13 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 2002–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ham v. Dunmiregreen2 sentences2025See id. (citing Commonwealth for the proposition that “[t]he dismissal of an action based on the violation of a discovery order will constitute an abuse of discretion where the trial court fails to make express written findings of fact supporting the conclusion that the failure to obey the court order demonstrated willful or deliberate disregard” (emphasis added)). 2023“The dismissal of an action based on the violation of a discovery order will constitute an abuse of discretion where the trial court fails to make express written findings of fact supporting the conclusion that the failure to obey the court order demonstrated willful or deliberate disregard.” Id. | 6 | 7 |
Commonwealth Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Tuberogreen2 sentences2005Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Tubero, 569 So.2d 1271, 1273 (Fla.1990) (holding that the trial court must make a "finding that the conduct upon which the order is based was equivalent to willfulness or deliberate disregard"). 2004Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Tubero, 569 So.2d 1271 (Fla.1990). | 1 | 2 |
Mercer v. Rainegreen1 sentence2023While courts have repeatedly recognized that dismissal of a claim for failure to comply with discovery orders “is the most severe of all sanctions which should be employed only in extreme circumstances,” it may be justified where the party 3 shows “deliberate and contumacious disregard of the court’s authority,” or “willful disregard or gross indifference to an order of the court.” Sukonik v. Wallack, 178 So. 3d 455, 457 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) (quoting Mercer v. Raine, 443 So. 2d 944, 946 (Fla. 1983)); accord Ham, 891 So. 2d at 495 . | 1 | 1 |
Sukonik v. Wallackgreen1 sentence2023While courts have repeatedly recognized that dismissal of a claim for failure to comply with discovery orders “is the most severe of all sanctions which should be employed only in extreme circumstances,” it may be justified where the party 3 shows “deliberate and contumacious disregard of the court’s authority,” or “willful disregard or gross indifference to an order of the court.” Sukonik v. Wallack, 178 So. 3d 455, 457 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) (quoting Mercer v. Raine, 443 So. 2d 944, 946 (Fla. 1983)); accord Ham, 891 So. 2d at 495 . | 1 | 1 |
Tubero v. Chapnichgreen1 sentence2012“We do not think it too great a task to require the trial court to make a written finding of the essential facts which supports the imposition of the most severe sanction .... ” Tubero v. Chapnich, 552 So.2d 932, 935 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989). | 1 | 1 |
Leo's Gulf Liquors v. Lakhanigreen1 sentence2002See Leo’s Gulf Liquors v. Lakhani, 802 So.2d 337 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Cartagena v. State
green
2 sentences2020In response, relying on Cartagena v. State, 125 So. 3d 919 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013), the State argued that appellant could not waive the statute of limitations defense because he previously moved to dismiss the action based on that defense. 2020In response, relying on Cartagena v. State, 125 So. 3d 919 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013), the State argued that appellant could not waive the statute of limitations defense because he previously moved to dismiss the action based on that defense. | 2 | 2020–2020 |
Weber v. Dobbins
green
1 sentence2017Id. at 958 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Reynolds v. Diamond Foods & Poultry, Inc.
green
1 sentence2003Ponte Architects, Ltd. v. Investors' Alert, Inc., 149 Md.App. 219 , 815 A.2d 816 (2003) (holding that Maryland's prior enactment of statute prohibiting unsolicited fax ads, which provided for enforcement by Attorney General only, and Maryland's subsequent failure to amend the statute to create a private cause of action, was sufficient evidence of the legislature's intent not to accept the federal grant of state jurisdiction over private actions); Reynolds v. Diamond Foods & Poultry, Inc., 79 S.W.3d 907 (Mo.2002) (holding that state enabling legislation was not necessary to create state jurisdi | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Hooters of Augusta, Inc. v. Nicholson
green
2 sentences2003Condon does not appeal this portion of the trial court's order. [2] 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b)(3) states: A person or entity may, if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a State, bring in an appropriate court of that State (A) an action based on a violation of this subsection or the regulations prescribed under this subsection to enjoin such violation, (B) an action to recover for actual monetary loss from such a violation, or to receive $500 in damages for each such violation, whichever is greater, or (C) both such actions. [3] See, e.g., Hooters of Augusta, Inc. v. Nicholson, 245 G 2003Condon does not appeal this portion of the trial court's order. [2] 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b)(3) states: A person or entity may, if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a State, bring in an appropriate court of that State (A) an action based on a violation of this subsection or the regulations prescribed under this subsection to enjoin such violation, (B) an action to recover for actual monetary loss from such a violation, or to receive $500 in damages for each such violation, whichever is greater, or (C) both such actions. [3] See, e.g., Hooters of Augusta, Inc. v. Nicholson, 245 G | 1 | 2003–2003 |
R.A. Ponte Architects, Ltd. v. Investors' Alert, Inc.
green
2 sentences2003Ponte Architects, Ltd. v. Investors' Alert, Inc., 149 Md.App. 219 , 815 A.2d 816 (2003) (holding that Maryland's prior enactment of statute prohibiting unsolicited fax ads, which provided for enforcement by Attorney General only, and Maryland's subsequent failure to amend the statute to create a private cause of action, was sufficient evidence of the legislature's intent not to accept the federal grant of state jurisdiction over private actions); Reynolds v. Diamond Foods & Poultry, Inc., 79 S.W.3d 907 (Mo.2002) (holding that state enabling legislation was not necessary to create state jurisdi 2003Ponte Architects, Ltd. v. Investors' Alert, Inc., 149 Md.App. 219 , 815 A.2d 816 (2003) (holding that Maryland's prior enactment of statute prohibiting unsolicited fax ads, which provided for enforcement by Attorney General only, and Maryland's subsequent failure to amend the statute to create a private cause of action, was sufficient evidence of the legislature's intent not to accept the federal grant of state jurisdiction over private actions); Reynolds v. Diamond Foods & Poultry, Inc., 79 S.W.3d 907 (Mo.2002) (holding that state enabling legislation was not necessary to create state jurisdi | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.