14 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 2008–2025 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Victor v. Stategreen2 sentences2021In Victor v. State, the Court confronted for the first time a dispute over the required elements of a failure-to-accommodate claim where a claimant does not allege an adverse employment action. 203 N.J. 383, 412-13 (2010). 2021We stated in Royster that [t]o establish a failure-to-accommodate claim under the LAD, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she (1) “qualifies as an individual with a disability, or [ ] is perceived as having a disability, as that has been defined by statute”; (2) “is qualified to perform the essential functions of the job, or was performing those essential functions, either with or without reasonable accommodations”; and (3) that defendant “failed to reasonably accommodate [his or her] disabilities.” [ 227 N.J. at 500 (alterations in original) (quoting Victor, 203 N.J. at 410 ).] Clearly a | 4 | 4 |
Brian Royster v. New Jersey State Police(075926)green2 sentences2024State Police, 227 N.J. 482, 500 (2017) (defining the three elements plaintiff must demonstrate for a failure-to-accommodate claim: (1) the plaintiff has a disability; (2) is able to perform the essential functions of the job with or without an accommodation; and (3) the employer failed to reasonably accommodate the disability). 2021In two later cases -- Royster v. State Police, 227 N.J. 482, 500 (2017), and Caraballo v. City of Jersey City Police Department, 237 N.J. 255, 267-68 (2019) -- the Court recited the elements of a failure-to- accommodate claim without including adverse employment action as a requirement, but did not expressly hold that an adverse employment action is not an element of an LAD claim for failure to accommodate. (pp. 18-21) 3. | 3 | 5 |
Tynan v. VICINAGE 13 OF SUPERIOR CT.green2 sentences2025Here, as in Tynan, the employee's failure-to-accommodate claim "should not have been dismissed on summary judgment and must be determined by a jury." Id. at 404 ; see also Taylor, 184 F.3d at 318 ("where there is a genuine dispute about whether 15 We are unpersuaded by defendant's reliance on Jones v. Aluminum Shapes, Inc., 339 N.J. 2021As Victor noted, two earlier cases implicitly suggested that an employee need not suffer an adverse employment consequence. 203 N.J. at 413-14 (discussing Tynan v. Vicinage 13 of Superior Ct., 351 N.J. | 2 | 5 |
Caraballo v. City of Jersey City Police Dep'tgreen2 sentences2021In two later cases -- Royster v. State Police, 227 N.J. 482, 500 (2017), and Caraballo v. City of Jersey City Police Department, 237 N.J. 255, 267-68 (2019) -- the Court recited the elements of a failure-to- accommodate claim without including adverse employment action as a requirement, but did not expressly hold that an adverse employment action is not an element of an LAD claim for failure to accommodate. (pp. 18-21) 3. 2021Two years later, in Caraballo v. City of Jersey City Police Department, we again recited the elements of a failure-to-accommodate claim without including adverse employment action as a requirement. 237 N.J. 255, 267-68 (2019). | 2 | 2 |
Seiden v. Marina Associatesgreen2 sentences2019Super. 451 , 459-61, 718 A.2d 1230 (Law Div. 1998), "seems to equate [that] the failure to accommodate with an unlawful employment practice, is included as part of the court's explanation about why the McDonnell Douglas 3 burden-shifting framework is not useful [and unnecessary] in the context of a failure to accommodate claim." Id. at 413-14, 4 A.3d 126 . 2008When examining a failure to accommodate claim, courts have limited the proofs to the first three elements of a prima facie discrimination claim "[b]ecause the fourth element's function is to allow an inference to be drawn of disparate treatment, the plaintiff need only establish it as to the discrimination claim, and not as to the reasonable accommodation claim." Leshner, supra, 113 F.Supp. 2d at 692 ; see also LaResca v. AT & T, 161 F.Supp. 2d 323, 329 (D.N.J.2001); Van de Pol v. Caesars Hotel Casino, 979 F.Supp. 308, 312 (D.N.J.1997); Bosshard, supra, 345 N.J.Super. at 91, 783 A. 2d 731 ; Se | 1 | 3 |
Katherine L. Taylor v. Phoenixville School Districtgreen2 sentences2025Here, as in Tynan, the employee's failure-to-accommodate claim "should not have been dismissed on summary judgment and must be determined by a jury." Id. at 404 ; see also Taylor, 184 F.3d at 318 ("where there is a genuine dispute about whether 15 We are unpersuaded by defendant's reliance on Jones v. Aluminum Shapes, Inc., 339 N.J. 2010As the court explained: in order for a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, the plaintiff must show: “(1) he is a disabled person within the meaning of the ADA; (2) he is otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of the job, with or without reasonable accommodations by the employer; and (3) he has suffered an otherwise adverse employment decision as a result of discrimination.” [Taylor, supra, 184 F.3d at 306 (quoting Gaul v. Lucent Techs., 134 F.36 576, 580 (3d Cir.1998) (citation omitted)).] The Taylor decision, therefore, did not divorce fa | 1 | 2 |
Bosshard v. Hackensack Univ. Med. Ctr.green2 sentences2025To prove a failure to accommodate claim against an employer, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she: (1) "had a [NJ]LAD handicap; (2) [were] qualified to perform the essential functions of the job, with our without accommodation; and (3) suffered an adverse employment action because of the handicap." Ibid. 2008When examining a failure to accommodate claim, courts have limited the proofs to the first three elements of a prima facie discrimination claim "[b]ecause the fourth element's function is to allow an inference to be drawn of disparate treatment, the plaintiff need only establish it as to the discrimination claim, and not as to the reasonable accommodation claim." Leshner, supra, 113 F.Supp. 2d at 692 ; see also LaResca v. AT & T, 161 F.Supp. 2d 323, 329 (D.N.J.2001); Van de Pol v. Caesars Hotel Casino, 979 F.Supp. 308, 312 (D.N.J.1997); Bosshard, supra, 345 N.J.Super. at 91, 783 A. 2d 731 ; Se | 1 | 2 |
A.D.P. v. Exxonmobil Research & Engineering Co.green1 sentence2025State Police, 227 N.J. 482, 500 (2017)) (internal quotation marks omitted). "[I]f an employer reasonably determines that [a disabled] employee 'cannot presently perform the job even with an accommodation, then the employer need not attempt reasonable accommodation.'" A.D.P v. ExxonMobil Research & Eng'g Co., 428 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Jones v. Aluminum Shapes, Inc.green1 sentence2025Here, as in Tynan, the employee's failure-to-accommodate claim "should not have been dismissed on summary judgment and must be determined by a jury." Id. at 404 ; see also Taylor, 184 F.3d at 318 ("where there is a genuine dispute about whether 15 We are unpersuaded by defendant's reliance on Jones v. Aluminum Shapes, Inc., 339 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Raspa v. Office of Sheriffgreen2 sentences2025Reasonable accommodation "refers to the duty of an employer to attempt to accommodate the physical disability of the employee, not to a duty on the part of the employer to acquiesce to the disabled employee's requests for certain benefits or remuneration." Raspa v. Office of Sheriff of City of Gloucester, 191 N.J. 323, 339 (2007). "[A]n employee must possess the bona fide occupational qualifications for the job position that employee seeks to occupy in order to A-1553-22 12 trigger an employer's obligation to reasonably accommodate the employee to the extent required by the LAD." Id. at 327 . 2025Reasonable accommodation "refers to the duty of an employer to attempt to accommodate the physical disability of the employee, not to a duty on the part of the employer to acquiesce to the disabled employee's requests for certain benefits or remuneration." Raspa v. Office of Sheriff of City of Gloucester, 191 N.J. 323, 339 (2007). "[A]n employee must possess the bona fide occupational qualifications for the job position that employee seeks to occupy in order to A-1553-22 12 trigger an employer's obligation to reasonably accommodate the employee to the extent required by the LAD." Id. at 327 . | 1 | 1 |
Exby-Stolley v. Board of County Commissionersgreen1 sentence2021Comm’rs, 979 F.3d 784, 792 (10th Cir. 2020) (en banc). | 1 | 1 |
Potente v. County of Hudsongreen1 sentence2021A. “The LAD prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of a disability.” Potente v. County of Hudson, 187 N.J. 103, 110 (2006) (citing N.J.S.A. 10:5-4.1, -29.1). | 1 | 1 |
Svarnas v. AT & T COMMUNICATIONSgreen1 sentence2021If the employee cannot perform the essential functions of the job because of the disability, "then the court must consider whether reasonable accommodations would enable the person to perform those functions; however, an accommodation is not reasonable if it imposes undue financial and administrative burdens or requires fundamental changes in the nature of the employment." Svarnas v. AT&T Commc'ns., 326 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Rochelle Garrison v. Dolgencorp, LLCgreen1 sentence2021In other words, it would verge on the illogical to require failure-to-accommodate plaintiffs to establish that their employer acted adversely toward them -- when the fundamental nature of the claim is that the employer failed to act. [Id. at 797 (citation omitted).] 24 See also Garrison v. Dolgencorp, LLC, 939 F.3d 937, 941 (8th Cir. 2019). 3 C. | 1 | 1 |
Armstrong v. Burdette Tomlin Memorial Hospitalgreen2 sentences2017As the trial judge acknowledged in her summary judgment opinion, “[t]he requirements for failure to accommodate claims under New Jersey’s LAD have been interpreted in accordance with the Americans with Disabilities Act.” (Quoting Armstrong v. 20 Burdette Tomlin Mem’l Hosp., 438 F.3d 240, 246, n.12 (3d Cir. 2006)).5 To establish a failure-to-accommodate claim under the LAD, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she (1) “qualifies as an individual with a disability, or [] is perceived as having a disability, as that has been defined by statute”; (2) “is qualified to perform the essential funct 2017As the trial judge acknowledged in her summary judgment opinion, “[t]he requirements for failure to accommodate claims under New Jersey’s LAD have been interpreted in accordance with the Americans with Disabilities Act.” (Quoting Armstrong v. Burdette Tomlin Mem’l Hosp., 438 F.3d 240, 246, n.12 (3d Cir. 2006)). 5 To establish a failure-to-accommodate claim under the LAD, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she (1) “qualifies as an individual with a disability, or [] is perceived as having a disability, as that has been defined by statute”; (2) “is qualified to perform the essential functio | 1 | 1 |
Viscik v. Fowler Equipment Co., Inc.green2 sentences2017The Administrative Code mandates that an employer “consider the possibility of reasonable accommodation before firing, demoting or refusing to hire or promote a person with a disability on the grounds that his or her disability precludes job performance.” N.J.A.C. 13:13-2.5(b)(2); see also Viscik, supra, 173 N.J. at 19-20 (noting that reasonable accommodation arises as issue in disability discrimination cases in two instances: where plaintiff affirmatively pleads failure to accommodate and where employer defends on grounds that employee was terminated due to inability to perform job). 21 We ha 2017The Administrative Code mandates that an employer “consider the possibility of reasonable accommodation before firing, demoting or refusing to hire or promote a person with a disability on the grounds that his or her disability precludes job performance.” N.J.A.C. 13:13-2.5(b)(2); see also Viscik, supra, 173 N.J. at 19-20 (noting that reasonable accommodation arises as issue in disability discrimination cases in two instances: where plaintiff affirmatively pleads failure to accommodate and where employer defends on grounds that employee was terminated due to inability to perform job). 21 We ha | 1 | 1 |
In Re Reasonable Testing Accommodations of LaFleurgreen1 sentence2012See, e.g., Randolph v. Rodgers, 170 F. 3d 850 , 858 (8th Cir.1999) ("[I]t is true that public entities [such as prison facilities] are not required to guess at what accommodations they should provide...."); In re: Reasonable Testing Accommodations of *452 LaFleur, 722 N.W. 2d 559, 562 (S.D.2006) (stating that to prevail on a failure to accommodate claim against an educational institution, a plaintiff "`must show (1) that [he] is disabled, (2) that [his] requests for accommodations [were] reasonable, and (3) that those requests have been denied'") (quoting D'Amico v. N.Y. | 1 | 1 |
Randolph v. Rodgersgreen1 sentence2012See, e.g., Randolph v. Rodgers, 170 F. 3d 850 , 858 (8th Cir.1999) ("[I]t is true that public entities [such as prison facilities] are not required to guess at what accommodations they should provide...."); In re: Reasonable Testing Accommodations of *452 LaFleur, 722 N.W. 2d 559, 562 (S.D.2006) (stating that to prevail on a failure to accommodate claim against an educational institution, a plaintiff "`must show (1) that [he] is disabled, (2) that [his] requests for accommodations [were] reasonable, and (3) that those requests have been denied'") (quoting D'Amico v. N.Y. | 1 | 1 |
D'Amico v. New York State Board of Law Examinersgreen1 sentence2012State Bd. of Law Exam'rs, 813 F.Supp. 217, 221 (W.D.N.Y.1993)); Lindberg v. Livonia Pub. | 1 | 1 |
Victor v. Stategreen2 sentences2010Concluding, however, that proof of an adverse employment action is a required element of a failure to accommodate claim under the LAD, id. at 617 , 952 A.2d 493 , the Appellate Division rejected the trial court’s reasoning that an adverse employment consequence “is presumed by the failure to accommodate or that plaintiffs claimed psychological suffering unequivocally qualifies.” Ibid. 2010Concluding, however, that proof of an adverse employment action is a required element of a failure to accommodate claim under the LAD, id. at 617 , 952 A.2d 493 , the Appellate Division rejected the trial court’s reasoning that an adverse employment consequence “is presumed by the failure to accommodate or that plaintiffs claimed psychological suffering unequivocally qualifies.” Ibid. | 1 | 1 |
Nawrot v. CPC Internationalgreen1 sentence2010See Nawrot v. CPC Int'l, 259 F.Supp.2d 716 (N.D.Ill. 2003). | 1 | 1 |
Jeffrey D. Lavia v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Corrections, State Correctional Institution at Greenegreen1 sentence2010See, e.g., Lavia v. Pennsylvania, 224 F.3d 190 , 203-04 (3d Cir.2000) (relying on “most penetrating analysis” of ADA’s constitutionality; citing Erickson v. Bd. of Governors, 207 F.3d 945 (7th Cir.2000) and Stevens v. Ill. | 1 | 1 |
| Laresca v. American Telephone & Telegraphgreen | 1 | 1 |
Clowes v. Terminix International, Inc.green2 sentences2008See Clowes, supra, 109 N.J. at 593-94 , 538 A. 2d 794 (alcoholism qualifies as handicap); Harris, supra, 353 N.J.Super. at 44 , 801 A. 2d 397 (reversed summary judgment finding that plaintiff who had been treated for breast cancer was not "handicapped" under the LAD); Tynan, supra, 351 N.J.Super. at 398-99 , 798 A. 2d 648 (post-traumatic stress disorder created an accommodatable handicap); Bosshard, supra, 345 N.J.Super. at 85, 783 A. 2d 731 (when heroin addiction may be a handicap); A.B.C. v. XYZ Corp., 282 N.J.Super. 494, 508 , 660 A. 2d 1199 (App.Div.1995) (conduct of a criminal nature is n 2008See Clowes, supra, 109 N.J. at 593-94 , 538 A. 2d 794 (alcoholism qualifies as handicap); Harris, supra, 353 N.J.Super. at 44 , 801 A. 2d 397 (reversed summary judgment finding that plaintiff who had been treated for breast cancer was not "handicapped" under the LAD); Tynan, supra, 351 N.J.Super. at 398-99 , 798 A. 2d 648 (post-traumatic stress disorder created an accommodatable handicap); Bosshard, supra, 345 N.J.Super. at 85, 783 A. 2d 731 (when heroin addiction may be a handicap); A.B.C. v. XYZ Corp., 282 N.J.Super. 494, 508 , 660 A. 2d 1199 (App.Div.1995) (conduct of a criminal nature is n | 1 | 1 |
Van De Pol v. Caesars Hotel Casinogreen1 sentence2008When examining a failure to accommodate claim, courts have limited the proofs to the first three elements of a prima facie discrimination claim "[b]ecause the fourth element's function is to allow an inference to be drawn of disparate treatment, the plaintiff need only establish it as to the discrimination claim, and not as to the reasonable accommodation claim." Leshner, supra, 113 F.Supp. 2d at 692 ; see also LaResca v. AT & T, 161 F.Supp. 2d 323, 329 (D.N.J.2001); Van de Pol v. Caesars Hotel Casino, 979 F.Supp. 308, 312 (D.N.J.1997); Bosshard, supra, 345 N.J.Super. at 91, 783 A. 2d 731 ; Se | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
VALLE-ARCE v. Puerto Rico Ports Authority
green
1 sentence2021Ports Auth., 651 F.3d 190 , 198 (1st Cir. 2011) (stating that, to make out a reasonable-accommodation claim under the ADA, the plaintiff had to show “(1) that she suffers from a disability . . . , (2) that she is an otherwise qualified individual . . . , and (3) that the [employer] knew of her disability and did not reasonably accommodate it”); Rhoads v. FDIC, 257 F.3d 373 , 387 n.11 (4th Cir. 2001) (stating that, to establish a prima facie failure-to-accommodate claim, a plaintiff must show “(1) that he was an individual who had a disability . . . ; (2) that the [employer] had notice of his d | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Rhoads v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
green
1 sentence2021Ports Auth., 651 F.3d 190 , 198 (1st Cir. 2011) (stating that, to make out a reasonable-accommodation claim under the ADA, the plaintiff had to show “(1) that she suffers from a disability . . . , (2) that she is an otherwise qualified individual . . . , and (3) that the [employer] knew of her disability and did not reasonably accommodate it”); Rhoads v. FDIC, 257 F.3d 373 , 387 n.11 (4th Cir. 2001) (stating that, to establish a prima facie failure-to-accommodate claim, a plaintiff must show “(1) that he was an individual who had a disability . . . ; (2) that the [employer] had notice of his d | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Robert E. Bultemeyer v. Fort Wayne Community Schools
green
1 sentence2010Id. at 1283-84 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Melinda Erickson, United States of America, Intervenor v. Board of Governors of State Colleges and Universities for Northeastern Illinois University
green
1 sentence2010See, e.g., Lavia v. Pennsylvania, 224 F.3d 190 , 203-04 (3d Cir.2000) (relying on “most penetrating analysis” of ADA’s constitutionality; citing Erickson v. Bd. of Governors, 207 F.3d 945 (7th Cir.2000) and Stevens v. Ill. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Leshner v. McCollister's Transportation Systems, Inc.
green
2 sentences2008When examining a failure to accommodate claim, courts have limited the proofs to the first three elements of a prima facie discrimination claim "[b]ecause the fourth element's function is to allow an inference to be drawn of disparate treatment, the plaintiff need only establish it as to the discrimination claim, and not as to the reasonable accommodation claim." Leshner, supra, 113 F.Supp. 2d at 692 ; see also LaResca v. AT & T, 161 F.Supp. 2d 323, 329 (D.N.J.2001); Van de Pol v. Caesars Hotel Casino, 979 F.Supp. 308, 312 (D.N.J.1997); Bosshard, supra, 345 N.J.Super. at 91, 783 A. 2d 731 ; Se 2008When examining a failure to accommodate claim, courts have limited the proofs to the first three elements of a prima facie discrimination claim "[b]ecause the fourth element's function is to allow an inference to be drawn of disparate treatment, the plaintiff need only establish it as to the discrimination claim, and not as to the reasonable accommodation claim." Leshner, supra, 113 F.Supp. 2d at 692 ; see also LaResca v. AT & T, 161 F.Supp. 2d 323, 329 (D.N.J.2001); Van de Pol v. Caesars Hotel Casino, 979 F.Supp. 308, 312 (D.N.J.1997); Bosshard, supra, 345 N.J.Super. at 91, 783 A. 2d 731 ; Se | 1 | 2008–2008 |
ABC v. XYZ Corp.
green
2 sentences2008See Clowes, supra, 109 N.J. at 593-94 , 538 A. 2d 794 (alcoholism qualifies as handicap); Harris, supra, 353 N.J.Super. at 44 , 801 A. 2d 397 (reversed summary judgment finding that plaintiff who had been treated for breast cancer was not "handicapped" under the LAD); Tynan, supra, 351 N.J.Super. at 398-99 , 798 A. 2d 648 (post-traumatic stress disorder created an accommodatable handicap); Bosshard, supra, 345 N.J.Super. at 85, 783 A. 2d 731 (when heroin addiction may be a handicap); A.B.C. v. XYZ Corp., 282 N.J.Super. 494, 508 , 660 A. 2d 1199 (App.Div.1995) (conduct of a criminal nature is n 2008See Clowes, supra, 109 N.J. at 593-94 , 538 A. 2d 794 (alcoholism qualifies as handicap); Harris, supra, 353 N.J.Super. at 44 , 801 A. 2d 397 (reversed summary judgment finding that plaintiff who had been treated for breast cancer was not "handicapped" under the LAD); Tynan, supra, 351 N.J.Super. at 398-99 , 798 A. 2d 648 (post-traumatic stress disorder created an accommodatable handicap); Bosshard, supra, 345 N.J.Super. at 85, 783 A. 2d 731 (when heroin addiction may be a handicap); A.B.C. v. XYZ Corp., 282 N.J.Super. 494, 508 , 660 A. 2d 1199 (App.Div.1995) (conduct of a criminal nature is n | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Harris v. Middlesex County College green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.