Pinkerton instruction in District of Columbia

2020However, “[t]his court has adopted and applied the Pinkerton doctrine,” Ashby v. United States, 199 A.3d 634, 665 (D.C. 2019), which “provides that a co-conspirator who does not directly commit a substantive offense may nevertheless be held liable for that offense if it was committed by another co-conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy and was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the conspiratorial agreement.” Id. (quoting Wilson-Bey, 903 A.2d at 840 ) (cleaned up)).

2020However, “[t]his court has adopted and applied the Pinkerton doctrine,” Ashby v. United States, 199 A.3d 634, 665 (D.C. 2019), which “provides that a co-conspirator who does not directly commit a substantive offense may nevertheless be held liable for that offense if it was committed by another co-conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy and was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the conspiratorial agreement.” Id. (quoting Wilson-Bey, 903 A.2d at 840 ) (cleaned up)).

2020See, e.g., Clark, 147 A.3d at 327 (citing Wilson-Bey for the Pinkerton principle and applying it to affirm a conviction, without explicitly mentioning Pinkerton); Richardson, 116 A.3d at 442 (affirming a conviction because the “evidence was sufficient under a straightforward application of Pinkerton”); Hagans v. United States, 96 A.3d 1, 23-25 (D.C. 2014) (implicitly endorsing the trial court’s use of a Pinkerton jury instruction in a conspiracy case and discussing complications that may arise in the context of vicarious liability for hearsay statements); Baker v. United States, 867 A.2d 988,

2020See, e.g., Clark, 147 A.3d at 327 (citing Wilson-Bey for the Pinkerton principle and applying it to affirm a conviction, without explicitly mentioning Pinkerton); Richardson, 116 A.3d at 442 (affirming a conviction because the “evidence was sufficient under a straightforward application of Pinkerton”); Hagans v. United States, 96 A.3d 1, 23-25 (D.C. 2014) (implicitly endorsing the trial court’s use of a Pinkerton jury instruction in a conspiracy case and discussing complications that may arise in the context of vicarious liability for hearsay statements); Baker v. United States, 867 A.2d 988,

2020See, e.g., Clark, 147 A.3d at 327 (citing Wilson-Bey for the Pinkerton principle and applying it to affirm a conviction, without explicitly mentioning Pinkerton); Richardson, 116 A.3d at 442 (affirming a conviction because the “evidence was sufficient under a straightforward application of Pinkerton”); Hagans v. United States, 96 A.3d 1, 23-25 (D.C. 2014) (implicitly endorsing the trial court’s use of a Pinkerton jury instruction in a conspiracy case and discussing complications that may arise in the context of vicarious liability for hearsay statements); Baker v. United States, 867 A.2d 988,

2020See, e.g., Clark, 147 A.3d at 327 (citing Wilson-Bey for the Pinkerton principle and applying it to affirm a conviction, without explicitly mentioning Pinkerton); Richardson, 116 A.3d at 442 (affirming a conviction because the “evidence was sufficient under a straightforward application of Pinkerton”); Hagans v. United States, 96 A.3d 1, 23-25 (D.C. 2014) (implicitly endorsing the trial court’s use of a Pinkerton jury instruction in a conspiracy case and discussing complications that may arise in the context of vicarious liability for hearsay statements); Baker v. United States, 867 A.2d 988,

2020See, e.g., Clark, 147 A.3d at 327 (citing Wilson-Bey for the Pinkerton principle and applying it to affirm a conviction, without explicitly mentioning Pinkerton); Richardson, 116 A.3d at 442 (affirming a conviction because the “evidence was sufficient under a straightforward application of Pinkerton”); Hagans v. United States, 96 A.3d 1, 23-25 (D.C. 2014) (implicitly endorsing the trial court’s use of a Pinkerton jury instruction in a conspiracy case and discussing complications that may arise in the context of vicarious liability for hearsay statements); Baker v. United States, 867 A.2d 988,

2020See, e.g., Clark, 147 A.3d at 327 (citing Wilson-Bey for the Pinkerton principle and applying it to affirm a conviction, without explicitly mentioning Pinkerton); Richardson, 116 A.3d at 442 (affirming a conviction because the “evidence was sufficient under a straightforward application of Pinkerton”); Hagans v. United States, 96 A.3d 1, 23-25 (D.C. 2014) (implicitly endorsing the trial court’s use of a Pinkerton jury instruction in a conspiracy case and discussing complications that may arise in the context of vicarious liability for hearsay statements); Baker v. United States, 867 A.2d 988,

2020See, e.g., Clark, 147 A.3d at 327 (citing Wilson-Bey for the Pinkerton principle and applying it to affirm a conviction, without explicitly mentioning Pinkerton); Richardson, 116 A.3d at 442 (affirming a conviction because the “evidence was sufficient under a straightforward application of Pinkerton”); Hagans v. United States, 96 A.3d 1, 23-25 (D.C. 2014) (implicitly endorsing the trial court’s use of a Pinkerton jury instruction in a conspiracy case and discussing complications that may arise in the context of vicarious liability for hearsay statements); Baker v. United States, 867 A.2d 988,

2020See, e.g., Clark, 147 A.3d at 327 (citing Wilson-Bey for the Pinkerton principle and applying it to affirm a conviction, without explicitly mentioning Pinkerton); Richardson, 116 A.3d at 442 (affirming a conviction because the “evidence was sufficient under a straightforward application of Pinkerton”); Hagans v. United States, 96 A.3d 1, 23-25 (D.C. 2014) (implicitly endorsing the trial court’s use of a Pinkerton jury instruction in a conspiracy case and discussing complications that may arise in the context of vicarious liability for hearsay statements); Baker v. United States, 867 A.2d 988,

2009The court left out the clause in element five of the standard Pinkerton instruction that "[i]t is not necessary to find that the crime was intended as part of the original plan,” id., an omission to which the government agreed. 10 .

2009The court left out the clause in element five of the standard Pinkerton instruction that "[i]t is not necessary to find that the crime was intended as part of the original plan,” id., an omission to which the government agreed. 10 .

2020See, e.g., Clark, 147 A.3d at 327 (citing Wilson-Bey for the Pinkerton principle and applying it to affirm a conviction, without explicitly mentioning Pinkerton); Richardson, 116 A.3d at 442 (affirming a conviction because the “evidence was sufficient under a straightforward application of Pinkerton”); Hagans v. United States, 96 A.3d 1, 23-25 (D.C. 2014) (implicitly endorsing the trial court’s use of a Pinkerton jury instruction in a conspiracy case and discussing complications that may arise in the context of vicarious liability for hearsay statements); Baker v. United States, 867 A.2d 988,

2020See, e.g., Clark, 147 A.3d at 327 (citing Wilson-Bey for the Pinkerton principle and applying it to affirm a conviction, without explicitly mentioning Pinkerton); Richardson, 116 A.3d at 442 (affirming a conviction because the “evidence was sufficient under a straightforward application of Pinkerton”); Hagans v. United States, 96 A.3d 1, 23-25 (D.C. 2014) (implicitly endorsing the trial court’s use of a Pinkerton jury instruction in a conspiracy case and discussing complications that may arise in the context of vicarious liability for hearsay statements); Baker v. United States, 867 A.2d 988,

2020See, e.g., Clark, 147 A.3d at 327 (citing Wilson-Bey for the Pinkerton principle and applying it to affirm a conviction, without explicitly mentioning Pinkerton); Richardson, 116 A.3d at 442 (affirming a conviction because the “evidence was sufficient under a straightforward application of Pinkerton”); Hagans v. United States, 96 A.3d 1, 23-25 (D.C. 2014) (implicitly endorsing the trial court’s use of a Pinkerton jury instruction in a conspiracy case and discussing complications that may arise in the context of vicarious liability for hearsay statements); Baker v. United States, 867 A.2d 988,

2020See, e.g., Clark, 147 A.3d at 327 (citing Wilson-Bey for the Pinkerton principle and applying it to affirm a conviction, without explicitly mentioning Pinkerton); Richardson, 116 A.3d at 442 (affirming a conviction because the “evidence was sufficient under a straightforward application of Pinkerton”); Hagans v. United States, 96 A.3d 1, 23-25 (D.C. 2014) (implicitly endorsing the trial court’s use of a Pinkerton jury instruction in a conspiracy case and discussing complications that may arise in the context of vicarious liability for hearsay statements); Baker v. United States, 867 A.2d 988,

2020However, “[t]his court has adopted and applied the Pinkerton doctrine,” Ashby v. United States, 199 A.3d 634, 665 (D.C. 2019), which “provides that a co-conspirator who does not directly commit a substantive offense may nevertheless be held liable for that offense if it was committed by another co-conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy and was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the conspiratorial agreement.” Id. (quoting Wilson-Bey, 903 A.2d at 840 ) (cleaned up)).

2020However, “[t]his court has adopted and applied the Pinkerton doctrine,” Ashby v. United States, 199 A.3d 634, 665 (D.C. 2019), which “provides that a co-conspirator who does not directly commit a substantive offense may nevertheless be held liable for that offense if it was committed by another co-conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy and was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the conspiratorial agreement.” Id. (quoting Wilson-Bey, 903 A.2d at 840 ) (cleaned up)).

2020See, e.g., Clark, 147 A.3d at 327 (citing Wilson-Bey for the Pinkerton principle and applying it to affirm a conviction, without explicitly mentioning Pinkerton); Richardson, 116 A.3d at 442 (affirming a conviction because the “evidence was sufficient under a straightforward application of Pinkerton”); Hagans v. United States, 96 A.3d 1, 23-25 (D.C. 2014) (implicitly endorsing the trial court’s use of a Pinkerton jury instruction in a conspiracy case and discussing complications that may arise in the context of vicarious liability for hearsay statements); Baker v. United States, 867 A.2d 988,

2020See, e.g., Clark, 147 A.3d at 327 (citing Wilson-Bey for the Pinkerton principle and applying it to affirm a conviction, without explicitly mentioning Pinkerton); Richardson, 116 A.3d at 442 (affirming a conviction because the “evidence was sufficient under a straightforward application of Pinkerton”); Hagans v. United States, 96 A.3d 1, 23-25 (D.C. 2014) (implicitly endorsing the trial court’s use of a Pinkerton jury instruction in a conspiracy case and discussing complications that may arise in the context of vicarious liability for hearsay statements); Baker v. United States, 867 A.2d 988,

2020See, e.g., Clark, 147 A.3d at 327 (citing Wilson-Bey for the Pinkerton principle and applying it to affirm a conviction, without explicitly mentioning Pinkerton); Richardson, 116 A.3d at 442 (affirming a conviction because the “evidence was sufficient under a straightforward application of Pinkerton”); Hagans v. United States, 96 A.3d 1, 23-25 (D.C. 2014) (implicitly endorsing the trial court’s use of a Pinkerton jury instruction in a conspiracy case and discussing complications that may arise in the context of vicarious liability for hearsay statements); Baker v. United States, 867 A.2d 988,

2020See, e.g., Clark, 147 A.3d at 327 (citing Wilson-Bey for the Pinkerton principle and applying it to affirm a conviction, without explicitly mentioning Pinkerton); Richardson, 116 A.3d at 442 (affirming a conviction because the “evidence was sufficient under a straightforward application of Pinkerton”); Hagans v. United States, 96 A.3d 1, 23-25 (D.C. 2014) (implicitly endorsing the trial court’s use of a Pinkerton jury instruction in a conspiracy case and discussing complications that may arise in the context of vicarious liability for hearsay statements); Baker v. United States, 867 A.2d 988,

2020See, e.g., Clark, 147 A.3d at 327 (citing Wilson-Bey for the Pinkerton principle and applying it to affirm a conviction, without explicitly mentioning Pinkerton); Richardson, 116 A.3d at 442 (affirming a conviction because the “evidence was sufficient under a straightforward application of Pinkerton”); Hagans v. United States, 96 A.3d 1, 23-25 (D.C. 2014) (implicitly endorsing the trial court’s use of a Pinkerton jury instruction in a conspiracy case and discussing complications that may arise in the context of vicarious liability for hearsay statements); Baker v. United States, 867 A.2d 988,

2020See, e.g., Clark, 147 A.3d at 327 (citing Wilson-Bey for the Pinkerton principle and applying it to affirm a conviction, without explicitly mentioning Pinkerton); Richardson, 116 A.3d at 442 (affirming a conviction because the “evidence was sufficient under a straightforward application of Pinkerton”); Hagans v. United States, 96 A.3d 1, 23-25 (D.C. 2014) (implicitly endorsing the trial court’s use of a Pinkerton jury instruction in a conspiracy case and discussing complications that may arise in the context of vicarious liability for hearsay statements); Baker v. United States, 867 A.2d 988,

2013We review the trial court’s decision to issue a jury instruction for abuse of discretion, determining whether it represents “an adequate statement of the law, and whether it is supported by evidence in the case.” (Anthony) Wheeler v. United States, 930 A.2d 232, 238 (D.C.2007).

2013An “intent to rob may be inferred not only from the words uttered by the suspect but also from his conduct or from the totality of the evidence.” Jones v. United States, 516 A.2d 929, 932 (D.C.1987) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2007Wilson-Bey did not question this court’s continued adherence to the doctrine of vicarious liability, see, e.g., Gatlin v. United States, 925 A.2d 594, 599 (D.C.2007), indeed distinguishing it from aiding and abetting and the concept of natural and probable consequences as applied thereto. 6 See Wilson-Bey, 903 A.2d at 839-42 .

2007Wilson-Bey did not question this court’s continued adherence to the doctrine of vicarious liability, see, e.g., Gatlin v. United States, 925 A.2d 594, 599 (D.C.2007), indeed distinguishing it from aiding and abetting and the concept of natural and probable consequences as applied thereto. 6 See Wilson-Bey, 903 A.2d at 839-42 .

2005Appellants’ objections to admission of Baker’s statements and later objections to the Pinkerton instruction 12 never included the Confrontation Clause assertion now made on appeal, viz. a jury could find Baker guilty based on his statements, which were admissible only against Baker, a non-testifying co-defendant, and then convict the other appellants based on vicarious liability. [10] While it is true, as appellants argue, that citation to a particular case is not a prerequisite to the preservation of an objection for appellate review, see Tindle v. United States, 778 A.2d 1077, 1082 (D.C. 200

2005Appellants’ objections to admission of Baker’s statements and later objections to the Pinkerton instruction 12 never included the Confrontation Clause assertion now made on appeal, viz. a jury could find Baker guilty based on his statements, which were admissible only against Baker, a non-testifying co-defendant, and then convict the other appellants based on vicarious liability. [10] While it is true, as appellants argue, that citation to a particular case is not a prerequisite to the preservation of an objection for appellate review, see Tindle v. United States, 778 A.2d 1077, 1082 (D.C. 200

2005In our own cases, we have phrased the test as “manifest injustice,” York v. United States, 803 A.2d 1009, 1011 (D.C.2002), or a showing that the error "resulted in a clear miscarriage of justice.” Perkins v. United States, 760 A.2d 604, 609 (D.C.2000). 15 .

2005In our own cases, we have phrased the test as “manifest injustice,” York v. United States, 803 A.2d 1009, 1011 (D.C.2002), or a showing that the error "resulted in a clear miscarriage of justice.” Perkins v. United States, 760 A.2d 604, 609 (D.C.2000). 15 .

1996Foster, supra, 548 A.2d at 1379 (applying constitutional harmless-error test identified in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824, 828 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)).

1996Foster, supra, 548 A.2d at 1379 (applying constitutional harmless-error test identified in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824, 828 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)).