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99 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 1996–2026 35 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Keathleygreen2 sentences2026Applicable Law OVI Traffic Stops {¶ 17} " '[W]hen detaining a motorist for a traffic violation, an officer may delay the motorist for a time period sufficient to issue a ticket or a warning.' " State v. Batchili, 2007- Ohio-2204, ¶ 12, quoting State v. Keathley, 55 Ohio App.3d 130, 131 (2d Dist. 1988). 2025Expansion of the traffic stop {¶18} “‘[W]hen detaining a motorist for a traffic violation, an officer may delay the motorist for a time period sufficient to issue a ticket or a warning.’” State v. Batchili, 2007- Ohio-2204, ¶ 12, quoting State v. Keathley, 55 Ohio App.3d 130, 131 (2d Dist. 1988). | 22 | 48 |
State v. Ramosgreen2 sentences2023However, “[a] seizure justified only by a police-observed traffic violation * * * ‘become[s] unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete th[e] mission’ of issuing a ticket for the violation.” Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 350 , 135 S.Ct. 1609 , 191 L.Ed.2d 492 (2015), quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 , 125 S.Ct. 834 , 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005). “[A]fter the reasonable period of time for issuing the traffic citation has passed, an officer must have a reasonable articulable suspicion of illegal activity to continue the detention.” State v. 2023However, “[a] seizure justified only by a police-observed traffic violation * * * ‘become[s] unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete th[e] mission’ of issuing a ticket for the violation.” Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 350 , 135 S.Ct. 1609 , 191 L.Ed.2d 492 (2015), quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 , 125 S.Ct. 834 , 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005). “[A]fter the reasonable period of time for issuing the traffic citation has passed, an officer must have a reasonable articulable suspicion of illegal activity to continue the detention.” State v. | 9 | 9 |
Rodriguez v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2026(Additional citations omitted.) “But, absent additional reasonable suspicion of drug activity, ‘a police stop exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for which the stop was made violates the Constitution’s shield against unreasonable seizures.’” Patterson at id., quoting Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 250 (2015). “‘In determining the reasonableness of a detention, the court must look at the totality of the 9. circumstances.’” Patterson at id., quoting State v. Harper, 2022-Ohio-4357 , ¶ 34 (4th Dist.), quoting State v. Matteucci, 2003-Ohio-702 , ¶ 30 (11th Dist.). {¶ 26} “A s 2026“Generally, a police officer’s decision to stop an automobile will comport with this requirement if the officer has a ‘reasonable suspicion’ of criminal activity.” Id. {¶ 13} A “seizure justified only by a police-observed traffic violation, therefore, ‘become[s] unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete th[e] 6 mission’ of issuing a ticket for the violation.” Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 350 (2015), quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005). | 7 | 25 |
State v. Gonyougreen2 sentences2025The scope and duration of a routine traffic stop "must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification . . .and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop." State v. Latona, 2011- Ohio-1253 ¶¶ 20-21 (5th Dist.) quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983); see also, State v. Gonyou, 108 Ohio App.3d 369, 372 (6th Dist.1995). 2024The scope and duration of a routine traffic stop "must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification * * * and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop." State v. Latona, 2011- Ohio-1253, ¶¶ 20-21 (5th Dist.) quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983); see also, State v. Gonyou, 108 Ohio App.3d 369, 372 (6th Dist.1995). | 5 | 5 |
Illinois v. Caballesgreen2 sentences2026(Additional citations omitted.) “But, absent additional reasonable suspicion of drug activity, ‘a police stop exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for which the stop was made violates the Constitution’s shield against unreasonable seizures.’” Patterson at id., quoting Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 250 (2015). “‘In determining the reasonableness of a detention, the court must look at the totality of the 9. circumstances.’” Patterson at id., quoting State v. Harper, 2022-Ohio-4357 , ¶ 34 (4th Dist.), quoting State v. Matteucci, 2003-Ohio-702 , ¶ 30 (11th Dist.). {¶ 26} “A s 2026“Generally, a police officer’s decision to stop an automobile will comport with this requirement if the officer has a ‘reasonable suspicion’ of criminal activity.” Id. {¶ 13} A “seizure justified only by a police-observed traffic violation, therefore, ‘become[s] unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete th[e] 6 mission’ of issuing a ticket for the violation.” Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 350 (2015), quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005). | 4 | 19 |
United States v. John Jay Hill and Malcolm Scott Hillgreen2 sentences2019United States v. Reed, 141 F.3d 644 (6th Cir.1998), (quoting United States v. Berry, 90 F.3d 148, 153 (6th Cir.1996), cert. denied 519 U.S. 999 (1996)); accord, United States v. Hill, 195 F.3d 258, 273 (6th Cir.1999); United States v. Diaz, 25 F.3d 392, 394 (6th Cir.1994); State v. French, 104 Ohio App.3d 740 , 663 N.E.2d 367 (12th Dist.1995), abrogated on different grounds, City of Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3 , 665 N.E.2d 1091 (1996). {¶14} The Ohio Supreme Court has held, “[W]hen detaining a motorist for a traffic violation, an officer may delay the motorist for a time period suffici 2013United States v. Reed, 141 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v. Berry, 90 F.3d 148, 153 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied 519 U.S. 999 (1996)); accord, United States v. Hill, 195 F.3d 258, 273 (6th Cir. 1999); United States v. Diaz, 25 F.3d Ashland County, Case No. 12-COA-031&12-COA-032 12 392, 394(6th Cir. 1994); State v. French, 104 Ohio App.3d 740 , 663 N.E.2d 367 (12th Dist. 1995), abrogated on different grounds, City of Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3 , 665 N.E.2d 1091 (1996). {¶33} The Ohio Supreme Court has held, “[W]hen detaining a motorist for a traffic violation, an off | 4 | 4 |
State v. Batchiligreen2 sentences2023“When detaining a motorist for a traffic violation, an officer may delay a motorist for a time period sufficient to issue a ticket or warning.” State v. Batchili, 113 Ohio St.3d 403 , 2007-Ohio-2204 , 865 N.E.2d 1282 . 2023“When detaining a motorist for a traffic violation, an officer may delay a motorist for a time period sufficient to issue a ticket or warning.” State v. Batchili, 113 Ohio St.3d 403 , 2007-Ohio-2204 , 865 N.E.2d 1282 . | 2 | 38 |
Florida v. Royergreen2 sentences2024However, “the officer must ‘carefully tailor’ the scope of the stop ‘to its underlying justification,’ and the stop must ‘last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.’” State v. Marcinko, 4th Dist. Washington No. 06CA51, 2007-Ohio-1166, ¶ 26 , quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 , 103 S.Ct. 1319 , 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983). {¶29} A traffic stop becomes “‘unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete th[e] mission’ of issuing a ticket for the violation.” Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 350 , 135 S.Ct. 1609 , quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U 2024However, “the officer must ‘carefully tailor’ the scope of the stop ‘to its underlying justification,’ and the stop must ‘last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.’” State v. Marcinko, 4th Dist. Washington No. 06CA51, 2007-Ohio-1166, ¶ 26 , quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 , 103 S.Ct. 1319 , 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983). {¶29} A traffic stop becomes “‘unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete th[e] mission’ of issuing a ticket for the violation.” Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 350 , 135 S.Ct. 1609 , quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U | 2 | 6 |
State v. Hallgreen2 sentences2019A seizure justified only by a police-observed traffic violation, therefore, ‘become[s] unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete th[e] mission’ of issuing a ticket for the violation.” Rodriguez at 1612 , citing Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407 , 125 S.Ct. 834 , 160 L.Ed.2d 842 . {¶ 20} Recently, in State v. Hall, 2017-Ohio-2682 , 90 N.E.3d 276 (2d Dist.), we addressed whether the trial court had erred in suppressing drug-related evidence found through a canine sniff during a traffic stop. 2019A seizure justified only by a police-observed traffic violation, therefore, ‘become[s] unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete th[e] mission’ of issuing a ticket for the violation.” Rodriguez at 1612 , citing Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407 , 125 S.Ct. 834 , 160 L.Ed.2d 842 . {¶ 20} Recently, in State v. Hall, 2017-Ohio-2682 , 90 N.E.3d 276 (2d Dist.), we addressed whether the trial court had erred in suppressing drug-related evidence found through a canine sniff during a traffic stop. | 2 | 6 |
United States v. Jonathan L. Berrygreen2 sentences2019United States v. Reed, 141 F.3d 644 (6th Cir.1998), (quoting United States v. Berry, 90 F.3d 148, 153 (6th Cir.1996), cert. denied 519 U.S. 999 (1996)); accord, United States v. Hill, 195 F.3d 258, 273 (6th Cir.1999); United States v. Diaz, 25 F.3d 392, 394 (6th Cir.1994); State v. French, 104 Ohio App.3d 740 , 663 N.E.2d 367 (12th Dist.1995), abrogated on different grounds, City of Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3 , 665 N.E.2d 1091 (1996). {¶14} The Ohio Supreme Court has held, “[W]hen detaining a motorist for a traffic violation, an officer may delay the motorist for a time period suffici 2013United States v. Reed, 141 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v. Berry, 90 F.3d 148, 153 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied 519 U.S. 999 (1996)); accord, United States v. Hill, 195 F.3d 258, 273 (6th Cir. 1999); United States v. Diaz, 25 F.3d Ashland County, Case No. 12-COA-031&12-COA-032 12 392, 394(6th Cir. 1994); State v. French, 104 Ohio App.3d 740 , 663 N.E.2d 367 (12th Dist. 1995), abrogated on different grounds, City of Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3 , 665 N.E.2d 1091 (1996). {¶33} The Ohio Supreme Court has held, “[W]hen detaining a motorist for a traffic violation, an off | 2 | 4 |
United States v. Modesto Diazgreen2 sentences2019United States v. Reed, 141 F.3d 644 (6th Cir.1998), (quoting United States v. Berry, 90 F.3d 148, 153 (6th Cir.1996), cert. denied 519 U.S. 999 (1996)); accord, United States v. Hill, 195 F.3d 258, 273 (6th Cir.1999); United States v. Diaz, 25 F.3d 392, 394 (6th Cir.1994); State v. French, 104 Ohio App.3d 740 , 663 N.E.2d 367 (12th Dist.1995), abrogated on different grounds, City of Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3 , 665 N.E.2d 1091 (1996). {¶14} The Ohio Supreme Court has held, “[W]hen detaining a motorist for a traffic violation, an officer may delay the motorist for a time period suffici 2009United States v. Reed (C.A.6, 1998), 141 F.3d 644 , quoting United States v. Berry (C.A.6, 1996), 90 F.3d 148, 153 ; accord United States v. Hill (C.A.6, 1999), 195 F.3d 258, 273 ; United States v. Diaz (C.A.6, 1994), 25 F.3d 392, 394 ; State v. French (1995), 104 Ohio App.3d 740 , 663 N.E.2d 367 . {¶ 11} “ ‘[W]hen detaining a motorist for a traffic violation, an officer may delay a motorist for a time period sufficient to issue a ticket or a warning.’ ” State v. Batchili, 113 Ohio St.3d 403 , 865 N.E.2d 1282 , 2007-Ohio-2204 , at ¶ 12, quoting State v. Keathley (1988), 55 Ohio App.3d 130, 131 | 2 | 3 |
State v. Dunlapgreen2 sentences2021See State v. Dunlap, 73 Ohio St.3d 308, 314 , 1995–Ohio–243, 652 N.E.2d 988 ; State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 20 , 437 N.E.2d 583 (1982). {¶27} Appellant argues that the Trooper unreasonably prolonged the traffic stop in order to allow a drug-detecting dog to sniff her vehicle and, in doing so, violated her rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 10 and Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution. {¶28} “’ [W]hen detaining a motorist for a traffic violation, an officer may delay a motorist for a time period sufficient to issue a ticket or a 2021See State v. Dunlap, 73 Ohio St.3d 308, 314 , 1995–Ohio–243, 652 N.E.2d 988 ; State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 20 , 437 N.E.2d 583 (1982). {¶27} Appellant argues that the Trooper unreasonably prolonged the traffic stop in order to allow a drug-detecting dog to sniff her vehicle and, in doing so, violated her rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 10 and Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution. {¶28} “’ [W]hen detaining a motorist for a traffic violation, an officer may delay a motorist for a time period sufficient to issue a ticket or a | 2 | 2 |
Delaware v. Prousegreen2 sentences2021Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 , 99 S.Ct. 1391 , 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979). {¶ 31} When a motorist is lawfully detained for a traffic violation, a police officer may delay the motorist for a period of time to issue a ticket or a warning. 2021Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 , 99 S.Ct. 1391 , 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979). {¶ 31} When a motorist is lawfully detained for a traffic violation, a police officer may delay the motorist for a period of time to issue a ticket or a warning. | 1 | 6 |
Whren v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2026“Generally, a police officer’s decision to stop an automobile will comport with this requirement if the officer has a ‘reasonable suspicion’ of criminal activity.” Id. {¶ 13} A “seizure justified only by a police-observed traffic violation, therefore, ‘become[s] unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete th[e] 6 mission’ of issuing a ticket for the violation.” Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 350 (2015), quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005). 2019“A seizure justified only by a police-observed traffic violation * * * ‘become[s] -9- unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete th[e] mission’ of issuing a ticket for the violation.” Id., quoting Rodriguez v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 1612 , 191 L.Ed.2d 492 (2015), quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 , 125 S.Ct. 834 , 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005). | 1 | 3 |
State v. Carlsongreen2 sentences2012See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 , 99 S.Ct. 1391 , 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979). “‘In determining if an officer completed these tasks within a reasonable length of time, the court must evaluate the duration of the stop in light of the totality of the circumstances and consider whether the officer diligently conducted the investigation.’” State v. Batchili, 113 Ohio St.3d 403 , 2007-Ohio-2204 , 865 N.E.2d 1282, ¶ 12 , quoting State v. Carlso, 102 Ohio App.3d 585, 598-99 , 657 N.E.2d 591 (9th Dist. 1995). {¶23} In addition, a lawfully detained vehicle may be subjected to a canine sniff of the 2007CA2006-02-002 and CA2006-02-003, 2006-Ohio-5656 , State v. Keathley and State v. Bolder ), as well as its own in State v. Carlson (1995), 102 Ohio App.3d 585 , the court *Page 13 laid the foundation for its holding in Batchili on certain tenets, the first being that "`[w]hen detaining a motorist for a traffic violation, an officer may delay the motorist for a time period sufficient to issue a ticket or warning.' " Batchili at ¶ 12. | 1 | 3 |
State v. Fanninggreen2 sentences2021See State v. Dunlap, 73 Ohio St.3d 308, 314 , 1995–Ohio–243, 652 N.E.2d 988 ; State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 20 , 437 N.E.2d 583 (1982). {¶27} Appellant argues that the Trooper unreasonably prolonged the traffic stop in order to allow a drug-detecting dog to sniff her vehicle and, in doing so, violated her rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 10 and Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution. {¶28} “’ [W]hen detaining a motorist for a traffic violation, an officer may delay a motorist for a time period sufficient to issue a ticket or a 2021See State v. Dunlap, 73 Ohio St.3d 308, 314 , 1995–Ohio–243, 652 N.E.2d 988 ; State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 20 , 437 N.E.2d 583 (1982). {¶27} Appellant argues that the Trooper unreasonably prolonged the traffic stop in order to allow a drug-detecting dog to sniff her vehicle and, in doing so, violated her rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 10 and Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution. {¶28} “’ [W]hen detaining a motorist for a traffic violation, an officer may delay a motorist for a time period sufficient to issue a ticket or a | 1 | 2 |
State v. Kellygreen2 sentences2017"Once the officer has initiated the stop, he or she may detain the vehicle no longer than is necessary to carry out the purpose of the stop which typically amounts to 'a time period sufficient to issue a ticket or a warning.' " Young at ¶ 21, quoting State v. Kelly , 188 Ohio App.3d 842 , 2010-Ohio-3560 , 937 N.E.2d 149 , ¶ 25 (12th Dist.). {¶ 19} R.C. 4503.21(A) provides, in relevant part, that "[n]o person who is the owner or operator of a motor vehicle shall fail to display in plain view on the front and rear of the motor vehicle the distinctive number and registration mark, including any c 2017"Once the officer has initiated the stop, he or she may detain the vehicle no longer than is necessary to carry out the purpose of the stop which typically amounts to 'a time period sufficient to issue a ticket or a warning.' " Young at ¶ 21, quoting State v. Kelly , 188 Ohio App.3d 842 , 2010-Ohio-3560 , 937 N.E.2d 149 , ¶ 25 (12th Dist.). {¶ 19} R.C. 4503.21(A) provides, in relevant part, that "[n]o person who is the owner or operator of a motor vehicle shall fail to display in plain view on the front and rear of the motor vehicle the distinctive number and registration mark, including any c | 1 | 2 |
State v. Bevangreen2 sentences2015“However, the duration of the stop ‘is limited to “effectuate the purpose for which the initial stop was made.’”” Cahill at ¶ 21, quoting Smith at 285 , quoting State v. Venham, 96 Ohio App.3d 649, 655 (4th Dist.1994), citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 , 95 S.Ct. 2574 -8- Case No. 10-15-05 (1975), State v. Chatton, 11 Ohio St.3d 59, 63 (1984), and State v. Bevan, 80 Ohio App.3d 126, 129 (11th Dist.1992). “‘Thus, when detaining a motorist for a traffic violation, an officer may delay the motorist for a time period sufficient to issue a ticket or a warning.’” Id., quoting Smit 2015“However, the duration of the stop ‘is limited to “effectuate the purpose for which the initial stop was made.’”” Cahill at ¶ 21, quoting Smith at 285 , quoting State v. Venham, 96 Ohio App.3d 649, 655 (4th Dist.1994), citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 , 95 S.Ct. 2574 -8- Case No. 10-15-05 (1975), State v. Chatton, 11 Ohio St.3d 59, 63 (1984), and State v. Bevan, 80 Ohio App.3d 126, 129 (11th Dist.1992). “‘Thus, when detaining a motorist for a traffic violation, an officer may delay the motorist for a time period sufficient to issue a ticket or a warning.’” Id., quoting Smit | 1 | 2 |
State v. Venhamgreen2 sentences2015“However, the duration of the stop ‘is limited to “effectuate the purpose for which the initial stop was made.’”” Cahill at ¶ 21, quoting Smith at 285 , quoting State v. Venham, 96 Ohio App.3d 649, 655 (4th Dist.1994), citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 , 95 S.Ct. 2574 -8- Case No. 10-15-05 (1975), State v. Chatton, 11 Ohio St.3d 59, 63 (1984), and State v. Bevan, 80 Ohio App.3d 126, 129 (11th Dist.1992). “‘Thus, when detaining a motorist for a traffic violation, an officer may delay the motorist for a time period sufficient to issue a ticket or a warning.’” Id., quoting Smit 2013His first assigned error is as follows: “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF APPELLANT IN DENYING HIS MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE.” {¶ 18} According to Greene, “Where, during a traffic stop, an officer detains an individual for an unreasonable period of time, beyond that needed to issue a ticket or warning, evidence discovered during a subsequent automobile search must be suppressed as fruit of the unlawful detention.” {¶ 19} As this Court has noted In deciding a motion to suppress, “the trial court assumes the role of trier of facts and is in the best position to resolve questions of fa | 1 | 2 |
State v. Vega (Slip Opinion)green1 sentence2026Id. at ¶ 17-19; see also State v. Vega, 2018-Ohio-4002, ¶ 17 (“When an officer has reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, however, nothing in Rodriguez limits his ability to prolong the stop for a reasonable time in order to conduct an investigation.”). {¶104} Nonetheless, a court need not reach the question of reasonable suspicion for further investigatory detention until answering the initial question of whether the use of the dog prolonged the stop beyond the time reasonably required to complete the “mission” of the stop, which includes not just writing the citation but determining whet | 1 | 1 |
| Toledo v. Reesegreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Jonesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Myersgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Wadegreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Whitmangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Bolden, Unpublished Decision (1-20-2004)
green
2 sentences2021“This measure includes the period of time sufficient to run a computer check on the driver's license, registration, and vehicle plates.” Id., citing State v. Bolden, 12th Dist. Preble No. CA2003-03-007, 2004-Ohio-184, ¶ 17 , citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 , 99 S.Ct. 1391 , 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979). 2021"This measure includes the period of time sufficient to run a computer check on the driver's license, registration, and vehicle plates." Id., citing State v. Bolden, 12th Dist. Preble No. CA2003-03-007, 2004-Ohio-184, ¶ 17 , citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 , 99 S.Ct. 1391 , 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979). | 5 | 2007–2021 |
State v. Elliot
green
2 sentences2023Traffic Stops {¶ 15} " '[W]hen detaining a motorist for a traffic violation, an officer may delay a motorist for a time period sufficient to issue a ticket or warning.' " State v. Elliot, 5th Dist. Guernsey No. 18 CA 22, 2019-Ohio-4411 , 2019 WL 5543085 , ¶ 21 quoting State v. Batchili, 113 Ohio St.3d 403 , 2007-Ohio-2204 , 865 N.E.2d 1282 , ¶ 12 quoting State v. Keathley, 55 Ohio App.3d 130, 131 , 562 N.E.2d 932 (2nd Dist.1988). 2022At issue here is whether appellee was properly detained after Officer Brown was able to read the temporary tag on appellee's vehicle. {¶ 18} " '[W]hen detaining a motorist for a traffic violation, an officer may delay a motorist for a time period sufficient to issue a ticket or warning.' " State v. Elliot, 5th Dist. Guernsey No. 18 CA 22, 2019-Ohio-4411 , ¶ 21 quoting State v. Batchili, 113 Ohio St.3d 403 , 2007-Ohio-2204 , 865 N.E.2d 1282 , ¶ 12 quoting State v. Keathley, 55 Ohio App.3d 130, 131 , 562 N.E.2d 932 (2nd Dist.1988). | 4 | 2022–2023 |
United States v. Joseph J. Reed
green
2 sentences2019United States v. Reed, 141 F.3d 644 (6th Cir.1998), (quoting United States v. Berry, 90 F.3d 148, 153 (6th Cir.1996), cert. denied 519 U.S. 999 (1996)); accord, United States v. Hill, 195 F.3d 258, 273 (6th Cir.1999); United States v. Diaz, 25 F.3d 392, 394 (6th Cir.1994); State v. French, 104 Ohio App.3d 740 , 663 N.E.2d 367 (12th Dist.1995), abrogated on different grounds, City of Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3 , 665 N.E.2d 1091 (1996). {¶14} The Ohio Supreme Court has held, “[W]hen detaining a motorist for a traffic violation, an officer may delay the motorist for a time period suffici 2013United States v. Reed, 141 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v. Berry, 90 F.3d 148, 153 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied 519 U.S. 999 (1996)); accord, United States v. Hill, 195 F.3d 258, 273 (6th Cir. 1999); United States v. Diaz, 25 F.3d Ashland County, Case No. 12-COA-031&12-COA-032 12 392, 394(6th Cir. 1994); State v. French, 104 Ohio App.3d 740 , 663 N.E.2d 367 (12th Dist. 1995), abrogated on different grounds, City of Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3 , 665 N.E.2d 1091 (1996). {¶33} The Ohio Supreme Court has held, “[W]hen detaining a motorist for a traffic violation, an off | 4 | 2008–2019 |
State v. French
green
2 sentences2019United States v. Reed, 141 F.3d 644 (6th Cir.1998), (quoting United States v. Berry, 90 F.3d 148, 153 (6th Cir.1996), cert. denied 519 U.S. 999 (1996)); accord, United States v. Hill, 195 F.3d 258, 273 (6th Cir.1999); United States v. Diaz, 25 F.3d 392, 394 (6th Cir.1994); State v. French, 104 Ohio App.3d 740 , 663 N.E.2d 367 (12th Dist.1995), abrogated on different grounds, City of Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3 , 665 N.E.2d 1091 (1996). {¶14} The Ohio Supreme Court has held, “[W]hen detaining a motorist for a traffic violation, an officer may delay the motorist for a time period suffici 2019United States v. Reed, 141 F.3d 644 (6th Cir.1998), (quoting United States v. Berry, 90 F.3d 148, 153 (6th Cir.1996), cert. denied 519 U.S. 999 (1996)); accord, United States v. Hill, 195 F.3d 258, 273 (6th Cir.1999); United States v. Diaz, 25 F.3d 392, 394 (6th Cir.1994); State v. French, 104 Ohio App.3d 740 , 663 N.E.2d 367 (12th Dist.1995), abrogated on different grounds, City of Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3 , 665 N.E.2d 1091 (1996). {¶14} The Ohio Supreme Court has held, “[W]hen detaining a motorist for a traffic violation, an officer may delay the motorist for a time period suffici | 4 | 2008–2019 |
State v. Latona
neutral
2 sentences2023The scope and duration of a routine traffic stop "must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification * * * and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop." State v. Latona, 5th Dist. Richland No. 2010-CA-0072, 2011-Ohio-1253 , 2011 WL 917728 , ¶¶ 20- 21 quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 , 103 S.Ct. 1319 , 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983); see also, State v. Gonyou, 108 Ohio App.3d 369, 372 , 670 N.E.2d 1040 (6th Dist.1995). 2022The scope and duration of a routine traffic stop "must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification * * * and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop." State v. Latona, 5th Dist. Richland No. 2010-CA-0072, 2011-Ohio-1253 , 2011 WL 917728 , ¶¶ 20-21 quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 , 103 S.Ct. 1319 , 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983); see also, State v. Gonyou, 108 Ohio App.3d 369, 372 , 670 N.E.2d 1040 (6th Dist.1995). | 3 | 2022–2023 |
City of Dayton v. Erickson
green
2 sentences2019United States v. Reed, 141 F.3d 644 (6th Cir.1998), (quoting United States v. Berry, 90 F.3d 148, 153 (6th Cir.1996), cert. denied 519 U.S. 999 (1996)); accord, United States v. Hill, 195 F.3d 258, 273 (6th Cir.1999); United States v. Diaz, 25 F.3d 392, 394 (6th Cir.1994); State v. French, 104 Ohio App.3d 740 , 663 N.E.2d 367 (12th Dist.1995), abrogated on different grounds, City of Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3 , 665 N.E.2d 1091 (1996). {¶14} The Ohio Supreme Court has held, “[W]hen detaining a motorist for a traffic violation, an officer may delay the motorist for a time period suffici 2019United States v. Reed, 141 F.3d 644 (6th Cir.1998), (quoting United States v. Berry, 90 F.3d 148, 153 (6th Cir.1996), cert. denied 519 U.S. 999 (1996)); accord, United States v. Hill, 195 F.3d 258, 273 (6th Cir.1999); United States v. Diaz, 25 F.3d 392, 394 (6th Cir.1994); State v. French, 104 Ohio App.3d 740 , 663 N.E.2d 367 (12th Dist.1995), abrogated on different grounds, City of Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3 , 665 N.E.2d 1091 (1996). {¶14} The Ohio Supreme Court has held, “[W]hen detaining a motorist for a traffic violation, an officer may delay the motorist for a time period suffici | 3 | 2008–2019 |
Berry v. United States
green
2 sentences2019United States v. Reed, 141 F.3d 644 (6th Cir.1998), (quoting United States v. Berry, 90 F.3d 148, 153 (6th Cir.1996), cert. denied 519 U.S. 999 (1996)); accord, United States v. Hill, 195 F.3d 258, 273 (6th Cir.1999); United States v. Diaz, 25 F.3d 392, 394 (6th Cir.1994); State v. French, 104 Ohio App.3d 740 , 663 N.E.2d 367 (12th Dist.1995), abrogated on different grounds, City of Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3 , 665 N.E.2d 1091 (1996). {¶14} The Ohio Supreme Court has held, “[W]hen detaining a motorist for a traffic violation, an officer may delay the motorist for a time period suffici 2013United States v. Reed, 141 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v. Berry, 90 F.3d 148, 153 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied 519 U.S. 999 (1996)); accord, United States v. Hill, 195 F.3d 258, 273 (6th Cir. 1999); United States v. Diaz, 25 F.3d Ashland County, Case No. 12-COA-031&12-COA-032 12 392, 394(6th Cir. 1994); State v. French, 104 Ohio App.3d 740 , 663 N.E.2d 367 (12th Dist. 1995), abrogated on different grounds, City of Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3 , 665 N.E.2d 1091 (1996). {¶33} The Ohio Supreme Court has held, “[W]hen detaining a motorist for a traffic violation, an off | 3 | 2008–2019 |
State v. Chatton
yellow
2 sentences2015“However, the duration of the stop ‘is limited to “effectuate the purpose for which the initial stop was made.’”” Cahill at ¶ 21, quoting Smith at 285 , quoting State v. Venham, 96 Ohio App.3d 649, 655 (4th Dist.1994), citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 , 95 S.Ct. 2574 -8- Case No. 10-15-05 (1975), State v. Chatton, 11 Ohio St.3d 59, 63 (1984), and State v. Bevan, 80 Ohio App.3d 126, 129 (11th Dist.1992). “‘Thus, when detaining a motorist for a traffic violation, an officer may delay the motorist for a time period sufficient to issue a ticket or a warning.’” Id., quoting Smit 2013“The duration of a traffic stop may last no longer than is necessary to resolve the issue that led to the original stop, absent some specific and articulable facts that further detention was reasonable.” State v. Ramos, 155 Ohio App.3d 396 , 2003-Ohio- Highland App. No. 12CA7 6 6535, 801 N.E.2d 523, ¶ 10 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Chatton, 11 Ohio St.3d 59, 63 , 463 N.E.2d 1237 (1984). “[W]hen detaining a motorist for a traffic violation, an officer may delay the motorist for a time period sufficient to issue a ticket or a warning. | 3 | 2013–2015 |
State v. Burnside
green
2 sentences2018After “the reasonable * * * time for issuing [a] traffic citation has [elapsed], an officer must have a reasonable articulable suspicion of illegal activity to continue the detention.” State v. Ramos, 155 Ohio App.3d 396 , 2003-Ohio-6535 , 801 N.E.2d 523, ¶ 13 (2d Dist.). {¶ 13} Appellate “review of a [trial court’s ruling on a] motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact.” State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152 , 2003-Ohio- 5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8 . 2016(Internal citations omitted.) State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152 , 2003-Ohio-5372 , ¶ 8. {¶6} “[W]hen detaining a motorist for a traffic violation, an officer may delay the motorist for a time period sufficient to issue a ticket or a warning. | 2 | 2016–2018 |
State v. Smith
green
2 sentences2012“Thus, when detaining a motorist for a traffic violation, an officer may delay the motorist for a time period sufficient to issue a ticket or a warning.” Smith, 117 Ohio App.3d at 285 , 690 N.E.2d 567 , citing State v. Keathley, 55 Ohio App.3d 130 , 562 N.E.2d 932 (2d Dist. 1998). -11- Case No. 9-11-17 This time period also includes the period of time sufficient to run a computer check on the driver’s license, registration, and vehicle plates. 2012“Thus, when detaining a motorist for a traffic violation, an officer may delay the motorist for a time period sufficient to issue a ticket or a warning.” Smith, 117 Ohio App.3d at 285 , 690 N.E.2d 567 , citing State v. Keathley, 55 Ohio App.3d 130 , 562 N.E.2d 932 (2d Dist. 1998). -11- Case No. 9-11-17 This time period also includes the period of time sufficient to run a computer check on the driver’s license, registration, and vehicle plates. | 2 | 2002–2012 |
| State v. Jones green | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| State v. Marcinko, Unpublished Decision (3-2-2007) green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| State v. Jones green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| State v. Matheny neutral | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| City of Bowling Green v. Godwin green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| State v. McNamara red | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| State v. Norvet green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| United States v. Jacobsen green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| State v. Harper neutral | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| State v. Thomas neutral | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| State v. Mays green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| United States v. Brignoni-Ponce green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| State v. Beltran, Unpublished Decision (8-15-2005) green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| State v. Hopfer green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| State v. Conley, 08ca009454 (3-2-2009) neutral | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Ornelas v. United States green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| State v. Groce, 06ap-1094 (6-12-2007) neutral | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.