respondent engaged violation in Ohio

2022The menacing by stalking statute, R.C. 2903.211, prohibits the offender from engaging “a pattern of conduct” that knowingly causes another person “to believe that the offender will cause physical harm to the other person * * * or cause mental distress to the other person * * *.” R.C. 2903.211(A)(1).7 7 “The petitioner has the burden to prove the elements of menacing by stalking by a preponderance of the evidence.” R.G. v. R.M., 2017-Ohio-8918 , 88 N.E.3d 1027 , ¶ 11 (7th Dist.), citing Felton v. Felton, 79 Ohio St.3d 34, 41-42 , 679 N.E.2d 672 (1997) Pursuant to R.C. 2903.211(D)(1), a pattern

2022The menacing by stalking statute, R.C. 2903.211, prohibits the offender from engaging “a pattern of conduct” that knowingly causes another person “to believe that the offender will cause physical harm to the other person * * * or cause mental distress to the other person * * *.” R.C. 2903.211(A)(1).7 7 “The petitioner has the burden to prove the elements of menacing by stalking by a preponderance of the evidence.” R.G. v. R.M., 2017-Ohio-8918 , 88 N.E.3d 1027 , ¶ 11 (7th Dist.), citing Felton v. Felton, 79 Ohio St.3d 34, 41-42 , 679 N.E.2d 672 (1997) Pursuant to R.C. 2903.211(D)(1), a pattern

2019Auglaize No. 2-13-04, 2013-Ohio-3981, ¶ 7 , citing Retterer at ¶ 26 , citing R.C. 2903.211. “[W]here the petitioner seeks protection of a ‘family or household member’ under a CSPO, the petitioner must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the respondent engaged in a violation of R.C. 2903.211 against the ‘family or household member’ to be protected.” Retterer at ¶ 25 , citing Luikart v. Shumate, 3d Dist.

2016Auglaize No. 2-13-04, 2013-Ohio-3981, ¶ 7 , quoting Retterer at ¶ 25 .

2019Marion No. 9-11-23, 2012-Ohio-131, ¶ 25 , citing Warnecke at ¶ 13 .

2013(Emphasis sic.) Retterer at ¶ 26 , citing R.C. 2903.211. {¶8} “[W]here the petitioner seeks protection of a ‘family or household member’ under a CSPO, the petitioner must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the respondent engaged in a violation of R.C. 2903.211 against the ‘family or household member’ to be protected.” Retterer, 2012-Ohio-131, at ¶ 25 , citing Luikart v. Shumate, 3d Dist.

2004Gerijo at 226, 638 N.E.2d 533 ; Karches v. Cincinnati (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 12 , 19 , 526 N.E.2d 1350 . {¶ 16} As we noted earlier, to be entitled to a stalking civil protection order, the petitioner must show, by a preponderance of the evidence that the respondent engaged in a violation of R.C. 2903.211 , the menacing by stalking statute, against the person seeking the order. {¶ 17} Revised Code 2903.211 (A) states that "[n]o person by engaging in a pattern of conduct shall knowingly cause another to believe that the offender will cause physical harm to the other person or cause mental distre

2004Gerijo at 226, 638 N.E.2d 533 ; Karches v. Cincinnati (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 12 , 19 , 526 N.E.2d 1350 . {¶ 16} As we noted earlier, to be entitled to a stalking civil protection order, the petitioner must show, by a preponderance of the evidence that the respondent engaged in a violation of R.C. 2903.211 , the menacing by stalking statute, against the person seeking the order. {¶ 17} Revised Code 2903.211 (A) states that "[n]o person by engaging in a pattern of conduct shall knowingly cause another to believe that the offender will cause physical harm to the other person or cause mental distre

2001R.C. 2903.211 (A), the menacing by stalking statute, provides that "[n]o person by engaging in a pattern of conduct shall knowingly cause another to believe that the offender will cause physical harm to the other person or cause mental distress to the other person." R.C. 2903.211 (D)(1) defines a "pattern of conduct" as "two or more actions or incidents closely related in time, whether or not there has been a prior conviction based on any of those actions or incidents." One incident is insufficient to establish a "pattern of conduct." See State v. Scruggs (2000), 136 Ohio App.3d 631 , 737 N.E.

2001R.C. 2903.211 (A), the menacing by stalking statute, provides that "[n]o person by engaging in a pattern of conduct shall knowingly cause another to believe that the offender will cause physical harm to the other person or cause mental distress to the other person." R.C. 2903.211 (D)(1) defines a "pattern of conduct" as "two or more actions or incidents closely related in time, whether or not there has been a prior conviction based on any of those actions or incidents." One incident is insufficient to establish a "pattern of conduct." See State v. Scruggs (2000), 136 Ohio App.3d 631 , 737 N.E.

2001R.C. 2903.211 (A), the menacing by stalking statute, provides that "[n]o person by engaging in a pattern of conduct shall knowingly cause another to believe that the offender will cause physical harm to the other person or cause mental distress to the other person." R.C. 2903.211 (D)(1) defines a "pattern of conduct" as "two or more actions or incidents closely related in time, whether or not there has been a prior conviction based on any of those actions or incidents." One incident is insufficient to establish a "pattern of conduct." See State v. Scruggs (2000), 136 Ohio App.3d 631 , 737 N.E.

2001R.C. 2903.211 (A), the menacing by stalking statute, provides that "[n]o person by engaging in a pattern of conduct shall knowingly cause another to believe that the offender will cause physical harm to the other person or cause mental distress to the other person." R.C. 2903.211 (D)(1) defines a "pattern of conduct" as "two or more actions or incidents closely related in time, whether or not there has been a prior conviction based on any of those actions or incidents." One incident is insufficient to establish a "pattern of conduct." See State v. Scruggs (2000), 136 Ohio App.3d 631 , 737 N.E.

2022The menacing by stalking statute, R.C. 2903.211, prohibits the offender from engaging “a pattern of conduct” that knowingly causes another person “to believe that the offender will cause physical harm to the other person * * * or cause mental distress to the other person * * *.” R.C. 2903.211(A)(1).7 7 “The petitioner has the burden to prove the elements of menacing by stalking by a preponderance of the evidence.” R.G. v. R.M., 2017-Ohio-8918 , 88 N.E.3d 1027 , ¶ 11 (7th Dist.), citing Felton v. Felton, 79 Ohio St.3d 34, 41-42 , 679 N.E.2d 672 (1997) Pursuant to R.C. 2903.211(D)(1), a pattern

2022Ashtabula No. 2012-A-0028, 2013-Ohio-1842, ¶ 32 . {¶26} We begin by analyzing whether it was against the manifest weight of the evidence for the trial court to grant Ellis’ petition for a CSPO. {¶27} In her first and second assignments, Skinner asserts that Ellis did not establish that she had engaged in a “pattern of conduct” (and if he did, that he contributed 8 Case No. 2022-G-0009 to that pattern of conduct), and that Ellis failed to establish jurisdiction and prove residency in Geauga County. {¶28} Pursuant to R.C. 2903.214(C)(1), a person may seek a protection order based upon an “allega

2011“Good cause shown” amounts to “[i]mmediate and present danger to the person to be protected by the protection order.” Id.

2003Id. {¶ 12} R.C. 2903.21.4 governs the filing of a "petition for a protection order." R.C. 2903.21.4(C) provides that a person may seek relief under this statute, but that the petition must include: (1) an allegation that the respondent engaged in a violation of section R.C. 2903.21.1 against the person to be protected by the protection order, including a description of the nature and extent of the violation; and, (2) a request for relief under this section.

2002The First District Court of Appeals resolved this omission by concluding that the Ohio Supreme Court's holding in Felton v. Felton (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 34 , 1997-Ohio-302 , 679 N.E.2d 672 applied to petitions for stalking civil protection orders.