Wimberly test in Colorado

2009The first step in the Wimberly analysis is a showing of injury in fact. 194 Colo. at 168 , 570 P.2d at 539 .

2009The first step in the Wimberly analysis is a showing of injury in fact. 194 Colo. at 168 , 570 P.2d at 539 .

2026Dist. 14, 2023 CO 52 , ¶ 46 (“We hold that subordinate state agencies, political subdivisions, and officials raising claims challenging a government entity’s decision are not subject to any specialized standing test in addition to the Wimberly test; instead, the court should conduct a Wimberly analysis, and that should be the end of its standing inquiry.”). 11 Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 2014 CO 77, ¶ 9 . “[T]he injury- in-fact requirement ensures that an actual controversy exists so that the matter is a proper one for judicial resolution.” Id. (citing Conrad v. City & County of Denver

2026Dist. 14, 2023 CO 52 , ¶ 46 (“We hold that subordinate state agencies, political subdivisions, and officials raising claims challenging a government entity’s decision are not subject to any specialized standing test in addition to the Wimberly test; instead, the court should conduct a Wimberly analysis, and that should be the end of its standing inquiry.”). 11 Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 2014 CO 77, ¶ 9 . “[T]he injury- in-fact requirement ensures that an actual controversy exists so that the matter is a proper one for judicial resolution.” Id. (citing Conrad v. City & County of Denver

1998See Maurer v. Young Life, 779 P.2d 1317, 1324-25 (Colo.1989).

1998See Maurer v. Young Life, 779 P.2d 1317, 1324-25 (Colo.1989).

2014Ainscough, 90 P.3d at 856 . ¶11     Because Respondents’ Preference Clause claim—which derives from article II, section 4 of the Colorado Constitution—clearly satisfies the second prong of the Wimberly test, our standing determination hinges on whether Respondents have alleged injuries—either as taxpayers or as individual nonbelievers—that satisfy the first prong.

2014Ainscough, 90 P.3d at 856 . ¶11     Because Respondents’ Preference Clause claim—which derives from article II, section 4 of the Colorado Constitution—clearly satisfies the second prong of the Wimberly test, our standing determination hinges on whether Respondents have alleged injuries—either as taxpayers or as individual nonbelievers—that satisfy the first prong.

2026“The requirement ensures a ‘concrete adverseness’ that sharpens the presentation of issues to the court.” Id. (quoting City of Greenwood Village v. Petitioners for the Proposed City of Centennial, 3 P.3d 427, 437 (Colo. 2000)). ¶ 21 To establish the second Wimberly prong, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the injury impacted a legally protected interest.

2026“The requirement ensures a ‘concrete adverseness’ that sharpens the presentation of issues to the court.” Id. (quoting City of Greenwood Village v. Petitioners for the Proposed City of Centennial, 3 P.3d 427, 437 (Colo. 2000)). ¶ 21 To establish the second Wimberly prong, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the injury impacted a legally protected interest.

2014Lake Creek Ranch, LL.P., 31 P.3d 886, 890 (Colo. 2001) ("Because we have applied the Wimberly test in a variety of contexts, it has become our 'general' test for standing."); see, eg., Barber, 196 P.3d at 246-47 (applying the Wim-berly test to determine whether the plaintiffs had taxpayer standing). 9 To satisfy the Wimberly test, a plaintiff must establish that (1) he suffered an injury in fact, and (2) his injury was to a legally protected interest.

2014Lake Creek Ranch, LL.P., 31 P.3d 886, 890 (Colo. 2001) ("Because we have applied the Wimberly test in a variety of contexts, it has become our 'general' test for standing."); see, eg., Barber, 196 P.3d at 246-47 (applying the Wim-berly test to determine whether the plaintiffs had taxpayer standing). 9 To satisfy the Wimberly test, a plaintiff must establish that (1) he suffered an injury in fact, and (2) his injury was to a legally protected interest.

2014Lake Creek Ranch, L.L.P., 31 P.3d 886, 890 (Colo. 2001) (“Because we have applied the Wimberly test in a variety of contexts, it has become our ‘general’ test for standing.”); see, e.g., Barber, 196 P.3d at 246–47 (applying the Wimberly test to determine whether the plaintiffs had taxpayer standing). 9 To satisfy the Wimberly test, a plaintiff must establish that (1) he suffered an injury in fact, and (2) his injury was to a legally protected interest.

2014Lake Creek Ranch, L.L.P., 31 P.3d 886, 890 (Colo. 2001) (“Because we have applied the Wimberly test in a variety of contexts, it has become our ‘general’ test for standing.”); see, e.g., Barber, 196 P.3d at 246–47 (applying the Wimberly test to determine whether the plaintiffs had taxpayer standing). 9 To satisfy the Wimberly test, a plaintiff must establish that (1) he suffered an injury in fact, and (2) his injury was to a legally protected interest.

2014See, eg., McCroskey v. Gustafson, 638 P.2d 51, 54-56 (Colo.1981) (affirming the court of appeals' departure from Wimberly and adopting its test for determining whether a taxpayer has derivative standing to bring an action on behalf of a municipality).

2014See, eg., McCroskey v. Gustafson, 638 P.2d 51, 54-56 (Colo.1981) (affirming the court of appeals' departure from Wimberly and adopting its test for determining whether a taxpayer has derivative standing to bring an action on behalf of a municipality).

2009That requirement stems from the "limitation on judicial power requiring the presence of an actual controversy, which is demonstrated by real injury." Douglas County, 829 P.2d at 1309 (citations omitted).

2009That requirement stems from the "limitation on judicial power requiring the presence of an actual controversy, which is demonstrated by real injury." Douglas County, 829 P.2d at 1309 (citations omitted).

2009In addition, we hold that the County has met the prudential standing considerations set forth in Romer v. Board of County Commissioners, 956 P.2d 566, 573 (Colo.1998), under which a subordinate state agency has no standing to sue the state unless expressly permitted to do so by statute.

2009In addition, we hold that the County has met the prudential standing considerations set forth in Romer v. Board of County Commissioners, 956 P.2d 566, 573 (Colo.1998), under which a subordinate state agency has no standing to sue the state unless expressly permitted to do so by statute.

2008For example, we have stated that in consideration of the first requirement of the Wimberly test, "taxpayers have standing to seek to enjoin an unlawful expenditure of public funds." Nicholl, 896 P.2d at 866 .

2008For example, we have stated that in consideration of the first requirement of the Wimberly test, "taxpayers have standing to seek to enjoin an unlawful expenditure of public funds." Nicholl, 896 P.2d at 866 .

2000See Howard v. City of Boulder, 132 Colo. 401 , 290 P.2d 237 (1955) (although proposal to amend city charter had no adverse economic effect on plaintiff, he had standing because of his interest that the form of government under which he lived be in accord with the state constitution); see also Colorado State Civil Service Employees Ass’n v. Love, 167 Colo. 436 , 448 P.2d 624 (1968) (petitioners state a justiciable controversy because they claim violation of the state constitution).

2000See Howard v. City of Boulder, 132 Colo. 401 , 290 P.2d 237 (1955) (although proposal to amend city charter had no adverse economic effect on plaintiff, he had standing because of his interest that the form of government under which he lived be in accord with the state constitution); see also Colorado State Civil Service Employees Ass’n v. Love, 167 Colo. 436 , 448 P.2d 624 (1968) (petitioners state a justiciable controversy because they claim violation of the state constitution).

2000See Howard v. City of Boulder, 132 Colo. 401 , 290 P.2d 237 (1955) (although proposal to amend city charter had no adverse economic effect on plaintiff, he had standing because of his interest that the form of government under which he lived be in accord with the state constitution); see also Colorado State Civil Service Employees Ass’n v. Love, 167 Colo. 436 , 448 P.2d 624 (1968) (petitioners state a justiciable controversy because they claim violation of the state constitution).

2000See Howard v. City of Boulder, 132 Colo. 401 , 290 P.2d 237 (1955) (although proposal to amend city charter had no adverse economic effect on plaintiff, he had standing because of his interest that the form of government under which he lived be in accord with the state constitution); see also Colorado State Civil Service Employees Ass’n v. Love, 167 Colo. 436 , 448 P.2d 624 (1968) (petitioners state a justiciable controversy because they claim violation of the state constitution).

1989Id. at 516.

1985As the DCPA maintains that it never collected the admissions tax from patrons of the theater or the cinema, the allegation that it will have to pay $100,000 of its own funds meets the first part of the Wimberly test. 2 This allegation distinguishes the present case from Wade v. State, 97 Colo. 52, 55 , 47 P.2d 412, 413 (1935), in which the tax collector was held to have no standing because it acknowledged that it had already collected the motor fuel tax from purchasers and then sought to avoid remitting the tax to the state.

1985As the DCPA maintains that it never collected the admissions tax from patrons of the theater or the cinema, the allegation that it will have to pay $100,000 of its own funds meets the first part of the Wimberly test. 2 This allegation distinguishes the present case from Wade v. State, 97 Colo. 52, 55 , 47 P.2d 412, 413 (1935), in which the tax collector was held to have no standing because it acknowledged that it had already collected the motor fuel tax from purchasers and then sought to avoid remitting the tax to the state.

1985In addition, we have held that a court should look to the language of the statute in determining who has standing to challenge it, Cloverleaf Kennel Club, Inc. v. Colorado Racing Commission, 620 P.2d 1051, 1058 (Colo.1980), and in Friends of Chamber Music we relied on the admissions tax ordinance, Denver Colo. Revised Municipal Code § 53-361 to -366 (1982), in determining that tax collectors/vendors have standing to challenge particular assessments under the ordinance.

1985In addition, we have held that a court should look to the language of the statute in determining who has standing to challenge it, Cloverleaf Kennel Club, Inc. v. Colorado Racing Commission, 620 P.2d 1051, 1058 (Colo.1980), and in Friends of Chamber Music we relied on the admissions tax ordinance, Denver Colo. Revised Municipal Code § 53-361 to -366 (1982), in determining that tax collectors/vendors have standing to challenge particular assessments under the ordinance.