14 Oregon opinions name it 1 courts 1985–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Terheargreen2 sentences2014We explained that a stop occurs “when an officer tells a person that the person has committed a violation or crime.” Id. at 165 (citing State v. Terhear/Goemmel, 142 Or App 450, 459 , 923 P2d 641 (1996) (“[The officer] began the encounter by telling [the defendant] that he had just seen him break the law. 2014We explained that a stop occurs “when an officer tells a person that the person has committed a violation or crime.” Id. at 165 (citing State v. Terhear/Goemmel, 142 Or App 450, 459 , 923 P2d 641 (1996) (“[The officer] began the encounter by telling [the defendant] that he had just seen him break the law. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Stookeygreen2 sentences2015State v. Stookey, 255 Or App 489, 491, 297 P3d 548 (2013) (citing ORS 810.410(2) and (3); State v. Matthews, 320 Or 398, 402 , 884 P2d 1224 (1994)). 2015State v. Stookey, 255 Or App 489, 491, 297 P3d 548 (2013) (citing ORS 810.410(2) and (3); State v. Matthews, 320 Or 398, 402 , 884 P2d 1224 (1994)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Allengreen2 sentences2014An ordinary citizen, faced with such a statement by a uniformed police officer, would not believe that he or she was free to leave.”)); see also State v. Allen, 224 Or App 524, 531 , 198 P3d 466 (2008) (“[The] defendant was seized when [an officer] told her that he ‘knew she was coming from a dope house’ and ‘that if she was honest and gave [him] the dope [he] would give her a citation.’” (Third and fourth brackets in original.)). 2014An ordinary citizen, faced with such a statement by a uniformed police officer, would not believe that he or she was free to leave.”)); see also State v. Allen, 224 Or App 524, 531 , 198 P3d 466 (2008) (“[The] defendant was seized when [an officer] told her that he ‘knew she was coming from a dope house’ and ‘that if she was honest and gave [him] the dope [he] would give her a citation.’” (Third and fourth brackets in original.)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Giffengreen1 sentence1991See State v. Giffen, 98 Or. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Matthews
green
2 sentences2019ORS 810.410(3)(b); State v. Matthews, 320 Or 398, 402 , 884 P2d 1224 (1994). 2019ORS 810.410(3)(b); State v. Matthews, 320 Or 398, 402 , 884 P2d 1224 (1994). | 5 | 2013–2019 |
State v. Derby
green
2 sentences2024On the one hand, our case law is clear that, “[t]o stop and detain a person for a traffic violation,” Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution requires an officer to “have probable cause to believe that the person has committed a violation.” State v. Derby, 301 Or App 134, 138 , 455 P3d 1009 (2019). 2024On the one hand, our case law is clear that, “[t]o stop and detain a person for a traffic violation,” Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution requires an officer to “have probable cause to believe that the person has committed a violation.” State v. Derby, 301 Or App 134, 138 , 455 P3d 1009 (2019). | 2 | 2023–2024 |
State v. Morfin-Estrada
green
2 sentences2015Id. at 165 . 2014We explained that a stop occurs “when an officer tells a person that the person has committed a violation or crime.” Id. at 165 (citing State v. Terhear/Goemmel, 142 Or App 450, 459 , 923 P2d 641 (1996) (“[The officer] began the encounter by telling [the defendant] that he had just seen him break the law. | 2 | 2014–2015 |
State v. Lipka
green
2 sentences2024And probable cause requires that “the facts that the officer per- ceived, either personally or as relayed to the officer, must in fact satisfy the elements of [an offense].” State v. Lipka, 314 Or App 154, 164 , 498 P3d 811 , rev dismissed, 368 Or 703 (2021). “[W]hen the facts an officer perceives do not meet the essential elements of the violation, probable cause is lack- ing.” Id. at 165. 2024And probable cause requires that “the facts that the officer per- ceived, either personally or as relayed to the officer, must in fact satisfy the elements of [an offense].” State v. Lipka, 314 Or App 154, 164 , 498 P3d 811 , rev dismissed, 368 Or 703 (2021). “[W]hen the facts an officer perceives do not meet the essential elements of the violation, probable cause is lack- ing.” Id. at 165. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Little
green
1 sentence2023“In order to stop and detain a per- son for a traffic violation, an officer ‘must have probable cause to believe that the person has committed a violation.’ ” Little, 326 Or App at 789 (quoting State v. Rabanales-Ramos, 273 Or App 228, 234 , 359 P3d 250 (2015)). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Rabanales-Ramos
green
2 sentences2023“In order to stop and detain a per- son for a traffic violation, an officer ‘must have probable cause to believe that the person has committed a violation.’ ” Little, 326 Or App at 789 (quoting State v. Rabanales-Ramos, 273 Or App 228, 234 , 359 P3d 250 (2015)). 2023“In order to stop and detain a per- son for a traffic violation, an officer ‘must have probable cause to believe that the person has committed a violation.’ ” Little, 326 Or App at 789 (quoting State v. Rabanales-Ramos, 273 Or App 228, 234 , 359 P3d 250 (2015)). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Gulley
green
2 sentences2009ORS 153.039(2) provides, in relevant part, that “[a]n enforcement officer may stop and detain any person if *530 the officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the person has committed a violation.” The trial court ruled that the words “reasonable grounds” in the statute impose a different standard than the “reasonable suspicion” of criminal activity standard in ORS 131.615(1), relying on the reasoning in State v. Gulley, 324 Or 57 , 921 P2d 396 (1996). 2 In Gulley , the defendant moved to suppress evidence seized during the search of his residence pursuant to a condition of his probation. 2009ORS 153.039(2) provides, in relevant part, that “[a]n enforcement officer may stop and detain any person if *530 the officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the person has committed a violation.” The trial court ruled that the words “reasonable grounds” in the statute impose a different standard than the “reasonable suspicion” of criminal activity standard in ORS 131.615(1), relying on the reasoning in State v. Gulley, 324 Or 57 , 921 P2d 396 (1996). 2 In Gulley , the defendant moved to suppress evidence seized during the search of his residence pursuant to a condition of his probation. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Walker v. City of Portland
green
2 sentences1987ORS 133.072 provides: "(1) When a person has committed a violation as defined in ORS 161.565 in the presence of a peace officer, the officer may issue and serve a citation to the person as provided in ORS 133.066 and 133.065. "(2) The peace officer may stop and detain a person for a violation offense for the purposes of investigation reasonably related to the violation offense, identification of the person and issuance of a citation to the person. "(3) A peace officer may detain a person pursuant to this section only for such time as it is reasonably necessary to investigate and verify the per 1987ORS 133.072 provides: “(1) When a person has committed a violation as defined in ORS 161.565 in the presence of a peace officer, the officer may issue and serve a citation to the person as provided in ORS 133.066 and 133.065. “(2) The peace officer may stop and detain a person for a violation offense for the purposes of investigation reasonably related to the violation offense, identification of the person and issuance of a citation to the person. “(3) A peace officer may detain a person pursuant to this section only for such time as it is reasonably necessary to investigate and verify the per | 1 | 1987–1987 |
State v. Mepham
green
1 sentence1985Igo therefore discovered the knife as a result of his seizure and search of defendant's person. [4] The trial court stated, in its conclusions of law, that "[i]t is not at all clear that what the officer saw was only a violation as defined by ORS 161.565 and ORS 475.992." However, the court explained that conclusion by stating, in the next sentence, that "[i]t is not unreasonable to believe that if one sees a small quantity of marijuana there is likely to be a larger quantity available." The court's conclusion was based on an approach which we rejected as a matter of law in State v. Tallman, s | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.