Sheppard hearing in Florida

2025Appellant timely appealed those dispositions to this Court, which reversed and remanded with directions for the trial court to review the motions 2 and if legally sufficient, then follow the procedures articulated in Sheppard v. State, 17 So. 3d 275, 286-87 (Fla. 2009), and hold a Sheppard hearing if necessary.

2025Appellant timely appealed those dispositions to this Court, which reversed and remanded with directions for the trial court to review the motions 2 and if legally sufficient, then follow the procedures articulated in Sheppard v. State, 17 So. 3d 275, 286-87 (Fla. 2009), and hold a Sheppard hearing if necessary.

2019Additionally, “general claims of ineffectiveness of [] counsel do not sufficiently allege an adversarial relationship requiring a Sheppard hearing.” Echeverria v. State, 33 So. 3d 802, 803-04 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (affirming the striking of the represented appellant’s pro se motion to withdraw plea as a nullity because his allegations “that his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered because his trial counsel was ineffective in advising him whether to go to trial and whether to accept a sentence over the original cap of six years in prison” were “broad, general allegations of ineffectiven

2019Additionally, “general claims of ineffectiveness of [] counsel do not sufficiently allege an adversarial relationship requiring a Sheppard hearing.” Echeverria v. State, 33 So. 3d 802, 803-04 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (affirming the striking of the represented appellant’s pro se motion to withdraw plea as a nullity because his allegations “that his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered because his trial counsel was ineffective in advising him whether to go to trial and whether to accept a sentence over the original cap of six years in prison” were “broad, general allegations of ineffectiven

2013See, e.g., Davis v. State, 52 So.3d 697, 698 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (holding that counsel’s motion was not sufficient where counsel alleged only that counsel and appellant’s positions had become adverse); Carter v. State, 22 So.3d 793, 795 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (recognizing that a general allegation of a conflict with counsel is insufficient to warrant a hearing).

2013See, e.g., Davis v. State, 52 So.3d 697, 698 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (holding that counsel’s motion was not sufficient where counsel alleged only that counsel and appellant’s positions had become adverse); Carter v. State, 22 So.3d 793, 795 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (recognizing that a general allegation of a conflict with counsel is insufficient to warrant a hearing).

2025See Carter v. State, 389 So. 3d 759 , 765 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024); Kilburn, 297 So. 3d at 674; Regalado v. State, 25 So. 3d 600, 606 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (“Based upon our understanding of both Florida and United States Supreme Court precedent, stopping a person solely on the ground that the individual possesses a gun violates the Fourth Amendment.”).

2024See Sheppard, 17 So. 3d at 286 (identifying three examples of allegations which could give rise to adversarial relationship: (1) counsel misadvised defendant; (2) counsel misrepresented terms of the plea; or (3) counsel coerced defendant into accepting the plea); Jones v. State, 230 So. 3d 20, 22 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (reversing and remanding for new hearing on motion to withdraw plea and for court to appoint conflict-free counsel where adversarial relationship was “obvious” from allegation that counsel misadvised defendant about strength of his case, including failing to inform him of available

2024See Sheppard, 17 So. 3d at 286 (identifying three examples of allegations which could give rise to adversarial relationship: (1) counsel misadvised defendant; (2) counsel misrepresented terms of the plea; or (3) counsel coerced defendant into accepting the plea); Jones v. State, 230 So. 3d 20, 22 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (reversing and remanding for new hearing on motion to withdraw plea and for court to appoint conflict-free counsel where adversarial relationship was “obvious” from allegation that counsel misadvised defendant about strength of his case, including failing to inform him of available

2022See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 .

2019Additionally, “general claims of ineffectiveness of [] counsel do not sufficiently allege an adversarial relationship requiring a Sheppard hearing.” Echeverria v. State, 33 So. 3d 802, 803-04 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (affirming the striking of the represented appellant’s pro se motion to withdraw plea as a nullity because his allegations “that his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered because his trial counsel was ineffective in advising him whether to go to trial and whether to accept a sentence over the original cap of six years in prison” were “broad, general allegations of ineffectiven

2019Additionally, “general claims of ineffectiveness of [] counsel do not sufficiently allege an adversarial relationship requiring a Sheppard hearing.” Echeverria v. State, 33 So. 3d 802, 803-04 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (affirming the striking of the represented appellant’s pro se motion to withdraw plea as a nullity because his allegations “that his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered because his trial counsel was ineffective in advising him whether to go to trial and whether to accept a sentence over the original cap of six years in prison” were “broad, general allegations of ineffectiven

2016Cf Bums, 50 So.3d at 747 (concluding that the defendant’s allegations that “his original counsel misadvised him and rendered the plea unknowing and involuntary” were sufficient to invoke the Sheppard procedure).

2016Cf Bums, 50 So.3d at 747 (concluding that the defendant’s allegations that “his original counsel misadvised him and rendered the plea unknowing and involuntary” were sufficient to invoke the Sheppard procedure).

2013See, e.g., Davis v. State, 52 So.3d 697, 698 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (holding that counsel’s motion was not sufficient where counsel alleged only that counsel and appellant’s positions had become adverse); Carter v. State, 22 So.3d 793, 795 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (recognizing that a general allegation of a conflict with counsel is insufficient to warrant a hearing).

2013See, e.g., Davis v. State, 52 So.3d 697, 698 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (holding that counsel’s motion was not sufficient where counsel alleged only that counsel and appellant’s positions had become adverse); Carter v. State, 22 So.3d 793, 795 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (recognizing that a general allegation of a conflict with counsel is insufficient to warrant a hearing).

2011See Nelfrard v. State, 34 So.3d 221, 223 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) ("[T]he trial court is not required to appoint conflict-free counsel unless both an adversary relationship exists and the defendant's allegations are not conclusively refuted by the record."); Lomelin-Flores v. State, 21 So.3d 918, 919 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) ("[W]e affirm the summary denial [of the pro se defendant's motion to draw plea] as the claims asserted in the motion are either conclusively refuted by the record or facially insufficient.").

2011See Nelfrard v. State, 34 So.3d 221, 223 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) ("[T]he trial court is not required to appoint conflict-free counsel unless both an adversary relationship exists and the defendant's allegations are not conclusively refuted by the record."); Lomelin-Flores v. State, 21 So.3d 918, 919 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) ("[W]e affirm the summary denial [of the pro se defendant's motion to draw plea] as the claims asserted in the motion are either conclusively refuted by the record or facially insufficient.").

2011See Nelfrard v. State, 34 So.3d 221, 223 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) ("[T]he trial court is not required to appoint conflict-free counsel unless both an adversary relationship exists and the defendant's allegations are not conclusively refuted by the record."); Lomelin-Flores v. State, 21 So.3d 918, 919 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) ("[W]e affirm the summary denial [of the pro se defendant's motion to draw plea] as the claims asserted in the motion are either conclusively refuted by the record or facially insufficient.").

2011See Nelfrard v. State, 34 So.3d 221, 223 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) ("[T]he trial court is not required to appoint conflict-free counsel unless both an adversary relationship exists and the defendant's allegations are not conclusively refuted by the record."); Lomelin-Flores v. State, 21 So.3d 918, 919 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) ("[W]e affirm the summary denial [of the pro se defendant's motion to draw plea] as the claims asserted in the motion are either conclusively refuted by the record or facially insufficient.").

2010Id. at 76; see also Johnson v. State, 22 So.3d 840, 844 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (holding that a trial court’s failure to hold a Sheppard hearing may be considered harmless if the allegations in the rule 3.170(Z) motion are conclusively refuted by the record).

2010Id. at 76; see also Johnson v. State, 22 So.3d 840, 844 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (holding that a trial court’s failure to hold a Sheppard hearing may be considered harmless if the allegations in the rule 3.170(Z) motion are conclusively refuted by the record).

2010Id. at 76; see also Johnson v. State, 22 So.3d 840, 844 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (holding that a trial court’s failure to hold a Sheppard hearing may be considered harmless if the allegations in the rule 3.170(Z) motion are conclusively refuted by the record).

2010Id. at 76; see also Johnson v. State, 22 So.3d 840, 844 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (holding that a trial court’s failure to hold a Sheppard hearing may be considered harmless if the allegations in the rule 3.170(Z) motion are conclusively refuted by the record).

2008We apply a de novo standard of review to the circuit court's denial of Sheppard's motion for judgment of acquittal. *262 See Pagan v. State, 830 So.2d 792, 803 (Fla.2002).

2008"If, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could find the existence of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, sufficient evidence exists to sustain a conviction." Id.