dual sovereignty doctrine (Michigan) · Go Syfert
← Michigan issues

dual sovereignty doctrine in Michigan

14 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1975–2018 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (6)

CaseFollowedCited
People v. Kincadegreen
michctapp · 1994 · cited in 2 Michigan opinions naming this issue, 2018–2018
2 sentences

2018As defendant 1 See People v Jones, 394 Mich 434, 435-436 ; 231 NW2d 649 (1975) (the scope of an appeal after a case has been remanded is limited by the scope of the remand), and People v Kincade (On Remand), 206 Mich App 477, 481 ; 522 NW2d 880 (1994) (“where an appellate court remands for some limited purpose following an appeal as of right in a criminal case, a second appeal as of right, limited to the scope of the remand, lies from the decision on remand”). -7- acknowledges, however, in People v Davis, 472 Mich 156, 168 ; 695 NW2d 45 (2005), our Supreme Court, relying on Heath v Alabama, 47

2018As defendant 1 See People v Jones, 394 Mich 434, 435-436 ; 231 NW2d 649 (1975) (the scope of an appeal after a case has been remanded is limited by the scope of the remand), and People v Kincade (On Remand), 206 Mich App 477, 481 ; 522 NW2d 880 (1994) (“where an appellate court remands for some limited purpose following an appeal as of right in a criminal case, a second appeal as of right, limited to the scope of the remand, lies from the decision on remand”). -7- acknowledges, however, in People v Davis, 472 Mich 156, 168 ; 695 NW2d 45 (2005), our Supreme Court, relying on Heath v Alabama, 47

22
Heath v. Alabamagreen
scotus · 1985 · cited in 5 Michigan opinions naming this issue, 1996–2018
2 sentences

2018As defendant 1 See People v Jones, 394 Mich 434, 435-436 ; 231 NW2d 649 (1975) (the scope of an appeal after a case has been remanded is limited by the scope of the remand), and People v Kincade (On Remand), 206 Mich App 477, 481 ; 522 NW2d 880 (1994) (“where an appellate court remands for some limited purpose following an appeal as of right in a criminal case, a second appeal as of right, limited to the scope of the remand, lies from the decision on remand”). -7- acknowledges, however, in People v Davis, 472 Mich 156, 168 ; 695 NW2d 45 (2005), our Supreme Court, relying on Heath v Alabama, 47

2018As defendant 1 See People v Jones, 394 Mich 434, 435-436 ; 231 NW2d 649 (1975) (the scope of an appeal after a case has been remanded is limited by the scope of the remand), and People v Kincade (On Remand), 206 Mich App 477, 481 ; 522 NW2d 880 (1994) (“where an appellate court remands for some limited purpose following an appeal as of right in a criminal case, a second appeal as of right, limited to the scope of the remand, lies from the decision on remand”). -7- acknowledges, however, in People v Davis, 472 Mich 156, 168 ; 695 NW2d 45 (2005), our Supreme Court, relying on Heath v Alabama, 47

15
People v. Davisgreen
mich · 2005 · cited in 3 Michigan opinions naming this issue, 2018–2018
2 sentences

2018As defendant 1 See People v Jones, 394 Mich 434, 435-436 ; 231 NW2d 649 (1975) (the scope of an appeal after a case has been remanded is limited by the scope of the remand), and People v Kincade (On Remand), 206 Mich App 477, 481 ; 522 NW2d 880 (1994) (“where an appellate court remands for some limited purpose following an appeal as of right in a criminal case, a second appeal as of right, limited to the scope of the remand, lies from the decision on remand”). -7- acknowledges, however, in People v Davis, 472 Mich 156, 168 ; 695 NW2d 45 (2005), our Supreme Court, relying on Heath v Alabama, 47

2018As defendant 1 See People v Jones, 394 Mich 434, 435-436 ; 231 NW2d 649 (1975) (the scope of an appeal after a case has been remanded is limited by the scope of the remand), and People v Kincade (On Remand), 206 Mich App 477, 481 ; 522 NW2d 880 (1994) (“where an appellate court remands for some limited purpose following an appeal as of right in a criminal case, a second appeal as of right, limited to the scope of the remand, lies from the decision on remand”). -7- acknowledges, however, in People v Davis, 472 Mich 156, 168 ; 695 NW2d 45 (2005), our Supreme Court, relying on Heath v Alabama, 47

13
United States v. Studabakergreen
ca6 · 2009 · cited in 1 Michigan opinions naming this issue, 2018–2018
1 sentence

2018See Davis, 472 Mich at 168 ; see also, e.g., United States v Studabaker, 578 F3d 423, 430 (CA 6, 2009) (A defendant convicted and incarcerated in England for the same conduct did not bar federal prosecution.).

11
United States v. Lanzagreen
scotus · 1922 · cited in 1 Michigan opinions naming this issue, 2005–2005
2 sentences

2005When a defendant in a single act violates the “peace and dignity” of two sovereigns by breaking the laws of each, he has committed two distinct “offences.” United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922).

2005When a defendant in a single act violates the "peace and dignity" of two sovereigns by breaking the laws of each, he has committed two distinct "offences." United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 , 43 S.Ct. 141 , 67 L.Ed. 314 (1922).

11
People v. Morillogreen
michctapp · 1979 · cited in 1 Michigan opinions naming this issue, 1980–1980
2 sentences

1980See also People v Morillo, 90 Mich App 655 ; 282 NW2d 434 (1979).

1980See also People v Morillo, 90 Mich App 655 ; 282 NW2d 434 (1979).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (1)

CaseNegativeCited
People v. Jonesgreen
mich · 1975 · cited in 2 Michigan opinions naming this issue, 2018–2018
2 sentences

2018As defendant 1 See People v Jones, 394 Mich 434, 435-436 ; 231 NW2d 649 (1975) (the scope of an appeal after a case has been remanded is limited by the scope of the remand), and People v Kincade (On Remand), 206 Mich App 477, 481 ; 522 NW2d 880 (1994) (“where an appellate court remands for some limited purpose following an appeal as of right in a criminal case, a second appeal as of right, limited to the scope of the remand, lies from the decision on remand”). -7- acknowledges, however, in People v Davis, 472 Mich 156, 168 ; 695 NW2d 45 (2005), our Supreme Court, relying on Heath v Alabama, 47

2018As defendant 1 See People v Jones, 394 Mich 434, 435-436 ; 231 NW2d 649 (1975) (the scope of an appeal after a case has been remanded is limited by the scope of the remand), and People v Kincade (On Remand), 206 Mich App 477, 481 ; 522 NW2d 880 (1994) (“where an appellate court remands for some limited purpose following an appeal as of right in a criminal case, a second appeal as of right, limited to the scope of the remand, lies from the decision on remand”). -7- acknowledges, however, in People v Davis, 472 Mich 156, 168 ; 695 NW2d 45 (2005), our Supreme Court, relying on Heath v Alabama, 47

22

Also cited on this issue (24)

CaseCitedYears
People v. Cooper green
mich · 1976
2 sentences

2018Relying on the dual sovereignty doctrine, our Supreme Court explained: “[W]here an individual’s behavior violated state and Federal laws which are framed to protect different social interests, prosecution by one sovereign will not satisfy the needs of the other sovereign.” Id. at 459 .

2005The facts that a court should consider in applying the Cooper balancing test include whether the maximum penalties of the statutes involved are greatly disparate, whether some reason exists why one jurisdiction cannot be entrusted to vindicate fully another jurisdiction's interests in securing a conviction, and whether the differences in the statutes are merely jurisdictional or are more substantive. [ Cooper, supra at 461 , 247 N.W.2d 866 .] The Cooper Court's rejection of the dual sovereignty doctrine as a basis for allowing successive prosecutions, without reference to the defendant's funda

61980–2018
Bartkus v. Illinois green
scotus · 1959
2 sentences

1996Marx Cooper's brief to this Court, as well as the briefs of amici curiae, all discussed the conflict between protecting an accused from being twice put in jeopardy and the dual sovereignty doctrine set forth in Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 , 79 S.Ct. 676 , 3 L.Ed.2d 684 (1959).

1996Marx Cooper's brief to this Court, as well as the briefs of amici curiae, all discussed the conflict between protecting an accused from being twice put in jeopardy and the dual sovereignty doctrine set forth in Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 , 79 S.Ct. 676 , 3 L.Ed.2d 684 (1959).

51980–2000
Abbate v. United States green
scotus · 1959
2 sentences

1980Under the dual sovereignty doctrine as set forth in Abbate v United States, 359 US 187 ; 79 S Ct 666 ; 3 L Ed 2d 729 (1959), and Bartkus v Illinois, 359 US 121 ; 79 S Ct 676 ; 3 L Ed 2d 684 (1959), successive prosecutions by the state and Federal governments for the same act do not constitute double jeopardy.

1980Under the dual sovereignty doctrine as set forth in Abbate v United States, 359 US 187 ; 79 S Ct 666 ; 3 L Ed 2d 729 (1959), and Bartkus v Illinois, 359 US 121 ; 79 S Ct 676 ; 3 L Ed 2d 684 (1959), successive prosecutions by the state and Federal governments for the same act do not constitute double jeopardy.

41980–2000
Moore v. Illinois green
· 1852
2 sentences

2005V. [4] See Fox v. Ohio , 46 U.S. 410 , 12 L.Ed. 213 (1847) (a state may prosecute for passing false coin; the federal government may prosecute for counterfeiting; the former is a private wrong, while the latter is an offense directly against the federal government); United States v. Marigold , 50 U.S. 560 , 13 L.Ed. 257 (1850) (federal statute and federal prosecution for uttering false coinage was constitutionally permissible); Moore v. Illinois , 55 U.S. 13 , 14 L.Ed. 306 (1852) (Illinois law and federal fugitive slave law dissimilar in essential purpose, definition of the offenses, and type

2005V. [4] See Fox v. Ohio , 46 U.S. 410 , 12 L.Ed. 213 (1847) (a state may prosecute for passing false coin; the federal government may prosecute for counterfeiting; the former is a private wrong, while the latter is an offense directly against the federal government); United States v. Marigold , 50 U.S. 560 , 13 L.Ed. 257 (1850) (federal statute and federal prosecution for uttering false coinage was constitutionally permissible); Moore v. Illinois , 55 U.S. 13 , 14 L.Ed. 306 (1852) (Illinois law and federal fugitive slave law dissimilar in essential purpose, definition of the offenses, and type

31996–2005
People v. Hermiz green
mich · 1996
2 sentences

2005Stat. Ann. 506.010 and 506.020 address criminal attempt. [5] MCL 750.413 and 750.535(3)(a). [6] Const. 1963, art. 1, § 15. [7] People v. Davis , unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued November 25, 2003, 2003 WL 22801590 (Docket No. 242207). [8] 453 Mich. 269 , 551 N.W.2d 389 (1996). [9] 470 Mich. 870 , 682 N.W.2d 85 (2004). [10] Justice Kelly in dissent asserts that the majority answers the wrong question when it decides whether this Court "correctly applied the doctrine of dual sovereignty in People v. Cooper ." "The appropriate question," she asserts, "is whether the

2005Stat. Ann. 506.010 and 506.020 address criminal attempt. [5] MCL 750.413 and 750.535(3)(a). [6] Const. 1963, art. 1, § 15. [7] People v. Davis , unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued November 25, 2003, 2003 WL 22801590 (Docket No. 242207). [8] 453 Mich. 269 , 551 N.W.2d 389 (1996). [9] 470 Mich. 870 , 682 N.W.2d 85 (2004). [10] Justice Kelly in dissent asserts that the majority answers the wrong question when it decides whether this Court "correctly applied the doctrine of dual sovereignty in People v. Cooper ." "The appropriate question," she asserts, "is whether the

31996–2005
Elkins v. United States green
scotus · 1960
2 sentences

1996"Scholarly analysis of the dual sovereignty exception was almost uniformly critical, and the decisions described above [Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 , 80 S.Ct. 1437 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960), and Murphy v. Waterfront Comm. of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52 , 84 S.Ct. 1594 , 12 L.Ed.2d 678 (1964)] suggest that the Court was moving in the same direction as the commentators.

1996"Scholarly analysis of the dual sovereignty exception was almost uniformly critical, and the decisions described above [Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 , 80 S.Ct. 1437 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960), and Murphy v. Waterfront Comm. of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52 , 84 S.Ct. 1594 , 12 L.Ed.2d 678 (1964)] suggest that the Court was moving in the same direction as the commentators.

31975–1996
Commonwealth v. Mills green
pa · 1971
2 sentences

1996The Court balanced the state's interests in prosecuting those who had broken the law and the defendant's right to avoid multiple prosecutions, and said: "We feel that the interests of the state and the defendant are best accommodated by the approach of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Mills, 447 Pa. 163 , 286 A.2d 638 (1971)." [35] While Justice Coleman did not fully agree with the reasoning in Cooper , she concurred in the result, making that decision to read the Michigan Constitution as barring multiple federal-state prosecutions unanimous.

1980In United States v Hayes, supra, the United States Court of Appeals reemphasizes that there is no United States constitutional bar to successive state and Federal prosecutions for the same criminal conduct. *789 However, in People v Cooper, 398 Mich 450, 460-461 ; 247 NW2d 866 (1976), the Michigan Supreme Court, recognizing the possibility of coincident state and Federal interests in prosecuting a defendant for offenses arising out of the same criminal act, qualified the dual sovereignty doctrine as follows: "We feel that the interests of the state and the defendant are best accommodated by th

31979–1996
Benton v. Maryland green
scotus · 1969
2 sentences

2005V. [4] See Fox v. Ohio , 46 U.S. 410 , 12 L.Ed. 213 (1847) (a state may prosecute for passing false coin; the federal government may prosecute for counterfeiting; the former is a private wrong, while the latter is an offense directly against the federal government); United States v. Marigold , 50 U.S. 560 , 13 L.Ed. 257 (1850) (federal statute and federal prosecution for uttering false coinage was constitutionally permissible); Moore v. Illinois , 55 U.S. 13 , 14 L.Ed. 306 (1852) (Illinois law and federal fugitive slave law dissimilar in essential purpose, definition of the offenses, and type

2005V. [4] See Fox v. Ohio , 46 U.S. 410 , 12 L.Ed. 213 (1847) (a state may prosecute for passing false coin; the federal government may prosecute for counterfeiting; the former is a private wrong, while the latter is an offense directly against the federal government); United States v. Marigold , 50 U.S. 560 , 13 L.Ed. 257 (1850) (federal statute and federal prosecution for uttering false coinage was constitutionally permissible); Moore v. Illinois , 55 U.S. 13 , 14 L.Ed. 306 (1852) (Illinois law and federal fugitive slave law dissimilar in essential purpose, definition of the offenses, and type

21976–2005
Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor red
scotus · 1964
2 sentences

1996"Scholarly analysis of the dual sovereignty exception was almost uniformly critical, and the decisions described above [Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 , 80 S.Ct. 1437 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960), and Murphy v. Waterfront Comm. of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52 , 84 S.Ct. 1594 , 12 L.Ed.2d 678 (1964)] suggest that the Court was moving in the same direction as the commentators.

1996"Scholarly analysis of the dual sovereignty exception was almost uniformly critical, and the decisions described above [Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 , 80 S.Ct. 1437 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960), and Murphy v. Waterfront Comm. of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52 , 84 S.Ct. 1594 , 12 L.Ed.2d 678 (1964)] suggest that the Court was moving in the same direction as the commentators.

21975–1996
Fox v. Ohio green
· 1847
2 sentences

2005V. [4] See Fox v. Ohio , 46 U.S. 410 , 12 L.Ed. 213 (1847) (a state may prosecute for passing false coin; the federal government may prosecute for counterfeiting; the former is a private wrong, while the latter is an offense directly against the federal government); United States v. Marigold , 50 U.S. 560 , 13 L.Ed. 257 (1850) (federal statute and federal prosecution for uttering false coinage was constitutionally permissible); Moore v. Illinois , 55 U.S. 13 , 14 L.Ed. 306 (1852) (Illinois law and federal fugitive slave law dissimilar in essential purpose, definition of the offenses, and type

2005V. [4] See Fox v. Ohio , 46 U.S. 410 , 12 L.Ed. 213 (1847) (a state may prosecute for passing false coin; the federal government may prosecute for counterfeiting; the former is a private wrong, while the latter is an offense directly against the federal government); United States v. Marigold , 50 U.S. 560 , 13 L.Ed. 257 (1850) (federal statute and federal prosecution for uttering false coinage was constitutionally permissible); Moore v. Illinois , 55 U.S. 13 , 14 L.Ed. 306 (1852) (Illinois law and federal fugitive slave law dissimilar in essential purpose, definition of the offenses, and type

12005–2005
United States v. Marigold green
scotus · 1850
2 sentences

2005V. [4] See Fox v. Ohio , 46 U.S. 410 , 12 L.Ed. 213 (1847) (a state may prosecute for passing false coin; the federal government may prosecute for counterfeiting; the former is a private wrong, while the latter is an offense directly against the federal government); United States v. Marigold , 50 U.S. 560 , 13 L.Ed. 257 (1850) (federal statute and federal prosecution for uttering false coinage was constitutionally permissible); Moore v. Illinois , 55 U.S. 13 , 14 L.Ed. 306 (1852) (Illinois law and federal fugitive slave law dissimilar in essential purpose, definition of the offenses, and type

2005V. [4] See Fox v. Ohio , 46 U.S. 410 , 12 L.Ed. 213 (1847) (a state may prosecute for passing false coin; the federal government may prosecute for counterfeiting; the former is a private wrong, while the latter is an offense directly against the federal government); United States v. Marigold , 50 U.S. 560 , 13 L.Ed. 257 (1850) (federal statute and federal prosecution for uttering false coinage was constitutionally permissible); Moore v. Illinois , 55 U.S. 13 , 14 L.Ed. 306 (1852) (Illinois law and federal fugitive slave law dissimilar in essential purpose, definition of the offenses, and type

12005–2005
People v. Nutt green
mich · 2004
1 sentence

2005The federal provision is substantially similar, providing “nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb ....” US Const, Am V In Nutt, supra, we explained that the protections provided by the Double Jeopardy Clause include: (1) protection against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, (2) protection against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and (3) protection against multiple punishments for the same offense.

12005–2005
People v. Childers green
mich · 1998
2 sentences

2000Although Cooper survived, today’s case brings Cooper one step closer to becoming a “hollow shell.” People v Childers, 459 Mich 216, 227 ; 587 NW2d 17 (1998) (Cavanagh, J., dissenting).

2000Although Cooper survived, today’s case brings Cooper one step closer to becoming a “hollow shell.” People v Childers, 459 Mich 216, 227 ; 587 NW2d 17 (1998) (Cavanagh, J., dissenting).

12000–2000
People v. Perlos green
mich · 1990
2 sentences

1996The essence of the analysis under Thomas and the other federal conspiracy tests is whether the agreement is for one, possibly extended, criminal enterprise, or more than one; it is not a narrow determination of the "intent and goal" of any one of the conspirators. [31] Op. at 393, quoting People v. Perlos, 436 Mich. 305, n. 7 , 462 N.W.2d 310 (1990). [32] See defendant-appellant Marx Cooper's brief and appendix on appeal, No. 3, June term 1976, pp 23-25 for discussion, pp 87a-89a for citations of sources discussing the dual sovereignty principle. [33] Id. at 23.

1996The essence of the analysis under Thomas and the other federal conspiracy tests is whether the agreement is for one, possibly extended, criminal enterprise, or more than one; it is not a narrow determination of the "intent and goal" of any one of the conspirators. [31] Op. at 393, quoting People v. Perlos, 436 Mich. 305, n. 7 , 462 N.W.2d 310 (1990). [32] See defendant-appellant Marx Cooper's brief and appendix on appeal, No. 3, June term 1976, pp 23-25 for discussion, pp 87a-89a for citations of sources discussing the dual sovereignty principle. [33] Id. at 23.

11996–1996
In Re Illova neutral
mich · 1958
2 sentences

1996The lead opinion relies on In re Illova, 351 Mich. 204 , 88 N.W.2d 589 (1958), for the proposition that this Court had accepted the dual sovereignty principle before Cooper was decided.

1996The lead opinion relies on In re Illova, 351 Mich. 204 , 88 N.W.2d 589 (1958), for the proposition that this Court had accepted the dual sovereignty principle before Cooper was decided.

11996–1996
Waller v. Florida green
scotus · 1970
2 sentences

1976Subsequently, in Benton v Maryland, 395 US 784 ; 89 S Ct 2056 ; 23 L Ed 2d 707 (1969), the Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment guarantee that no person may be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense was binding on the states, and in Waller v Florida, supra, the Court held that the scope of the guarantee precluded the recognition of the dual sovereignty doctrine with respect to separate state and municipal prosecutions.

1976Subsequently, in Benton v Maryland, 395 US 784 ; 89 S Ct 2056 ; 23 L Ed 2d 707 (1969), the Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment guarantee that no person may be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense was binding on the states, and in Waller v Florida, supra , the Court held that the scope of the guarantee precluded the recognition of the dual sovereignty doctrine with respect to separate state and municipal prosecutions.

11976–1976
Mapp v. Ohio green
scotus · 1961
2 sentences

1975Bronson, P. J., concurred. "1 See, e.g., Elkins v United States, 364 US 206 ; 80 S Ct 1437 ; 4 L Ed 2d 1669 (1960); Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643 ; 81 S Ct 1684 ; 6 L Ed 2d 1081 (1961); Murphy v Waterfront Commission, 378 US 52 ; 84 S Ct 1594 ; 12 L Ed 2d 678 (1964). "2 We note further that the United States Supreme Court has recently denied certiorari in several cases questioning the application of the dual sovereignty doctrine to consecutive federal and state prosecutions.

1975Bronson, P. J., concurred. "1 See, e.g., Elkins v United States, 364 US 206 ; 80 S Ct 1437 ; 4 L Ed 2d 1669 (1960); Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643 ; 81 S Ct 1684 ; 6 L Ed 2d 1081 (1961); Murphy v Waterfront Commission, 378 US 52 ; 84 S Ct 1594 ; 12 L Ed 2d 678 (1964). "2 We note further that the United States Supreme Court has recently denied certiorari in several cases questioning the application of the dual sovereignty doctrine to consecutive federal and state prosecutions.

11975–1975
Commissioner v. First Security Bank of Utah, N. A. green
scotus · 1971
11975–1975
Ball v. Board of Trustees green
scotus · 1971
2 sentences

1975Bechtel v New Jersey, cert den, 404 US 831 ; 92 S Ct 72 ; 30 L Ed 2d 61 (1971); Colonial Pipeline Co v New Jersey, cert den, 404 US 831 ; 92 S Ct 72 ; 30 L Ed 2d 61 (1971); Feldman v New Jersey, cert den, 404 US 865 ; 92 S Ct 76 ; 30 L Ed 2d 109 (1971); Jacks v New Jersey, cert den, 404 US 865 ; 92 S Ct 76 ; 30 L Ed 2d 109 (1971); Leuty v New Jersey, cert den, 404 US 865 ; 92 S Ct 77 ; 30 L Ed 2d 109 (1971).”

1975Bechtel v New Jersey, cert den, 404 US 831 ; 92 S Ct 72 ; 30 L Ed 2d 61 (1971); Colonial Pipeline Co v New Jersey, cert den, 404 US 831 ; 92 S Ct 72 ; 30 L Ed 2d 61 (1971); Feldman v New Jersey, cert den, 404 US 865 ; 92 S Ct 76 ; 30 L Ed 2d 109 (1971); Jacks v New Jersey, cert den, 404 US 865 ; 92 S Ct 76 ; 30 L Ed 2d 109 (1971); Leuty v New Jersey, cert den, 404 US 865 ; 92 S Ct 77 ; 30 L Ed 2d 109 (1971).”

11975–1975
Goulet v. Municipal Court of Pasadena Judicial District green
scotus · 1971
2 sentences

1975Bechtel v New Jersey, cert den, 404 US 831 ; 92 S Ct 72 ; 30 L Ed 2d 61 (1971); Colonial Pipeline Co v New Jersey, cert den, 404 US 831 ; 92 S Ct 72 ; 30 L Ed 2d 61 (1971); Feldman v New Jersey, cert den, 404 US 865 ; 92 S Ct 76 ; 30 L Ed 2d 109 (1971); Jacks v New Jersey, cert den, 404 US 865 ; 92 S Ct 76 ; 30 L Ed 2d 109 (1971); Leuty v New Jersey, cert den, 404 US 865 ; 92 S Ct 77 ; 30 L Ed 2d 109 (1971).”

1975Bechtel v New Jersey, cert den, 404 US 831 ; 92 S Ct 72 ; 30 L Ed 2d 61 (1971); Colonial Pipeline Co v New Jersey, cert den, 404 US 831 ; 92 S Ct 72 ; 30 L Ed 2d 61 (1971); Feldman v New Jersey, cert den, 404 US 865 ; 92 S Ct 76 ; 30 L Ed 2d 109 (1971); Jacks v New Jersey, cert den, 404 US 865 ; 92 S Ct 76 ; 30 L Ed 2d 109 (1971); Leuty v New Jersey, cert den, 404 US 865 ; 92 S Ct 77 ; 30 L Ed 2d 109 (1971).”

11975–1975
Glouner v. California ex rel. Department of Public Works green
scotus · 1971
2 sentences

1975Bechtel v New Jersey, cert den, 404 US 831 ; 92 S Ct 72 ; 30 L Ed 2d 61 (1971); Colonial Pipeline Co v New Jersey, cert den, 404 US 831 ; 92 S Ct 72 ; 30 L Ed 2d 61 (1971); Feldman v New Jersey, cert den, 404 US 865 ; 92 S Ct 76 ; 30 L Ed 2d 109 (1971); Jacks v New Jersey, cert den, 404 US 865 ; 92 S Ct 76 ; 30 L Ed 2d 109 (1971); Leuty v New Jersey, cert den, 404 US 865 ; 92 S Ct 77 ; 30 L Ed 2d 109 (1971).”

1975Bechtel v New Jersey, cert den, 404 US 831 ; 92 S Ct 72 ; 30 L Ed 2d 61 (1971); Colonial Pipeline Co v New Jersey, cert den, 404 US 831 ; 92 S Ct 72 ; 30 L Ed 2d 61 (1971); Feldman v New Jersey, cert den, 404 US 865 ; 92 S Ct 76 ; 30 L Ed 2d 109 (1971); Jacks v New Jersey, cert den, 404 US 865 ; 92 S Ct 76 ; 30 L Ed 2d 109 (1971); Leuty v New Jersey, cert den, 404 US 865 ; 92 S Ct 77 ; 30 L Ed 2d 109 (1971).”

11975–1975
Phillips v. First National City Bank of New York green
scotus · 1971
2 sentences

1975Bechtel v New Jersey, cert den, 404 US 831 ; 92 S Ct 72 ; 30 L Ed 2d 61 (1971); Colonial Pipeline Co v New Jersey, cert den, 404 US 831 ; 92 S Ct 72 ; 30 L Ed 2d 61 (1971); Feldman v New Jersey, cert den, 404 US 865 ; 92 S Ct 76 ; 30 L Ed 2d 109 (1971); Jacks v New Jersey, cert den, 404 US 865 ; 92 S Ct 76 ; 30 L Ed 2d 109 (1971); Leuty v New Jersey, cert den, 404 US 865 ; 92 S Ct 77 ; 30 L Ed 2d 109 (1971).”

1975Bechtel v New Jersey, cert den, 404 US 831 ; 92 S Ct 72 ; 30 L Ed 2d 61 (1971); Colonial Pipeline Co v New Jersey, cert den, 404 US 831 ; 92 S Ct 72 ; 30 L Ed 2d 61 (1971); Feldman v New Jersey, cert den, 404 US 865 ; 92 S Ct 76 ; 30 L Ed 2d 109 (1971); Jacks v New Jersey, cert den, 404 US 865 ; 92 S Ct 76 ; 30 L Ed 2d 109 (1971); Leuty v New Jersey, cert den, 404 US 865 ; 92 S Ct 77 ; 30 L Ed 2d 109 (1971).”

11975–1975
Evans v. Blue Ridge Railway Co. green
sc · 1912
2 sentences

1975Bechtel v New Jersey, cert den, 404 US 831 ; 92 S Ct 72 ; 30 L Ed 2d 61 (1971); Colonial Pipeline Co v New Jersey, cert den, 404 US 831 ; 92 S Ct 72 ; 30 L Ed 2d 61 (1971); Feldman v New Jersey, cert den, 404 US 865 ; 92 S Ct 76 ; 30 L Ed 2d 109 (1971); Jacks v New Jersey, cert den, 404 US 865 ; 92 S Ct 76 ; 30 L Ed 2d 109 (1971); Leuty v New Jersey, cert den, 404 US 865 ; 92 S Ct 77 ; 30 L Ed 2d 109 (1971).”

1975Bechtel v New Jersey, cert den, 404 US 831 ; 92 S Ct 72 ; 30 L Ed 2d 61 (1971); Colonial Pipeline Co v New Jersey, cert den, 404 US 831 ; 92 S Ct 72 ; 30 L Ed 2d 61 (1971); Feldman v New Jersey, cert den, 404 US 865 ; 92 S Ct 76 ; 30 L Ed 2d 109 (1971); Jacks v New Jersey, cert den, 404 US 865 ; 92 S Ct 76 ; 30 L Ed 2d 109 (1971); Leuty v New Jersey, cert den, 404 US 865 ; 92 S Ct 77 ; 30 L Ed 2d 109 (1971)."

11975–1975
Bennett v. Columbia Electric Street Railway, Light & Power Co. green
sc · 1912
2 sentences

1975Bechtel v New Jersey, cert den, 404 US 831 ; 92 S Ct 72 ; 30 L Ed 2d 61 (1971); Colonial Pipeline Co v New Jersey, cert den, 404 US 831 ; 92 S Ct 72 ; 30 L Ed 2d 61 (1971); Feldman v New Jersey, cert den, 404 US 865 ; 92 S Ct 76 ; 30 L Ed 2d 109 (1971); Jacks v New Jersey, cert den, 404 US 865 ; 92 S Ct 76 ; 30 L Ed 2d 109 (1971); Leuty v New Jersey, cert den, 404 US 865 ; 92 S Ct 77 ; 30 L Ed 2d 109 (1971).”

1975Bechtel v New Jersey, cert den, 404 US 831 ; 92 S Ct 72 ; 30 L Ed 2d 61 (1971); Colonial Pipeline Co v New Jersey, cert den, 404 US 831 ; 92 S Ct 72 ; 30 L Ed 2d 61 (1971); Feldman v New Jersey, cert den, 404 US 865 ; 92 S Ct 76 ; 30 L Ed 2d 109 (1971); Jacks v New Jersey, cert den, 404 US 865 ; 92 S Ct 76 ; 30 L Ed 2d 109 (1971); Leuty v New Jersey, cert den, 404 US 865 ; 92 S Ct 77 ; 30 L Ed 2d 109 (1971).”

11975–1975

Statutes the citing opinions construe

MI § Mich. Comp. Laws § 333.7409 (4) MI § Mich. Comp. Laws § 333.7401 (3) MI § Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520b (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

TX 21 (1988–2025) MI 14 (1975–2018) OH 11 (1971–2024) GA 11 (1987–2020) MD 10 (1984–2017) CO 10 (1977–2026) NJ 9 (1977–2022) TN 8 (2000–2006) PA 7 (1980–2021) FL 6 (1981–2015) WI 6 (1993–2021) CA 6 (1976–2020) AL 5 (1983–2010) MS 5 (1993–2014) UT 5 (1987–2026) NY 5 (1984–2014) NM 4 (1977–2023) WA 4 (1983–2021) KY 3 (1999–2003) MN 3 (2012–2014) CT 3 (1976–1999) MO 3 (1974–1997) NV 3 (1989–2016) IA 3 (1998–2001) OK 2 (2013–2020) RI 2 (2004–2007) ME 2 (2015–2017) AR 2 (1999–2020) IL 2 (1986–1989)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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