legally cognizable defense in District of Columbia

1999Still, it is a defense unsupported by any other evidence, including any representations as to his whereabouts or habitual behavior suggesting why he could not have been at the scene of the shooting. 27 Furthermore, “the mere assertion of a legally cognizable defense is [not] always a sufficient condition for securing withdrawal of a plea.” Barker, supra, 168 U.S.App.D.C. at 325 , 514 F.2d at 221 . 28 See also Austin v. United States, 356 A.2d 648, 649 (D.C.1976); McKoy, supra, 207 U.S.App.

1999Still, it is a defense unsupported by any other evidence, including any representations as to his whereabouts or habitual behavior suggesting why he could not have been at the scene of the shooting. 27 Furthermore, “the mere assertion of a legally cognizable defense is [not] always a sufficient condition for securing withdrawal of a plea.” Barker, supra, 168 U.S.App.D.C. at 325 , 514 F.2d at 221 . 28 See also Austin v. United States, 356 A.2d 648, 649 (D.C.1976); McKoy, supra, 207 U.S.App.

1999Rather, "the movant must set forth some facts, which when accepted as true, make out some legally cognizable defense to the charges, in order to effectively deny culpability." Id. (citations omitted). [26] *167 We recognize that Bennett, in claiming that he did not participate in the murder and was not even present at the crime scene, has presented what can be described on its face as a legally cognizable defense.

1999Rather, “the movant must set forth some facts, which when accepted as true, make out some legally cognizable defense to the charges, in order to effectively deny culpability.” Id. (citations omitted). 26 We recognize that Bennett, in claiming that he did not participate in the murder and was not even present at the crime scene, has presented what can be described on its face as a legally cognizable defense.

2015“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must set forth sufficient facts to establish the elements of a legally cognizable claim,” Woods v. District of Columbia, 63 A.3d 551, 552-53 (D.C.2013), containing “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 , 129 S.Ct. 1937 , 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citing Bell Atl.

2015“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must set forth sufficient facts to establish the elements of a legally cognizable claim,” Woods v. District of Columbia, 63 A.3d 551, 552-53 (D.C.2013), containing “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 , 129 S.Ct. 1937 , 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citing Bell Atl.

2015Corp. v. Twombly, 550 *705 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 , 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)).

2015Corp. v. Twombly, 550 *705 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 , 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)).

2014Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1300 (3d ed. 2013) (“Leave to replead will be denied, however, when the district court believes that it would be futile ....”); cf. Floyd v. Bank of Am., 70 A.3d 246 (D.C.2013) (af firming trial court’s dismissal of complaint on the alternative ground that plaintiffs failed to state a legally-cognizable claim, even though the trial court dismissed for lack of standing and never reached that issue).

2014MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1300 (3d ed. 2013) (“Leave to replead will be denied, however, when the district court believes that it would be futile . . . .”); cf. Floyd v. Bank of Am., 70 A.3d 246 (D.C. 2013) (affirming trial court‟s dismissal of complaint on the alternative ground that plaintiffs failed to state a legally-cognizable claim, even though the trial court dismissed for lack of standing and never reached that issue).

1999Because Binion never repudiated his sworn statement, made when he entered his guilty plea, that at the time he shot the victims his life was no longer at peril, he did not make out a legally cognizable claim of innocence. 658 A.2d at 192-93 . [27] As the trial judge noted, Bennett "offered no more than a general denial to the offenses. [His] father's testimony makes it clear that he cannot provide his son with an alibi nor did any witnesses or Mr. Bennett testify as to where he was at the time ... the offense was committed." [28] The Barker court noted that "[w]hile some decisions have come cl

1999Because Binion never repudiated his sworn statement, made when he entered his guilty plea, that at the time he shot the victims his life was no longer at peril, he did not make out a legally cognizable claim of innocence. 658 A.2d at 192-93 . .

1999D.C. at 114, 645 F.2d at 1039 .

1999D.C. at 114, 645 F.2d at 1039 .

1999We agree with the Barker court’s observation that if the mere assertion of a legally cognizable defense were a sufficient condition for withdrawal, “the guilty plea would become a mere gesture, a temporary and meaningless formality reversible at the defendant’s whim” rather than “ ‘a grave and solemn act ... accepted only with care and discernment.’ ” 168 U.S.App.D.C. at 325 , 514 F.2d at 221 (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 , 90 S.Ct. 1463 , 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970)). 29 Moreover, in this analysis we place considerable reliance upon the weighing by the trial judge of Bennett’s

1999We agree with the Barker court’s observation that if the mere assertion of a legally cognizable defense were a sufficient condition for withdrawal, “the guilty plea would become a mere gesture, a temporary and meaningless formality reversible at the defendant’s whim” rather than “ ‘a grave and solemn act ... accepted only with care and discernment.’ ” 168 U.S.App.D.C. at 325 , 514 F.2d at 221 (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 , 90 S.Ct. 1463 , 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970)). 29 Moreover, in this analysis we place considerable reliance upon the weighing by the trial judge of Bennett’s

1995While appellant’s statement to the police standing alone might amount to a claim of legal innocence, his unretracted, sworn admission at the time of the plea of the additional circumstances surrounding the shooting defeats any claim of a legally cognizable defense. 6 Where the movant’s factual contentions, when accepted as true, “make out no legally cognizable defense to the charges, he has not effectively denied culpability, and his withdrawal motion need not be granted.” Barker, supra, 168 U.S.App.D.C. at 324 , 514 F.2d at 220 ; accord, Jordan, supra, 350 A.2d at 738 .

1995In order to make out a legally cognizable claim of self-defense, an accused using deadly force, “must—at the time of the incident —actually believe and reasonably believe that he is in imminent peril of death or serious bodily harm.” McPhaul v. United States, 452 A.2d 371, 373 (D.C.1982) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). “[T]he right of self-defense arises only when the necessity begins, and equally ends with the necessity....” United States v. Peterson, 157 U.S.App.D.C. 219, 226 , 483 F.2d 1222, 1229 , cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1007 , 94 S.Ct. 367 , 38 L.Ed.2d 244 (1973); see also Harper v.

1995In order to make out a legally cognizable claim of self-defense, an accused using deadly force, “must—at the time of the incident —actually believe and reasonably believe that he is in imminent peril of death or serious bodily harm.” McPhaul v. United States, 452 A.2d 371, 373 (D.C.1982) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). “[T]he right of self-defense arises only when the necessity begins, and equally ends with the necessity....” United States v. Peterson, 157 U.S.App.D.C. 219, 226 , 483 F.2d 1222, 1229 , cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1007 , 94 S.Ct. 367 , 38 L.Ed.2d 244 (1973); see also Harper v.

1995In order to make out a legally cognizable claim of self-defense, an accused using deadly force, “must—at the time of the incident —actually believe and reasonably believe that he is in imminent peril of death or serious bodily harm.” McPhaul v. United States, 452 A.2d 371, 373 (D.C.1982) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). “[T]he right of self-defense arises only when the necessity begins, and equally ends with the necessity....” United States v. Peterson, 157 U.S.App.D.C. 219, 226 , 483 F.2d 1222, 1229 , cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1007 , 94 S.Ct. 367 , 38 L.Ed.2d 244 (1973); see also Harper v.

1995In order to make out a legally cognizable claim of self-defense, an accused using deadly force, “must—at the time of the incident —actually believe and reasonably believe that he is in imminent peril of death or serious bodily harm.” McPhaul v. United States, 452 A.2d 371, 373 (D.C.1982) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). “[T]he right of self-defense arises only when the necessity begins, and equally ends with the necessity....” United States v. Peterson, 157 U.S.App.D.C. 219, 226 , 483 F.2d 1222, 1229 , cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1007 , 94 S.Ct. 367 , 38 L.Ed.2d 244 (1973); see also Harper v.

1995In order to make out a legally cognizable claim of self-defense, an accused using deadly force, “must—at the time of the incident —actually believe and reasonably believe that he is in imminent peril of death or serious bodily harm.” McPhaul v. United States, 452 A.2d 371, 373 (D.C.1982) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). “[T]he right of self-defense arises only when the necessity begins, and equally ends with the necessity....” United States v. Peterson, 157 U.S.App.D.C. 219, 226 , 483 F.2d 1222, 1229 , cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1007 , 94 S.Ct. 367 , 38 L.Ed.2d 244 (1973); see also Harper v.