State used a peremptory challenge in Ohio

2011KENTUCKY[] (1986), 476 U.S. 79 .” {¶25} In her second assignment of error, Ms. Frazier argues that she was denied her right to equal protection under the law when the State used a peremptory challenge to exclude an African-American female from the jury.

2006Batson Challenge {¶ 10} In his first of six assignments of error, Harris argues: {¶ 11} "When the prosecutor exercises a peremptory challenge of a prospective juror in a racially discriminatory manner, in contravention of Batson v. Kentucky (1986), 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 , and its progeny, the trial court's refusal to impanel a new venire or fashion another appropriate remedy deprives the defendant of his right to equal protection of the law, as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I , Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution." {¶

2011State v. Hernandez (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 577, 583 . {¶46} In this case, when the state used a peremptory challenge to excuse the only African-American juror sitting in the jury box at the time, appellant raised a Batson challenge making a prima facie case of discrimination.

1995Hernandez v. New York (1991), 500 U.S. 352 , 111 S.Ct. 1859 , 114 L.Ed.2d 395 ; State v. Hernandez, 63 Ohio St.3d at 583 , 589 N.E.2d at 1314 ; State v. Cook, supra. Applying these principles to the facts in the instant case, we initially note that the argument of appellant’s counsel that a prima facie equal protection violation arises simply because the state used a peremptory challenge on one of two African-Americans is erroneous.

1999Inasmuch as Dent was the only black prospective juror on whom the state used a peremptory challenge, the state argues that there was no pattern, and hence no Batson violation. {¶ 20} We reject this view, for “the exercise of even one peremptory challenge in a purposefully discriminatory manner would violate equal protection.” (Emphasis added.) State v. Ellison (Tenn.1992), 841 S.W.2d 824, 827 . “ ‘A single invidiously discriminatory act’ is not ‘immunized by the absence of such discrimination in the making of other comparable decisions.’ “ Batson, 476 U.S. at 95 , 106 S.Ct. at 1722 , 90 L.Ed.2

1999We reject this view, for “the exercise of even one peremptory challenge in a purposefully discriminatory manner would violate equal protection.” (Emphasis added.) State v. Ellison (Tenn.1992), 841 S.W.2d 824, 827 . “ ‘A single invidiously discriminatory act’ is not ‘immunized by the absence of such discrimination in the making of other comparable decisions.’ ” Batson, 476 U.S. at 95 , 106 S.Ct. at 1722 , 90 L.Ed.2d at 87 , quoting Arlington Hts. v. Metro.

2023Butler No. CA2005-07-192, 2007-Ohio-348, ¶ 11 . {¶ 54} The first part of the three-prong Batson test asks whether Fidelis has made a prima facie case of racial discrimination by showing the state used a peremptory challenge to exclude Juror 99 based on race.

2014Cuyahoga No. 84059, 2004-Ohio-6862 . {¶41} The state used a peremptory challenge on juror number 6 because she knew one of the witnesses who had been a client of hers with whom she had worked closely.

2006Ingram, at ¶ 17, citing State v. Gowdy (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 387 , 727 N.E.2d 579 . {¶ 23} A three-step burden shifting procedure is used to determine whether the state's peremptory challenge is race based.

2006Ingram, at ¶ 17, citing State v. Gowdy (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 387 , 727 N.E.2d 579 . {¶ 23} A three-step burden shifting procedure is used to determine whether the state's peremptory challenge is race based.

2003Id. ¶ 10 In this case, the State used a peremptory challenge to excuse a Hispanic juror.

2000In State v. Powers (1993), 92 Ohio App.3d 400 , the state used a peremptory challenge to excuse a prospective juror based upon the juror's difficulty in understanding the legal concepts of burden of proof and proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

1995Hernandez v. New York (1991), 500 U.S. 352 , 111 S.Ct. 1859 , 114 L.Ed.2d 395 ; State v. Hernandez, 63 Ohio St.3d at 583 , 589 N.E.2d at 1314 ; State v. Cook, supra. Applying these principles to the facts in the instant case, we initially note that the argument of appellant’s counsel that a prima facie equal protection violation arises simply because the state used a peremptory challenge on one of two African-Americans is erroneous.

1995Hernandez v. New York (1991), 500 U.S. 352 , 111 S.Ct. 1859 , 114 L.Ed.2d 395 ; State v. Hernandez, 63 Ohio St.3d at 583 , 589 N.E.2d at 1314 ; State v. Cook, supra. Applying these principles to the facts in the instant case, we initially note that the argument of appellant’s counsel that a prima facie equal protection violation arises simply because the state used a peremptory challenge on one of two African-Americans is erroneous.