Legislature in setting standard in Washington

2001Thus the courts have rejected the use of the fact of injury, the age of the victim, and the fact that a burglary was of an occupied dwelling where those facts were elements of the crime and thus used as a basis for determining the applicable presumptive sentence range.")). [79] See State v. Cardenas, 129 Wash.2d 1, 6-7 , 914 P.2d 57 (1996) (Defendant's vehicular assault conviction, which contained the element of "serious bodily injury," in comparison with the victim's severe injuries, was of the type contemplated by the Legislature in setting the standard sentence range and could not justify a

2001See State v. Cardenas, 129 Wn.2d 1, 6-7 , 914 P.2d 57 (1996) (Defendant’s vehicular assault conviction, which contained the element of “serious bodily injury,” in comparison with the victim’s severe injuries, was of the type contemplated by the Legislature in setting the standard sentence range and could not justify an exceptional sentence.); Chadderton, 119 Wn.2d at 395 -96 (citing State v. Dunaway, 109 Wn.2d 207, 218 , 743 P.2d 1237 , 749 P.2d 160 (1987) (First degree murder contains the premeditation element of “planning,” was considered by the Legislature in establishing the standard sente

2010It held that the injuries unambiguously fell within the statutory definition of "great bodily harm." The court reconciled its ruling with its prior ruling in George by noting that the exceptional sentence in George was supported by the aggravating circumstance of the "`deliberate and gratuitous violence of the assault.'" Id. at 663, 866 P.2d 43 (quoting George, 67 Wash.App. at 223 n. 3, 834 P.2d 664 ). ¶ 14 In another vehicular assault case, the aforementioned Cardenas, this court reiterated that a victim's injuries do not justify an exceptional sentence unless they are "greater than that cont

2010It held that the injuries unambiguously fell within the statutory definition of "great bodily harm." The court reconciled its ruling with its prior ruling in George by noting that the exceptional sentence in George was supported by the aggravating circumstance of the "`deliberate and gratuitous violence of the assault.'" Id. at 663, 866 P.2d 43 (quoting George, 67 Wash.App. at 223 n. 3, 834 P.2d 664 ). ¶ 14 In another vehicular assault case, the aforementioned Cardenas, this court reiterated that a victim's injuries do not justify an exceptional sentence unless they are "greater than that cont

2001See State v. Cardenas, 129 Wn.2d 1, 6-7 , 914 P.2d 57 (1996) (Defendant’s vehicular assault conviction, which contained the element of “serious bodily injury,” in comparison with the victim’s severe injuries, was of the type contemplated by the Legislature in setting the standard sentence range and could not justify an exceptional sentence.); Chadderton, 119 Wn.2d at 395 -96 (citing State v. Dunaway, 109 Wn.2d 207, 218 , 743 P.2d 1237 , 749 P.2d 160 (1987) (First degree murder contains the premeditation element of “planning,” was considered by the Legislature in establishing the standard sente

2001See State v. Cardenas, 129 Wn.2d 1, 6-7 , 914 P.2d 57 (1996) (Defendant’s vehicular assault conviction, which contained the element of “serious bodily injury,” in comparison with the victim’s severe injuries, was of the type contemplated by the Legislature in setting the standard sentence range and could not justify an exceptional sentence.); Chadderton, 119 Wn.2d at 395 -96 (citing State v. Dunaway, 109 Wn.2d 207, 218 , 743 P.2d 1237 , 749 P.2d 160 (1987) (First degree murder contains the premeditation element of “planning,” was considered by the Legislature in establishing the standard sente

2001Thus the courts have rejected the use of the fact of injury, the age of the victim, and the fact that a burglary was of an occupied dwelling where those facts were elements of the crime and thus used as a basis for determining the applicable presumptive sentence range.")). [79] See State v. Cardenas, 129 Wash.2d 1, 6-7 , 914 P.2d 57 (1996) (Defendant's vehicular assault conviction, which contained the element of "serious bodily injury," in comparison with the victim's severe injuries, was of the type contemplated by the Legislature in setting the standard sentence range and could not justify a

2001See State v. Cardenas, 129 Wn.2d 1, 6-7 , 914 P.2d 57 (1996) (Defendant’s vehicular assault conviction, which contained the element of “serious bodily injury,” in comparison with the victim’s severe injuries, was of the type contemplated by the Legislature in setting the standard sentence range and could not justify an exceptional sentence.); Chadderton, 119 Wn.2d at 395 -96 (citing State v. Dunaway, 109 Wn.2d 207, 218 , 743 P.2d 1237 , 749 P.2d 160 (1987) (First degree murder contains the premeditation element of “planning,” was considered by the Legislature in establishing the standard sente

2011However, pursuant to the 2005 amendments, which codified the aggravating circumstances that can be used to support an exceptional sentence, such a sentence may be imposed where "[t]he victim's injuries substantially exceed the level of bodily harm necessary to satisfy the elements of the offense." RCW 9.94A.535(3)(y). ¶ 8 Our Supreme Court recently recognized that this statutory aggravating circumstance "creates a somewhat different test than we have employed in the past." State v. Stubbs, 170 Wash.2d 117, 128 , 240 P.3d 143 (2010).

2011However, pursuant to the 2005 amendments, which codified the aggravating circumstances that can be used to support an exceptional sentence, such a sentence may be imposed where “[t]he victim’s injuries substantially exceed the level of bodily harm necessary to satisfy the elements of the offense.” RCW 9.94A.535(3)(y). ¶8 Our Supreme Court recently recognized that this statutory aggravating circumstance “creates a somewhat different test than we have employed in the past.” State v. Stubbs, 170 Wn.2d 117, 128 , 240 P.3d 143 (2010).

2010It held that the injuries unambiguously fell within the statutory definition of "great bodily harm." The court reconciled its ruling with its prior ruling in George by noting that the exceptional sentence in George was supported by the aggravating circumstance of the "`deliberate and gratuitous violence of the assault.'" Id. at 663, 866 P.2d 43 (quoting George, 67 Wash.App. at 223 n. 3, 834 P.2d 664 ). ¶ 14 In another vehicular assault case, the aforementioned Cardenas, this court reiterated that a victim's injuries do not justify an exceptional sentence unless they are "greater than that cont

2010Although we do not compare a victim's injuries to the minimum level of harm that could have led to the same conviction in applying the serious injury aggravator, State v. Bourgeois, 72 Wash.App. 650, 662 , 866 P.2d 43 (1994), Goodwin's injuries obviously surpass this level of harm. [3] This disapproval was expressed in dicta, however, and did not overrule George because the discussion was not necessary to the resolution of the vehicular assault issue in Cardenas. [4] See Cardenas, 129 Wash.2d at 6-7 , 914 P.2d 57 ("Michel's injuries, while severe, are evidently the type of injuries envisioned

2006Hughes, 154 Wash.2d at 129, 110 P.3d 192 (The harm inflicted by the defendant was severe and not contemplated by the legislature in setting the standard range.).

2006Even though the Hughes trial court had held that each aggravating factor could support the exceptional sentence, id. at 130, 110 P.3d 192 , we did not conclude that this factor survived the Blakely challenge in that case.

2001Thus the courts have rejected the use of the fact of injury, the age of the victim, and the fact that a burglary was of an occupied dwelling where those facts were elements of the crime and thus used as a basis for determining the applicable presumptive sentence range.")). [79] See State v. Cardenas, 129 Wash.2d 1, 6-7 , 914 P.2d 57 (1996) (Defendant's vehicular assault conviction, which contained the element of "serious bodily injury," in comparison with the victim's severe injuries, was of the type contemplated by the Legislature in setting the standard sentence range and could not justify a

2001Thus the courts have rejected the use of the fact of injury, the age of the victim, and the fact that a burglary was of an occupied dwelling where those facts were elements of the crime and thus used as a basis for determining the applicable presumptive sentence range.")). [79] See State v. Cardenas, 129 Wash.2d 1, 6-7 , 914 P.2d 57 (1996) (Defendant's vehicular assault conviction, which contained the element of "serious bodily injury," in comparison with the victim's severe injuries, was of the type contemplated by the Legislature in setting the standard sentence range and could not justify a

2001Thus the courts have rejected the use of the fact of injury, the age of the victim, and the fact that a burglary was of an occupied dwelling where those facts were elements of the crime and thus used as a basis for determining the applicable presumptive sentence range.")). [79] See State v. Cardenas, 129 Wash.2d 1, 6-7 , 914 P.2d 57 (1996) (Defendant's vehicular assault conviction, which contained the element of "serious bodily injury," in comparison with the victim's severe injuries, was of the type contemplated by the Legislature in setting the standard sentence range and could not justify a

2001Thus the courts have rejected the use of the fact of injury, the age of the victim, and the fact that a burglary was of an occupied dwelling where those facts were elements of the crime and thus used as a basis for determining the applicable presumptive sentence range.")). [79] See State v. Cardenas, 129 Wash.2d 1, 6-7 , 914 P.2d 57 (1996) (Defendant's vehicular assault conviction, which contained the element of "serious bodily injury," in comparison with the victim's severe injuries, was of the type contemplated by the Legislature in setting the standard sentence range and could not justify a

2001State v. Ferguson, 142 Wn.2d 631, 649 , 15 P.3d 1271 (2001).

2001Thus the courts have rejected the use of the fact of injury, the age of the victim, and the fact that a burglary was of an occupied dwelling where those facts were elements of the crime and thus used as a basis for determining the applicable presumptive sentence range.")). [79] See State v. Cardenas, 129 Wash.2d 1, 6-7 , 914 P.2d 57 (1996) (Defendant's vehicular assault conviction, which contained the element of "serious bodily injury," in comparison with the victim's severe injuries, was of the type contemplated by the Legislature in setting the standard sentence range and could not justify a

2001Thus the courts have rejected the use of the fact of injury, the age of the victim, and the fact that a burglary was of an occupied dwelling where those facts were elements of the crime and thus used as a basis for determining the applicable presumptive sentence range.")). [79] See State v. Cardenas, 129 Wash.2d 1, 6-7 , 914 P.2d 57 (1996) (Defendant's vehicular assault conviction, which contained the element of "serious bodily injury," in comparison with the victim's severe injuries, was of the type contemplated by the Legislature in setting the standard sentence range and could not justify a

2001State v. Ferguson, 142 Wn.2d 631, 649 , 15 P.3d 1271 (2001).

2001Thus the courts have rejected the use of the fact of injury, the age of the victim, and the fact that a burglary was of an occupied dwelling where those facts were elements of the crime and thus used as a basis for determining the applicable presumptive sentence range.")). [79] See State v. Cardenas, 129 Wash.2d 1, 6-7 , 914 P.2d 57 (1996) (Defendant's vehicular assault conviction, which contained the element of "serious bodily injury," in comparison with the victim's severe injuries, was of the type contemplated by the Legislature in setting the standard sentence range and could not justify a

2001Thus the courts have rejected the use of the fact of injury, the age of the victim, and the fact that a burglary was of an occupied dwelling where those facts were elements of the crime and thus used as a basis for determining the applicable presumptive sentence range.")). [79] See State v. Cardenas, 129 Wash.2d 1, 6-7 , 914 P.2d 57 (1996) (Defendant's vehicular assault conviction, which contained the element of "serious bodily injury," in comparison with the victim's severe injuries, was of the type contemplated by the Legislature in setting the standard sentence range and could not justify a

2001Thus the courts have rejected the use of the fact of injury, the age of the victim, and the fact that a burglary was of an occupied dwelling where those facts were elements of the crime and thus used as a basis for determining the applicable presumptive sentence range.")). [79] See State v. Cardenas, 129 Wash.2d 1, 6-7 , 914 P.2d 57 (1996) (Defendant's vehicular assault conviction, which contained the element of "serious bodily injury," in comparison with the victim's severe injuries, was of the type contemplated by the Legislature in setting the standard sentence range and could not justify a

2001Thus the courts have rejected the use of the fact of injury, the age of the victim, and the fact that a burglary was of an occupied dwelling where those facts were elements of the crime and thus used as a basis for determining the applicable presumptive sentence range.")). [79] See State v. Cardenas, 129 Wash.2d 1, 6-7 , 914 P.2d 57 (1996) (Defendant's vehicular assault conviction, which contained the element of "serious bodily injury," in comparison with the victim's severe injuries, was of the type contemplated by the Legislature in setting the standard sentence range and could not justify a

2001Thus the courts have rejected the use of the fact of injury, the age of the victim, and the fact that a burglary was of an occupied dwelling where those facts were elements of the crime and thus used as a basis for determining the applicable presumptive sentence range.")). [79] See State v. Cardenas, 129 Wash.2d 1, 6-7 , 914 P.2d 57 (1996) (Defendant's vehicular assault conviction, which contained the element of "serious bodily injury," in comparison with the victim's severe injuries, was of the type contemplated by the Legislature in setting the standard sentence range and could not justify a

2001Thus the courts have rejected the use of the fact of injury, the age of the victim, and the fact that a burglary was of an occupied dwelling where those facts were elements of the crime and thus used as a basis for determining the applicable presumptive sentence range.")). [79] See State v. Cardenas, 129 Wash.2d 1, 6-7 , 914 P.2d 57 (1996) (Defendant's vehicular assault conviction, which contained the element of "serious bodily injury," in comparison with the victim's severe injuries, was of the type contemplated by the Legislature in setting the standard sentence range and could not justify a

2001Thus the courts have rejected the use of the fact of injury, the age of the victim, and the fact that a burglary was of an occupied dwelling where those facts were elements of the crime and thus used as a basis for determining the applicable presumptive sentence range.")). [79] See State v. Cardenas, 129 Wash.2d 1, 6-7 , 914 P.2d 57 (1996) (Defendant's vehicular assault conviction, which contained the element of "serious bodily injury," in comparison with the victim's severe injuries, was of the type contemplated by the Legislature in setting the standard sentence range and could not justify a

2001Thus the courts have rejected the use of the fact of injury, the age of the victim, and the fact that a burglary was of an occupied dwelling where those facts were elements of the crime and thus used as a basis for determining the applicable presumptive sentence range.")). [79] See State v. Cardenas, 129 Wash.2d 1, 6-7 , 914 P.2d 57 (1996) (Defendant's vehicular assault conviction, which contained the element of "serious bodily injury," in comparison with the victim's severe injuries, was of the type contemplated by the Legislature in setting the standard sentence range and could not justify a

2001Thus the courts have rejected the use of the fact of injury, the age of the victim, and the fact that a burglary was of an occupied dwelling where those facts were elements of the crime and thus used as a basis for determining the applicable presumptive sentence range.")). [79] See State v. Cardenas, 129 Wash.2d 1, 6-7 , 914 P.2d 57 (1996) (Defendant's vehicular assault conviction, which contained the element of "serious bodily injury," in comparison with the victim's severe injuries, was of the type contemplated by the Legislature in setting the standard sentence range and could not justify a

2001Thus the courts have rejected the use of the fact of injury, the age of the victim, and the fact that a burglary was of an occupied dwelling where those facts were elements of the crime and thus used as a basis for determining the applicable presumptive sentence range.")). [79] See State v. Cardenas, 129 Wash.2d 1, 6-7 , 914 P.2d 57 (1996) (Defendant's vehicular assault conviction, which contained the element of "serious bodily injury," in comparison with the victim's severe injuries, was of the type contemplated by the Legislature in setting the standard sentence range and could not justify a

2001See State v. Cardenas, 129 Wn.2d 1, 6-7 , 914 P.2d 57 (1996) (Defendant’s vehicular assault conviction, which contained the element of “serious bodily injury,” in comparison with the victim’s severe injuries, was of the type contemplated by the Legislature in setting the standard sentence range and could not justify an exceptional sentence.); Chadderton, 119 Wn.2d at 395 -96 (citing State v. Dunaway, 109 Wn.2d 207, 218 , 743 P.2d 1237 , 749 P.2d 160 (1987) (First degree murder contains the premeditation element of “planning,” was considered by the Legislature in establishing the standard sente