14 Alabama opinions name it 3 courts 1970–2007 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alabama courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ex Parte Bonnergreen2 sentences2007"This general rule is, however, subject to an equally well-established exception, namely, that ` [r]emedial statutes . . . are not within the legal [concept] of "retrospective laws," . . . and do operate retroactively , in the absence of language clearly showing a contrary intention.'" Ex parte Bonner , 676 So.2d 925 , 926 (Ala. 1995), quoting Street v. City of Anniston , 381 So.2d 26 , 29 (Ala. 1980). 2007He cites Ex parte Bonner, 676 So.2d 925, 926-27 (Ala.1995), in which we stated: “[T]his Court has often noted that ‘retrospective application of a statute is generally not favored, absent an express statutory provision or clear legislative intent that the enactment apply retroactively as well as prospectively.’ This general rule is, however, subject to an equally well-established exception, namely, that ‘[r]emedia.l statutes ... are not within the legal [concept] of “retrospective laws,” ... and do operate retroactively, in the absence of language clearly showing a contrary intention.’ In othe | 6 | 7 |
Jones v. Caseygreen2 sentences2000See Jones , 445 So.2d at 875 , citing Street . 1998See Jones, 445 So.2d at 875 , citing Street, supra . | 4 | 4 |
Street v. City of Annistongreen2 sentences2007"This general rule is, however, subject to an equally well-established exception, namely, that ` [r]emedial statutes . . . are not within the legal [concept] of "retrospective laws," . . . and do operate retroactively , in the absence of language clearly showing a contrary intention.'" Ex parte Bonner , 676 So.2d 925 , 926 (Ala. 1995), quoting Street v. City of Anniston , 381 So.2d 26 , 29 (Ala. 1980). 2000This general rule is, however, subject to an equally well-established exception, namely, that `[r]emedial statutes . . . are not within the legal [concept] of "retrospective laws," . . . and do operate retroactively , in the absence of language clearly showing a contrary intention.' Street v. City of Anniston , 381 So.2d 26 , 29 (Ala. 1980). | 2 | 5 |
Ex Parte Burksgreen2 sentences2001Ex parte Bonner, 676 So.2d 925, 926 (Ala.1995). "`Remedial statutesthose which do not create, enlarge, diminish, or destroy vested rights are favored by the courts, and their retrospective operation is not obnoxious to the spirit and policy of the law.' Ex parte Burks, 487 So.2d 905, 907 (Ala.1985) (emphasis added) (quoting Barrington v. Barrington, 200 Ala. 315, 316 , 76 So. 81, 82 (1917)). 2001Ex parte Bonner, 676 So.2d 925, 926 (Ala.1995). “ ‘Remedial statutes — those which do not create, enlarge, diminish, or destroy vested rights — are favored by the courts, and their retrospective operation is not obnoxious to the spirit and policy of the law.’ Ex parte Burks, 487 So.2d 905, 907 (Ala.1985) (emphasis added) (quoting Barrington v. Barrington, 200 Ala. 315, 316 , 76 So. 81, 82 (1917)). | 2 | 2 |
Barrington v. Barringtongreen2 sentences2001Ex parte Bonner, 676 So.2d 925, 926 (Ala.1995). “ ‘Remedial statutes — those which do not create, enlarge, diminish, or destroy vested rights — are favored by the courts, and their retrospective operation is not obnoxious to the spirit and policy of the law.’ Ex parte Burks, 487 So.2d 905, 907 (Ala.1985) (emphasis added) (quoting Barrington v. Barrington, 200 Ala. 315, 316 , 76 So. 81, 82 (1917)). 2001Ex parte Bonner, 676 So.2d 925, 926 (Ala.1995). “ ‘Remedial statutes — those which do not create, enlarge, diminish, or destroy vested rights — are favored by the courts, and their retrospective operation is not obnoxious to the spirit and policy of the law.’ Ex parte Burks, 487 So.2d 905, 907 (Ala.1985) (emphasis added) (quoting Barrington v. Barrington, 200 Ala. 315, 316 , 76 So. 81, 82 (1917)). | 2 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alabama. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
STATE, HOME BUILDERS LIC. BD. v. Grzelak
green
1 sentence2007In other words, "remedial legislation is generally applied retrospectively while substantive laws are limited to prospective application." State Home Builders Licensure Bd. v. Grzelak , 705 So.2d 406 , 409 (Ala.Civ.App. 1997). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Ex Parte State, Dept. of Revenue
green
1 sentence1999This Court has also held that "when a new statute deals with procedure only, it applies to all actions, including ... actions that are pending." Grant v. State, 667 So.2d 1372 , 1374 (Ala.1995) (emphasis added). *383 It might at first glance appear that, given these principles of law, we should affirm the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals applying the Act retroactively or that we should quash the writ in case no. 1971747 as having been improvidently granted. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Smoot v. Ryan
green
2 sentences1987The equally well-established exception to this rule is where the contract entered into by the minor is for "necessaries." Ragan v. Williams , 220 Ala. 590 , 127 So. 190 (1930); Smoot v. Ryan , 187 Ala. 396 , 65 So. 828 (1914). 1987The equally well-established exception to this rule is where the contract entered into by the minor is for "necessaries." Ragan v. Williams , 220 Ala. 590 , 127 So. 190 (1930); Smoot v. Ryan , 187 Ala. 396 , 65 So. 828 (1914). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Ragan v. Williams
green
2 sentences1987The equally well-established exception to this rule is where the contract entered into by the minor is for "necessaries." Ragan v. Williams , 220 Ala. 590 , 127 So. 190 (1930); Smoot v. Ryan , 187 Ala. 396 , 65 So. 828 (1914). 1987The equally well-established exception to this rule is where the contract entered into by the minor is for "necessaries." Ragan v. Williams , 220 Ala. 590 , 127 So. 190 (1930); Smoot v. Ryan , 187 Ala. 396 , 65 So. 828 (1914). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Western Railway of Alabama v. Brown
green
2 sentences1974The argument that such failure constitutes error to reverse, however, overlooks the equally well-established rule so aptly stated by Mr. Justice Coleman, speaking for the Court, in Western Railway of Alabama v. Brown, 280 Ala. 543 , 196 So.2d 392 (1967): “The rule is that if there is some defect of averment in the complaint and the court has erred in holding such pleading good, nevertheless, if there is evidence of the matter so omitted and both parties try the issue as though such allegation were made, and the court instructs the jury that such matters must be proven, and both parties have fu 1974The argument that such failure constitutes error to reverse, however, overlooks the equally well-established rule so aptly stated by Mr. Justice Coleman, speaking for the Court, in Western Railway of Alabama v. Brown, 280 Ala. 543 , 196 So.2d 392 (1967): “The rule is that if there is some defect of averment in the complaint and the court has erred in holding such pleading good, nevertheless, if there is evidence of the matter so omitted and both parties try the issue as though such allegation were made, and the court instructs the jury that such matters must be proven, and both parties have fu | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Turner v. Blanton
green
2 sentences1974Turner v. Blanton, 277 Ala. 536, 540 , 173 So.2d 80 , and authorities there cited.” The record discloses evidence reasonably affording an inference as to whether plaintiff was defrauded, and whether plaintiff could have reasonably discovered the fraud within the 15-day period (between June 20, 1969—the date of the fraud—and July 6, 1969—-one year prior to the filing of the complaint) ; thus, it was within the province of the jury to resolve the conflicts in the evidence and to determine whether, on all of the evidence, the statute of limitations created a bar to the suit. 1974Turner v. Blanton, 277 Ala. 536, 540 , 173 So.2d 80 , and authorities there cited.” The record discloses evidence reasonably affording an inference as to whether plaintiff was defrauded, and whether plaintiff could have reasonably discovered the fraud within the 15-day period (between June 20, 1969—the date of the fraud—and July 6, 1969—-one year prior to the filing of the complaint) ; thus, it was within the province of the jury to resolve the conflicts in the evidence and to determine whether, on all of the evidence, the statute of limitations created a bar to the suit. | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Snead v. Snead
neutral
2 sentences1970Stairs v. Stairs, 283 Ala. 263 , 215 So.2d. 591; and Snead v. Snead, 279 Ala. 344 , 185 So.2d 135 . 1970Stairs v. Stairs, 283 Ala. 263 , 215 So.2d. 591; and Snead v. Snead, 279 Ala. 344 , 185 So.2d 135 . | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Stairs v. Stairs
green
1 sentence1970Stairs v. Stairs, 283 Ala. 263 , 215 So.2d. 591; and Snead v. Snead, 279 Ala. 344 , 185 So.2d 135 . | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.