14 Ohio opinions name it 3 courts 1983–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re Martin, Jr.green2 sentences2024Ex parte Martin, 141 Ohio St. 87, 104-105 (1943); see Lemley v. Kaiser, 6 Ohio St.3d 258, 264 (1983) (identity of client not privileged when the identity is not “connected with and related to the matter for which the attorney had been retained”). {¶ 15} A client’s voluntary disclosure of a communication protected by the common-law attorney-client privilege to a third party waives the privilege. 2024Ex parte Martin, 141 Ohio St. 87, 104-105 (1943); see Lemley v. Kaiser, 6 Ohio St.3d 258, 264 (1983) (identity of client not privileged when the identity is not “connected with and related to the matter for which the attorney had been retained”). {¶ 15} A client’s voluntary disclosure of a communication protected by the common-law attorney-client privilege to a third party waives the privilege. | 3 | 4 |
State v. McDermottgreen2 sentences2021Voluntary Disclosure {¶ 15} A client’s voluntary disclosure to a third party of communications protected by the common-law attorney-client privilege “breaches the confidentiality underlying the privilege, and constitutes a waiver thereof.” State v. Post, 32 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 , 513 N.E.2d 754 (1987); see also State v. McDermott, 72 Ohio St.3d 570, 574 , 651 N.E.2d 985 (1995). 2021Voluntary Disclosure {¶ 15} A client’s voluntary disclosure to a third party of communications protected by the common-law attorney-client privilege “breaches the confidentiality underlying the privilege, and constitutes a waiver thereof.” State v. Post, 32 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 , 513 N.E.2d 754 (1987); see also State v. McDermott, 72 Ohio St.3d 570, 574 , 651 N.E.2d 985 (1995). | 3 | 4 |
Lemley v. Kaisergreen2 sentences2024Ex parte Martin, 141 Ohio St. 87, 104-105 (1943); see Lemley v. Kaiser, 6 Ohio St.3d 258, 264 (1983) (identity of client not privileged when the identity is not “connected with and related to the matter for which the attorney had been retained”). {¶ 15} A client’s voluntary disclosure of a communication protected by the common-law attorney-client privilege to a third party waives the privilege. 2024Ex parte Martin, 141 Ohio St. 87, 104-105 (1943); see Lemley v. Kaiser, 6 Ohio St.3d 258, 264 (1983) (identity of client not privileged when the identity is not “connected with and related to the matter for which the attorney had been retained”). {¶ 15} A client’s voluntary disclosure of a communication protected by the common-law attorney-client privilege to a third party waives the privilege. | 2 | 3 |
Grace v. Mastruseriogreen2 sentences2012(Internal quotations and citations omitted.) Id. {¶8} Thus, as Ms. Nageotte seeks discovery of Mr. Conde’s witness statements, the question is whether the common-law attorney-client privilege applies. “[T]he party seeking protection under the privilege carries the burden of establishing the existence of that privilege.” Perfection Corp. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur., 153 Ohio App.3d 28 , 2003-Ohio-2750, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.); see also Grace v. Mastruserio, 182 Ohio App.3d 243 , 2007-Ohio-3942, ¶ 19 (1st Dist.), citing Lemley v. Kaiser, 6 Ohio St.3d 258, 263-264 (1983). 2012(Internal quotations and citations omitted.) Id. {¶8} Thus, as Ms. Nageotte seeks discovery of Mr. Conde’s witness statements, the question is whether the common-law attorney-client privilege applies. “[T]he party seeking protection under the privilege carries the burden of establishing the existence of that privilege.” Perfection Corp. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur., 153 Ohio App.3d 28 , 2003-Ohio-2750, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.); see also Grace v. Mastruserio, 182 Ohio App.3d 243 , 2007-Ohio-3942, ¶ 19 (1st Dist.), citing Lemley v. Kaiser, 6 Ohio St.3d 258, 263-264 (1983). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Postgreen2 sentences2021Voluntary Disclosure {¶ 15} A client’s voluntary disclosure to a third party of communications protected by the common-law attorney-client privilege “breaches the confidentiality underlying the privilege, and constitutes a waiver thereof.” State v. Post, 32 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 , 513 N.E.2d 754 (1987); see also State v. McDermott, 72 Ohio St.3d 570, 574 , 651 N.E.2d 985 (1995). 2021Voluntary Disclosure {¶ 15} A client’s voluntary disclosure to a third party of communications protected by the common-law attorney-client privilege “breaches the confidentiality underlying the privilege, and constitutes a waiver thereof.” State v. Post, 32 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 , 513 N.E.2d 754 (1987); see also State v. McDermott, 72 Ohio St.3d 570, 574 , 651 N.E.2d 985 (1995). | 1 | 3 |
State ex rel. Leslie v. Ohio Housing Finance Agencygreen2 sentences2019Agency, 105 Ohio St.3d 261 , 2005-Ohio-1508 , 824 N.E.2d 990 , ¶ 21. {¶6} Further, “the common-law attorney-client privilege * * * ‘reaches far beyond a proscription against testimonial speech. 2006See Leslie, 105 Ohio St.3d 261 , 2005-Ohio-1508 , 824 N.E.2d 990 , ¶ 26. | 1 | 2 |
State ex rel. Lanham v. DeWinegreen2 sentences2024See Lanham at ¶ 26. {¶ 14} To be covered by the attorney-client privilege, a communication does not have to contain purely legal advice; communications between a lawyer and a client that facilitate the rendition of legal services or advice are privileged. 2024See Lanham at ¶ 26. {¶ 14} To be covered by the attorney-client privilege, a communication does not have to contain purely legal advice; communications between a lawyer and a client that facilitate the rendition of legal services or advice are privileged. | 1 | 1 |
Perfection Corp. v. Travelers Casualty & Suretygreen2 sentences2012(Internal quotations and citations omitted.) Id. {¶8} Thus, as Ms. Nageotte seeks discovery of Mr. Conde’s witness statements, the question is whether the common-law attorney-client privilege applies. “[T]he party seeking protection under the privilege carries the burden of establishing the existence of that privilege.” Perfection Corp. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur., 153 Ohio App.3d 28 , 2003-Ohio-2750, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.); see also Grace v. Mastruserio, 182 Ohio App.3d 243 , 2007-Ohio-3942, ¶ 19 (1st Dist.), citing Lemley v. Kaiser, 6 Ohio St.3d 258, 263-264 (1983). 2012(Internal quotations and citations omitted.) Id. {¶8} Thus, as Ms. Nageotte seeks discovery of Mr. Conde’s witness statements, the question is whether the common-law attorney-client privilege applies. “[T]he party seeking protection under the privilege carries the burden of establishing the existence of that privilege.” Perfection Corp. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur., 153 Ohio App.3d 28 , 2003-Ohio-2750, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.); see also Grace v. Mastruserio, 182 Ohio App.3d 243 , 2007-Ohio-3942, ¶ 19 (1st Dist.), citing Lemley v. Kaiser, 6 Ohio St.3d 258, 263-264 (1983). | 1 | 1 |
Tierney v. Flowergreen2 sentences2010Therefore, the court, adopting the reasoning of the court in Tierney v. Flower (1969), 32 A.D.2d 392 , 302 N.Y.S.2d 640 , stated: “ ‘The seal of secrecy between attorney and client is to be preserved “in the aid of a public purpose to expose wrongdoing and not * * * to conceal wrongdoing.” * * * “[T]he veil [of privilege is removed] from the client's name when the attorney's assertion of a privilege is a cover for cooperation in wrongdoing.” ’ ” (Brackets and ellipses sic.) Lemley at 266 , quoting Tierney at 395-396 and Matter of Kaplan (Blumenfeld) (1960), 8 N.Y.2d 214, 218 , 203 N.Y.S.2d 836 2010Therefore, the court, adopting the reasoning of the court in Tierney v. Flower (1969), 32 A.D.2d 392 , 302 N.Y.S.2d 640 , stated: “ ‘The seal of secrecy between attorney and client is to be preserved “in the aid of a public purpose to expose wrongdoing and not * * * to conceal wrongdoing.” * * * “[T]he veil [of privilege is removed] from the client's name when the attorney's assertion of a privilege is a cover for cooperation in wrongdoing.” ’ ” (Brackets and ellipses sic.) Lemley at 266 , quoting Tierney at 395-396 and Matter of Kaplan (Blumenfeld) (1960), 8 N.Y.2d 214, 218 , 203 N.Y.S.2d 836 | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Smith v. Technology House, Ltd.
green
2 sentences2020Portage No. 2018-P-0080, 2019-Ohio-2670 , ¶¶ 14-17 {¶21} In Pales v. Fedor, 8th Dist. 2020Portage No. 2018-P-0080, 2019-Ohio-2670 , ¶¶ 14-17 {¶21} In Pales v. Fedor, 8th Dist. | 2 | 2020–2020 |
American Motors Corp. v. Huffstutler
green
2 sentences2022Motors Corp. v. Huffstutler, 61 Ohio St.3d 343, 348 , 575 N.E.2d 116 . {¶ 29} Though R.C. 2317.02(A) expressly covers when an attorney may testify about attorney-client-privileged statements, we have held that the statute “provides the exclusive means by which privileged communications directly between an attorney and a client can be waived.” Jackson, 110 Ohio St.3d 488 , 2006-Ohio-4968 , 854 N.E.2d 487 , at paragraph one of the syllabus (following McDermott, 72 Ohio St.3d 570 , 651 N.E.2d 985 ); see also Jackson at ¶ 21-26 (Lanzinger, J., concurring in judgment only) (noting that the plain la 2022Motors Corp. v. Huffstutler, 61 Ohio St.3d 343, 348 , 575 N.E.2d 116 . {¶ 29} Though R.C. 2317.02(A) expressly covers when an attorney may testify about attorney-client-privileged statements, we have held that the statute “provides the exclusive means by which privileged communications directly between an attorney and a client can be waived.” Jackson, 110 Ohio St.3d 488 , 2006-Ohio-4968 , 854 N.E.2d 487 , at paragraph one of the syllabus (following McDermott, 72 Ohio St.3d 570 , 651 N.E.2d 985 ); see also Jackson at ¶ 21-26 (Lanzinger, J., concurring in judgment only) (noting that the plain la | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Jackson v. Greger
green
1 sentence2022Motors Corp. v. Huffstutler, 61 Ohio St.3d 343, 348 , 575 N.E.2d 116 . {¶ 29} Though R.C. 2317.02(A) expressly covers when an attorney may testify about attorney-client-privileged statements, we have held that the statute “provides the exclusive means by which privileged communications directly between an attorney and a client can be waived.” Jackson, 110 Ohio St.3d 488 , 2006-Ohio-4968 , 854 N.E.2d 487 , at paragraph one of the syllabus (following McDermott, 72 Ohio St.3d 570 , 651 N.E.2d 985 ); see also Jackson at ¶ 21-26 (Lanzinger, J., concurring in judgment only) (noting that the plain la | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, L.L.P. v. Givaudan Flavors Corp.
green
2 sentences2019Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, L.L.P. v. Givaudan Flavors Corp., 127 Ohio St.3d 161 , 2010-Ohio-4469 , 937 N.E.2d 533 , ¶ 55- 56. “[A] party may obtain discovery of documents, electronically stored information and tangible things prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for that other party’s representative (including his attorney * * *) only upon a showing of good cause therefor.” Civ.R. 26(B)(3). {¶19} Technology House and Gear’s claims that their investigation into Smith’s allegations is protected by the attorney-client privilege and work-product doct 2019Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, L.L.P. v. Givaudan Flavors Corp., 127 Ohio St.3d 161 , 2010-Ohio-4469 , 937 N.E.2d 533 , ¶ 55- 56. “[A] party may obtain discovery of documents, electronically stored information and tangible things prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for that other party’s representative (including his attorney * * *) only upon a showing of good cause therefor.” Civ.R. 26(B)(3). {¶19} Technology House and Gear’s claims that their investigation into Smith’s allegations is protected by the attorney-client privilege and work-product doct | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State Ex Rel. Toledo Blade Co. v. Toledo-Lucas County Port Authority
green
1 sentence2012(Internal quotations and citations omitted.) Id. {¶8} Thus, as Ms. Nageotte seeks discovery of Mr. Conde’s witness statements, the question is whether the common-law attorney-client privilege applies. “[T]he party seeking protection under the privilege carries the burden of establishing the existence of that privilege.” Perfection Corp. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur., 153 Ohio App.3d 28 , 2003-Ohio-2750, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.); see also Grace v. Mastruserio, 182 Ohio App.3d 243 , 2007-Ohio-3942, ¶ 19 (1st Dist.), citing Lemley v. Kaiser, 6 Ohio St.3d 258, 263-264 (1983). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Matter of Kaplan (Blumenfeld)
green
2 sentences2010Therefore, the court, adopting the reasoning of the court in Tierney v. Flower (1969), 32 A.D.2d 392 , 302 N.Y.S.2d 640 , stated: “ ‘The seal of secrecy between attorney and client is to be preserved “in the aid of a public purpose to expose wrongdoing and not * * * to conceal wrongdoing.” * * * “[T]he veil [of privilege is removed] from the client's name when the attorney's assertion of a privilege is a cover for cooperation in wrongdoing.” ’ ” (Brackets and ellipses sic.) Lemley at 266 , quoting Tierney at 395-396 and Matter of Kaplan (Blumenfeld) (1960), 8 N.Y.2d 214, 218 , 203 N.Y.S.2d 836 2010Therefore, the court, adopting the reasoning of the court in Tierney v. Flower (1969), 32 A.D.2d 392 , 302 N.Y.S.2d 640 , stated: “ ‘The seal of secrecy between attorney and client is to be preserved “in the aid of a public purpose to expose wrongdoing and not * * * to conceal wrongdoing.” * * * “[T]he veil [of privilege is removed] from the client's name when the attorney's assertion of a privilege is a cover for cooperation in wrongdoing.” ’ ” (Brackets and ellipses sic.) Lemley at 266 , quoting Tierney at 395-396 and Matter of Kaplan (Blumenfeld) (1960), 8 N.Y.2d 214, 218 , 203 N.Y.S.2d 836 | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Spitzer v. Stillings
green
2 sentences1988See In re Martin (1943), 141 Ohio St. 87 , 25 O.O. 225 , 47 N.E. 2d 388 , paragraph six of the syllabus; Spitzer v. Stillings (1924), 109 Ohio St. 297, 302 , 142 N.E. 365, 366 . 1988See In re Martin (1943), 141 Ohio St. 87 , 25 O.O. 225 , 47 N.E. 2d 388 , paragraph six of the syllabus; Spitzer v. Stillings (1924), 109 Ohio St. 297, 302 , 142 N.E. 365, 366 . | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Waldmann v. Waldmann
green
1 sentence1983This court stated in In re Martin (1943), 141 Ohio St. 87, 103 [ 25 O.O. 225 ], which statement was reaffirmed in Waldmann v. Waldmann (1976), 48 Ohio St. 2d 176, 178 , that it is well-settled that the burden of showing that testimony sought to be excluded under the doctrine of privileged attorney-client communications rests upon the parties seeking to exclude it. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.