Electroplating factors in Tennessee

2026Further, so long as the trial court considers the Parker and Electroplating factors, weighs them against each other, and places its findings on the record, we will presume that its decision is reasonable and will “uphold the grant or denial [of diversion] so long as there is any substantial evidence to support the trial court’s decision.” King, 432 S.W.3d at 326-27 .

2025“Substantial evidence” is “[e]vidence that a reasonable mind could accept as adequate to support a conclusion; evidence beyond a scintilla.” Black’s Law Dictionary 640 (12th ed. 2024). -7- While the trial court is “not required to recite all of the Parker and Electroplating factors when justifying its decision on the record in order to obtain the presumption of reasonableness[,]” the record should reflect that the court “considered the Parker and Electroplating factors in rendering its decision and that it identified the specific factors applicable to the case before it.” King, 432 S.W.3d at 3

2022App. June 2, 2014) (quoting State v. Washington, 866 S.W.2d 950, 951 (Tenn. 1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2021App. June 2, 2014) (quoting State v. Washington, 866 S.W.2d 950, 951 (Tenn. 1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2024In King, our supreme court held that State v. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682 (Tenn. 2012), did not abrogate the Electroplating factors.

2024In King, our supreme court held that State v. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682 (Tenn. 2012), did not abrogate the Electroplating factors.

2016“The truthfulness of a defendant, or lack thereof, is a permissible factor for a trial judge to consider in ruling on a petition for suspended sentence.” State v. Neeley, 678 S.W.2d 48, 49 (Tenn. 1984). -6- On review of a decision to grant or deny judicial diversion, this court will apply a presumption of reasonableness if the record reflects that the trial court considered the Parker and Electroplating factors, specifically identified the relevant factors, and placed on the record the reasons for granting or denying judicial diversion, provided any substantial evidence exists to support the c

2016“The truthfulness of a defendant, or lack thereof, is a permissible factor for a trial judge to consider in ruling on a petition for suspended sentence.” State v. Neeley, 678 S.W.2d 48, 49 (Tenn. 1984) On review of a decision to grant or deny judicial diversion, this court will apply a presumption of reasonableness if the record reflects that the trial court considered the Parker and Electroplating factors, specifically identified the relevant factors, and placed on the record the reasons for granting or denying judicial diversion, provided any substantial evidence exists to support the court‟

2025Id. at 327 . -8- Because the trial court in the Defendant’s case did not properly identify the Parker and Electroplating factors, weigh these factors, or make sufficient findings as to why it was denying judicial diversion, the presumption of reasonableness does not apply to the trial court’s decision, and the abuse of discretion is not appropriate.

2025Under the Bise standard of review, when the trial court “considers the Parker and Electroplating factors, specifically identifies the relevant factors, and places on the record its reasons for granting or denying judicial diversion,” this court “must apply a presumption of reasonableness and uphold the grant or denial so long as there is any substantial evidence to support the trial court’s decision.” Id. at 327 .

2022Trent, 533 S.W.3d at 291 ; Electroplating, 990 S.W.2d at 229 .

2022Trent, 533 S.W.3d at 291 ; Electroplating, 990 S.W.2d at 229 .

2019App. 1993)(in a denial of judicial diversion, the trial court must make “more than an abstract statement in the record that [the trial court] has considered [the Parker and Electroplating factors]”), overruled on other grounds by State v. Hooper, 29 S.W.3d 1, 9-10 (Tenn. 2000).

2018App. 1993) (quoting State v. Herron, 767 S.W. 2d 151, 156 (Tenn. 1989) (concluding that in a denial of judicial diversion, the trial court must make “more than an abstract statement in the record that [the trial court] has considered [the Parker and Electroplating factors]”), overruled on other grounds by State v. Hooper, 29 S.W.3d 1, 9-10 (Tenn. 2000).

2017State v. Dycus, 456 S.W.3d 918, 930 (Tenn. 2015). “[E]ven though an abuse of discretion standard of review is appropriate for a trial court’s judicial diversion decision, the trial court must consider and discuss each of the Parker and Electroplating factors on the record before the appellate court can determine whether ‘any substantial evidence’ exists to support the decision.” -5- King, 432 S.W.3d at 327 .

2017State v. Dycus, 456 S.W.3d 918, 930 (Tenn. 2015). ―[E]ven though an abuse of discretion standard of review is appropriate for a trial court‘s judicial diversion decision, the trial court must consider and discuss each of the Parker and Electroplating factors on the record before the appellate court can determine whether ‗any substantial evidence‘ exists to support the decision.‖ King, 432 S.W.3d at 327 .

2023See State v. Parker, 932 S.W.2d 945, 958 (Tenn. Crim.

2016App. 1998) (citing Parker, 932 S.W.2d at 958 ); see also King, 432 S.W.3d at 326 (reaffirming that the Electroplating requirements “are essential considerations for judicial diversion”). -5- A trial court is “not required to recite all of the Parker and Electroplating factors when justifying its decision on the record in order to obtain the presumption of reasonableness.” King, 432 S.W.3d at 327 .

2018App. 1993) (quoting State v. Herron, 767 S.W. 2d 151, 156 (Tenn. 1989) (concluding that in a denial of judicial diversion, the trial court must make “more than an abstract statement in the record that [the trial court] has considered [the Parker and Electroplating factors]”), overruled on other grounds by State v. Hooper, 29 S.W.3d 1, 9-10 (Tenn. 2000).

2016App. 1993) (quoting State v. Herron, 767 S.W. 2d 151, 156 (Tenn. 1989)) (concluding that in a denial of judicial diversion, the trial court must make “more than an abstract statement in the record that [the trial court] has considered [the Parker and Electroplating factors]”), overruled on other grounds by State v. Hooper, 29 S.W.3d 1, 9-10 (Tenn. 2000).

2025However, if the trial court “fails to consider and weigh” the Parker and Electroplating factors, “the presumption of reasonableness does not apply and the abuse of discretion standard, which merely looks for ‘any substantial evidence’ to support the trial court’s decision, is not appropriate.” Id. (citing State v. Pollard, 432 S.W.3d 851, 863-64 (Tenn. 2013)).

2025However, if the trial court “fails to consider and weigh” the Parker and Electroplating factors, “the presumption of reasonableness does not apply[,] and the abuse of discretion standard, which merely looks for ‘any substantial evidence’ to support the trial court's decision, is not appropriate.” Id. (citing State v. Pollard, 432 S.W.3d 851 , 863- 64 (Tenn. 2013)).

2026“Substantial evidence” is “[e]vidence that a reasonable mind could accept as adequate to support a conclusion; evidence beyond a scintilla.” Evidence, Black's Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (“substantial evidence” defined within); see State v. Clark, 452 S.W.3d 268, 280 (Tenn. 2014) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary).

2017The trial court must balance the Parker and Electroplating factors against 3 “When a record does not include a transcript of the hearing on a guilty plea, [this Court] should determine on a case-by-case basis whether the record is sufficient for a meaningful review under the standard adopted in Bise.” State v. Caudle, 388 S.W.3d 273, 279 (Tenn. 2012).

2017If this Court determines that the record is sufficient for meaningful review, this Court “may review the merits of the sentencing decision with a presumption that the missing transcript would support the ruling of the trial court.” Id. -6- one another and explain its ruling on the record.

2015The evidence does not support a charge of vehicular homicide by intoxication, id. at (a)(2), because Defendant voluntarily submitted to a blood alcohol test within two hours of the accident which showed that she was not intoxicated. 5 We note that the supreme court has cautioned that “the circumstances of the offense and the need for deterrence „cannot be given controlling weight unless they are of such overwhelming significance that they [necessarily] outweigh all other factors.‟” Stanton, 395 S.W.3d at 686 (quoting McKim, 215 S.W.3d at 787 (emphasis and alteration in original)). -13- Parker