public building exception in Maine

2003E.g., Jensen, 574 A.2d at 886 (“The decision where to place a patient is clearly a decision arising from the hospital’s authority to care for patients, not the state’s authority to design and construct buildings.”); Darling, 535 A.2d at 423-25 (holding that wrongful training of personnel and promulgation of rules does not constitute the operation of a public building). 7 Lightfoot does not argue that the hallways, the fire door openings, or the fire doors were physically operated in an unsafe manner, or improperly maintained. *67 Similar to the plaintiffs’ arguments in Darling and Jensen , Lig

1990In Darling v. Augusta Mental Health Institute, 535 A.2d 421, 423 (Me.1987), we rejected an appellant’s contention that his complaint, which alleged that AMHI had “negligently promulgated procedures for diagnosing and retaining patients and ha[d] negligently trained its personnel involved in such diagnosis,” established a claim falling within the “construction, operation, or maintenance of any public building or the appurtenances thereto” language of the public building exception.

2023It came closest to doing so in Rodriguez v. Town ofMoose River, 2007 ME 68 , ,i 33, 922 A.2d 484 , where it held "the function a building performs and its character in relation to the public are important factors in determining whether a building is public." This statement was partly based on the law court's prior holding in Adriance v. Town ofStandish, 687 A.2d 238,240 (Me. 1996), where it affirmed a Superior Comi that held a waste transfer station "falls squarely within the public building exception to sovereign immunity" because "[t]he transfer station is permanent, fully enclosed and compl

2007See 14 M.R.S. § 8104-A(2) (2006). 1 [¶ 36] In Adriance v. Town of Standish, 687 A.2d 238 -40 (Me.1996), we held that a town may be held liable pursuant to the public building exception for its negligent failure to properly construct, operate or maintain a waste transfer station.

2023It came closest to doing so in Rodriguez v. Town ofMoose River, 2007 ME 68 , ,i 33, 922 A.2d 484 , where it held "the function a building performs and its character in relation to the public are important factors in determining whether a building is public." This statement was partly based on the law court's prior holding in Adriance v. Town ofStandish, 687 A.2d 238,240 (Me. 1996), where it affirmed a Superior Comi that held a waste transfer station "falls squarely within the public building exception to sovereign immunity" because "[t]he transfer station is permanent, fully enclosed and compl

2023It came closest to doing so in Rodriguez v. Town ofMoose River, 2007 ME 68 , ,i 33, 922 A.2d 484 , where it held "the function a building performs and its character in relation to the public are important factors in determining whether a building is public." This statement was partly based on the law court's prior holding in Adriance v. Town ofStandish, 687 A.2d 238,240 (Me. 1996), where it affirmed a Superior Comi that held a waste transfer station "falls squarely within the public building exception to sovereign immunity" because "[t]he transfer station is permanent, fully enclosed and compl

2022See, e.g., id., ¶ 15 (bleachers); Sanford, 2004 ME 73, ¶ 12 , 850 A.2d 325 (freestanding trash bin); Donovan v. City of Portland, 2004 ME 70, ¶ 5 , 850 A.2d 319 (exterior lighting); Peterson v. City of Bangor, 2003 ME 102, ¶¶ 7-8 , 831 A.2d 416 (monkey bars); Petillo v. City of Portland, 657 A.2d 325, 327 (Me. 1995) (irrigation system) (dicta).

2022See, e.g., id., ¶ 15 (bleachers); Sanford, 2004 ME 73, ¶ 12 , 850 A.2d 325 (freestanding trash bin); Donovan v. City of Portland, 2004 ME 70, ¶ 5 , 850 A.2d 319 (exterior lighting); Peterson v. City of Bangor, 2003 ME 102, ¶¶ 7-8 , 831 A.2d 416 (monkey bars); Petillo v. City of Portland, 657 A.2d 325, 327 (Me. 1995) (irrigation system) (dicta).

2025Therefore, “[e]xceptions to immunity, such as the public building exception, ‘are strictly construed so as to adhere to immunity as the general rule.’” McDonald, 2020 ME 119, ¶ 12 , 239 A.3d 662 (quoting Searle, 2010 ME 89, ¶ 9 , 3 A.3d 390 ); see also Klein, 2022 ME 17, ¶ 8 , 271 A.3d 777 (holding that exceptions to the immunity created by the MTCA are construed strictly “in order to adhere to the Legislature’s directive that immunity for a governmental entity remains the general rule”); Est. of Fortier v. City of Lewiston, 2010 ME 50, ¶ 8 , 997 A.2d 84 (“[T]he MTCA employs an exception-to-im

2025Therefore, “[e]xceptions to immunity, such as the public building exception, ‘are strictly construed so as to adhere to immunity as the general rule.’” McDonald, 2020 ME 119, ¶ 12 , 239 A.3d 662 (quoting Searle, 2010 ME 89, ¶ 9 , 3 A.3d 390 ); see also Klein, 2022 ME 17, ¶ 8 , 271 A.3d 777 (holding that exceptions to the immunity created by the MTCA are construed strictly “in order to adhere to the Legislature’s directive that immunity for a governmental entity remains the general rule”); Est. of Fortier v. City of Lewiston, 2010 ME 50, ¶ 8 , 997 A.2d 84 (“[T]he MTCA employs an exception-to-im

2020See, e.g., ABT & A Co. v. State, 644 A.2d 460, 460 (Me. 1994) (holding that the public building exception was inapplicable where claims were based on the State’s supervision of prisoners rather than the “operation or maintenance” of a correctional facility).

2012Instead the public building exception "must implicate the physical structure of the public building." Finally, in ABT & A Co. v. State, 644 A.2d 460 (Me 1994), the Law Court ruled that the public building exception "applies only to the State's acts in the care or operation of its buildings and property, not to the State's care or supervision of people in its charge." In light of the above authorities, it is evident that Amergian' s claim does not involve alleged negligence in_ the operation or maintenance of a public building and is therefore barred by sovereign immunity. 2 The entry shall be:

2007In focusing on the public character of the transfer station, we stated: “The transfer station is permanent, fully enclosed and completely open to the public and falls squarely within the public building exception to sovereign immunity.” Id.; see also Lovejoy v. State, 544 A.2d 750, 751 (Me.1988) (holding that a camouflaged, underground assault shelter on a military training base, used exclusively for military training, was not a public building). [¶ 32] Because we have not expressly defined “public building,” we look to its plain meaning.

1996Cf. Lovejoy v. State, 544 A.2d 750 (Me.1988) (prefabricated, air transportable underground’ assault shelter located on state-owned military training grounds is not a public budding within the purview of the Act).

2025Therefore, “[e]xceptions to immunity, such as the public building exception, ‘are strictly construed so as to adhere to immunity as the general rule.’” McDonald, 2020 ME 119, ¶ 12 , 239 A.3d 662 (quoting Searle, 2010 ME 89, ¶ 9 , 3 A.3d 390 ); see also Klein, 2022 ME 17, ¶ 8 , 271 A.3d 777 (holding that exceptions to the immunity created by the MTCA are construed strictly “in order to adhere to the Legislature’s directive that immunity for a governmental entity remains the general rule”); Est. of Fortier v. City of Lewiston, 2010 ME 50, ¶ 8 , 997 A.2d 84 (“[T]he MTCA employs an exception-to-im

2025Therefore, “[e]xceptions to immunity, such as the public building exception, ‘are strictly construed so as to adhere to immunity as the general rule.’” McDonald, 2020 ME 119, ¶ 12 , 239 A.3d 662 (quoting Searle, 2010 ME 89, ¶ 9 , 3 A.3d 390 ); see also Klein, 2022 ME 17, ¶ 8 , 271 A.3d 777 (holding that exceptions to the immunity created by the MTCA are construed strictly “in order to adhere to the Legislature’s directive that immunity for a governmental entity remains the general rule”); Est. of Fortier v. City of Lewiston, 2010 ME 50, ¶ 8 , 997 A.2d 84 (“[T]he MTCA employs an exception-to-im

2022See, e.g., id., ¶ 15 (bleachers); Sanford, 2004 ME 73, ¶ 12 , 850 A.2d 325 (freestanding trash bin); Donovan v. City of Portland, 2004 ME 70, ¶ 5 , 850 A.2d 319 (exterior lighting); Peterson v. City of Bangor, 2003 ME 102, ¶¶ 7-8 , 831 A.2d 416 (monkey bars); Petillo v. City of Portland, 657 A.2d 325, 327 (Me. 1995) (irrigation system) (dicta).

2020See Tolliver v. Department a/Transportation, 2008 ME 83 116 , 948 A.2d 1223 .

2020See Tolliver v. Department a/Transportation, 2008 ME 83 116 , 948 A.2d 1223 .

2020Contrary to the City’s argument, the City’s failure to treat the icy conditions of the plaza could be considered a “negligent act[] or omission[]” in the “maintenance” of the plaza.3 14 M.R.S. § 8104-A(2); see Maintenance, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining “maintenance” to mean “[t]he care and work put into a property to keep it operating and productive; general repair and upkeep”); Isaacson v. Husson Coll., 297 A.2d 98, 104 (Me. 1972) (“[T]he defendant was not substantially impeded in its maintenance of the pathways and area ways free and clear of snow.” (emphasis added)); Denm

2004“A governmental entity is not liable for any defect, [or] lack of repair ... in any ... sidewalk, [or] parking area .... ” 14 M.R.S.A. § 8104-A(4) (2003); see also Kitchen v. City of Calais, 666 A.2d 77, 78 (Me.1995) (stating that “[a] parking area constitutes neither a public building nor an appurtenance to a public building”). [¶ 10] Instead, Donovan contends that the public building exception allows her claim to proceed because the lights that were not illuminated were appurtenant to the public building.

2003Id.

2003We concluded that the operation of a public building exception to immunity did not apply to the allegations that the decedent was negligently placed in a closed room with the instruments necessary to hang himself because “AMHI’s practices of monitoring and supervising its patients ... fall within AMHI’s authority to care for its patients, not its authority to operate or maintain its buildings or property.” Id.