guilty plea involves waiver in Georgia

14 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1972–2015 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (9)

Case	Followed	Cited
Foskey v. Battlegreen ga · 2004 · cited in 5 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2005–2009 2 sentences 2009“The entry of a guilty plea involves the waiver of three federal constitutional rights: the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront one’s accusers [cit.]. . . .” Foskey v. Battle, 277 Ga. 480, 481-482 (1) ( 591 SE2d 802 ) (2004). 2009“The entry of a guilty plea involves the waiver of three federal constitutional rights: the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront one’s accusers [cit.]. . . .” Foskey v. Battle, 277 Ga. 480, 481-482 (1) ( 591 SE2d 802 ) (2004).	5	5
Boykin v. Alabamagreen scotus · 1969 · cited in 6 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1972–2009 2 sentences 2009In 2007, Bullard petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily made, primarily asserting that he did not understand the rights he was waiving as a result of his pleas, as required by Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S. 238, 243 (89 SC 1709, 23 LE2d 274) (1969). [T]he entry of a guilty plea involves the waiver of three federal constitutional rights: the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront one’s accusers. 2006As originally established in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S. 238 (89 SC 1709, 23 LE2d 274) (1969), [t]he entry of a guilty plea involves the waiver of three federal constitutional rights: the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront one’s accusers, and the trial court has a duty to ensure that the defendant understands the constitutional rights being waived.	4	6
Sanders v. Holdergreen ga · 2009 · cited in 2 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011 2 sentences 2011"The entry of a guilty plea involves the waiver of three federal constitutional rights: the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront one's accusers [cit.]...." [Cit.] In a habeas corpus proceeding, the State has the burden to show that the defendant's guilty plea was voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made. [Cit.] Waiver cannot be presumed from a record that is silent. [Cit.] When the record reflects a failure to inform the defendant of each of his three Boykin 338 rights prior to his entering a guilty plea, a judgment denyi 2011"The entry of a guilty plea involves the waiver of three federal constitutional rights: the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront one's accusers [cit.]...." [Cit.] In a habeas corpus proceeding, the State has the burden to show that the defendant's guilty plea was voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made. [Cit.] Waiver cannot be presumed from a record that is silent. [Cit.] When the record reflects a failure to inform the defendant of each of his three Boykin 338 rights prior to his entering a guilty plea, a judgment denyi	1	2
State v. Coopergreen ga · 2006 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015 2 sentences 2015State v. Cooper, 281 Ga. 63, 64 (1) ( 636 SE2d 493 ) (2006). 2015State v. Cooper, 281 Ga. 63, 64 (1) ( 636 SE2d 493 ) (2006).	1	1
Britt v. Smithgreen ga · 2001 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006 2 sentences 2006Thus, the burden was on the State “to address [Cooper’s] challenge and show that the ‘ “guilty plea[s were] informed and voluntary, and made with an articulated waiver of the three Boykin rights.” (Cit.)’ [Cit.]” (Emphasis in original.) Britt v. Smith, 274 Ga. 611, 612 ( 556 SE2d 435 ) (2001). 2006Thus, the burden was on the State “to address [Cooper’s] challenge and show that the ‘ “guilty plea[s were] informed and voluntary, and made with an articulated waiver of the three Boykin rights.” (Cit.)’ [Cit.]” (Emphasis in original.) Britt v. Smith, 274 Ga. 611, 612 ( 556 SE2d 435 ) (2001).	1	1
Johnson v. Zerbstgreen scotus · 1938 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1974–1974 2 sentences 1974Bailey's contention here that the strict standards of Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 464 (58 SC 1019, 82 LE 1461, 146 ALR 357 ), involving a knowing and intentional relinquishment of known rights, applies and must be 88 satisfied here because a guilty plea involves waiver of trial rights, is unsupported by authority. 1974*Bailey’s contention here that the strict standards of Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 464 (58 SC 1019, 82 LE 1461, 146 ALR 357 ), involving a knowing and intentional relinquishment of known rights, applies and must be satisfied here because a guilty plea involves waiver of trial rights, is unsupported by authority.	1	1
North Carolina v. Alfordgreen scotus · 1970 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1974–1974 2 sentences 1974In a lengthy discussion of voluntariness in various contexts the United States Supreme Court in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218, 238 (n. 25) (93 SC 2041, 36 LE2d 854) though noting that under McMann v. Richardson, 397 U. S. 759, 766 (90 SC 1441, 25 LE2d 763) the waiver of trial rights inherent in a guilty plea must be "done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences," declared that "voluntariness" and "waiver" were "distinct." Though the court's language in Schneckloth might be clearer, we conclude that nothing in that opinion is inconsistent with 1974In a lengthy discussion of voluntariness in various contexts the United States Supreme Court in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218, 238 (n. 25) (93 SC 2041, 36 LE2d 854) though noting that under McMann v. Richardson, 397 U. S. 759, 766 (90 SC 1441, 25 LE2d 763) the waiver of trial rights inherent in a guilty plea must be "done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences,” declared that "voluntariness” and "waiver” were "distinct.” Though the court’s language in Schneckloth might be clearer, we conclude that nothing in that opinion is inconsistent with	1	1
McMann v. Richardsongreen scotus · 1970 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1974–1974 2 sentences 1974In a lengthy discussion of voluntariness in various contexts the United States Supreme Court in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218, 238 (n. 25) (93 SC 2041, 36 LE2d 854) though noting that under McMann v. Richardson, 397 U. S. 759, 766 (90 SC 1441, 25 LE2d 763) the waiver of trial rights inherent in a guilty plea must be "done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences," declared that "voluntariness" and "waiver" were "distinct." Though the court's language in Schneckloth might be clearer, we conclude that nothing in that opinion is inconsistent with 1974In a lengthy discussion of voluntariness in various contexts the United States Supreme Court in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218, 238 (n. 25) (93 SC 2041, 36 LE2d 854) though noting that under McMann v. Richardson, 397 U. S. 759, 766 (90 SC 1441, 25 LE2d 763) the waiver of trial rights inherent in a guilty plea must be "done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences,” declared that "voluntariness” and "waiver” were "distinct.” Though the court’s language in Schneckloth might be clearer, we conclude that nothing in that opinion is inconsistent with	1	1
Schneckloth v. Bustamontegreen scotus · 1973 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1974–1974 2 sentences 1974In a lengthy discussion of voluntariness in various contexts the United States Supreme Court in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218, 238 (n. 25) (93 SC 2041, 36 LE2d 854) though noting that under McMann v. Richardson, 397 U. S. 759, 766 (90 SC 1441, 25 LE2d 763) the waiver of trial rights inherent in a guilty plea must be "done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences," declared that "voluntariness" and "waiver" were "distinct." Though the court's language in Schneckloth might be clearer, we conclude that nothing in that opinion is inconsistent with 1974In a lengthy discussion of voluntariness in various contexts the United States Supreme Court in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218, 238 (n. 25) (93 SC 2041, 36 LE2d 854) though noting that under McMann v. Richardson, 397 U. S. 759, 766 (90 SC 1441, 25 LE2d 763) the waiver of trial rights inherent in a guilty plea must be "done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences,” declared that "voluntariness” and "waiver” were "distinct.” Though the court’s language in Schneckloth might be clearer, we conclude that nothing in that opinion is inconsistent with	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (3)

Case	Cited	Years
Adams v. State green ga · 2009 2 sentences 2011While nothing in Boykin requires the use of any precisely-defined language or "magic words" during a guilty plea proceeding, Adams v. State, 285 Ga. 744 (1), 683 S.E.2d 586 (2009), the trial court's discussion of Wilson's "right to remain silent" did not comply with the requirements of Boykin . 2011While nothing in Boykin requires the use of any precisely-defined language or "magic words" during a guilty plea proceeding, Adams v. State, 285 Ga. 744 (1), 683 S.E.2d 586 (2009), the trial court's discussion of Wilson's "right to remain silent" did not comply with the requirements of Boykin .	2	2011–2011
Beckworth v. State green ga · 2006 2 sentences 2007Appellant subsequently filed this habeas petition, a review of which reveals that the only meritorious claim was his assertion that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. 1 As this Court recently reiterated in Beckworth v. State, 281 Ga. 41 ( 635 SE2d 769 ) (2006), “[t]he entry of a guilty plea involves the waiver of three federal constitutional rights: the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront one’s accusers. [Cit.]” [Cit.] It is the duty of a trial court to establish that the defendant understands the consti 2007Appellant subsequently filed this habeas petition, a review of which reveals that the only meritorious claim was his assertion that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. 1 As this Court recently reiterated in Beckworth v. State, 281 Ga. 41 ( 635 SE2d 769 ) (2006), “[t]he entry of a guilty plea involves the waiver of three federal constitutional rights: the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront one’s accusers. [Cit.]” [Cit.] It is the duty of a trial court to establish that the defendant understands the consti	1	2007–2007
Purvis v. Connell green ga · 1971 1 sentence 1972Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S. 238, 242 (1969); Purvis v. Connell, 227 Ga. 764 (1971).	1	1972–1972

Where else courts name it

MS 38 (1992–2019) GA 14 (1972–2015) TX 7 (2017–2026) UT 6 (1993–2015) OH 6 (2021–2026) IL 4 (2020–2025) CO 3 (1982–2026) HI 2 (2016–2021) ID 2 (1993–2009) TN 2 (2010–2015)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

← Caselaw search · G Cite Topics · Brief Check