two schools of thought doctrine in Pennsylvania

1993See also Morganstein v. House, 377 Pa.Super. 512, 519 , 547 A.2d 1180, 1183 (1988) (where two schools of thought charge could have lead jury to believe that defendant physician was not negligent merely because “his conduct was supported by the testimony of another medical expert,” the charge was erroneous and prejudicial to the plaintiff); D’Angelis v. Zakuto, 383 Pa.Super. 65, 75 , 556 A.2d 431, 435-36 (1989) (Kelly, J., concurring) (the two schools of thought doctrine “applies only to a school of thought advocated by ‘a considerable number’ of reputable, and respected physicians”).

1993See also Morganstein v. House, 377 Pa.Super. 512, 519 , 547 A.2d 1180, 1183 (1988) (where two schools of thought charge could have lead jury to believe that defendant physician was not negligent merely because “his conduct was supported by the testimony of another medical expert,” the charge was erroneous and prejudicial to the plaintiff); D’Angelis v. Zakuto, 383 Pa.Super. 65, 75 , 556 A.2d 431, 435-36 (1989) (Kelly, J., concurring) (the two schools of thought doctrine “applies only to a school of thought advocated by ‘a considerable number’ of reputable, and respected physicians”).

1998In Jones v. Chidester, 531 Pa. 31 , 610 A.2d 964 (1992), this Court thoroughly reviewed the development of the two schools of thought doctrine, noting that it first appeared in modern Pennsylvania law in Remley v. Plummer, 79 Pa.Super. 117 (1922). 1 The Court made the following definitive statement regarding the standard applied in this Commonwealth: Where competent medical authority is divided, a physician will not be held responsible if in the exercise of his judgment he followed a course of treatment advocated by a considerable number of recognized and respected professionals in his given a

1998In Jones v. Chidester, 531 Pa. 31 , 610 A.2d 964 (1992), this Court thoroughly reviewed the development of the two schools of thought doctrine, noting that it first appeared in modern Pennsylvania law in Remley v. Plummer, 79 Pa.Super. 117 (1922). 1 The Court made the following definitive statement regarding the standard applied in this Commonwealth: Where competent medical authority is divided, a physician will not be held responsible if in the exercise of his judgment he followed a course of treatment advocated by a considerable number of recognized and respected professionals in his given a

1993See also Morganstein v. House, 377 Pa.Super. 512, 519 , 547 A.2d 1180, 1183 (1988) (where two schools of thought charge could have lead jury to believe that defendant physician was not negligent merely because “his conduct was supported by the testimony of another medical expert,” the charge was erroneous and prejudicial to the plaintiff); D’Angelis v. Zakuto, 383 Pa.Super. 65, 75 , 556 A.2d 431, 435-36 (1989) (Kelly, J., concurring) (the two schools of thought doctrine “applies only to a school of thought advocated by ‘a considerable number’ of reputable, and respected physicians”).

1993See also Morganstein v. House, 377 Pa.Super. 512, 519 , 547 A.2d 1180, 1183 (1988) (where two schools of thought charge could have lead jury to believe that defendant physician was not negligent merely because “his conduct was supported by the testimony of another medical expert,” the charge was erroneous and prejudicial to the plaintiff); D’Angelis v. Zakuto, 383 Pa.Super. 65, 75 , 556 A.2d 431, 435-36 (1989) (Kelly, J., concurring) (the two schools of thought doctrine “applies only to a school of thought advocated by ‘a considerable number’ of reputable, and respected physicians”).

2003Gala v. Hamilton, 552 Pa. 466, 472 , 715 A.2d 1108, 1111 (1998). 13 ¶ 32 As with the two schools of thought doctrine, Frye’s general acceptance standard requires only that the scientific community generally accept the principles from which the scientist is proceeding and the methodology the scientist is employing to reach his or her conclusions.

2003Gala v. Hamilton, 552 Pa. 466, 472 , 715 A.2d 1108, 1111 (1998). 13 ¶ 32 As with the two schools of thought doctrine, Frye’s general acceptance standard requires only that the scientific community generally accept the principles from which the scientist is proceeding and the methodology the scientist is employing to reach his or her conclusions.

2019He relies upon our Supreme Court's decision in Levine v. Rosen , 532 Pa. 512 , 616 A.2d 623 (1992), reversing a defense verdict because the court neglected to tell the jury whether the two schools of thought defense applied to the defendant physician's failure to diagnose her cancer, or to his negligence in failing to order her to undergo an annual mammogram. 6 Since the Court found that the defense did not apply to the negligent failure to diagnose, the error was not harmless.

2019He relies upon our Supreme Court's decision in Levine v. Rosen , 532 Pa. 512 , 616 A.2d 623 (1992), reversing a defense verdict because the court neglected to tell the jury whether the two schools of thought defense applied to the defendant physician's failure to diagnose her cancer, or to his negligence in failing to order her to undergo an annual mammogram. 6 Since the Court found that the defense did not apply to the negligent failure to diagnose, the error was not harmless.

2019In support of his position, he relies upon our decision in Choma v. Iyer , 871 A.2d 238 , 240 (Pa.Super. 2005) ( en banc ), where we ordered a new trial because the trial court's charge instructing the jury on inapplicable law was fundamentally erroneous and may have been responsible for the verdict.

2017See Choma, supra at 243 ; Levine, supra at 628 . 3 In their third claim, Appellants maintain that the trial court erred when it allowed evidence from CHOP’S website over their objection.

2017See Rittenhouse v. Hanks, 777 A.2d 1113, 1118 *1243 (Pa. Super. 2001). [Appellee’s] case concerned whether [Appellants] were negligent in failing to provide the necessary testing and treat the bacterial infection [that] they would be aware of had the proper testing been performed.

1998Hosp., 325 Pa.Super. 212, 226 , 472 A.2d 1083, 1090-91 (1984).

1998Hosp., 325 Pa.Super. 212, 226 , 472 A.2d 1083, 1090-91 (1984).

1998See Tesauro, 437 Pa.Super. at 627 , 650 A.2d at 1083 . 1 The two schools of thought doctrine is a complete defense where “competent medical authority is divided.” See Jones, 531 Pa. 31 , 610 A.2d 964 ; see also Furey v. Thomas Jefferson Univ.

1998See Tesauro, 437 Pa.Super. at 627 , 650 A.2d at 1083 . 1 The two schools of thought doctrine is a complete defense where “competent medical authority is divided.” See Jones, 531 Pa. 31 , 610 A.2d 964 ; see also Furey v. Thomas Jefferson Univ.

1994Id.; Bonavitacola v. Cluver, 422 Pa.Super. 556, 564-66 , 619 A.2d 1363, 1368 (1993), appeal denied, 535 Pa. 652 , 634 A.2d 216 (1993) (“trial court must initially determine whether the defendant has introduced sufficient evidence that ‘there is a considerable number of professionals who agree with the treatment employed by the defendant’ ”).

1994Id.; Bonavitacola v. Cluver, 422 Pa.Super. 556, 564-66 , 619 A.2d 1363, 1368 (1993), appeal denied, 535 Pa. 652 , 634 A.2d 216 (1993) (“trial court must initially determine whether the defendant has introduced sufficient evidence that ‘there is a considerable number of professionals who agree with the treatment employed by the defendant’ ”).

1992The two schools of thought doctrine is based on the premise that “a lay jury is not to be put in a position of choosing one respected body of medical opinion over another, when each has a reasonable following among the members of the medical community.” D’Angelis v. Zakuto, 383 Pa.Super. 65, 69 , 556 A.2d 431, 432 (1989), quoting Trent v. Trotman, 352 Pa.Super. 490, 496 , 508 A.2d 580, 584 (1986).

1992The two schools of thought doctrine is based on the premise that “a lay jury is not to be put in a position of choosing one respected body of medical opinion over another, when each has a reasonable following among the members of the medical community.” D’Angelis v. Zakuto, 383 Pa.Super. 65, 69 , 556 A.2d 431, 432 (1989), quoting Trent v. Trotman, 352 Pa.Super. 490, 496 , 508 A.2d 580, 584 (1986).

1991See Levine, 394 Pa.Super. at 183-184 , 575 A.2d at 581-582 , citing Morganstein v. House, 377 Pa.Super. 512, 517-519 , 547 A.2d 1180, 1182-1183 (1988), appeal dismissed, 525 Pa. 498 , 581 A.2d 1377 (1990), (which held that the two schools of thought doctrine was inapplicable where the medical experts agreed on the treatment of unstable angina, but disagreed as to whether the patient’s symptoms and EKG disclosed the illness and should have been diagnosed) and D’Angelis v. Zakuto, 383 Pa.Super. 65, 69-71 , 556 A.2d 431, 433-434 (1989) (which held that the two schools of thought instruction was i

1991See Levine, 394 Pa.Super. at 183-184 , 575 A.2d at 581-582 , citing Morganstein v. House, 377 Pa.Super. 512, 517-519 , 547 A.2d 1180, 1182-1183 (1988), appeal dismissed, 525 Pa. 498 , 581 A.2d 1377 (1990), (which held that the two schools of thought doctrine was inapplicable where the medical experts agreed on the treatment of unstable angina, but disagreed as to whether the patient’s symptoms and EKG disclosed the illness and should have been diagnosed) and D’Angelis v. Zakuto, 383 Pa.Super. 65, 69-71 , 556 A.2d 431, 433-434 (1989) (which held that the two schools of thought instruction was i

1991See Levine, 394 Pa.Super. at 183-184 , 575 A.2d at 581-582 , citing Morganstein v. House, 377 Pa.Super. 512, 517-519 , 547 A.2d 1180, 1182-1183 (1988), appeal dismissed, 525 Pa. 498 , 581 A.2d 1377 (1990), (which held that the two schools of thought doctrine was inapplicable where the medical experts agreed on the treatment of unstable angina, but disagreed as to whether the patient’s symptoms and EKG disclosed the illness and should have been diagnosed) and D’Angelis v. Zakuto, 383 Pa.Super. 65, 69-71 , 556 A.2d 431, 433-434 (1989) (which held that the two schools of thought instruction was i

1991See Levine, 394 Pa.Super. at 183-184 , 575 A.2d at 581-582 , citing Morganstein v. House, 377 Pa.Super. 512, 517-519 , 547 A.2d 1180, 1182-1183 (1988), appeal dismissed, 525 Pa. 498 , 581 A.2d 1377 (1990), (which held that the two schools of thought doctrine was inapplicable where the medical experts agreed on the treatment of unstable angina, but disagreed as to whether the patient’s symptoms and EKG disclosed the illness and should have been diagnosed) and D’Angelis v. Zakuto, 383 Pa.Super. 65, 69-71 , 556 A.2d 431, 433-434 (1989) (which held that the two schools of thought instruction was i