great and controlling principle in New York

2025"In matters of statutory and regulatory interpretation, 'legislative intent is the great and controlling principle, and the proper judicial function is to discern and apply the will of the [enactors]'" ( Town of Huntington v County of Suffolk , 79 AD3d 207, 217 , quoting Matter of ATM One v Landaverde , 2 NY3d 472, 477 ). "[T]he starting point in any case of interpretation must always be the language itself, giving effect to the plain meaning thereof" ( Majewski v Broadalbin-Perth Cent.

2025"In matters of statutory and regulatory interpretation, 'legislative intent is the great and controlling principle, and the proper judicial function is to discern and apply the will of the [enactors]'" ( Town of Huntington v County of Suffolk , 79 AD3d 207, 217, quoting Matter of ATM One v Landaverde , 2 NY3d 472, 477). "[T]he starting point in any case of interpretation must always be the language itself, giving effect to the plain meaning thereof" ( Majewski v Broadalbin-Perth Cent.

2013Legislative intent is the great and controlling principle in statutory construction and the proper judicial function is to discern and apply the will of the legislature (Mowczan v Bacon, 92 NY2d 281, 285 [1998]; Matter of Scotto v Dinkins, 85 NY2d 209, 214 [1995]; Matter of Sutka v Conners, 73 NY2d 395, 403 [1989]).

2012In matters of statutory and regulatory interpretation, “legislative intent is the great and controlling principle, and the proper judicial function is to discern and apply the will of the [enac tors]” (Matter of ATM One v Landaverde, 2 NY3d 472, 477 [2004]; see Mowczan v Bacon, 92 NY2d 281, 285 [1998]; Patrolmen’s Benevolent Assn, of City of N.Y. v City of New York, 41 NY2d 205 , 208 [1976]; see Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v Barnes & Reinecke, 15 NY2d 443, 453 , [1965], cert denied sub nom.

1977The Court of Appeals, in construing another section of the Public Officers Law (former section 66), which pertains to similar subject matter, stated the principle thusly: "In construing statutory provisions, the spirit and purpose of the statute and the objectives sought to be accomplished by the legislature must be borne in mind. 'The legislative intent is the great and controlling principle’ * * * (People v. Ryan, 274 N. Y. 149, 152 ; see, also, Matter of United Press Assns. v. Valente, supra, 308 N. Y. 71, 83-84 ; Matter of River Brand Rice Mills v. Latrobe Brewing Co., 305 N. Y. 36, 43-44

1977The Court of Appeals, in construing another section of the Public Officers Law (former section 66), which pertains to similar subject matter, stated the principle thusly: "In construing statutory provisions, the spirit and purpose of the statute and the objectives sought to be accomplished by the legislature must be borne in mind. 'The legislative intent is the great and controlling principle’ * * * (People v. Ryan, 274 N. Y. 149, 152 ; see, also, Matter of United Press Assns. v. Valente, supra, 308 N. Y. 71, 83-84 ; Matter of River Brand Rice Mills v. Latrobe Brewing Co., 305 N. Y. 36, 43-44

2011The legislative intent is the great and controlling principle’ ” (Ferres v City of New Rochelle, 68 NY2d 446, 451 [1986] [emphasis omitted], quoting People v Ryan, 274 NY 149, 152 [1937]).

2009The legislative intent is the great and controlling principle.” (Price v Price, 69 NY2d 8, 14 [1986], quoting People v Ryan, 274 NY 149, 152 [1937] and citing Matter of Petterson v Daystrom Corp., 17 NY2d 32 [1966] [where the court found that a literal reading of the statute without regard to the purpose of the provision leads to an unjust result].) The “deceased tenant” section of RPAPL 711 (2) is derived from section 1410 (7) of the former Civil Practice Act.

2013Legislative intent is the great and controlling principle in statutory construction and the proper judicial function is to discern and apply the will of the legislature (Mowczan v Bacon, 92 NY2d 281, 285 [1998]; Matter of Scotto v Dinkins, 85 NY2d 209, 214 [1995]; Matter of Sutka v Conners, 73 NY2d 395, 403 [1989]).

2009Further support for the appointment of a money manager can be found in the legislative goals of the statute. “[Legislative intent is the great and controlling principle, and the proper judicial function is to discern and apply the will of the [legislators]” (Matter of ATM One v Landaverde, 2 NY3d 472, 476-477 [2004]; see Matter of Sutka v Conners, 73 NY2d 395, 403 [1989]; East Acupuncture, P.C. v Allstate Ins.

2024II "In matters of statutory . . . interpretation, 'legislative intent is the great and controlling principle, and the proper judicial function is to discern and apply the will of the enactors'" ( Sedacca v Mangano , 18 NY3d 609, 615 [2012]).

2024II "In matters of statutory . . . interpretation, 'legislative intent is the great and controlling principle, and the proper judicial function is to discern and apply the will of the enactors'" ( Sedacca v Mangano , 18 NY3d 609, 615 [2012]).

2009The legislative intent is the great and controlling principle.” (Price v Price, 69 NY2d 8, 14 [1986], quoting People v Ryan, 274 NY 149, 152 [1937] and citing Matter of Petterson v Daystrom Corp., 17 NY2d 32 [1966] [where the court found that a literal reading of the statute without regard to the purpose of the provision leads to an unjust result].) The “deceased tenant” section of RPAPL 711 (2) is derived from section 1410 (7) of the former Civil Practice Act.

1992(People v Graham, 55 NY2d 144 [1982].) Moreover, while legislative intent is the great and controlling principle (Matter of Petterson v Daystrom Corp., 17 NY2d 32, 38 [1966]), it should not be confused with legislative history as the two are not coextensive.

2011The legislative intent is the great and controlling principle’ ” (Ferres v City of New Rochelle, 68 NY2d 446, 451 [1986] [emphasis omitted], quoting People v Ryan, 274 NY 149, 152 [1937]).

2003The legislative intent is the great and controlling principle.’ (Ferres v City of New Rochelle, 68 NY2d 446, 451 [1986], quoting People v Ryan, 274 NY 149, 152 [1937])” (Matter of Long v Adirondack Park Agency, 76 NY2d 416, 422 [1990]).

2010School Dist., 9 NY3d 367, 372-373 [2007]; Sega v State of New York, 60 NY2d 183, 191 [1983], rearg denied 61 NY2d 670 [1983] [“While legislative intent is the great and controlling principle . . . , it should not be confused with legislative history, as the two are not coextensive.

1990While legislative intent is the great and controlling principle (Matter of Petterson v Daystrom Corp., 17 NY2d 32, 38 ), it should not be confused with legislative history, as the two are not coextensive” (Sega v State of New York, 60 NY2d 183, 190-191 ).

1972(See, e.g., Eck v. United Arab Airlines, 15 N Y 2d 53, 62; Matter of New York Post Corp. v. Leibowitz, 2 N Y 2d 677, 685; see, also, Cabell v. Markham, 148 F. 2d 737, 739 , affd. 326 U. S. 404 .) ‘ In construing statutory provisions, ’ we wrote in the New York Post case (2 N Y 2d 677, 685-686, supra), ' the spirit and purpose of the statute and the objectives sought to be accomplished by the legislature must be borne in mind. “ The legislative intent is the great and controlling principle.

1971(See, e.g., Eck v. United Arab Airlines, 15 N Y 2d 53, 62; Matter of New York Post Corp. v. Leibowits, 2 N Y 2d 677, 685; see, also, Cabell v. Markham, 148 F. 2d 737, 739 , affd. 326 U. S. 404 .) ‘In construing statutory provisions,’ we wrote in the New York Post case (2 N Y 2d 677, 685-686, supra), ‘ the spirit and purpose of the statute and the objectives sought to be accomplished by the legislature must be borne in mind. ‘ The legislative intent is the great and controlling principle.

1972(See, e.g., Eck v. United Arab Airlines, 15 N Y 2d 53, 62; Matter of New York Post Corp. v. Leibowitz, 2 N Y 2d 677, 685; see, also, Cabell v. Markham, 148 F. 2d 737, 739 , affd. 326 U. S. 404 .) ‘ In construing statutory provisions, ’ we wrote in the New York Post case (2 N Y 2d 677, 685-686, supra), ' the spirit and purpose of the statute and the objectives sought to be accomplished by the legislature must be borne in mind. “ The legislative intent is the great and controlling principle.

1971(See, e.g., Eck v. United Arab Airlines, 15 N Y 2d 53, 62; Matter of New York Post Corp. v. Leibowits, 2 N Y 2d 677, 685; see, also, Cabell v. Markham, 148 F. 2d 737, 739 , affd. 326 U. S. 404 .) ‘In construing statutory provisions,’ we wrote in the New York Post case (2 N Y 2d 677, 685-686, supra), ‘ the spirit and purpose of the statute and the objectives sought to be accomplished by the legislature must be borne in mind. ‘ The legislative intent is the great and controlling principle.

2013Legislative intent is the great and controlling principle in statutory construction and the proper judicial function is to discern and apply the will of the legislature (Mowczan v Bacon, 92 NY2d 281, 285 [1998]; Matter of Scotto v Dinkins, 85 NY2d 209, 214 [1995]; Matter of Sutka v Conners, 73 NY2d 395, 403 [1989]).

1999In such controversies, “ ‘legislative intent is the great and controlling principle,’ ” and the “proper judicial function is to ‘discern and apply the will of the Legislature’ ” (Matter of Scotto v Dinkins, 85 NY2d 209, 214 [citations omitted]; see also, Griffin v Oceanic Contrs., 458 US 564, 570 ).

2009The legislative intent is the great and controlling principle.” (Price v Price, 69 NY2d 8, 14 [1986], quoting People v Ryan, 274 NY 149, 152 [1937] and citing Matter of Petterson v Daystrom Corp., 17 NY2d 32 [1966] [where the court found that a literal reading of the statute without regard to the purpose of the provision leads to an unjust result].) The “deceased tenant” section of RPAPL 711 (2) is derived from section 1410 (7) of the former Civil Practice Act.

1990It is necessary, therefore, to look beyond the words of the statute at the circumstances surrounding its adoption and to consider the policy reasons for enacting legislation in an area where common-law rules have long controlled ( see , Price v Price , supra , at 13-14), being mindful, of course, that the "`legislative intent is the great and controlling principle'" ( id. , at 14; People v Ryan , 274 N.Y. 149, 152 ).

2020After all, “[i]n statutory interpretation, legislative intent is the great and controlling principle” and there may be “instances where the literal meaning of words is not to be so slavishly adhered to as to defeat the general purpose and manifest policy intended to be promoted” (Carr v New York State Board of Elections, 40 NY2d 556, 559 [1976] [citations omitted]).

1983Carr v. New York State Board of Elections, 40 N.Y.2d 556, 559 (1976).

2017Chesterton Co., 15 NY3d 502, 507 [2010] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). "[L]egislative intent is the great and controlling principle," and accordingly, "the proper judicial function is to discern and apply the will of the [enactors]" (id., citing Matter of ATM One v Landaverde, 2 NY3d 472, 477 [2004]).

2012Chesterton Co., 15 NY3d 502, 507 [2010], quoting Matter of ATM One v Landaverde, 2 NY3d 472, 477 [2004]).

2013(Williams v Williams, 23 NY2d 592, 598 [1969].) Indeed, “[t]he primary consideration of the courts in the construction of statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature.” (McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 92.) “In matters of statutory construction, legislative intent is the great and controlling principle, and our proper judicial function is to discern and apply the will of the Legislature.” (People v Allen, 92 NY2d 378, 383 [1998] [citations and internal quotation marks omitted]; People v Santi, 3 NY3d 234, 243 [2004].) Penal Law § 190.80 was enacte

2012“In matters of statutory construction, legislative intent is the great and controlling principle, and [the] proper judicial function is to discern and apply the will of the Legislature” (People v Allen, 92 NY2d 378, 383 [1998] [citations and internal quotation marks omitted]).

2005“It is fundamental that in construing the words of a statute [t]he legislative intent is the great and controlling principle” (Braschi, 74 NY2d at 207 [internal quotation marks omitted]).

1995Co., 74 NY2d 201, 207-208 [1989] [citations omit ted]).

1977Since the board had the information before it, we cannot say the action of the board is without some reasonable basis.” (Emphasis added.) Associate Judge Lawrence Cooke writing for a unanimous Court of Appeals in Matter of Albano v Kirby ( 36 NY2d 526, 529-531 ), also factually distinguishable, said: "In the construction of statutory provisions, the legislative intent is the great and controlling principle (Matter of Petterson v Daystrom Corp., 17 NY2d 32 ), same being sought first in the words of the statute under consideration (Department of Welfare of City of NY v Siebel, 6 NY2d 536, 545 ;

1977It is settled law, however, that "[i]n the construction of statutory provisions, the legislative intent is the great and controlling principle” (Matter of Albano v Kirby, 36 NY2d 526, 529-530 ).

1979Literal meanings of words are not to be adhered to or suffered "to defeat the general purpose and manifest policy intended to be promoted”.’ ” (Matter of New York Post Corp. v Leibowitz, 2 NY2d 677, 685, citing People v Ryan, 274 NY 149, 152 ; see, also, Matter of United Press Assns. v Valente, 308 NY 71, 83-84 .) "[Government is the people’s business and * * * the people have a right to know the processes by which government decisions are made and actions taken.” (Governor’s Memorandum, NY Legis Ann, 1974, p 392.) In the circumstances presented here the most significant portion of the public

1976In construing statutory provisions, "the spirit and purpose of the statute and the objectives sought to be accomplished by the Legislature must be borne in mind. `The legislative intent is the great and controlling principle'" Matter of Petterson v. Daystrom Corp., 17 N.Y.2d 32 , 38 (1966); Matter of New York Post Corp . v. Leibowitz, 2 N.Y.2d 677 , 685 (1957); Matter of Hogan v. Culkin, 18 N.Y.2d 330 , 335 (1966); Matter of Albano v. Kirby, 36 N.Y.2d 526 , 529-530 (1975).

2017The legislative intent is the great and controlling principle" ( 92 A.D.3d at 35 n. 2, 936 N.Y.S.2d 112 [internal quotation marks and brackets omitted], quoting Matter of Meegan v. Brown, 16 N.Y.3d 395 , 403, 924 N.Y.S.2d 1 , 948 N.E.2d 425 [2011] ).

2017The legislative intent is the great and controlling principle" ( 92 A.D.3d at 35 n. 2, 936 N.Y.S.2d 112 [internal quotation marks and brackets omitted], quoting Matter of Meegan v. Brown, 16 N.Y.3d 395 , 403, 924 N.Y.S.2d 1 , 948 N.E.2d 425 [2011] ).

2013(Williams v Williams, 23 NY2d 592, 598 [1969].) Indeed, “[t]he primary consideration of the courts in the construction of statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature.” (McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 92.) “In matters of statutory construction, legislative intent is the great and controlling principle, and our proper judicial function is to discern and apply the will of the Legislature.” (People v Allen, 92 NY2d 378, 383 [1998] [citations and internal quotation marks omitted]; People v Santi, 3 NY3d 234, 243 [2004].) Penal Law § 190.80 was enacte

1976Save for those instances where the literal meaning of words is not to be so slavishly adhered to as to defeat the general purpose and manifest policy intended to be promoted (see Williams v Williams, 23 NY2d 592, 599 ; Matter of Capone v Weaver, 6 NY2d 307, 309 ), where the legislative design is expressed in an act employing unambiguous terms such as here, the court must enforce it according to the letter, the responsibility for the result being upon the Legislature, not upon the courts (Matter of De Peyster, 210 NY 216, 225 ; Kinner v Board of Educ., 6 AD2d 204, 207 , affd 9 NY2d 845 ; Tribor

2010Co., 61 AD3d 202, 207 [2009]).

2009Co., 61 AD3d 202 [2009]).

2025"In matters of statutory and regulatory interpretation, 'legislative intent is the great and controlling principle, and the proper judicial function is to discern and apply the will of the [enactors]'" ( Town of Huntington v County of Suffolk , 79 AD3d 207, 217 , quoting Matter of ATM One v Landaverde , 2 NY3d 472, 477 ). "[T]he starting point in any case of interpretation must always be the language itself, giving effect to the plain meaning thereof" ( Majewski v Broadalbin-Perth Cent.

2025"In matters of statutory and regulatory interpretation, 'legislative intent is the great and controlling principle, and the proper judicial function is to discern and apply the will of the [enactors]'" ( Town of Huntington v County of Suffolk , 79 AD3d 207, 217, quoting Matter of ATM One v Landaverde , 2 NY3d 472, 477). "[T]he starting point in any case of interpretation must always be the language itself, giving effect to the plain meaning thereof" ( Majewski v Broadalbin-Perth Cent.

2025School Dist. , 91 NY2d 577, 583 ; see Matter of Affiliated Brookhaven Civic Orgs., Inc. v Planning Bd. of the Town of Brookhaven , 209 AD3d 854, 855-856 ).

2025School Dist. , 91 NY2d 577, 583; see Matter of Affiliated Brookhaven Civic Orgs., Inc. v Planning Bd. of the Town of Brookhaven , 209 AD3d 854, 855-856).