fiduciary standard in Illinois

2012In Jicarilla, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the leading case on 1 The slip opinion in Garvy is subject to modification or correction until it has been released for publication. -5- the fiduciary exception is Riggs National Bank of Washington, D.C. v. Zimmer, 355 A.2d 709 (Del.

2012In Jicarilla, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the leading case on the fiduciary exception is Riggs National Bank of Washington, D.C. v. Zimmer, 355 A.2d 709 (Del.Ch.1976), and discussed the factors considered by the Riggs court in determining the "real client" to whom the attorney-client privilege properly belongs.

2025Instead insurance producers have only a general duty to exercise ordinary care.” Krop, 2018 IL 122556 , ¶ 28. ¶ 185 Plaintiffs’ allegations against HUB do not fall within the narrow circumstances under which section 2-2201(b) permits a claim for breach of fiduciary duty against an insurance -41- 1-24-0276 producer; there is no allegation of HUB’s “wrongful retention or misappropriation” of money. 735 ILCS 5/2-2201(b) (West 2024).

2020“This statute prevents any insurance producer from being held to the fiduciary standard, except in a narrow set of circumstances” (Krop, 2018 IL 122556 , ¶ 28), i.e., those involving the appropriation of money.

2012Jicarilla, 564 U.S. ___ , 131 S. Ct. at 2321-22 .

2012Jicarilla, 564 U.S. at ___ , 131 S.Ct. at 2321-22 .

2000That, of course, is the traditional standard of the common law. [Citation.] Thus, for all practical purposes, every claim of fiduciary breach by an HMO physician making a mixed decision [about a patient’s eligibility for treatment under an HMO and the appropriate treatment for the patient] would boil down to a malpractice claim, and the fiduciary standard would be nothing but the malpractice standard traditionally applied in actions against physicians.” Herdrich, 530 U.S. at 235 , 147 L.

2000That, of course, is the traditional standard of the common law. [Citation.] Thus, for all practical purposes, every claim of fiduciary breach by an HMO physician making a mixed decision [about a patient’s eligibility for treatment under an HMO and the appropriate treatment for the patient] would boil down to a malpractice claim, and the fiduciary standard would be nothing but the malpractice standard traditionally applied in actions against physicians.” Herdrich, 530 U.S. at 235 , 147 L.

1986(Compare Estate of Beach (1975), 15 Cal. 3d 623, 631 , 542 P.2d 994, 998 , 125 Cal. Rptr. 570, 574 , cert, denied sub nom.

1986(Compare Estate of Beach (1975), 15 Cal. 3d 623, 631 , 542 P.2d 994, 998 , 125 Cal. Rptr. 570, 574 , cert, denied sub nom.

2020Petrovic v. Department of Employment Security, 2016 IL 118562, ¶ 19 . ¶ 16 As its name implies, the City of Chicago’s Department of Administrative Hearings is established essentially, and solely, as a large court system.

1989These decisions recognize the principle that a bank may be held to a fiduciary standard in its dealing with bank customers or depositors “where a bank holds itself out as a financial advisor or otherwise has reason to know (has actual or constructive knowledge) that a depositor is reposing trust and confidence in the bank. [Citations.]” Hooper v. Barnett Bank, 474 So. 2d at 1257 .

1989These decisions recognize the principle that a bank may be held to a fiduciary standard in its dealing with bank customers or depositors "where a bank holds itself out as a financial advisor or otherwise has reason to know (has actual or constructive knowledge) that a depositor is reposing trust and confidence in the bank. [Citations.]" Hooper v. Barnett Bank, 474 So.2d at 1257 . • 13 This legal principle finds no factual application in the record of the case at bar.

1987This court has held that “[a]ny disposition of *** funds for a purpose other than as authorized by the plaintiff [is] improper and a violation *** of the [fiduciary] duty which it [the fiduciary] owe[s] ***.” (Janes v. First Federal Savings & Loan (1974), 57 Ill. 2d 398, 408-09 .) In Janes this court determined that when an agent supplies his principal with an accounting for the disposition of funds, the agent is held to a fiduciary standard and may use the funds only for the designated purpose.

1987This court has held that "[a]ny disposition of * * * funds for a purpose other than as authorized by the plaintiff [is] improper and a violation * * * of the [fiduciary] duty which it [the fiduciary] owe[s] * * *." ( Janes v. First Federal *89 Savings & Loan (1974), 57 Ill.2d 398, 408-09 .) In Janes this court determined that when an agent supplies his principal with an accounting for the disposition of funds, the agent is held to a fiduciary standard and may use the funds only for the designated purpose.

1987It is also unnecessary to remand this cause to determine whether Heinold's fiduciary duty is of such a special, confidential nature that it falls within the exception to the general rule that one seeking to be an agent is not held to a fiduciary standard when negotiating the terms of its employment ( 117 Ill.2d at 79 ).

1985It is this sense that the phrase, ‘utmost fair dealing,’ is used herein to denote the standard of conduct required to satisfy the various implied covenants.” Perhaps the leading case defining the duty owed by the holder of an executive interest to the owner of, in that case, a nonparticipating royalty is Federal Land Bank v. United States (U.S. Ct. U. 1958), 168 F. Supp. 788, 790-91 , in which the court reasoned: “It seems clear that the courts will not leave the royalty owners completely at the mercy of the holder of the exclusive leasing power; however, the Texas law is not clear as to what