chief rule in New York

1888In that case the assessors of the town of Hoosic assessed the relator’s railroad at $21,762.58 per mile, and this court, on certiorari, reduced the assessment to $10,000 per mile; and Justice Peckham, in delivering the opinion of the court, says: “Upon the law as laid down in some of the late cases in the supreme court, there is no doubt but that one of the chief factors, in determining the value of a railroad, for the purposes of assessment, is the earning of the company, or its capacity to do business.” And the learned judge reiterated the rule laid down in People v. Barker, 48 N. Y. 70 , th

1888In that case the assessors of the town of 'Hoosiek, assessed the .relator’s railroad at $21,762.58 per mile and this court on certiorari reduced the assessment to $10,000 per mile; and Justice Peckham in delivering the opinion of the court says: “Upon the law as laid down in some of the late cases in the supreme court there is no doubt but that one of the chief factors in determining the value of a railroad for the purpose of assessment is the earning of the company or its capacity to do business.” And the learned judge reiterated the rule laid down in People, etc. v. Barker ( 48 N. Y., 70 ),

2001The federal courts have interpreted this to mean that the jurisdiction which first arrests a defendant has “primary” jurisdiction (In re Liberatore, 574 F2d 78, 89 [2d Cir]; Thomas v Brewer, 923 F2d 1361, 1365 [9th Cir]; Zerbst v McPike, 97 F2d 253, 254 [5th Cir]; Millard v Roach, 631 A2d 1217, 1222 [DC Cir]; Shumate v United States, 893 F Supp 137, 139 ; Buggs v Crabtree, 32 F Supp 2d 1215, 1219 ; United States v Ayscue, 187 F Supp 946, 947 ).

2001“The chief rule which preserves our two systems of courts from actual conflict of jurisdiction is that the court which first takes the subject-matter of the litigation into its control, whether this be person or property, must be permitted to exhaust its remedy, to attain which it assumed control, before the other court shall attempt to take it for its purpose.” Thus, the jurisdiction “which first takes subject matter of the litigation into its control * * * must be permitted to exhaust its remedy” (see also, United States v Evans, 159 F3d 908, 992 [4th Cir]; State v Yee, 55 Ohio App 3d 88 n 2

2001The federal courts have interpreted this to mean that the jurisdiction which first arrests a defendant has “primary” jurisdiction (In re Liberatore, 574 F2d 78, 89 [2d Cir]; Thomas v Brewer, 923 F2d 1361, 1365 [9th Cir]; Zerbst v McPike, 97 F2d 253, 254 [5th Cir]; Millard v Roach, 631 A2d 1217, 1222 [DC Cir]; Shumate v United States, 893 F Supp 137, 139 ; Buggs v Crabtree, 32 F Supp 2d 1215, 1219 ; United States v Ayscue, 187 F Supp 946, 947 ).

2001The federal courts have interpreted this to mean that the jurisdiction which first arrests a defendant has “primary” jurisdiction (In re Liberatore, 574 F2d 78, 89 [2d Cir]; Thomas v Brewer, 923 F2d 1361, 1365 [9th Cir]; Zerbst v McPike, 97 F2d 253, 254 [5th Cir]; Millard v Roach, 631 A2d 1217, 1222 [DC Cir]; Shumate v United States, 893 F Supp 137, 139 ; Buggs v Crabtree, 32 F Supp 2d 1215, 1219 ; United States v Ayscue, 187 F Supp 946, 947 ).

2001“The chief rule which preserves our two systems of courts from actual conflict of jurisdiction is that the court which first takes the subject-matter of the litigation into its control, whether this be person or property, must be permitted to exhaust its remedy, to attain which it assumed control, before the other court shall attempt to take it for its purpose.” Thus, the jurisdiction “which first takes subject matter of the litigation into its control * * * must be permitted to exhaust its remedy” (see also, United States v Evans, 159 F3d 908, 992 [4th Cir]; State v Yee, 55 Ohio App 3d 88 n 2

1996By this standard, defendant received meaningful representation (see, People v English, 215 AD2d 871, 873 , lv denied 86 NY2d 793 ).

1996On a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the chief inquiry is the competence of the attorney representing defendant, not defendant’s refusal to cooperate in his own defense (see, People v Aiken, 45 NY2d 394, 399 ).

1991It has been stated that in determining whether permission to serve a late notice of claim should be granted, the chief factors are whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a reasonable excuse for failure to serve a timely notice of claim, whether the entity to be served acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within 90 days after the claim arose, or a reasonable time thereafter, and whether the delay would substantially prejudice the entity in maintaining its defense on the merits (see, Perry v City of New York, 133 AD2d 692, 693 ; see also, Braverman v City of Wh

1976The Trial Judge engaged in prolonged questioning of a defense witness during which he appeared to display an inordinate amount of skepticism in the witness’ testimony which was crucial to the defense (see People v Mendes, 3 NY2d 120, 121-122 ).

1974We reject it again.” And in Food Employees v. Logan Plaza ( 391 U. S. 308 ), the majority opinion, sustaining the appellants’ right to picket a business enterprise located within a shopping plaza, stated (p. 320): “ where property is not ordinarily open to the public, this Court has held that access to it for the purpose of exercising First Amendment rights may be denied altogether.” The chief defense argument asserts that the People must allege and prove criminal intent to bring about conviction of the defendants.

1960Belying on the authority of Luft v. Hoffman ( 201 Misc. 384 ), the defendant argues that the words “ obtainable for anything ” are too vague to be defamatory and that the complaint should be dismissed.

1955Since the provisions of that section were not complied with, the sale was void as against the judgment creditor plaintiffs.” In Stumpp & Walter Co. v. Napanoch Country Club ( 198 Misc. 600 ), the now well-established construction of section 44 of the Personal Property Law was stated as follows: “ While some of the earlier cases, cited by defendants, adopt a restrictive interpretation of the statute and hold that it does not apply to a transaction such as this, the later cases reach a contrary conclusion.

1943(Matter of Groothaert, 201 App. Div. 510 .) In regard to the items in which examination is sought on the chief claim, all but two deal with what plaintiff would be entitled to recover either on his own behalf or as a stockholder suing in a representative capacity.

1928(Matter of Wyman, 76 App. Div. 292 .) But the courts have interpreted the exemption to apply to the net proceeds or profits of a business where the debtor’s services are the chief factors in it, even though such business is conducted with the assistance of others.

1922The case of Kent v. Dunham, 106 Mass. 586 , cited by the residuary legatees, is not helpful.

1910(La Rue v. Smith, 153 N. Y. 428, 433 ; Stephens v. Wider, 32 id. 351; Rambaut v. Irving Nat.