claimant must file claim (Pennsylvania) · Go Syfert
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claimant must file claim in Pennsylvania

14 Pennsylvania opinions name it 2 courts 1985–2025 4 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (6)

CaseFollowedCited
Holland Enterprises, Inc. v. Neshaminy School Districtgreen
pacommwct · 1985 · cited in 3 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1986–1991
2 sentences

1991Therefore, the finding that claimant suffers from both an injury and an occupational disease is supported by substantial evidence. 5 In Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Feiertag), 90 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 567, 579, 496 A.2d 412, 419 (1985), we stated that: [I]n cases of total disability due to an occupational disease, the three-year period in which a claimant must file a claim petition under § 315 of the Act commences at the time when a claimant knows, or should have known through reasonable diligence, of his or her disability and that it is caused by an occup

1986Similarly, in Jones & Laughlin Steel v. Workmens Compensation Appeal Board (Feiertag), 90 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 567, 579 , 496 A.2d 412, 419 (1985), we held that “in cases of total disability due to an occupational disease, the three-year period in which a claimant must file a claim petition under Section 315 of the Act commences at the time when a claimant knows, or should have known through reasonable diligence, of his or her disability and that it is caused by an occupational disease.” In the case sub judice, it is undisputed that we do not have a case of total disability due to an occupatio

33
Fargo v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Boardgreen
pacommwct · 2016 · cited in 5 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2017–2025
2 sentences

2025“First, a claimant must file the claim within 300 weeks of the last date of work with exposure to a known Group 1 carcinogen; if the claimant fails to do so, he is not foreclosed from bringing a claim by Section 301(f), but he loses the statutory presumption of Sections 301(e) and 301(f).” Fargo v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (City of Philadelphia), 148 A.3d 514, 520 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (emphasis added).

2024“First, a claimant must file the claim within 300 weeks of the last date of work with exposure to a known Group 1 carcinogen; if the claimant fails to do so, he is not foreclosed from bringing a claim by Section 301(f), but he loses the statutory presumption of Sections 301(e) and 301(f).” Fargo v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (City of Philadelphia), 148 A.3d 514, 520 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (emphasis added).

25
Mormak v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Reviewgreen
pacommwct · 1990 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025
1 sentence

2025This Court takes judicial notice that the Department’s website reflects the UCBR’s interpretation in this case: “In order to serve a penalty week, the claimant must file a claim for the week and be eligible for partial or full benefits.” 24 23 See also Marcellus Shale Coalition v. Department of Environmental Protection, 292 A.3d 921 (Pa. 2023); Corman v. Acting Secretary of Pennsylvania Department of Health, 267 A.3d 561 (Pa. Cmwlth.), aff’d, 268 A.3d 1080 (Pa. 2021); Mormak v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 579 A.2d 1383, 1386 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990) (“Courts generally respect the spec

11
Levenson v. Sousergreen
pa · 1989 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
1 sentence

2017First, a claimant must file the claim within 300 weeks of the last date of work with exposure to a known Group 1 carcinogen; if the claimant fails to do so, he is not toll the running of a statute where the existence of a cause of action cannot reasonably be ascertained within the prescribed time.’ Levenson v. Souser, 557 A.2d 1081, 1086 (Pa. Super. 1989) (citations omitted).

11
School District of Philadelphia v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Boardgreen
pacommwct · 2000 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006
1 sentence

2006In School District of Philadelphia v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board *488 (Hennegan), 751 A.2d 729, 731 (Pa. Cmwlth.2000), we stated that: [F]or statute of limitations purposes the last date of exposure to hazardous occupational noise begins the three-year period in which a claimant must file his claim petition in order to be timely.

11
Campbell v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Boardgreen
pacommwct · 1998 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2005–2005
2 sentences

2005See Campbell v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Bd. (Antietam Valley Animal Hospital), 705 A.2d 503 (Pa.Cmwlth.1998).

2005See Campbell v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Bd. (Antietam Valley Animal Hospital), 705 A.2d 503 (Pa.Cmwlth.1998).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (7)

CaseCitedYears
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board green
pacommwct · 1985
2 sentences

1986Similarly, in Jones & Laughlin Steel v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Feiertag), 90 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 567, 579 , 496 A.2d 412, 419 (1985), we held that "in cases of total disability due to an occupational disease, the three-year period in which a claimant must file a claim petition under Section 315 of the Act commences at the time when a claimant knows, or should have known through reasonable diligence, of his or her disability and that it is caused by an occupational disease." In the case sub judice, it is undisputed that we do not have a case of total disability due to an occupati

1986Similarly, in Jones & Laughlin Steel v. Workmens Compensation Appeal Board (Feiertag), 90 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 567, 579 , 496 A.2d 412, 419 (1985), we held that “in cases of total disability due to an occupational disease, the three-year period in which a claimant must file a claim petition under Section 315 of the Act commences at the time when a claimant knows, or should have known through reasonable diligence, of his or her disability and that it is caused by an occupational disease.” In the case sub judice, it is undisputed that we do not have a case of total disability due to an occupatio

21986–1986
City of Philadelphia v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board green
pacommwct · 2003
1 sentence

2021(Employer’s Br. at p. 16.) Employer cites City of Philadelphia v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Brown), 830 A.2d 649 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003), and Waldameer Park, Inc. v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Morrison), 819 A.2d 164 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003), for the proposition that the acknowledgment of compensability accomplished by a medical-only notice of compensation payable is sufficient to meet Employer’s obligations under Section 406.1.

12021–2021
Waldameer Park, Inc. v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board green
pacommwct · 2003
1 sentence

2021(Employer’s Br. at p. 16.) Employer cites City of Philadelphia v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Brown), 830 A.2d 649 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003), and Waldameer Park, Inc. v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Morrison), 819 A.2d 164 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003), for the proposition that the acknowledgment of compensability accomplished by a medical-only notice of compensation payable is sufficient to meet Employer’s obligations under Section 406.1.

12021–2021
Anastasio v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (NGK Metals Corp.) green
pacommwct · 1997
1 sentence

2006Claimant’s and the Board’s reliance on [Anastasio v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (NGK Metals Corporation), 713 A.2d 116 (Pa.Cmwlth.1997) and Sellari v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (NGK Metals Corporation), 698 A.2d 1372 (Pa.Cmwlth.1997) ] is misplaced.

12006–2006
Sellari v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board green
pacommwct · 1997
1 sentence

2006Claimant’s and the Board’s reliance on [Anastasio v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (NGK Metals Corporation), 713 A.2d 116 (Pa.Cmwlth.1997) and Sellari v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (NGK Metals Corporation), 698 A.2d 1372 (Pa.Cmwlth.1997) ] is misplaced.

12006–2006
Findlay Refractories v. Commonwealth green
pacommwct · 1980
2 sentences

1985Indeed, our conclusion here is bolstered by the long-established principle that the compensation laws are remedial legislation which is to be broadly construed to effectuate its remedial and humanitarian purposes, Bley v. Department of Labor and Industry, 484 Pa. 365 , 399 A.2d 119 (1979), and also “with the approach that an overly technical construction should not be placed on the word ‘filed’ as used in Section 315 of the Compensation Act.” (Citations omitted.) Findlay Refractories v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Renz), 52 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 454 , 415 A.2d 1270 (1980). 14 We conclu

1985Indeed, our conclusion here is bolstered by the long-established principle that the compensation laws are remedial legislation which is to be broadly construed to effectuate its remedial and humanitarian purposes, Bley v. Department of Labor and Industry, 484 Pa. 365 , 399 A.2d 119 (1979), and also “with the approach that an overly technical construction should not be placed on the word ‘filed’ as used in Section 315 of the Compensation Act.” (Citations omitted.) Findlay Refractories v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Renz), 52 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 454 , 415 A.2d 1270 (1980). 14 We conclu

11985–1985
Bley v. Com., Dept. of Labor & Industry green
pa · 1979
2 sentences

1985Indeed, our conclusion here is bolstered by the long-established principle that the compensation laws are remedial legislation which is to be broadly construed to effectuate its remedial and humanitarian purposes, Bley v. Department of Labor and Industry, 484 Pa. 365 , 399 A.2d 119 (1979), and also “with the approach that an overly technical construction should not be placed on the word ‘filed’ as used in Section 315 of the Compensation Act.” (Citations omitted.) Findlay Refractories v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Renz), 52 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 454 , 415 A.2d 1270 (1980). 14 We conclu

1985Indeed, our conclusion here is bolstered by the long-established principle that the compensation laws are remedial legislation which is to be broadly construed to effectuate its remedial and humanitarian purposes, Bley v. Department of Labor and Industry, 484 Pa. 365 , 399 A.2d 119 (1979), and also “with the approach that an overly technical construction should not be placed on the word ‘filed’ as used in Section 315 of the Compensation Act.” (Citations omitted.) Findlay Refractories v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Renz), 52 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 454 , 415 A.2d 1270 (1980). 14 We conclu

11985–1985

Where else courts name it

PA 14 (1985–2025) AR 4 (1949–1989) MD 2 (2003–2009) LA 2 (1992–2006)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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