PCR hearing in Iowa

2023See Dunbar, 515 N.W.2d at 15 (refusing to consider the specific claim that PCR counsel failed to have defendant testify because, although that ground was specific, there was no development of what the testimony would have been or how it would have supported the PCR application).

2023See Dunbar, 515 N.W.2d at 15 (refusing to consider the specific claim that PCR counsel failed to have defendant testify because, although that ground was specific, there was no development of what the testimony would have been or how it would have supported the PCR application).

2019To establish a due process violation, Pierce “must prove by a preponderance of the evidence ‘(1) the prosecution suppressed evidence; (2) 1 In its brief, the State acknowledges it provided this evidence to Pierce after the PCR hearing. 14 the evidence was favorable to the defendant; and (3) the evidence was material to the issue of guilt.’” Id. (quoting Harrington v. State, 659 N.W.2d 509, 516 (Iowa 2003)).

2019To establish a due process violation, Pierce “must prove by a preponderance of the evidence ‘(1) the prosecution suppressed evidence; (2) 1 In its brief, the State acknowledges it provided this evidence to Pierce after the PCR hearing. 14 the evidence was favorable to the defendant; and (3) the evidence was material to the issue of guilt.’” Id. (quoting Harrington v. State, 659 N.W.2d 509, 516 (Iowa 2003)).

2017With regard to Stilen’s new claim concerning the district court’s failings during his probation revocation hearing, we agree with the State that error was not preserved because the issues were not raised before or considered by the district court at the PCR hearing and there is no decision for us to review. 1 See Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002) (“It is a fundamental doctrine of appellate review that issues must ordinarily be both raised and decided by the district court before we will decide them on appeal.”).

2017With regard to Stilen’s new claim concerning the district court’s failings during his probation revocation hearing, we agree with the State that error was not preserved because the issues were not raised before or considered by the district court at the PCR hearing and there is no decision for us to review. 1 See Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002) (“It is a fundamental doctrine of appellate review that issues must ordinarily be both raised and decided by the district court before we will decide them on appeal.”).

2025Ledezma, 626 N.W.2d at 142 .

2025Ledezma, 626 N.W.2d at 142 .

2024Lado v. State, 804 N.W.2d 248, 250 (Iowa 2011).

2024Lado v. State, 804 N.W.2d 248, 250 (Iowa 2001).

2021As noted above, Allison allows a belated second PCR action “if the successive PCR petition is filed promptly after the conclusion of the first PCR action.” 914 N.W.2d at 891 (emphasis added); see also Goode v. State, 920 N.W.2d 520, 526 (Iowa 2018) (“Based on Allison, the statutory limitation period is not an impediment to pursuing a second PCR application relating to the claim in this case if promptly filed following the appeal.”).

2021Allison v. State, 914 N.W.2d 866, 870 (Iowa 2018).

2021See Thorndike, 860 N.W.2d at 320 ; see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (“[A] court must indulge a strong presumption that 2 During the PCR hearing, Plain admitted to at least five prior felony convictions, one of which was for perjury.

2021See Thorndike, 860 N.W.2d at 320 ; see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (“[A] court must indulge a strong presumption that 2 During the PCR hearing, Plain admitted to at least five prior felony convictions, one of which was for perjury.

2016First, Gamble is not a new ground of law to toll a PCR claim because the court in Gamble did not “expressly overrule[] the prior law.” See Iowa Code § 822.3 (providing the three-year statute of limitations for the filing of PCR applications “does not apply to a ground of fact or law that could not have been raised within the applicable time period”); Nguyen v. State, 829 N.W.2d 183, 188 (Iowa 2013) (“[A] ground of law that had been clearly and repeatedly rejected by controlling precedent from the court with final decision-making authority is one 3 Morgan raises variations of these claims in th

2016First, Gamble is not a new ground of law to toll a PCR claim because the court in Gamble did not “expressly overrule[] the prior law.” See Iowa Code § 822.3 (providing the three-year statute of limitations for the filing of PCR applications “does not apply to a ground of fact or law that could not have been raised within the applicable time period”); Nguyen v. State, 829 N.W.2d 183, 188 (Iowa 2013) (“[A] ground of law that had been clearly and repeatedly rejected by controlling precedent from the court with final decision-making authority is one 3 Morgan raises variations of these claims in th

2025LeGear points to Linn in support of his argument that the PCR court should have granted his pro se motion to hire an expert to discuss his new memories.2 See 929 N.W.2d at 753–54 (finding PCR court erred by granting summary judgment on the merits as the applicant demonstrated a reasonable need to hire a battered woman syndrome expert and should have been allowed to fully develop the record to show trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to introduce the evidence as part of a justification defense). 2 PCR counsel submitted Exhibit A at the PCR hearing, which included several do

2025LeGear points to Linn in support of his argument that the PCR court should have granted his pro se motion to hire an expert to discuss his new memories.2 See 929 N.W.2d at 753–54 (finding PCR court erred by granting summary judgment on the merits as the applicant demonstrated a reasonable need to hire a battered woman syndrome expert and should have been allowed to fully develop the record to show trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to introduce the evidence as part of a justification defense). 2 PCR counsel submitted Exhibit A at the PCR hearing, which included several do

2022Our case law establishes that, when a new case creates a ground-of-law that would entitle a criminal defendant to PCR, the PCR application must be filed within three years of the filing of the new case.19 The same logic applies to a new ground of fact.20 As Garcia did not file this PCR action within three years of his discovery of J.M.’s affidavit, his claim remains time- barred by section 822.3. 18 Id. 19 See Nguyen v. State, 829 N.W.2d 183 , 187–89 (Iowa 2013) (applying the new ground-of-law exception when the PCR applicant files the application within three years of the case announcing chan

2022Our case law establishes that, when a new case creates a ground-of-law that would entitle a criminal defendant to PCR, the PCR application must be filed within three years of the filing of the new case.19 The same logic applies to a new ground of fact.20 As Garcia did not file this PCR action within three years of his discovery of J.M.’s affidavit, his claim remains time- barred by section 822.3. 18 Id. 19 See Nguyen v. State, 829 N.W.2d 183 , 187–89 (Iowa 2013) (applying the new ground-of-law exception when the PCR applicant files the application within three years of the case announcing chan

2021Jackson contends his trial counsel failed to discuss trial preparation with him and instead focused on advising him to plead guilty.2 Now on appeal, the only argument relating to prejudice that Jackson proffers is that “[t]he lack of trial preparation negatively affected the appellant’s chance of success at trial.” These types of “‘conclusory claims of prejudice’ are not sufficient to satisfy the prejudice element.” State v. Tate, 710 N.W.2d 237 , 241 2 At the PCR hearing, trial counsel testified he and Jackson discussed trial strategy, for example, the “pitfalls” of Jackson’s request to subpo

2021Jackson contends his trial counsel failed to discuss trial preparation with him and instead focused on advising him to plead guilty.2 Now on appeal, the only argument relating to prejudice that Jackson proffers is that “[t]he lack of trial preparation negatively affected the appellant’s chance of success at trial.” These types of “‘conclusory claims of prejudice’ are not sufficient to satisfy the prejudice element.” State v. Tate, 710 N.W.2d 237 , 241 2 At the PCR hearing, trial counsel testified he and Jackson discussed trial strategy, for example, the “pitfalls” of Jackson’s request to subpo

2025More v. State, 880 N.W.2d 487, 499 (Iowa 2016). 9 During the PCR hearing, Elliott testified that, at some point, his son told a therapist that H.E.’s allegations were “made up.” The PCR court rejected this claim as frivolous, explaining Elliott’s testimony regarding [the son’s] purported new statements is entirely self-serving.

2025More v. State, 880 N.W.2d 487, 499 (Iowa 2016). 9 During the PCR hearing, Elliott testified that, at some point, his son told a therapist that H.E.’s allegations were “made up.” The PCR court rejected this claim as frivolous, explaining Elliott’s testimony regarding [the son’s] purported new statements is entirely self-serving.

2020See Blue v. State, No. 16-2201, 2017 WL 4050248 , at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 13, 2017) (“Although Blue made a few statements during his testimony at the PCR hearing that he would have insisted on going to trial if he knew there was a chance his confession could be suppressed, these self-serving statements are not enough to establish prejudice.” (citing Kirchner v. State, 756 N.W.2d 202, 206 (Iowa 2008))); cf. Schmidt v. State, 909 N.W.2d 778, 797 (Iowa 2018) (“For an applicant to succeed on a freestanding actual-innocence claim, the applicant must show by clear and convincing evidence that, de

2020See Blue v. State, No. 16-2201, 2017 WL 4050248 , at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 13, 2017) (“Although Blue made a few statements during his testimony at the PCR hearing that he would have insisted on going to trial if he knew there was a chance his confession could be suppressed, these self-serving statements are not enough to establish prejudice.” (citing Kirchner v. State, 756 N.W.2d 202, 206 (Iowa 2008))); cf. Schmidt v. State, 909 N.W.2d 778, 797 (Iowa 2018) (“For an applicant to succeed on a freestanding actual-innocence claim, the applicant must show by clear and convincing evidence that, de

2019See Dempsey v. State, 860 N.W.2d 860, 869 (Iowa 2015).

2016See id. (“For example, the disparity between the sentence a defendant faced and a significantly shorter sentence in the plea offer can support a defendant’s claim of prejudice.”).

2017See Brewer v. State, 444 N.W.2d 77, 83 (Iowa 1989) (“[W]e will not reverse where counsel has made a reasonable decision concerning trial tactics and strategy, even if such judgments ultimately fail.”).

2015See State v. Bentley, 757 N.W.2d 257, 264 (Iowa 2008) (“Even a lawyer is entitled to his day in court, especially when his professional reputation is impugned.”); Brewer v. State, 444 N.W.2d 77, 83 (Iowa 1989) (“[W]e will not reverse where counsel has made a reasonable decision concerning trial tactics and strategy, even if such judgments ultimately fail.”).

2023Id. at 797 At the PCR hearing, King testified on direct examination: Q.

2023Id. at 797 At the PCR hearing, King testified on direct examination: Q.

2024Mayorga, 2024 WL 1295965 , at *2–3. 1 We recognize Ruiz’s window of time to file a new PCR action has passed, but “we decline to remand claims of ineffective assistance of [PCR] counsel raised for the first time on appeal.” Goode, 920 N.W.2d at 527 ; see also Karns v. State, No. 21-0758, 2022 WL 2348144 , at *4 n.3 (Iowa Ct. App. June 29, 2022) (relying on Goode and refusing to remand for new PCR trial even though the applicant’s “window to file a new PCR action may be closed”). 5 Further, Ruiz concedes in his appellate brief that his requested path still requires a “record . . . adequate to w

2021As noted above, Allison allows a belated second PCR action “if the successive PCR petition is filed promptly after the conclusion of the first PCR action.” 914 N.W.2d at 891 (emphasis added); see also Goode v. State, 920 N.W.2d 520, 526 (Iowa 2018) (“Based on Allison, the statutory limitation period is not an impediment to pursuing a second PCR application relating to the claim in this case if promptly filed following the appeal.”).

2024Moon, 911 N.W.2d at 151 .

2024Moon, 911 N.W.2d at 151 .

2026In his PCR claim, Smith argued 6 “the decision to commit [him] to disciplinary detention and transfer him in the first instance was based on a disciplinary allegation and report that has since been expunged because a court held that there was not even ‘some evidence’ that [he] violated the prison rules.” Id. at 1079 .

2026In dismissing the PCR claim, the court reasoned that “the Supreme Court has held that the Constitution itself does not give rise to a liberty interest in avoiding transfer to more adverse conditions of confinement.” Id. (cleaned up).

2024General intent exists “when from the circumstances the prohibited result may reasonably be expected to follow from the offender’s voluntary act, irrespective of any subjective desire to have accomplished such result.” State v. Benson, 919 N.W.2d 237, 244 (Iowa 2018) (citation omitted).

2024General intent exists “when from the circumstances the prohibited result may reasonably be expected to follow from the offender’s voluntary act, irrespective of any subjective desire to have accomplished such result.” State v. Benson, 919 N.W.2d 237, 244 (Iowa 2018) (citation omitted).

2024See State v. McCormack, 293 4 The PCR court read these two arguments as one: [Marcott] states that counsel informed him that all that was necessary to prove guilt was that he was driving a vehicle, and that the owner of the vehicle has not given consent for him to do so; and that it did not matter what his intent was concerning the vehicle. [His] argument is essentially that trial counsel allowed him to plead guilty to OMVWOC without there being a factual basis for the charge. 5 Marcott’s explanation at the PCR hearing was not that he had the owner’s permission to drive the Buick, but that he

2024See State v. McCormack, 293 4 The PCR court read these two arguments as one: [Marcott] states that counsel informed him that all that was necessary to prove guilt was that he was driving a vehicle, and that the owner of the vehicle has not given consent for him to do so; and that it did not matter what his intent was concerning the vehicle. [His] argument is essentially that trial counsel allowed him to plead guilty to OMVWOC without there being a factual basis for the charge. 5 Marcott’s explanation at the PCR hearing was not that he had the owner’s permission to drive the Buick, but that he

2024But, he asserts “[t]here were valid arguments against dismissal” that PCR counsel never raised, including that his “pro se petition alleged new facts that were previously unavailable.”2 Yet Ruiz has not even listed for us what “new facts” were part of his second PCR application, see Hyler v. Garner, 548 N.W.2d 864, 876 (Iowa 1996) (“[W]e will not . . . comb the record for facts to support [a party’s] arguments.”), let alone conducted any analysis to show he could “meet the ‘obvious requirement’ that he . . . could not have raised the ground of fact within the limitations period.” Moon v. State

2023This act “reflects adversely on [Johnson’s] honesty, trustworthiness, and fitness as a lawyer, even if the authorities never charged him with the crime.” Id. at 225–26; see Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Stowe, 830 N.W.2d 737, 743 (Iowa 2013) (“We have previously recognized the crime of forgery, by its very nature, reflects adversely on an attorney’s fitness to practice law.”).

2023This act “reflects adversely on [Johnson’s] honesty, trustworthiness, and fitness as a lawyer, even if the authorities never charged him with the crime.” Id. at 225–26; see Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Stowe, 830 N.W.2d 737, 743 (Iowa 2013) (“We have previously recognized the crime of forgery, by its very nature, reflects adversely on an attorney’s fitness to practice law.”).

2022See Ondayog, 722 N.W.2d at 785 (“Courts generally presume counsel is competent and a ‘defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action “might be considered sound trial strategy.”’”).

2022See Ondayog, 722 N.W.2d at 785 (“Courts generally presume counsel is competent and a ‘defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action “might be considered sound trial strategy.”’”).

2022Ct., 395 N.W.2d 841, 844 (Iowa 1986)) (concluding a PCR application based on a new ground of fact must be filed within three years of the discovery of that new ground of fact). 7 B.

2022Ct., 395 N.W.2d 841, 844 (Iowa 1986)) (concluding a PCR application based on a new ground of fact must be filed within three years of the discovery of that new ground of fact). 7 B.