often repeated doctrine in Maryland

1992See also Millison v. Fruchtman, 214 Md. 515, 518 , 136 A.2d 240 (1957). .

1992See also Millison v. Fruchtman, 214 Md. 515, 518 , 136 A.2d 240 (1957). .

2013Standard of Review The often repeated test for sufficiency of the evidence is, “ ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Bordley v. State, 205 Md.App. 692, 716 , 46 A.3d 1204 (2012) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)); accord Smith v. State, 415 Md. 174, 184 , 999 A.2d 986 (2010); see also Breakfield v. State, 195 Md.App. 377, 392-393 , 6 A.3d 381 (2010) (opining that the limited question

2013Standard of Review The often repeated test for sufficiency of the evidence is, “ ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Bordley v. State, 205 Md.App. 692, 716 , 46 A.3d 1204 (2012) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)); accord Smith v. State, 415 Md. 174, 184 , 999 A.2d 986 (2010); see also Breakfield v. State, 195 Md.App. 377, 392-393 , 6 A.3d 381 (2010) (opining that the limited question

2013Standard of Review The often repeated test for sufficiency of the evidence is, “ ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Bordley v. State, 205 Md.App. 692, 716 , 46 A.3d 1204 (2012) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)); accord Smith v. State, 415 Md. 174, 184 , 999 A.2d 986 (2010); see also Breakfield v. State, 195 Md.App. 377, 392-393 , 6 A.3d 381 (2010) (opining that the limited question

2013Standard of Review The often repeated test for sufficiency of the evidence is, “ ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Bordley v. State, 205 Md.App. 692, 716 , 46 A.3d 1204 (2012) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)); accord Smith v. State, 415 Md. 174, 184 , 999 A.2d 986 (2010); see also Breakfield v. State, 195 Md.App. 377, 392-393 , 6 A.3d 381 (2010) (opining that the limited question

2010Comm'r, 302 Md. 248, 268 , 487 A.2d 271, 281 (1985) ("It is an often repeated principle that a specific statutory provision governs over a general one.

2010Comm'r, 302 Md. 248, 268 , 487 A.2d 271, 281 (1985) ("It is an often repeated principle that a specific statutory provision governs over a general one.

2007See, e.g., Lamone v. Capozzi, 396 Md. 53, 72 , 912 A.2d 674, 685 (2006) (“this Court ... first will look to the ‘normal, plain meaning of the language,’ and, if the language is clear ..., it will not look past those terms,” quoting Bienkowski v. Brooks, 386 Md. 516, 536 , 873 A.2d 1122, 1134 (2005)); Stoddard v. State, 395 Md. 653, 668 , 911 A.2d 1245, 1254 (2006) (“When interpreting a statute, the ‘ordinary, popular understanding of the English language dictates interpretation of its terminology,’ ” quoting Walzer v. Osborne, 395 Md. 563, 572 , 911 A.2d 427, 432 (2006)); Blake v. State, 395 M

2007See, e.g., Lamone v. Capozzi, 396 Md. 53, 72 , 912 A.2d 674, 685 (2006) (“this Court ... first will look to the ‘normal, plain meaning of the language,’ and, if the language is clear ..., it will not look past those terms,” quoting Bienkowski v. Brooks, 386 Md. 516, 536 , 873 A.2d 1122, 1134 (2005)); Stoddard v. State, 395 Md. 653, 668 , 911 A.2d 1245, 1254 (2006) (“When interpreting a statute, the ‘ordinary, popular understanding of the English language dictates interpretation of its terminology,’ ” quoting Walzer v. Osborne, 395 Md. 563, 572 , 911 A.2d 427, 432 (2006)); Blake v. State, 395 M

2007See, e.g., Lamone v. Capozzi, 396 Md. 53, 72 , 912 A.2d 674, 685 (2006) (“this Court ... first will look to the ‘normal, plain meaning of the language,’ and, if the language is clear ..., it will not look past those terms,” quoting Bienkowski v. Brooks, 386 Md. 516, 536 , 873 A.2d 1122, 1134 (2005)); Stoddard v. State, 395 Md. 653, 668 , 911 A.2d 1245, 1254 (2006) (“When interpreting a statute, the ‘ordinary, popular understanding of the English language dictates interpretation of its terminology,’ ” quoting Walzer v. Osborne, 395 Md. 563, 572 , 911 A.2d 427, 432 (2006)); Blake v. State, 395 M

2007See, e.g., Lamone v. Capozzi, 396 Md. 53, 72 , 912 A.2d 674, 685 (2006) (“this Court ... first will look to the ‘normal, plain meaning of the language,’ and, if the language is clear ..., it will not look past those terms,” quoting Bienkowski v. Brooks, 386 Md. 516, 536 , 873 A.2d 1122, 1134 (2005)); Stoddard v. State, 395 Md. 653, 668 , 911 A.2d 1245, 1254 (2006) (“When interpreting a statute, the ‘ordinary, popular understanding of the English language dictates interpretation of its terminology,’ ” quoting Walzer v. Osborne, 395 Md. 563, 572 , 911 A.2d 427, 432 (2006)); Blake v. State, 395 M

2007See, e.g., Lamone v. Capozzi, 396 Md. 53, 72 , 912 A.2d 674, 685 (2006) (“this Court ... first will look to the ‘normal, plain meaning of the language,’ and, if the language is clear ..., it will not look past those terms,” quoting Bienkowski v. Brooks, 386 Md. 516, 536 , 873 A.2d 1122, 1134 (2005)); Stoddard v. State, 395 Md. 653, 668 , 911 A.2d 1245, 1254 (2006) (“When interpreting a statute, the ‘ordinary, popular understanding of the English language dictates interpretation of its terminology,’ ” quoting Walzer v. Osborne, 395 Md. 563, 572 , 911 A.2d 427, 432 (2006)); Blake v. State, 395 M

2007See, e.g., Lamone v. Capozzi, 396 Md. 53, 72 , 912 A.2d 674, 685 (2006) (“this Court ... first will look to the ‘normal, plain meaning of the language,’ and, if the language is clear ..., it will not look past those terms,” quoting Bienkowski v. Brooks, 386 Md. 516, 536 , 873 A.2d 1122, 1134 (2005)); Stoddard v. State, 395 Md. 653, 668 , 911 A.2d 1245, 1254 (2006) (“When interpreting a statute, the ‘ordinary, popular understanding of the English language dictates interpretation of its terminology,’ ” quoting Walzer v. Osborne, 395 Md. 563, 572 , 911 A.2d 427, 432 (2006)); Blake v. State, 395 M

2007See, e.g., Lamone v. Capozzi, 396 Md. 53, 72 , 912 A.2d 674, 685 (2006) (“this Court ... first will look to the ‘normal, plain meaning of the language,’ and, if the language is clear ..., it will not look past those terms,” quoting Bienkowski v. Brooks, 386 Md. 516, 536 , 873 A.2d 1122, 1134 (2005)); Stoddard v. State, 395 Md. 653, 668 , 911 A.2d 1245, 1254 (2006) (“When interpreting a statute, the ‘ordinary, popular understanding of the English language dictates interpretation of its terminology,’ ” quoting Walzer v. Osborne, 395 Md. 563, 572 , 911 A.2d 427, 432 (2006)); Blake v. State, 395 M

2007See, e.g., Lamone v. Capozzi, 396 Md. 53, 72 , 912 A.2d 674, 685 (2006) (“this Court ... first will look to the ‘normal, plain meaning of the language,’ and, if the language is clear ..., it will not look past those terms,” quoting Bienkowski v. Brooks, 386 Md. 516, 536 , 873 A.2d 1122, 1134 (2005)); Stoddard v. State, 395 Md. 653, 668 , 911 A.2d 1245, 1254 (2006) (“When interpreting a statute, the ‘ordinary, popular understanding of the English language dictates interpretation of its terminology,’ ” quoting Walzer v. Osborne, 395 Md. 563, 572 , 911 A.2d 427, 432 (2006)); Blake v. State, 395 M

2007See, e.g., Lamone v. Capozzi, 396 Md. 53, 72 , 912 A.2d 674, 685 (2006) (“this Court ... first will look to the ‘normal, plain meaning of the language,’ and, if the language is clear ..., it will not look past those terms,” quoting Bienkowski v. Brooks, 386 Md. 516, 536 , 873 A.2d 1122, 1134 (2005)); Stoddard v. State, 395 Md. 653, 668 , 911 A.2d 1245, 1254 (2006) (“When interpreting a statute, the ‘ordinary, popular understanding of the English language dictates interpretation of its terminology,’ ” quoting Walzer v. Osborne, 395 Md. 563, 572 , 911 A.2d 427, 432 (2006)); Blake v. State, 395 M

2007See, e.g., Lamone v. Capozzi, 396 Md. 53, 72 , 912 A.2d 674, 685 (2006) (“this Court ... first will look to the ‘normal, plain meaning of the language,’ and, if the language is clear ..., it will not look past those terms,” quoting Bienkowski v. Brooks, 386 Md. 516, 536 , 873 A.2d 1122, 1134 (2005)); Stoddard v. State, 395 Md. 653, 668 , 911 A.2d 1245, 1254 (2006) (“When interpreting a statute, the ‘ordinary, popular understanding of the English language dictates interpretation of its terminology,’ ” quoting Walzer v. Osborne, 395 Md. 563, 572 , 911 A.2d 427, 432 (2006)); Blake v. State, 395 M

2007Directly on point is the often-repeated principle that “[w] e neither add nor delete words to a clear and unambiguous statute to give it a meaning not reflected by the words the Legislature used or engage in forced or subtle interpretation in an attempt to extend or limit the statute’s meaning.” Taylor v. NationsBank, N.A., 365 Md. 166, 181 , 776 A.2d 645, 654 (2001).

2007Directly on point is the often-repeated principle that “[w] e neither add nor delete words to a clear and unambiguous statute to give it a meaning not reflected by the words the Legislature used or engage in forced or subtle interpretation in an attempt to extend or limit the statute’s meaning.” Taylor v. NationsBank, N.A., 365 Md. 166, 181 , 776 A.2d 645, 654 (2001).

2007See, e.g., Lamone v. Capozzi, 396 Md. 53, 72 , 912 A.2d 674, 685 (2006) (“this Court ... first will look to the ‘normal, plain meaning of the language,’ and, if the language is clear ..., it will not look past those terms,” quoting Bienkowski v. Brooks, 386 Md. 516, 536 , 873 A.2d 1122, 1134 (2005)); Stoddard v. State, 395 Md. 653, 668 , 911 A.2d 1245, 1254 (2006) (“When interpreting a statute, the ‘ordinary, popular understanding of the English language dictates interpretation of its terminology,’ ” quoting Walzer v. Osborne, 395 Md. 563, 572 , 911 A.2d 427, 432 (2006)); Blake v. State, 395 M

2007See, e.g., Lamone v. Capozzi, 396 Md. 53, 72 , 912 A.2d 674, 685 (2006) (“this Court ... first will look to the ‘normal, plain meaning of the language,’ and, if the language is clear ..., it will not look past those terms,” quoting Bienkowski v. Brooks, 386 Md. 516, 536 , 873 A.2d 1122, 1134 (2005)); Stoddard v. State, 395 Md. 653, 668 , 911 A.2d 1245, 1254 (2006) (“When interpreting a statute, the ‘ordinary, popular understanding of the English language dictates interpretation of its terminology,’ ” quoting Walzer v. Osborne, 395 Md. 563, 572 , 911 A.2d 427, 432 (2006)); Blake v. State, 395 M

2007See, e.g., Lamone v. Capozzi, 396 Md. 53, 72 , 912 A.2d 674, 685 (2006) (“this Court ... first will look to the ‘normal, plain meaning of the language,’ and, if the language is clear ..., it will not look past those terms,” quoting Bienkowski v. Brooks, 386 Md. 516, 536 , 873 A.2d 1122, 1134 (2005)); Stoddard v. State, 395 Md. 653, 668 , 911 A.2d 1245, 1254 (2006) (“When interpreting a statute, the ‘ordinary, popular understanding of the English language dictates interpretation of its terminology,’ ” quoting Walzer v. Osborne, 395 Md. 563, 572 , 911 A.2d 427, 432 (2006)); Blake v. State, 395 M

2007See, e.g., Lamone v. Capozzi, 396 Md. 53, 72 , 912 A.2d 674, 685 (2006) (“this Court ... first will look to the ‘normal, plain meaning of the language,’ and, if the language is clear ..., it will not look past those terms,” quoting Bienkowski v. Brooks, 386 Md. 516, 536 , 873 A.2d 1122, 1134 (2005)); Stoddard v. State, 395 Md. 653, 668 , 911 A.2d 1245, 1254 (2006) (“When interpreting a statute, the ‘ordinary, popular understanding of the English language dictates interpretation of its terminology,’ ” quoting Walzer v. Osborne, 395 Md. 563, 572 , 911 A.2d 427, 432 (2006)); Blake v. State, 395 M

2003See, e.g., Medex v. McCabe, 372 Md. 28, 38 , 811 A.2d 297, 303 (2002) (“We cannot modify an unambiguous statute, by adding or removing words”); Dyer v. Otis Warren Real Estate, 371 Md. 576, 585 , 810 A.2d 938, 943 (2002) (“[F]or the petitioner’s interpretation to be adopted, ... there would need to be additional language added to [the statute]”); Caffrey v. Dept. of Liquor Control for Montgomery County, 370 Md. 272, 292 , 805 A.2d 268, 279 (2002) (“ ‘[A] plainly worded statute must be construed without forced or subtle interpretations designed to ... limit the scope of its operation’ ”); Gille

2003See, e.g., Medex v. McCabe, 372 Md. 28, 38 , 811 A.2d 297, 303 (2002) (“We cannot modify an unambiguous statute, by adding or removing words”); Dyer v. Otis Warren Real Estate, 371 Md. 576, 585 , 810 A.2d 938, 943 (2002) (“[F]or the petitioner’s interpretation to be adopted, ... there would need to be additional language added to [the statute]”); Caffrey v. Dept. of Liquor Control for Montgomery County, 370 Md. 272, 292 , 805 A.2d 268, 279 (2002) (“ ‘[A] plainly worded statute must be construed without forced or subtle interpretations designed to ... limit the scope of its operation’ ”); Gille

2003See, e.g., Medex v. McCabe, 372 Md. 28, 38 , 811 A.2d 297, 303 (2002) (“We cannot modify an unambiguous statute, by adding or removing words”); Dyer v. Otis Warren Real Estate, 371 Md. 576, 585 , 810 A.2d 938, 943 (2002) (“[F]or the petitioner’s interpretation to be adopted, ... there would need to be additional language added to [the statute]”); Caffrey v. Dept. of Liquor Control for Montgomery County, 370 Md. 272, 292 , 805 A.2d 268, 279 (2002) (“ ‘[A] plainly worded statute must be construed without forced or subtle interpretations designed to ... limit the scope of its operation’ ”); Gille

2003See, e.g., Medex v. McCabe, 372 Md. 28, 38 , 811 A.2d 297, 303 (2002) (“We cannot modify an unambiguous statute, by adding or removing words”); Dyer v. Otis Warren Real Estate, 371 Md. 576, 585 , 810 A.2d 938, 943 (2002) (“[F]or the petitioner’s interpretation to be adopted, ... there would need to be additional language added to [the statute]”); Caffrey v. Dept. of Liquor Control for Montgomery County, 370 Md. 272, 292 , 805 A.2d 268, 279 (2002) (“ ‘[A] plainly worded statute must be construed without forced or subtle interpretations designed to ... limit the scope of its operation’ ”); Gille

2003See, e.g., Medex v. McCabe, 372 Md. 28, 38 , 811 A.2d 297, 303 (2002) (“We cannot modify an unambiguous statute, by adding or removing words”); Dyer v. Otis Warren Real Estate, 371 Md. 576, 585 , 810 A.2d 938, 943 (2002) (“[F]or the petitioner’s interpretation to be adopted, ... there would need to be additional language added to [the statute]”); Caffrey v. Dept. of Liquor Control for Montgomery County, 370 Md. 272, 292 , 805 A.2d 268, 279 (2002) (“ ‘[A] plainly worded statute must be construed without forced or subtle interpretations designed to ... limit the scope of its operation’ ”); Gille

2003See, e.g., Medex v. McCabe, 372 Md. 28, 38 , 811 A.2d 297, 303 (2002) (“We cannot modify an unambiguous statute, by adding or removing words”); Dyer v. Otis Warren Real Estate, 371 Md. 576, 585 , 810 A.2d 938, 943 (2002) (“[F]or the petitioner’s interpretation to be adopted, ... there would need to be additional language added to [the statute]”); Caffrey v. Dept. of Liquor Control for Montgomery County, 370 Md. 272, 292 , 805 A.2d 268, 279 (2002) (“ ‘[A] plainly worded statute must be construed without forced or subtle interpretations designed to ... limit the scope of its operation’ ”); Gille

2003See, e.g., Medex v. McCabe, 372 Md. 28, 38 , 811 A.2d 297, 303 (2002) (“We cannot modify an unambiguous statute, by adding or removing words”); Dyer v. Otis Warren Real Estate, 371 Md. 576, 585 , 810 A.2d 938, 943 (2002) (“[F]or the petitioner’s interpretation to be adopted, ... there would need to be additional language added to [the statute]”); Caffrey v. Dept. of Liquor Control for Montgomery County, 370 Md. 272, 292 , 805 A.2d 268, 279 (2002) (“ ‘[A] plainly worded statute must be construed without forced or subtle interpretations designed to ... limit the scope of its operation’ ”); Gille

2003See, e.g., Medex v. McCabe, 372 Md. 28, 38 , 811 A.2d 297, 303 (2002) (“We cannot modify an unambiguous statute, by adding or removing words”); Dyer v. Otis Warren Real Estate, 371 Md. 576, 585 , 810 A.2d 938, 943 (2002) (“[F]or the petitioner’s interpretation to be adopted, ... there would need to be additional language added to [the statute]”); Caffrey v. Dept. of Liquor Control for Montgomery County, 370 Md. 272, 292 , 805 A.2d 268, 279 (2002) (“ ‘[A] plainly worded statute must be construed without forced or subtle interpretations designed to ... limit the scope of its operation’ ”); Gille

2003See, e.g., Medex v. McCabe, 372 Md. 28, 38 , 811 A.2d 297, 303 (2002) (“We cannot modify an unambiguous statute, by adding or removing words”); Dyer v. Otis Warren Real Estate, 371 Md. 576, 585 , 810 A.2d 938, 943 (2002) (“[F]or the petitioner’s interpretation to be adopted, ... there would need to be additional language added to [the statute]”); Caffrey v. Dept. of Liquor Control for Montgomery County, 370 Md. 272, 292 , 805 A.2d 268, 279 (2002) (“ ‘[A] plainly worded statute must be construed without forced or subtle interpretations designed to ... limit the scope of its operation’ ”); Gille

2003See, e.g., Medex v. McCabe, 372 Md. 28, 38 , 811 A.2d 297, 303 (2002) (“We cannot modify an unambiguous statute, by adding or removing words”); Dyer v. Otis Warren Real Estate, 371 Md. 576, 585 , 810 A.2d 938, 943 (2002) (“[F]or the petitioner’s interpretation to be adopted, ... there would need to be additional language added to [the statute]”); Caffrey v. Dept. of Liquor Control for Montgomery County, 370 Md. 272, 292 , 805 A.2d 268, 279 (2002) (“ ‘[A] plainly worded statute must be construed without forced or subtle interpretations designed to ... limit the scope of its operation’ ”); Gille

2003See, e.g., Medex v. McCabe, 372 Md. 28, 38 , 811 A.2d 297, 303 (2002) (“We cannot modify an unambiguous statute, by adding or removing words”); Dyer v. Otis Warren Real Estate, 371 Md. 576, 585 , 810 A.2d 938, 943 (2002) (“[F]or the petitioner’s interpretation to be adopted, ... there would need to be additional language added to [the statute]”); Caffrey v. Dept. of Liquor Control for Montgomery County, 370 Md. 272, 292 , 805 A.2d 268, 279 (2002) (“ ‘[A] plainly worded statute must be construed without forced or subtle interpretations designed to ... limit the scope of its operation’ ”); Gille

2003See, e.g., Medex v. McCabe, 372 Md. 28, 38 , 811 A.2d 297, 303 (2002) (“We cannot modify an unambiguous statute, by adding or removing words”); Dyer v. Otis Warren Real Estate, 371 Md. 576, 585 , 810 A.2d 938, 943 (2002) (“[F]or the petitioner’s interpretation to be adopted, ... there would need to be additional language added to [the statute]”); Caffrey v. Dept. of Liquor Control for Montgomery County, 370 Md. 272, 292 , 805 A.2d 268, 279 (2002) (“ ‘[A] plainly worded statute must be construed without forced or subtle interpretations designed to ... limit the scope of its operation’ ”); Gille

2003That line of cases requires *31 both (1) that the accidental injury arise out of and in the course of employment and (2) that the accidental injury arise out of “unusual activity.” Such cases cannot be reconciled with the often-repeated principle that this Court will “neither add nor delete words in order to give the statute a meaning not otherwise communicated by the language used,” Blind Industries v. Department of General Services, 371 Md. 221, 231 , 808 A.2d 782, 788 (2002).

2003That line of cases requires *31 both (1) that the accidental injury arise out of and in the course of employment and (2) that the accidental injury arise out of “unusual activity.” Such cases cannot be reconciled with the often-repeated principle that this Court will “neither add nor delete words in order to give the statute a meaning not otherwise communicated by the language used,” Blind Industries v. Department of General Services, 371 Md. 221, 231 , 808 A.2d 782, 788 (2002).