13 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1984–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
City of Greenwood Village v. for the Proposed City of Centennialgreen2 sentences2019The legally protected interest requirement recognizes that “parties actually protected by a statute or constitutional provision are generally best situated to vindicate their own rights.” Id. (quoting City of Greenwood Village v. Petitioners for Proposed City of Centennial, 3 P.3d 427, 437 (Colo. 2000)). ¶ 34 We need not decide whether the former foster parents have standing to oppose the motion to transfer jurisdiction in the adoption cases because resolution of the jurisdiction question in this dependency and neglect case could result in vacating and dismissing the former foster parents’ pet 2018The legally protected interest requirement-the prudential aspect of the standing inquiry-recognizes that "parties actually protected by a statute or constitutional provision are generally best situated to vindicate their own rights." City of Greenwood Vill. , 3 P.3d at 437 . | 2 | 3 |
Ainscough v. Owensgreen2 sentences2017Ainscough v. Owens, 90 P.3d 851, 856 (Colo. 2004). 19 ¶ 53 The second prong, the legally-protected-interest requirement, promotes judicial efficiency. 2015Freedom from Religion Found., 19 (internal quotation marks omitted); Ainscough, 90 P.3d at 856 . 111 The legally-protected-interest requirement promotes judicial self-restraint. | 1 | 6 |
Board of County Commissioners v. Bowen/Edwards Associates, Inc.green1 sentence2026Ainscough, 90 P.3d at 856 ; see also Bd. of Cnty. 5 Comm’rs v. Bowen/Edwards Assocs., Inc., 830 P.2d 1045, 1053 (Colo. 1992) (an interest is protected if it “emanates from a constitutional, statutory, or judicially created rule of law that entitles the plaintiff to some form of judicial relief”). | 1 | 1 |
Mt. Emmons Mining Co. v. Town of Crested Buttegreen1 sentence2026Emmons Mining Co. v. Town of Crested Butte, 690 P.2d 231, 240 (Colo. 1984) (quoting Cmty. Tele-Commc’ns, Inc. v. Heather Corp., 677 P.2d 330, 334 (Colo. 1984)). ¶ 12 A party satisfies the legally protected interest requirement if they show that they have a claim for relief to redress their injury under the constitution, the common law, a statute, or a rule or regulation. | 1 | 1 |
Community Tele-Communications, Inc. v. Heather Corp.green1 sentence2026Emmons Mining Co. v. Town of Crested Butte, 690 P.2d 231, 240 (Colo. 1984) (quoting Cmty. Tele-Commc’ns, Inc. v. Heather Corp., 677 P.2d 330, 334 (Colo. 1984)). ¶ 12 A party satisfies the legally protected interest requirement if they show that they have a claim for relief to redress their injury under the constitution, the common law, a statute, or a rule or regulation. | 1 | 1 |
People in Interest of L.Mgreen1 sentence2019See § 19-3- 205(1), C.R.S. 2018; People in Interest of L.M., 2018 CO 34, ¶ 38 (noting a “preference for addressing issues relating to a child’s status under the provisions of Article 3” when a dependency and neglect proceeding is pending). | 1 | 1 |
Diamond v. Charlesgreen2 sentences2018Except in certain limited circumstances, "a litigant must assert his or her own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest a claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties." Hollingsworth v. Perry , 570 U.S. 693 , 133 S.Ct. 2652 , 2663, 186 L.Ed.2d 768 (2013) (quoting Powers v. Ohio , 499 U.S. 400 , 410, 111 S.Ct. 1364 , 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991) ). ¶19 Standing to intervene at the trial court level is not the same as standing to proceed on appeal. 5 See Diamond v. Charles , 476 U.S. 54 , 68, 106 S.Ct. 1697 , 90 L.Ed.2d 48 (1986) ("[Petitioner's] status as an intervenor below, 2018Except in certain limited circumstances, "a litigant must assert his or her own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest a claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties." Hollingsworth v. Perry , 570 U.S. 693 , 133 S.Ct. 2652 , 2663, 186 L.Ed.2d 768 (2013) (quoting Powers v. Ohio , 499 U.S. 400 , 410, 111 S.Ct. 1364 , 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991) ). ¶19 Standing to intervene at the trial court level is not the same as standing to proceed on appeal. 5 See Diamond v. Charles , 476 U.S. 54 , 68, 106 S.Ct. 1697 , 90 L.Ed.2d 48 (1986) ("[Petitioner's] status as an intervenor below, | 1 | 1 |
Wimberly v. Ettenberggreen2 sentences2014Ainscough, 90 P.8d at 856; see- also Wimberty, 194 Colo. at 168 , 570 P.2d at 589 (holding that the plaintiffs' "(indirect and incidental pecuniary injury" was insufficient to confer standing). 110 The second prong, the legally-protected-interest requirement, promotes judicial self-restraint. 2014Ainscough, 90 P.8d at 856; see- also Wimberty, 194 Colo. at 168 , 570 P.2d at 589 (holding that the plaintiffs' "(indirect and incidental pecuniary injury" was insufficient to confer standing). 110 The second prong, the legally-protected-interest requirement, promotes judicial self-restraint. | 1 | 1 |
Nicholl v. E-470 Public Highway Authoritygreen1 sentence2008See Nicholl, 896 P.2d at 866 . | 1 | 1 |
Cloverleaf Kennel Club, Inc. v. Colorado Racing Commissiongreen2 sentences1984See id. at 1058-1059 . 1984See id. at 1058-1059 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
in Interest of C.W.B., Jr
green
2 sentences2026The legally protected interest requirement recognizes that “parties actually protected by a statute or constitutional provision are generally best situated to vindicate their own rights.” Id. (citation omitted). 2019The legally protected interest requirement recognizes that “parties actually protected by a statute or constitutional provision are generally best situated to vindicate their own rights.” Id. (quoting City of Greenwood Village v. Petitioners for Proposed City of Centennial, 3 P.3d 427, 437 (Colo. 2000)). ¶ 34 We need not decide whether the former foster parents have standing to oppose the motion to transfer jurisdiction in the adoption cases because resolution of the jurisdiction question in this dependency and neglect case could result in vacating and dismissing the former foster parents’ pet | 2 | 2019–2026 |
Hickenlooper, Governor of Colorado v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc
green
1 sentence2026Hickenlooper v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 2014 CO 77, ¶ 10 . | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Powers v. Ohio
green
2 sentences2018Except in certain limited circumstances, "a litigant must assert his or her own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest a claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties." Hollingsworth v. Perry , 570 U.S. 693 , 133 S.Ct. 2652 , 2663, 186 L.Ed.2d 768 (2013) (quoting Powers v. Ohio , 499 U.S. 400 , 410, 111 S.Ct. 1364 , 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991) ). ¶19 Standing to intervene at the trial court level is not the same as standing to proceed on appeal. 5 See Diamond v. Charles , 476 U.S. 54 , 68, 106 S.Ct. 1697 , 90 L.Ed.2d 48 (1986) ("[Petitioner's] status as an intervenor below, 2018Except in certain limited circumstances, "a litigant must assert his or her own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest a claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties." Hollingsworth v. Perry , 570 U.S. 693 , 133 S.Ct. 2652 , 2663, 186 L.Ed.2d 768 (2013) (quoting Powers v. Ohio , 499 U.S. 400 , 410, 111 S.Ct. 1364 , 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991) ). ¶19 Standing to intervene at the trial court level is not the same as standing to proceed on appeal. 5 See Diamond v. Charles , 476 U.S. 54 , 68, 106 S.Ct. 1697 , 90 L.Ed.2d 48 (1986) ("[Petitioner's] status as an intervenor below, | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Hollingsworth v. Perry
green
2 sentences2018Except in certain limited circumstances, "a litigant must assert his or her own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest a claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties." Hollingsworth v. Perry , 570 U.S. 693 , 133 S.Ct. 2652 , 2663, 186 L.Ed.2d 768 (2013) (quoting Powers v. Ohio , 499 U.S. 400 , 410, 111 S.Ct. 1364 , 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991) ). ¶19 Standing to intervene at the trial court level is not the same as standing to proceed on appeal. 5 See Diamond v. Charles , 476 U.S. 54 , 68, 106 S.Ct. 1697 , 90 L.Ed.2d 48 (1986) ("[Petitioner's] status as an intervenor below, 2018Except in certain limited circumstances, "a litigant must assert his or her own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest a claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties." Hollingsworth v. Perry , 570 U.S. 693 , 133 S.Ct. 2652 , 2663, 186 L.Ed.2d 768 (2013) (quoting Powers v. Ohio , 499 U.S. 400 , 410, 111 S.Ct. 1364 , 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991) ). ¶19 Standing to intervene at the trial court level is not the same as standing to proceed on appeal. 5 See Diamond v. Charles , 476 U.S. 54 , 68, 106 S.Ct. 1697 , 90 L.Ed.2d 48 (1986) ("[Petitioner's] status as an intervenor below, | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Conrad v. City & County of Denver
green
2 sentences2014Conrad, 656 P.2d at 668 . 2014Conrad, 656 P.2d at 668 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Washington v. Davis
green
2 sentences1984Our research has located no case in which the court applied explicitly a legally-protected-interest analysis to a Commerce Clause challenge. [6] In Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 , 96 S.Ct. 2040 , 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976), the United States Supreme Court ruled, in the context of strict scrutiny of legislative action under the Fourteenth Amendment, that once a plaintiff sets forth a prima facie case of discriminatory intent, the burden of proof shifts to the state to rebut the presumption of unconstitutional action. 1984Our research has located no case in which the court applied explicitly a legally-protected-interest analysis to a Commerce Clause challenge. [6] In Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 , 96 S.Ct. 2040 , 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976), the United States Supreme Court ruled, in the context of strict scrutiny of legislative action under the Fourteenth Amendment, that once a plaintiff sets forth a prima facie case of discriminatory intent, the burden of proof shifts to the state to rebut the presumption of unconstitutional action. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.
green
2 sentences1984The court, in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev., 429 U.S. 252 , 97 S.Ct. 555 , 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977), made clear that contemporaneous statements by legislators could be used to make this prima facie case. 1984The court, in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev., 429 U.S. 252 , 97 S.Ct. 555 , 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977), made clear that contemporaneous statements by legislators could be used to make this prima facie case. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.