DCS motion in Arizona

2018Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 47, ¶ 8 (App. 2004). ¶22 DCS’s motion to terminate father’s parental rights stated three grounds for termination: (1) abandonment, (2) six-months out-of- home placement, and (3) nine-months out-of-home placement.

2017Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 47, ¶ 8 , 83 P.3d 43, 47 (App. 2004). ¶15 There is sufficient evidence in the record to support the termination of mother’s parental rights based on the grounds DCS asserted for termination and the juvenile court’s best interest findings. ¶16 First, as noted, DCS’s motion to terminate mother’s parental rights stated two grounds for termination—1) chronic substance abuse and 2) nine-months out-of-home placement.

2026See Kline v. Kline, 221 Ariz. 564, 569, ¶ 18 (App. 2009) (“A party has made a general appearance when he has taken any action, other than objecting to personal jurisdiction, that recognizes the case is pending in court.”); see also Montano v. Scottsdale Baptist Hosp., Inc., 119 Ariz. 448, 452 (1978) (“[A] general appearance by a party who has not been properly served has exactly the same effect as a proper, timely and valid service of process.”); Ariz. R.P.

2026See Kline v. Kline, 221 Ariz. 564, 569, ¶ 18 (App. 2009) (“A party has made a general appearance when he has taken any action, other than objecting to personal jurisdiction, that recognizes the case is pending in court.”); see also Montano v. Scottsdale Baptist Hosp., Inc., 119 Ariz. 448, 452 (1978) (“[A] general appearance by a party who has not been properly served has exactly the same effect as a proper, timely and valid service of process.”); Ariz. R.P.

2022Decision of the Court should the current placement be unable to adopt.”2 Father contends the court erred in finding M.H.’s potential adoptability supported termination because Mother’s rights were not terminated. ¶13 “When a current placement meets the child’s needs and the child’s prospective adoption is otherwise legally possible and likely, a juvenile court may find that termination of parental rights, so as to permit adoption, is in the child’s best interests.” Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 4, ¶ 12 (2016); see also Titus S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 244 Ariz. 365 , 370, ¶ 22 (A

2022See Cruz v. Garcia, 240 Ariz. 233, 236, ¶ 11 (App. 2016) (recognizing that parents whose custodial rights are at issue are entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time in a meaningful manner); Jessicah C. v. Dept’ of Child Safety, 248 Ariz. 203 , 204, 207, ¶¶ 1, 18–21 (App. 2020) (holding that parent waived right to present evidence by explicitly agreeing to resolve on oral argument alone DCS’s motion to change physical custody of the dependent child); Rule 56(D) (providing that court may consider all relevant evidence at disposition hearing, including the parents’ or

2021Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 284, ¶ 22 (2005).

2020Sec., 230 Ariz. 236, 240, ¶ 22 (App. 2012). ¶16 Here, the court adopted DCS’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, which repeated verbatim the language in DCS’s motion for termination, with only a few additional findings and conclusions.

2020Action No. JS-501568, 177 Ariz. 571, 577 (App. 1994). ¶15 At the September 2018 severance hearing, the superior court denied DCS’s motion to terminate father’s parental rights in part because DCS failed to assess father’s then current living arrangements and employment.

2020See Crystal E. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 241 Ariz. 576, 577, ¶ 5 (App. 2017) (“By failing to challenge the time-in-care ground, Mother has abandoned and waived any contention that the court erred in granting severance on that basis.”). ¶9 Mother’s arguments are instead directed at the juvenile court’s 2015 dependency finding, along with J.W.’s out-of-state placement, a post-termination order, due process, jurisdictional issues and the grant of DCS’s motion to amend.

2018See City of Phoenix v. Leroy’s Liquors, Inc., 177 Ariz. 375, 378 (App. 1993) (recognizing the court of appeals is bound by decisions of the supreme court and may not “overrule, modify or disregard them”). ¶10 The juvenile court acted within its discretion in proceeding to the merits of DCS’s motion to terminate Father’s parental rights after Father failed to appear at the pretrial conference without good cause.

2016Here, the superior court granted DCS’s motion to terminate Father’s parental rights based on its review of the evidence, and this court will not reweigh the evidence on which that court based its ruling. *215 See Rocky J., 234 Ariz. at 441, ¶ 15 , 323 P.3d at 724 (superior court “reasonably concluded” insufficient evidence presented to support severance when parent had been incarcerated for much of 12-year-old child’s life but expected to be released on parole seven months after severance trial). ¶ 13 Father contends the superior court failed to recognize the relationship he had with Child for

2016Here, the superior court granted DCS’s motion to terminate Father’s parental rights based on its review of the evidence, and this court will not reweigh the evidence on which that court based its ruling. *215 See Rocky J., 234 Ariz. at 441, ¶ 15 , 323 P.3d at 724 (superior court “reasonably concluded” insufficient evidence presented to support severance when parent had been incarcerated for much of 12-year-old child’s life but expected to be released on parole seven months after severance trial). ¶ 13 Father contends the superior court failed to recognize the relationship he had with Child for

2014Discussing factors set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) and Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JD-561, 131 Ariz. 25 , 638 P.2d 692 (1981), but without addressing the best interests of the children, the ruling noted that maintaining Parents’ “due process rights in a termination proceeding is superior to the interests of the state.” Accordingly, the ruling concludes that precluding Parents from calling the children as witnesses would violate Parents’ due process rights.

2014Discussing factors set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) and Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JD-561, 131 Ariz. 25 , 638 P.2d 692 (1981), but without addressing the best interests of the children, the ruling noted that maintaining Parents’ “due process rights in a termination proceeding is superior to the interests of the state.” Accordingly, the ruling concludes that precluding Parents from calling the children as witnesses would violate Parents’ due process rights.