palpable violation in Arkansas

1959For the jury are the sole judges of fact, and the credibility of witnesses; and the constitution expressly prohibits the judge from charging them as to the facts. * * * Any expression or intimation of an opinion by the judge, as to questions of fact or the credibility of witnesses, necessary for them to decide in order for them to render a verdict, would tend to deprive one or more of the parties of the benefits guarantied by the constitution, and would be a palpable violation of the organic law of the state." [ 51 Ark. 147 , 10 S.W.231] "Counsel for appellant contends with much force that the

1953Any expression or intimation of an opinion by the judge as to questions of fact or the credibility of witnesses necessary for them to decide in order for them to render a verdict would tend to deprive one or more of the parties of the benefits guaranteed by the constitution, and would be a palpable violation of the organic law of the State.” Sharp v. State, 51 Ark. 147 , 10 S. W. 228 , 14 Am.

2020This court wrote, “The legal analysis behind Layman [v. Layman, 292 Ark. 539 , 731 S.W.2d 771 (1987)] and its progeny, regarding the judicially created “active appreciation doctrine” contains a palpable error, and it is patently wrong to the extent we now must overrule it in order to return to the statute’s plain language.” Moore, 2016 Ark. 105, at 9 , 486 S.W.3d at 772 .

2020This court wrote, “The legal analysis behind Layman [v. Layman, 292 Ark. 539 , 731 S.W.2d 771 (1987)] and its progeny, regarding the judicially created “active appreciation doctrine” contains a palpable error, and it is patently wrong to the extent we now must overrule it in order to return to the statute’s plain language.” Moore, 2016 Ark. 105, at 9 , 486 S.W.3d at 772 .

2016However, we will overrule | ^precedent “when there has been a palpable error in legal analysis.” Ward v. State, 2015 Ark. 62, 4 , 455 S.W.3d 830, 833 .

2016However, we will overrule | ^precedent “when there has been a palpable error in legal analysis.” Ward v. State, 2015 Ark. 62, 4 , 455 S.W.3d 830, 833 .

2020This court wrote, “The legal analysis behind Layman [v. Layman, 292 Ark. 539 , 731 S.W.2d 771 (1987)] and its progeny, regarding the judicially created “active appreciation doctrine” contains a palpable error, and it is patently wrong to the extent we now must overrule it in order to return to the statute’s plain language.” Moore, 2016 Ark. 105, at 9 , 486 S.W.3d at 772 .

2020This court wrote, “The legal analysis behind Layman [v. Layman, 292 Ark. 539 , 731 S.W.2d 771 (1987)] and its progeny, regarding the judicially created “active appreciation doctrine” contains a palpable error, and it is patently wrong to the extent we now must overrule it in order to return to the statute’s plain language.” Moore, 2016 Ark. 105, at 9 , 486 S.W.3d at 772 .

2018Ward v. State , 2015 Ark. 62 , 455 S.W.3d 830 ; Nooner v. State , 2014 Ark. 296 , 438 S.W.3d 233 .

2018Ward v. State , 2015 Ark. 62 , 455 S.W.3d 830 ; Nooner v. State , 2014 Ark. 296 , 438 S.W.3d 233 .

2015The Goodners’ decision to elect for less coverage is not a palpable error that offends the public welfare, thus requiring this court to take the extraordinary step of voiding it on public policy grounds. 9 Cite as 2015 Ark. 460 Accordingly, I dissent.

1989In Watkins v. State, 222 Ark. 444 , 261 S.W.2d 274 (1953), we noted that where a judge, by language or conduct expresses an opinion as to the credibility of a witness there is a palpable violation of our constitution.

1989In Watkins v. State, 222 Ark. 444 , 261 S.W.2d 274 (1953), we noted that where a judge, by language or conduct expresses an opinion as to the credibility of a witness there is a palpable violation of our constitution.

1972Any expression or intimation of an opinion by the judge, as to questions of fact or the credibility of witnesses necessary for them to decide in order for them to render a verdict, would tend to deprive one or more of the parties of the benefits guarantied by the constitution, and would be a palpable violation of the organic law of the State." Other jurisdictions in considering the question, State v. Barber, 268 N.C. 609 , 151 S.W.2d 51 (1966), and United States v. Fayette, 388 F.2d 728 (1968), hold that the findings of the trial court on the issue of voluntariness should not be referred to in

1972Any expression or intimation of an opinion by the judge as to questions of fact or the credibility of witness'es necessary for them to decide in order for them to render a verdict would tend to deprive one or more of the parties of the benefits guaranteed by the constitution, and would be a palpable violation of the organic law of the State.” Other jurisdictions in considering the question, State v. Barber, 268 N.C. 609 , 151 S.W. 2d 51 (1966), and United States v. Fayette, 388 F. 2d 728 (1968), hold that the findings of the trial court on the issue of voluntariness should not be referred to i

1972Any expression or intimation of an opinion by the judge, as to questions of fact or the credibility of witnesses necessary for them to decide in order for them to render a verdict, would tend to deprive one or more of the parties of the benefits guarantied by the constitution, and would be a palpable violation of the organic law of the State." Other jurisdictions in considering the question, State v. Barber, 268 N.C. 609 , 151 S.W.2d 51 (1966), and United States v. Fayette, 388 F.2d 728 (1968), hold that the findings of the trial court on the issue of voluntariness should not be referred to in

1972Any expression or intimation of an opinion by the judge as to questions of fact or the credibility of witness'es necessary for them to decide in order for them to render a verdict would tend to deprive one or more of the parties of the benefits guaranteed by the constitution, and would be a palpable violation of the organic law of the State.” Other jurisdictions in considering the question, State v. Barber, 268 N.C. 609 , 151 S.W. 2d 51 (1966), and United States v. Fayette, 388 F. 2d 728 (1968), hold that the findings of the trial court on the issue of voluntariness should not be referred to i

1953"It was wholly within the province of the jury to say whether the testimony of the witness, as disclosed by his examination at the trial, was true or false." Crosby v. State, 154 Ark. 20 , 241 S.W. 380, 382 .

1953"It was wholly within the province of the jury to say whether the testimony of the witness, as disclosed by his examination at the trial, was true or false." Crosby v. State, 154 Ark. 20 , 241 S.W. 380, 382 .

1936As is said in Loftin v. State, 41 Ark. 153 : “It must be a flagrant instance of arbitrary or capricious exercise of power by the circuit court, operating, to the denial of justice, that will induce us to interfere.” Although it might have been that the trial court could have consistently granted the continuance, we are unwilling to say that his refusal to do so was an arbitrary or capricious exercise of his power.

1930To support the holding, the court quoted from Bank of Commerce v. Goolsby, 129 Ark. 416 , 196 S. W. 803 , the following: “'"When notes are taken in exchange for stock, it is a palpable violation of the constitutional provision, because notes are merely evidences of indebtedness, and such a transaction shows upon its face that the stock has not been paid for.

1930To support the holding, the court quoted from Bank of Commerce v. Goolsby, 129 Ark. 416 , 196 S. W. 803 , the following: “'"When notes are taken in exchange for stock, it is a palpable violation of the constitutional provision, because notes are merely evidences of indebtedness, and such a transaction shows upon its face that the stock has not been paid for.

1922It commands the judge to permit them to arrive at their conclusion without any suggestion from him as to his opinion about the facts.” In the recent case of Martin v. State, 130 Ark. 442 , a witness whose testimony tended to prove that the appellant was not guilty of the crime charged was arrested in the presence and hearing’ of the jury, by order of the court directing the sheriff to take charge of the witness and hold him to bail in the sum of $500 to answer the charge of giving away whiskey, etc. This court held that the conduct of the court constituted prejudicial error, and we quoted from

1922It commands the judge to permit them to arrive at their conclusion without any suggestion from him as to his opinion about the facts.” In the recent case of Martin v. State, 130 Ark. 442 , a witness whose testimony tended to prove that the appellant was not guilty of the crime charged was arrested in the presence and hearing’ of the jury, by order of the court directing the sheriff to take charge of the witness and hold him to bail in the sum of $500 to answer the charge of giving away whiskey, etc. This court held that the conduct of the court constituted prejudicial error, and we quoted from

1922Any expression or intimation of an opinion by the judge as to questions of fact or the credibility of witnesses necessary for them to decide in order for them to render a verdict would tend to deprive one or more of the parties of the benefits guaranteed by the Constitution, and would be a palpable violation of the organic law of the State.” In Catlett v. Ry., 57 Ark. 461 -466, Chief Justice Cockrill, speaking for the court, said: “This provision shears the judge of a part of his magisterial functions, but it confers no new power upon the jury. * * * The Constitution has not altered their prov

1913“In the midst of doubt as to what their verdict should be as to appellant,” said Judge Battle, speaking for the court in Sharp v. State, 51 Ark. 147 , “it was natural for them to seize upon and adopt any opinion which they understood the judge to have expressed or intimated upon the questions which they were required to decide;” and ! ‘ any expression or intimation of an opinion by the judge as to questions of fact or the credibility of witnesses necessary for them to decide in order for them to render a verdict would tend to deprive one or more of the parties of the benefits guaranteed by the

1888In McMinn v. Whelan, 27 Cal., 300 , a witness on cross-examination, was interrogated in respect to her residence and business.