dispossessory hearing in Georgia

1991“Under [OCGA § 44-7-50], before the plaintiff is entitled to recover, he must show that the defendant is in possession of the premises as his tenant. [Cits.]” Williams v. Stark, 75 Ga. App. 668, 669 (1) ( 44 SE2d 300 ) (1947). “[T]he relationship of landlord and tenant must exist before a dispossessory hearing can be held under OCGA § 44-7-50 et seq. . . .” Stevens v. Way, 167 Ga. App. 688, 690 (5) ( 307 SE2d 507 ) (1983).

1991“Under [OCGA § 44-7-50], before the plaintiff is entitled to recover, he must show that the defendant is in possession of the premises as his tenant. [Cits.]” Williams v. Stark, 75 Ga. App. 668, 669 (1) ( 44 SE2d 300 ) (1947). “[T]he relationship of landlord and tenant must exist before a dispossessory hearing can be held under OCGA § 44-7-50 et seq. . . .” Stevens v. Way, 167 Ga. App. 688, 690 (5) ( 307 SE2d 507 ) (1983).

2014America Net, 243 Ga. App. at 207 . 2 For example, OCGA § 44-7-54 (a) requires that “[i]n any case where the issue of the right of possession cannot be finally determined within two weeks from the date of service of the copy of the summons and the copy of the affidavit, the tenant shall be required to pay into the registry of the trial court: (1) All rent and utility payments which are the responsibility of the tenant payable to the landlord . . . .” Following dismissal of the dispossessory claim, the trial court denied Sterling United’s motion to pay its rent into the registry of the court. 7

2014America Net, 243 Ga. App. at 207 . 2 For example, OCGA § 44-7-54 (a) requires that “[i]n any case where the issue of the right of possession cannot be finally determined within two weeks from the date of service of the copy of the summons and the copy of the affidavit, the tenant shall be required to pay into the registry of the trial court: (1) All rent and utility payments which are the responsibility of the tenant payable to the landlord . . . .” Following dismissal of the dispossessory claim, the trial court denied Sterling United’s motion to pay its rent into the registry of the court. 7

2024See Radio Sandy Springs, 311 Ga. App. at 335 (“OCGA § 44–7–56 is not limited in scope to a particular type of judgment.

2020See Trumpet, 215 Ga. App. at 300 (2) (writ of possession 8 As explained in Cordell, OCGA § 9-11-56 (c), which requires that a motion for summary judgment be served at least 30 days before the time fixed for a hearing, and OCGA § 9-11-6 (d), which requires that when a motion is supported by affidavit, the affidavit shall be served with the motion, have been construed together to mean that an affidavit relied on in support of a motion for summary judgment must be on file for at least 30 days prior to the hearing.

2008Roberts’s amended notice of appeal requests that the trial court clerk transmit to this court only “copies of all records pertaining to this case as required by law.” “When a transcript of the evidence is necessary, as it is here, and the appellant omits it from the record or fails to submit a statutorily authorized substitute, we must assume that the evidence supported the grant of a writ of possession.” (Citations, punctuation and footnote omitted.) Hall v. Hall, 281 Ga. App. 256, 257 ( 635 SE2d 847 ) (2006).

2008Roberts’s amended notice of appeal requests that the trial court clerk transmit to this court only “copies of all records pertaining to this case as required by law.” “When a transcript of the evidence is necessary, as it is here, and the appellant omits it from the record or fails to submit a statutorily authorized substitute, we must assume that the evidence supported the grant of a writ of possession.” (Citations, punctuation and footnote omitted.) Hall v. Hall, 281 Ga. App. 256, 257 ( 635 SE2d 847 ) (2006).

1999Pursuant to OCGA § 44-7-9, Myers “is estopped from asserting an ownership interest in the property, and thereby disputing his landlord’s title to the property, during a dispossessory hearing.” Gentry v. Chateau Properties, 236 Ga. App. 371, 372 (1) ( 511 SE2d 892 ) (1999); Bridges v. City of Moultrie, 210 Ga. App. 697, 698 (1) ( 437 SE2d 368 ) (1993).

1999Pursuant to OCGA § 44-7-9, Myers “is estopped from asserting an ownership interest in the property, and thereby disputing his landlord’s title to the property, during a dispossessory hearing.” Gentry v. Chateau Properties, 236 Ga. App. 371, 372 (1) ( 511 SE2d 892 ) (1999); Bridges v. City of Moultrie, 210 Ga. App. 697, 698 (1) ( 437 SE2d 368 ) (1993).

1999Pursuant to OCGA § 44-7-9, Myers “is estopped from asserting an ownership interest in the property, and thereby disputing his landlord’s title to the property, during a dispossessory hearing.” Gentry v. Chateau Properties, 236 Ga. App. 371, 372 (1) ( 511 SE2d 892 ) (1999); Bridges v. City of Moultrie, 210 Ga. App. 697, 698 (1) ( 437 SE2d 368 ) (1993).

1999Pursuant to OCGA § 44-7-9, Myers “is estopped from asserting an ownership interest in the property, and thereby disputing his landlord’s title to the property, during a dispossessory hearing.” Gentry v. Chateau Properties, 236 Ga. App. 371, 372 (1) ( 511 SE2d 892 ) (1999); Bridges v. City of Moultrie, 210 Ga. App. 697, 698 (1) ( 437 SE2d 368 ) (1993).

1993Appellant’s legal right to possession ended when appellee became the legal title holder and appellant, as a tenant at sufferance, was subject to being summarily dispossessed.” Stevens v. Way, 167 Ga. App. 688, 690 (5) ( 307 SE2d 507 ). “ ‘As to the claim that no landlord/tenant relationship was shown to exist, it is well established that “(w)here the grantor, or his privy, in a security deed remains in possession of the premises after lawful foreclosure of the deed, he is a tenant at sufferance and is subject to be summarily dispossessed by the purchaser at the foreclosure sale, or by his priv

1993Appellant’s legal right to possession ended when appellee became the legal title holder and appellant, as a tenant at sufferance, was subject to being summarily dispossessed.” Stevens v. Way, 167 Ga. App. 688, 690 (5) ( 307 SE2d 507 ). “ ‘As to the claim that no landlord/tenant relationship was shown to exist, it is well established that “(w)here the grantor, or his privy, in a security deed remains in possession of the premises after lawful foreclosure of the deed, he is a tenant at sufferance and is subject to be summarily dispossessed by the purchaser at the foreclosure sale, or by his priv

1991“Under [OCGA § 44-7-50], before the plaintiff is entitled to recover, he must show that the defendant is in possession of the premises as his tenant. [Cits.]” Williams v. Stark, 75 Ga. App. 668, 669 (1) ( 44 SE2d 300 ) (1947). “[T]he relationship of landlord and tenant must exist before a dispossessory hearing can be held under OCGA § 44-7-50 et seq. . . .” Stevens v. Way, 167 Ga. App. 688, 690 (5) ( 307 SE2d 507 ) (1983).

1991“Under [OCGA § 44-7-50], before the plaintiff is entitled to recover, he must show that the defendant is in possession of the premises as his tenant. [Cits.]” Williams v. Stark, 75 Ga. App. 668, 669 (1) ( 44 SE2d 300 ) (1947). “[T]he relationship of landlord and tenant must exist before a dispossessory hearing can be held under OCGA § 44-7-50 et seq. . . .” Stevens v. Way, 167 Ga. App. 688, 690 (5) ( 307 SE2d 507 ) (1983).

1983(Code Ann. § 61-301 et seq.), Crain v. Daniel, 79 Ga. App. 647, 651-653 ( 54 SE2d 487 ) (1949), the provisions of OCGA § 44-7-50 (Code Ann. § 61-301) are clearly satisfied when the relationship between the parties is that of legal title holder and tenant at sufferance.

1983(Code Ann. § 61-301 et seq.), Crain v. Daniel, 79 Ga. App. 647, 651-653 ( 54 SE2d 487 ) (1949), the provisions of OCGA § 44-7-50 (Code Ann. § 61-301) are clearly satisfied when the relationship between the parties is that of legal title holder and tenant at sufferance.