PFA hearing in Pennsylvania

2025Thus, one of the court’s objectives in a PFA hearing is to ascertain “whether the victim is in reasonable fear of imminent serious bodily injury.” E.K., 237 A.3d at 519 (cleaned up).

2025Thus, one of the court’s objectives in a PFA hearing is to ascertain “whether the victim is in reasonable fear of imminent serious bodily injury.” E.K., 237 A.3d at 519 (cleaned up).

1996Cf. Weir v. Weir, 428 Pa.Super. 515, 529 , 631 A.2d 650, 657 (1993) (no legislatively created right to counsel at a PFA hearing).

1996Cf. Weir v. Weir, 428 Pa.Super. 515, 529 , 631 A.2d 650, 657 (1993) (no legislatively created right to counsel at a PFA hearing).

2020Ferko-Fox, supra, is the seminal case addressing delays associated with a trial court’s serial continuance of the final PFA hearing.

2020Ferko-Fox, supra, is the seminal case addressing delays associated with a trial court’s serial continuance of the final PFA hearing.

2026In the context of a PFA hearing, a person seeking a protective order will not be “rigorously limited to the specific allegation of abuse found in the Petition.” Snyder v. Snyder, 629 A.2d 977, 981 (Pa. Super. 1993).

2026In the context of a PFA hearing, a person seeking a protective order will not be “rigorously limited to the specific allegation of abuse found in the Petition.” Snyder v. Snyder, 629 A.2d 977, 981 (Pa. Super. 1993).

2023In order for a PFA hearing to comport with due process, “the parties must, at a minimum, have the opportunity to present witnesses, testify on one’s behalf, and cross-examine the opposing party and his/her witnesses.” Lanza v. Simconis, 914 A.2d 902, 906 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation omitted).

2023In order for a PFA hearing to comport with due process, “the parties must, at a minimum, have the opportunity to present witnesses, testify on one’s behalf, and cross-examine the opposing party and his/her witnesses.” Lanza v. Simconis, 914 A.2d 902, 906 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation omitted).

2022On appeal to this Court, we observed that “[i]t is imperative that trial judges use common sense and consider the context and surrounding factors in making their determinations of whether a violation of a court order is truly intentional before imposing sanctions of criminal contempt.” Haigh, supra at 1177 (emphasis in original).

2022On appeal to this Court, we observed that “[i]t is imperative that trial judges use common sense and consider the context and surrounding factors in making their determinations of whether a violation of a court order is truly intentional before imposing sanctions of criminal contempt.” Haigh, supra at 1177 (emphasis in original).

2023However, because there is no legislatively created right to counsel at a PFA hearing, parties “must bear the consequences for failing to secure an attorney in time for the hearing.” R.G. v. T.D., 672 A.2d 341, 343 , (Pa. Super. 1996).3 Here, however, Appellant was pro se throughout the proceedings, and no attorney entered an appearance for Appellant.

2023However, because there is no legislatively created right to counsel at a PFA hearing, parties “must bear the consequences for failing to secure an attorney in time for the hearing.” R.G. v. T.D., 672 A.2d 341, 343 , (Pa. Super. 1996).3 Here, however, Appellant was pro se throughout the proceedings, and no attorney entered an appearance for Appellant.

2022Custer, supra. Accordingly, we affirm.

2022Custer, supra. Accordingly, we affirm.

2023See E.K., supra (holding past acts play a significant role in determining the reasonableness of a victim’s fear and whether a course of conduct exists); Buchhalter, supra (indicating the purpose of the PFA Act is to prevent victims of domestic violence from those who perpetrate the abuse with the primary goal of advancing prevention thereof); Raker, 847 A.2d at 726 (“[I]n light of the purpose of the [PFA] Act to prevent imminent harm to abused persons, some flexibility must be allowed in the admission of evidence relating to past acts of abuse.”) (quotation marks and quotation omitted)).

2023See E.K., supra (holding past acts play a significant role in determining the reasonableness of a victim’s fear and whether a course of conduct exists); Buchhalter, supra (indicating the purpose of the PFA Act is to prevent victims of domestic violence from those who perpetrate the abuse with the primary goal of advancing prevention thereof); Raker, 847 A.2d at 726 (“[I]n light of the purpose of the [PFA] Act to prevent imminent harm to abused persons, some flexibility must be allowed in the admission of evidence relating to past acts of abuse.”) (quotation marks and quotation omitted)).

2019Believing the facts to be similar, Husband relies exclusively on Shandra v. Williams, 819 A.2d 87 (Pa. Super. 2003), wherein we concluded that the trial court had improperly modified a child custody order following a PFA hearing without first providing the parties an opportunity to introduce evidence relating to the best interests of the child.

2019Believing the facts to be similar, Husband relies exclusively on Shandra v. Williams, 819 A.2d 87 (Pa. Super. 2003), wherein we concluded that the trial court had improperly modified a child custody order following a PFA hearing without first providing the parties an opportunity to introduce evidence relating to the best interests of the child.

2026Commonwealth v. Wilson, 227 A.3d 928, 939-40 (Pa. Super. 2020). -4- J-S18043-26 Commonwealth v. Williams, 314 A.3d 910, 912 (Pa. Super. 2024) (some citations omitted).

2026Commonwealth v. Wilson, 227 A.3d 928, 939-40 (Pa. Super. 2020). -4- J-S18043-26 Commonwealth v. Williams, 314 A.3d 910, 912 (Pa. Super. 2024) (some citations omitted).

2021(Appellant’s Brief at 9). -2- J-S20019-21 “In the context of a PFA order, we review the trial court’s legal conclusions for an error of law or abuse of discretion.” Stamus v. Dutcavich, 938 A.2d 1098, 1100 (Pa.Super. 2007) (quoting Drew v. Drew, 870 A.2d 377, 378 (Pa.Super. 2005)).

2017Boykai v. Young, 83 A.3d 1043, 1045 (Pa. Super. 2014), quoting Stamus v. Dutcavich, 938 A.2d 1098, 1100 (Pa. Super. 2007) ____________________________________________ 6 The notes of testimony of the August 24, 2016, PFA hearing do not reflect that any physical exhibits were admitted at the hearing, and there are no exhibits included in the certified record.

2016See id.; see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (providing that “[i]ssues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”); Wills, 873 A.2d at 761 (concluding that appellant’s objection to a witness was waived, as he failed to object to the witness at the PFA hearing).5 5 The trial court further determined that, even if Jeffrey’s second issue had not been waived, it nevertheless lacks merit.

2015We also note that this Court has held that “the Protection from Abuse Act requires flexibility in the admission of evidence and that prior instances of abuse are relevant and admissible.” Hood-O'Hara v. Wills, 873 A.2d 757, 761 (Pa.Super. 2005) (citing Miller v. Walker, 665 A.2d 1252 (Pa.Super. 1995)).

2025We vacate the final PFA order and remand for a new final PFA hearing.3 See Leshko v. Leshko, 833 A.2d 790, 792 (Pa. Super. 2003).

2025We vacate the final PFA order and remand for a new final PFA hearing.3 See Leshko v. Leshko, 833 A.2d 790, 792 (Pa. Super. 2003).

2025See D.H. v. B.O., 734 A.2d 409, 410 (Pa. Super. 1999).

2025See D.H. v. B.O., 734 A.2d 409, 410 (Pa. Super. 1999).

2025K.B., 208 A.3d at 129 & n.4.

2022Accord K.B., 208 A.3d at 130 (holding the defendant did not suffer any prejudice and was not entitled to any relief on the basis of his claim that the trial court erred by not viewing a note at a PFA hearing, when the defendant was allowed to testify about the contents of the note).

2023Rather, as indicated supra, the evidence was relevant in determining whether Appellant was in reasonable fear of either bodily harm (via Appellee’s course of conduct or repeatedly committing acts) or of imminent serious bodily injury.3 See Raker, supra. In her third issue, Appellant contends the trial court erred in prohibiting Appellant from testifying about Appellee’s behavior towards her, which led to the police filing summary harassment charges that were pending against Appellee at the time of the PFA hearing.

2023Rather, as indicated supra, the evidence was relevant in determining whether Appellant was in reasonable fear of either bodily harm (via Appellee’s course of conduct or repeatedly committing acts) or of imminent serious bodily injury.3 See Raker, supra. In her third issue, Appellant contends the trial court erred in prohibiting Appellant from testifying about Appellee’s behavior towards her, which led to the police filing summary harassment charges that were pending against Appellee at the time of the PFA hearing.

2026Commonwealth v. Wilson, 227 A.3d 928, 939-40 (Pa. Super. 2020). -4- J-S18043-26 Commonwealth v. Williams, 314 A.3d 910, 912 (Pa. Super. 2024) (some citations omitted).

2026Commonwealth v. Wilson, 227 A.3d 928, 939-40 (Pa. Super. 2020). -4- J-S18043-26 Commonwealth v. Williams, 314 A.3d 910, 912 (Pa. Super. 2024) (some citations omitted).

2026See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a); see also Hong, 765 A.2d at 1123 (holding that this Court will not consider a claim which was not called to the trial court’s attention at a time when any error committed could have been corrected).

2025See 339 F.3d at 272 ; see also United States v. Coccia, 249 F. Supp. 2d 79, 82 (D.

2025See Commonwealth v. Nelson, 690 A.2d 728, 731 (Pa. Super. 1997).

2025See 339 F.3d at 272 ; see also United States v. Coccia, 249 F. Supp. 2d 79, 82 (D.

2025See Feingold v. Hendrzak, 15 A.3d 937, 943 (Pa. Super. 2011) (imposing counsel fees for abusing the court system to harass the opposing party with lawsuits containing unfounded allegations).

2025See Feingold v. Hendrzak, 15 A.3d 937, 943 (Pa. Super. 2011) (imposing counsel fees for abusing the court system to harass the opposing party with lawsuits containing unfounded allegations).

2025See Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 748 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“If those three characteristics [of § 922(g)(8)] are present, § 922(g)(8) automatically bans the individual subject to the order from possessing ‘any firearm or ammunition.’”) (emphasis added).