equal-and-exact-justice instruction in Nevada

2022Johnson v. State, 118 Nev. 787, 806 , 59 P.3d 450, 462 (2002) (declining to reconsider constitutionality of reasonable-doubt instruction based on purported lack of "meaningful principles or standards to guide the jury in evaluating the evidence where the district court also instructed the jury on presumption of innocence and burden of proof), overruled on other grounds by Nunnery v. State, 127 Nev. 749, 772 , 263 P.3d 235, 250-51 (2011); Leonard v. State, 114 Nev. 1196, 1209 , 969 P.2d 288, 296 (1998) (explaining that the equal-and-exact-justice instruction "does not concern the presumption of

2022Johnson v. State, 118 Nev. 787, 806 , 59 P.3d 450, 462 (2002) (declining to reconsider constitutionality of reasonable-doubt instruction based on purported lack of "meaningful principles or standards to guide the jury in evaluating the evidence where the district court also instructed the jury on presumption of innocence and burden of proof), overruled on other grounds by Nunnery v. State, 127 Nev. 749, 772 , 263 P.3d 235, 250-51 (2011); Leonard v. State, 114 Nev. 1196, 1209 , 969 P.2d 288, 296 (1998) (explaining that the equal-and-exact-justice instruction "does not concern the presumption of

2020See, e.g., Leonard v. State, 117 Nev. 53 , 78-79, 17 P.3d 397 , 413 (2001) (holding that the "abandoned and malignant heart" language is essential and informs the jury of the distinction between express and implied malice); Byford v. State, 116 Nev. 215 , 232, 995 P.2d 700 , 712 (2000) (upholding the malice instruction where the jury is properly instructed on the presumption of innocence); Leonard v. State, 114 Nev. 1196, 1209 , 969 P.2d 288, 296 (1998) (providing that where the jury has been instructed that the defendant is presumed innocent and that the State bears the burden of proving guil

2020See, e.g., Leonard v. State, 117 Nev. 53 , 78-79, 17 P.3d 397 , 413 (2001) (holding that the "abandoned and malignant heart" language is essential and informs the jury of the distinction between express and implied malice); Byford v. State, 116 Nev. 215 , 232, 995 P.2d 700 , 712 (2000) (upholding the malice instruction where the jury is properly instructed on the presumption of innocence); Leonard v. State, 114 Nev. 1196, 1209 , 969 P.2d 288, 296 (1998) (providing that where the jury has been instructed that the defendant is presumed innocent and that the State bears the burden of proving guil

2018See, e.g., Leonard v. State (Leonard II), 117 Nev. 53, 78-79 , 17 P.3d 397 , 413 (2001) (holding that the statutory language defining implied malice accurately informs the jury of the distinction between express and implied malice); Byford, 116 Nev. at 232, 994 P.2d at 712 (upholding malice instruction where the jury is properly instructed on the presumption of innocence); see also Leonard v. State (Leonard I), 114 Nev. 1196, 1208 , 969 P.2d 288, 296 (1998) (providing that where the jury has been instructed that defendant is presumed innocent and that the State bears the burden of proving guil

2018As this court has held the language used in the implied-malice instruction, see Leonard v. State, 117 Nev. 53 , 78-79, 17 P.3d 397 , 413 (2001), the premeditation instruction, see Byford v. State, 116 Nev. 215 , 237, 994 P.2d 700, 714 (2000), and the equal-and-exact-justice instruction, see Leonard v. State, 114 Nev. 1196, 1209 , 969 P.2d 288, 296 (1998), is not improper, we conclude that Castillo-Sanchez has failed to SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 4 (0) 1947A show that appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise these futile challenges.

2016This court has upheld the language used in the implied malice instruction, see Leonard v. State, 117 Nev. 53, 78-79 , 17 P.3d 367 , 413 (2001) (the statutory language of implied malice is well established in Nevada and accurately informs the jury of the distinction between express and implied malice); Cordova v. State, 116 Nev. 664 , 666, 6 P.3d 481, 483 (2000) (the substitution of the word "may" for "shall" in an implied malice instruction is preferable because it eliminates the mandatory presumption); the premeditation instruction, see Byford v. State, 116 Nev. 215 , 236-37, 994 P.2d 700, 71

2016This court has upheld the language used in the implied malice instruction, see Leonard v. State, 117 Nev. 53, 78-79 , 17 P.3d 367 , 413 (2001) (the statutory language of implied malice is well established in Nevada and accurately informs the jury of the distinction between express and implied malice); Cordova v. State, 116 Nev. 664 , 666, 6 P.3d 481, 483 (2000) (the substitution of the word "may" for "shall" in an implied malice instruction is preferable because it eliminates the mandatory presumption); the premeditation instruction, see Byford v. State, 116 Nev. 215 , 236-37, 994 P.2d 700, 71

2016This court has upheld the language used in the implied malice instruction, see Leonard v. State, 117 Nev. 53, 78-79 , 17 P.3d 367 , 413 (2001) (the statutory language of implied malice is well established in Nevada and accurately informs the jury of the distinction between express and implied malice); Cordova v. State, 116 Nev. 664 , 666, 6 P.3d 481, 483 (2000) (the substitution of the word "may" for "shall" in an implied malice instruction is preferable because it eliminates the mandatory presumption); the premeditation instruction, see Byford v. State, 116 Nev. 215 , 236-37, 994 P.2d 700, 71

2016This court has upheld the language used in the implied malice instruction, see Leonard v. State, 117 Nev. 53, 78-79 , 17 P.3d 367 , 413 (2001) (the statutory language of implied malice is well established in Nevada and accurately informs the jury of the distinction between express and implied malice); Cordova v. State, 116 Nev. 664 , 666, 6 P.3d 481, 483 (2000) (the substitution of the word "may" for "shall" in an implied malice instruction is preferable because it eliminates the mandatory presumption); the premeditation instruction, see Byford v. State, 116 Nev. 215 , 236-37, 994 P.2d 700, 71

2022Johnson v. State, 118 Nev. 787, 806 , 59 P.3d 450, 462 (2002) (declining to reconsider constitutionality of reasonable-doubt instruction based on purported lack of "meaningful principles or standards to guide the jury in evaluating the evidence where the district court also instructed the jury on presumption of innocence and burden of proof), overruled on other grounds by Nunnery v. State, 127 Nev. 749, 772 , 263 P.3d 235, 250-51 (2011); Leonard v. State, 114 Nev. 1196, 1209 , 969 P.2d 288, 296 (1998) (explaining that the equal-and-exact-justice instruction "does not concern the presumption of

2022Johnson v. State, 118 Nev. 787, 806 , 59 P.3d 450, 462 (2002) (declining to reconsider constitutionality of reasonable-doubt instruction based on purported lack of "meaningful principles or standards to guide the jury in evaluating the evidence where the district court also instructed the jury on presumption of innocence and burden of proof), overruled on other grounds by Nunnery v. State, 127 Nev. 749, 772 , 263 P.3d 235, 250-51 (2011); Leonard v. State, 114 Nev. 1196, 1209 , 969 P.2d 288, 296 (1998) (explaining that the equal-and-exact-justice instruction "does not concern the presumption of

2022Johnson v. State, 118 Nev. 787, 806 , 59 P.3d 450, 462 (2002) (declining to reconsider constitutionality of reasonable-doubt instruction based on purported lack of "meaningful principles or standards to guide the jury in evaluating the evidence where the district court also instructed the jury on presumption of innocence and burden of proof), overruled on other grounds by Nunnery v. State, 127 Nev. 749, 772 , 263 P.3d 235, 250-51 (2011); Leonard v. State, 114 Nev. 1196, 1209 , 969 P.2d 288, 296 (1998) (explaining that the equal-and-exact-justice instruction "does not concern the presumption of

2022Johnson v. State, 118 Nev. 787, 806 , 59 P.3d 450, 462 (2002) (declining to reconsider constitutionality of reasonable-doubt instruction based on purported lack of "meaningful principles or standards to guide the jury in evaluating the evidence where the district court also instructed the jury on presumption of innocence and burden of proof), overruled on other grounds by Nunnery v. State, 127 Nev. 749, 772 , 263 P.3d 235, 250-51 (2011); Leonard v. State, 114 Nev. 1196, 1209 , 969 P.2d 288, 296 (1998) (explaining that the equal-and-exact-justice instruction "does not concern the presumption of

2021See id. (collecting cases).

2021State, 116 Nev. 215 , 236-37, 995 P.2d 700 , 714-15 (2000) (approving the premeditation and deliberation instruction given here); id. at 232, 995 P.2d at 712 (upholding the malice instruction where the jury is properly instructed on the presumption of innocence); Leonard v. State (Leonard I), 114 Nev. 1196, 1209 , 969 P.2d 288, 296 (1998) (providing that where the jury has been instructed that the defendant is presumed innocent and that the State bears the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the equal-and-exact-justice instruction does not undermine the presumption of innocence

2021State, 116 Nev. 215 , 236-37, 995 P.2d 700 , 714-15 (2000) (approving the premeditation and deliberation instruction given here); id. at 232, 995 P.2d at 712 (upholding the malice instruction where the jury is properly instructed on the presumption of innocence); Leonard v. State (Leonard I), 114 Nev. 1196, 1209 , 969 P.2d 288, 296 (1998) (providing that where the jury has been instructed that the defendant is presumed innocent and that the State bears the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the equal-and-exact-justice instruction does not undermine the presumption of innocence

2016We conclude Middleton fails to demonstrate that trial or appellate counsel could have raised a successful claim as the challenged comments did not amount to prosecutorial misconduct because the prosecutor's language refers to the prosecution as a whole or as a rhetorical device, see Snow v. State, 101 Nev. 439, 447-48 , 705 P.2d 632, 638-39 (1985) (recognizing that prosecutor's use of "we" not improper when merely a rhetorical device); did not mischaracterize the equal and exact justice instruction; permissibly asked the jury to consider the victims' final moments, see Williams v. State, 113 N

2016We conclude Middleton fails to demonstrate that trial or appellate counsel could have raised a successful claim as the challenged comments did not amount to prosecutorial misconduct because the prosecutor's language refers to the prosecution as a whole or as a rhetorical device, see Snow v. State, 101 Nev. 439, 447-48 , 705 P.2d 632, 638-39 (1985) (recognizing that prosecutor's use of "we" not improper when merely a rhetorical device); did not mischaracterize the equal and exact justice instruction; permissibly asked the jury to consider the victims' final moments, see Williams v. State, 113 N

2016We conclude Middleton fails to demonstrate that trial or appellate counsel could have raised a successful claim as the challenged comments did not amount to prosecutorial misconduct because the prosecutor's language refers to the prosecution as a whole or as a rhetorical device, see Snow v. State, 101 Nev. 439, 447-48 , 705 P.2d 632, 638-39 (1985) (recognizing that prosecutor's use of "we" not improper when merely a rhetorical device); did not mischaracterize the equal and exact justice instruction; permissibly asked the jury to consider the victims' final moments, see Williams v. State, 113 N

2016We conclude Middleton fails to demonstrate that trial or appellate counsel could have raised a successful claim as the challenged comments did not amount to prosecutorial misconduct because the prosecutor's language refers to the prosecution as a whole or as a rhetorical device, see Snow v. State, 101 Nev. 439, 447-48 , 705 P.2d 632, 638-39 (1985) (recognizing that prosecutor's use of "we" not improper when merely a rhetorical device); did not mischaracterize the equal and exact justice instruction; permissibly asked the jury to consider the victims' final moments, see Williams v. State, 113 N

2016This court has upheld the language used in the implied malice instruction, see Leonard v. State, 117 Nev. 53, 78-79 , 17 P.3d 367 , 413 (2001) (the statutory language of implied malice is well established in Nevada and accurately informs the jury of the distinction between express and implied malice); Cordova v. State, 116 Nev. 664 , 666, 6 P.3d 481, 483 (2000) (the substitution of the word "may" for "shall" in an implied malice instruction is preferable because it eliminates the mandatory presumption); the premeditation instruction, see Byford v. State, 116 Nev. 215 , 236-37, 994 P.2d 700, 71

2016We conclude Middleton fails to demonstrate that trial or appellate counsel could have raised a successful claim as the challenged comments did not amount to prosecutorial misconduct because the prosecutor's language refers to the prosecution as a whole or as a rhetorical device, see Snow v. State, 101 Nev. 439, 447-48 , 705 P.2d 632, 638-39 (1985) (recognizing that prosecutor's use of "we" not improper when merely a rhetorical device); did not mischaracterize the equal and exact justice instruction; permissibly asked the jury to consider the victims' final moments, see Williams v. State, 113 N

2016We conclude Middleton fails to demonstrate that trial or appellate counsel could have raised a successful claim as the challenged comments did not amount to prosecutorial misconduct because the prosecutor's language refers to the prosecution as a whole or as a rhetorical device, see Snow v. State, 101 Nev. 439, 447-48 , 705 P.2d 632, 638-39 (1985) (recognizing that prosecutor's use of "we" not improper when merely a rhetorical device); did not mischaracterize the equal and exact justice instruction; permissibly asked the jury to consider the victims' final moments, see Williams v. State, 113 N

2016We conclude Middleton fails to demonstrate that trial or appellate counsel could have raised a successful claim as the challenged comments did not amount to prosecutorial misconduct because the prosecutor's language refers to the prosecution as a whole or as a rhetorical device, see Snow v. State, 101 Nev. 439, 447-48 , 705 P.2d 632, 638-39 (1985) (recognizing that prosecutor's use of "we" not improper when merely a rhetorical device); did not mischaracterize the equal and exact justice instruction; permissibly asked the jury to consider the victims' final moments, see Williams v. State, 113 N

2016We conclude Middleton fails to demonstrate that trial or appellate counsel could have raised a successful claim as the challenged comments did not amount to prosecutorial misconduct because the prosecutor's language refers to the prosecution as a whole or as a rhetorical device, see Snow v. State, 101 Nev. 439, 447-48 , 705 P.2d 632, 638-39 (1985) (recognizing that prosecutor's use of "we" not improper when merely a rhetorical device); did not mischaracterize the equal and exact justice instruction; permissibly asked the jury to consider the victims' final moments, see Williams v. State, 113 N