 (1973) (per curiam affirmance of trial court’s nonsuit of plaintiff’s claim based on defendant’s invocation of statute of limitations — equally divided court). | 1 | 1 |
Newcomer v. Searle & Co.green1 sentence1980See Newcomer v. Searle & Co., 378 F.Supp. 1154 (E.D.Pa.1974) (Act of 1855 should be interpreted in conformity with the Act of 1895). c Appellants also offer an argument based not on their interpretation of the Act of 1895 (“injury”) or the Act of 1855 (“death”) but on considerations of general policy. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Baumgart v. Keene Building Products Corp.
green
1 sentence2025Corp., 633 A.2d 1189, 1192 (Pa. Super. 1993) (noting that the discovery rule tolls the commencement of the statute of limitation to the date on which the plaintiff, through the exercise of diligence, first learned of the fact of a cause of action), affirmed, 666 A.2d 238 (Pa. 1995). 2 The correspondence from the sheriff’s office was attached to Appellant’s March 1, 2024 response to Appellee’s request for production of documents. 3 “Except as provided in subdivisions (b) and (c) and in Rules 400.1 and 1930.4, original process shall be served within the Commonwealth only by the sheriff.” Pa.R.Ci | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Crouse v. Cyclops Industries
green
1 sentence2019In doing so, however, the Court noted, among other things, that the situation was not one “where the damages were based on an actual contract, but instead, on the quasi-contractual and equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment.” Id., slip op. at 6. 25 As pointed out by Justice Saylor in Crouse, states are split as to the applicability of the discovery rule in breach of contract actions. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Baily v. Lewis
green
1 sentence1993Faced with this lack of directly applicable Pennsylvania precedent, the trial court relied on the recent federal court decision in Baily v. Lewis, 763 F.Supp. 802 (E.D.Pa.1991), aff'd mem., 950 F.2d 721 (3d Cir.1991), where the court engaged in a thoroughgoing analysis of the applicability of the discovery rule in sexual assault and battery cases under Pennsylvania law. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Eddy v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board
green
1 sentence1993In Eddy v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Bell Transit, Inc.), 130 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 306, 568 A.2d 279 (1989), petition for allowance of appeal granted, 525 Pa. 606 , 575 A.2d 570 (1990), this Court stated: In Young the claimant suffered a disability due to the aggravation of a preexisting medical condition, rather than an occupational disease or an injury caused by ionizing radiation and argued that a discovery rule should apply in his case. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Allegheny Intern., Inc. v. Al Tech Specialty Steel Corp.
green
1 sentence1993Faced with this lack of directly applicable Pennsylvania precedent, the trial court relied on the recent federal court decision in Baily v. Lewis, 763 F.Supp. 802 (E.D.Pa.1991), aff'd mem., 950 F.2d 721 (3d Cir.1991), where the court engaged in a thoroughgoing analysis of the applicability of the discovery rule in sexual assault and battery cases under Pennsylvania law. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Gray v. Grunnagle
green
2 sentences1989The issue arises only because of the quirk of Pennsylvania law, first appearing in Gray v. Grunnagle, 423 Pa. *141 144, 223 A.2d 663 (1966), which has been construed to characterize a patient's suit against a physician for lack of informed consent as an action for assault and battery. [1] *142 This characterization is clearly out of line with modern cases from numerous other jurisdictions which view such an action as one for negligence. 1989The issue arises only because of the quirk of Pennsylvania law, first appearing in Gray v. Grunnagle, 423 Pa. 144 , 223 A.2d 663 (1966), which has been construed to characterize a patient’s suit against a physician for lack of informed consent as an action for assault and battery. 1 This characterization is clearly out of line with modern cases from numerous other jurisdictions which view such an action as one for negligence. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.