Gibson factors in Mississippi

2010Additionally, in Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance v. Gibson, 883 So.2d 1155 (Miss.2004), this Court listed the following factors, which we use when determining the appropriate sanctions (the “Gibson factors”): (1) The length and character of the judge’s public service; (2) Whether there is any prior case law on point; (3) The magnitude of the offense and the harm suffered; (4) Whether the misconduct is an isolated incident or evidences a pattern of conduct; (5) Whether moral turpitude was involved; and (6) The presence or absence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances.

2010Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Gibson, 883 So.2d 1155, 1158 (Miss.2004) (hereinafter “Gibson factors”).

2026Therefore, on remand, if the State fails to show good cause for the delay, “the indictment against [Gibson] must be dismissed, and he must be finally discharged.” Barnes v. State, 577 So. 2d 840, 844 (Miss. 1991). 2 taking judicial notice of a backlog in the medical examiner’s office. ¶4.

2026After a hearing on the matter, the trial court denied Gibson’s motion to dismiss, 1 “[T]he sole remedy for denial of a defendant’s right to a speedy trial is dismissal of the charges against him.” Smith v. State, 550 So. 2d 406, 409 (Miss. 1989) (citing Perry v. State, 419 So. 2d 194, 197 (Miss. 1982)).

2026After a hearing on the matter, the trial court denied Gibson’s motion to dismiss, 1 “[T]he sole remedy for denial of a defendant’s right to a speedy trial is dismissal of the charges against him.” Smith v. State, 550 So. 2d 406, 409 (Miss. 1989) (citing Perry v. State, 419 So. 2d 194, 197 (Miss. 1982)).

2026Here, Gibson’s claim of excusable homicide has no foundation in evidence since he intentionally acted. 5 Subsection two of the Oklahoma excusable-homicide statute provides for excusable homicide “[w]hen committed by accident and misfortune in the heat of passion, upon any sudden and sufficient provocation, or upon a sudden combat provided that no undue advantage is taken, nor any dangerous weapon used, and that the killing is not done in a cruel or unusual manner.” Mead, 83 P.2d at 409 (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Okla.

2013In Skinner, we added to the Gibson factors the consideration of “the extent to which the conduct exploited the judge’s position to satisfy his or her personal desires or was intended to deprive the public of assets or funds rightfully belonging to it.” Skinner, 119 So.3d at 297 (¶ 32).

2013In Skinner, we added to the Gibson factors the consideration of “the extent to which the conduct exploited the judge’s position to satisfy his or her personal desires or was intended to deprive the public of assets or funds rightfully belonging to it.” Skinner, 119 So.3d at 297 (¶ 32).

2010Gibson factor number four is "[w]hether the misconduct is an isolated incident or evidences a pattern of conduct." Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Sanford, 941 So.2d 209, 216 (Miss.2006) (citing Gibson, 883 So.2d at 1158 ). ¶ 31.

2010Gibson factor number four is “[wjhether the misconduct is an isolated incident or evidences a pattern of conduct.” Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Sanford, 941 So.2d 209, 216 (Miss.2006) (citing Gibson, 883 So.2d at 1158 ). ¶ 31.

2010In Re Baker, 535 So.2d 47, 54 (Miss. 1988); Miss.

2010In Re Baker, 535 So.2d 47, 54 (Miss. 1988); Miss.

2004Gibson argues that' the circuit'court erred in giving the jury written instruction S-2 which states, “The Court instructs the Jury that if wounds are inflicted upon a person with-a deadly weapon in a manner calculated to destroy life then intent may be inferred from the use of the weapon.” Gibson, citing Tran v. State, 681 So.2d 514, 517 (Miss.1996), alleges that the instruction runs contrary to Mississippi law which provides that deliberate design cannot be presumed from the unlawful and deliberate use of a deadly weapon where the evidence adduced at trial established the circumstances surrou

2002As this Court has stated on many occasions, "[a] successful claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must include evidence that, but for the attorney's deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding was likely to have been different." Buford, 756 So.2d at 817 (¶ 7) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)).

1991Lane v. State, 562 So.2d 1235, 1236-37 (Miss. 1990); May v. State, 460 So.2d 778, 781 (Miss. 1984).

1991Lane v. State, 562 So.2d 1235, 1236-37 (Miss. 1990); May v. State, 460 So.2d 778, 781 (Miss. 1984).