13 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1982–2022 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Georgia Power Co. v. Wattsgreen1 sentence2022See Watts, 56 Ga. App. at 323 (1) (reversing judgment in favor of plaintiff against street car company where defendant introduced uncontradicted evidence “to the effect that there was no sudden, unusual, or unnecessary jerk” of the street car). | 1 | 1 |
Vitner v. Funkgreen2 sentences2021Co., 121 Ga. App. 573, 575 (3) ( 174 SE2d 447 ) (1970). 16 Vitner v. Funk, 182 Ga. App. 39, 41 (1) ( 354 SE2d 666 ) (1987). 8 court abused its discretion by granting MARTA’s motion to sever the claims and by transferring part of those claims to Fulton County.17 Judgment reversed. 2021Co., 121 Ga. App. 573, 575 (3) ( 174 SE2d 447 ) (1970). 16 Vitner v. Funk, 182 Ga. App. 39, 41 (1) ( 354 SE2d 666 ) (1987). 8 court abused its discretion by granting MARTA’s motion to sever the claims and by transferring part of those claims to Fulton County.17 Judgment reversed. | 1 | 1 |
Southern Concrete Co. v. Carter Construction Co.green2 sentences2021Co., 121 Ga. App. 573, 575 (3) ( 174 SE2d 447 ) (1970). 16 Vitner v. Funk, 182 Ga. App. 39, 41 (1) ( 354 SE2d 666 ) (1987). 8 court abused its discretion by granting MARTA’s motion to sever the claims and by transferring part of those claims to Fulton County.17 Judgment reversed. 2021Co., 121 Ga. App. 573, 575 (3) ( 174 SE2d 447 ) (1970). 16 Vitner v. Funk, 182 Ga. App. 39, 41 (1) ( 354 SE2d 666 ) (1987). 8 court abused its discretion by granting MARTA’s motion to sever the claims and by transferring part of those claims to Fulton County.17 Judgment reversed. | 1 | 1 |
Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority v. Mosleygreen2 sentences2021Reese and Brown, JJ., concur. 17 See MARTA v. Mosley, 280 Ga. App. 486, 492-493 (5) ( 634 SE2d 466 ) (2006) (affirming the denial of a defendant’s motion to sever and explaining that, to the extent that evidence against another defendant may be inadmissible against the movant, he had “failed to show that his interests could not be adequately protected by a limiting instruction to the jury”). 9 2021Reese and Brown, JJ., concur. 17 See MARTA v. Mosley, 280 Ga. App. 486, 492-493 (5) ( 634 SE2d 466 ) (2006) (affirming the denial of a defendant’s motion to sever and explaining that, to the extent that evidence against another defendant may be inadmissible against the movant, he had “failed to show that his interests could not be adequately protected by a limiting instruction to the jury”). 9 | 1 | 1 |
Delk v. Sellersgreen2 sentences2021The second case cited by Appellee, Delk v. Sellers, 149 Ga. App. 439, 443 (6) ( 254 SE2d 446 ) (1979), cites only to Seaboard and contains no analysis of the facts as it relates to this proposition. 9 The entire fall was captured on video, which was repeatedly played during the trial. 2021The second case cited by Appellee, Delk v. Sellers, 149 Ga. App. 439, 443 (6) ( 254 SE2d 446 ) (1979), cites only to Seaboard and contains no analysis of the facts as it relates to this proposition. 9 The entire fall was captured on video, which was repeatedly played during the trial. | 1 | 1 |
CARPENTER v. MCMANNgreen1 sentence2020See Carpenter, 304 Ga. at 211 (“[T]he legislature has the authority to create reasonable statutory rules concerning venue when the Constitution leaves space to do so.”). | 1 | 1 |
Jahncke Service, Inc. v. Department of Transportationgreen2 sentences2020In that case, MARTA was sued as a joint tort- See generally McDonald, 251 Ga. App. at 230 (“Georgia law vested exclusive subject matter jurisdiction and venue for all actions against MARTA in the Superior Court of Fulton County.”) (citing, inter alia, Section 10 (t) of the MARTA Act of 1965); Jahncke Svc. v. Dept. of Transp., 134 Ga. App. 106, 109-110 (3) ( 213 SE2d 150 ) (1975) (analyzing whether special venue statutes are exclusive or cumulative of other venue statutes). 7 The record shows that when the State Court denied MARTA’s motion for reconsideration, it elaborated upon its reasoning, 2020In that case, MARTA was sued as a joint tort- See generally McDonald, 251 Ga. App. at 230 (“Georgia law vested exclusive subject matter jurisdiction and venue for all actions against MARTA in the Superior Court of Fulton County.”) (citing, inter alia, Section 10 (t) of the MARTA Act of 1965); Jahncke Svc. v. Dept. of Transp., 134 Ga. App. 106, 109-110 (3) ( 213 SE2d 150 ) (1975) (analyzing whether special venue statutes are exclusive or cumulative of other venue statutes). 7 The record shows that when the State Court denied MARTA’s motion for reconsideration, it elaborated upon its reasoning, | 1 | 1 |
McDonald v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authoritygreen1 sentence2020In that case, MARTA was sued as a joint tort- See generally McDonald, 251 Ga. App. at 230 (“Georgia law vested exclusive subject matter jurisdiction and venue for all actions against MARTA in the Superior Court of Fulton County.”) (citing, inter alia, Section 10 (t) of the MARTA Act of 1965); Jahncke Svc. v. Dept. of Transp., 134 Ga. App. 106, 109-110 (3) ( 213 SE2d 150 ) (1975) (analyzing whether special venue statutes are exclusive or cumulative of other venue statutes). 7 The record shows that when the State Court denied MARTA’s motion for reconsideration, it elaborated upon its reasoning, | 1 | 1 |
Ware v. Multibank 2009-1 RES-ADC Venture, LLCgreen2 sentences2015Andrews, P. J., and McFadden, J., concur. 1 In MARTA v. Maloof, 304 Ga. App. 824 ( 698 SE2d 1 ) (2010), this Court reversed, upon interlocutory appeal, the trial court’s denial of MARTA’s motion for summary judgment on Maloof’s claims for wrongful death. 2 Specifically, the Estate contends that the Statement falls under the following exceptions to the hearsay rule under Georgia’s new Evidence Code: OCGA §§ 24-8-803 (3) (“Then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition”); 24-8-803 (6) (“Records of regularly conducted activity”); 24-8-803 (8) (“Public records and reports”) and 24-8-807 (“ 2015Andrews, P. J., and McFadden, J., concur. 1 In MARTA v. Maloof, 304 Ga. App. 824 ( 698 SE2d 1 ) (2010), this Court reversed, upon interlocutory appeal, the trial court’s denial of MARTA’s motion for summary judgment on Maloof’s claims for wrongful death. 2 Specifically, the Estate contends that the Statement falls under the following exceptions to the hearsay rule under Georgia’s new Evidence Code: OCGA §§ 24-8-803 (3) (“Then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition”); 24-8-803 (6) (“Records of regularly conducted activity”); 24-8-803 (8) (“Public records and reports”) and 24-8-807 (“ | 1 | 1 |
Anderson v. Cobbgreen2 sentences2015Robinson alleges that his due process rights were violated under 42 USC § 1983 because he was arrested without probable cause. *748 “[C]ourts must consider the issue of a government employee’s qualified immunity from liability as the threshold issue in a suit against the officer in his personal capacity.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Anderson v. Cobb, 258 Ga. App. 159, 160 (2) ( 573 SE2d 417 ) (2002). 2015Robinson alleges that his due process rights were violated under 42 USC § 1983 because he was arrested without probable cause. *748 “[C]ourts must consider the issue of a government employee’s qualified immunity from liability as the threshold issue in a suit against the officer in his personal capacity.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Anderson v. Cobb, 258 Ga. App. 159, 160 (2) ( 573 SE2d 417 ) (2002). | 1 | 1 |
Pound v. Augusta National, Inc.green2 sentences1986“Resolution of this question requires that we establish as a predicate the applicable legal principles and parameters within which the facts of the instant case must be considered. ‘(I)n order for (a plaintiff in a slip and fall case such as this) to recover, two elements must exist: (1) fault on the part of the owner, and (2) ignorance of the danger on the part of the invitee, [cit.].’ Pound v. Augusta Nat., 158 Ga. App. 166, 168 ( 279 SE2d 342 ) (1981). 1986“Resolution of this question requires that we establish as a predicate the applicable legal principles and parameters within which the facts of the instant case must be considered. ‘(I)n order for (a plaintiff in a slip and fall case such as this) to recover, two elements must exist: (1) fault on the part of the owner, and (2) ignorance of the danger on the part of the invitee, [cit.].’ Pound v. Augusta Nat., 158 Ga. App. 166, 168 ( 279 SE2d 342 ) (1981). | 1 | 1 |
Peek v. Millergreen2 sentences1982Had the bus here involved been marked ‘school bus,’ as required by law, this would have been notice to the defendant, [Rucker], to stop, and the injury sustained by [Jeffrey] would probably not have occurred, certainly not, had [Rucker] obeyed the law and stopped his car...” Dishinger, 84 Ga. App. at 505 , supra. Once MARTA’s violation of the statute had been established, the only remaining issues concerning MARTA’s ultimate liability for Jeffrey’s injuries consisted of whether MARTA’s negligence was a proximate cause of those injuries (Peek v. Miller, 119 Ga. App. 138, 139 (4) ( 166 SE2d 377 1982Had the bus here involved been marked ‘school bus,’ as required by law, this would have been notice to the defendant, [Rucker], to stop, and the injury sustained by [Jeffrey] would probably not have occurred, certainly not, had [Rucker] obeyed the law and stopped his car...” Dishinger, 84 Ga. App. at 505 , supra. Once MARTA’s violation of the statute had been established, the only remaining issues concerning MARTA’s ultimate liability for Jeffrey’s injuries consisted of whether MARTA’s negligence was a proximate cause of those injuries (Peek v. Miller, 119 Ga. App. 138, 139 (4) ( 166 SE2d 377 | 1 | 1 |
Brewer v. Gittingsgreen2 sentences1982See generally Brewer v. Gittings, 102 Ga. App. 367, 373 (4) ( 116 SE2d 500 ) (1960). 1982See generally Brewer v. Gittings, 102 Ga. App. 367, 373 (4) ( 116 SE2d 500 ) (1960). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Cotton States Fertilizer Co. v. Childs
green
2 sentences2021MARTA’s defense was, in large part, that Johnson was a paratransit passenger due to endurance issues and did not have difficulties with stability or mobility; thus neither MARTA nor the driver were put on notice that Johnson needed assistance. inspection was denied.) 10 The Seaboard Court acknowledged existing precedent that the adverse inference charge should only be given in exceptional circumstances, see Cotton States Fertilizer Co. v. Childs, 179 Ga. 23 ( 174 SE 708 ) (1934), but nevertheless concluded that a new trial was not warranted. 2021MARTA’s defense was, in large part, that Johnson was a paratransit passenger due to endurance issues and did not have difficulties with stability or mobility; thus neither MARTA nor the driver were put on notice that Johnson needed assistance. inspection was denied.) 10 The Seaboard Court acknowledged existing precedent that the adverse inference charge should only be given in exceptional circumstances, see Cotton States Fertilizer Co. v. Childs, 179 Ga. 23 ( 174 SE 708 ) (1934), but nevertheless concluded that a new trial was not warranted. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority v. Maloof
green
2 sentences2015Andrews, P. J., and McFadden, J., concur. 1 In MARTA v. Maloof, 304 Ga. App. 824 ( 698 SE2d 1 ) (2010), this Court reversed, upon interlocutory appeal, the trial court’s denial of MARTA’s motion for summary judgment on Maloof’s claims for wrongful death. 2 Specifically, the Estate contends that the Statement falls under the following exceptions to the hearsay rule under Georgia’s new Evidence Code: OCGA §§ 24-8-803 (3) (“Then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition”); 24-8-803 (6) (“Records of regularly conducted activity”); 24-8-803 (8) (“Public records and reports”) and 24-8-807 (“ 2015Andrews, P. J., and McFadden, J., concur. 1 In MARTA v. Maloof, 304 Ga. App. 824 ( 698 SE2d 1 ) (2010), this Court reversed, upon interlocutory appeal, the trial court’s denial of MARTA’s motion for summary judgment on Maloof’s claims for wrongful death. 2 Specifically, the Estate contends that the Statement falls under the following exceptions to the hearsay rule under Georgia’s new Evidence Code: OCGA §§ 24-8-803 (3) (“Then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition”); 24-8-803 (6) (“Records of regularly conducted activity”); 24-8-803 (8) (“Public records and reports”) and 24-8-807 (“ | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Marta v. Gomez
green
2 sentences1991Our reversal of the trial court’s grant of MARTA’s motion for directed verdict having been reversed by the Supreme Court in MARTA v. Gomez, 261 Ga. 617 ( 409 SE2d 35 ) (1991), our decision in Gomez v. MARTA, 197 Ga. App. 834 ( 399 SE2d 536 ) (1990), is hereby vacated and the judgment of the Supreme Court is made the judgment of this Court. 1991Our reversal of the trial court’s grant of MARTA’s motion for directed verdict having been reversed by the Supreme Court in MARTA v. Gomez, 261 Ga. 617 ( 409 SE2d 35 ) (1991), our decision in Gomez v. MARTA, 197 Ga. App. 834 ( 399 SE2d 536 ) (1990), is hereby vacated and the judgment of the Supreme Court is made the judgment of this Court. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Gomez v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority
neutral
2 sentences1991Our reversal of the trial court’s grant of MARTA’s motion for directed verdict having been reversed by the Supreme Court in MARTA v. Gomez, 261 Ga. 617 ( 409 SE2d 35 ) (1991), our decision in Gomez v. MARTA, 197 Ga. App. 834 ( 399 SE2d 536 ) (1990), is hereby vacated and the judgment of the Supreme Court is made the judgment of this Court. 1991Our reversal of the trial court’s grant of MARTA’s motion for directed verdict having been reversed by the Supreme Court in MARTA v. Gomez, 261 Ga. 617 ( 409 SE2d 35 ) (1991), our decision in Gomez v. MARTA, 197 Ga. App. 834 ( 399 SE2d 536 ) (1990), is hereby vacated and the judgment of the Supreme Court is made the judgment of this Court. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Boswell v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority
neutral
2 sentences1991Boswell, supra, 196 Ga. App. at 903 , 397 S.E.2d 165 . 1991Boswell, supra, 196 Ga. App. at 903 , 397 S.E.2d 165 . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
International Energy Structures v. Fennelly
green
1 sentence1991Id. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Holt's Bakery v. Hutchinson
green
2 sentences1987In rejecting MARTA's defense that Ledbetter's claim was barred *519 by the two-year limitation period provided under OCGA § 34-9-104 (b), the ALJ held that "[s]ince it is obvious that claimant had continual back pain from his work related injury of 1982 and that he had some degree of permanent partial disability, the WC-2 suspending payment of income benefits for total disability did not represent final payment of income benefits due." The ALJ apparently relied upon Holt's Bakery v. Hutchinson, 177 Ga. App. 154 (3) ( 338 SE2d 742 ) (1985), wherein this Court ruled that where there is evidence 1987In rejecting MARTA's defense that Ledbetter's claim was barred *519 by the two-year limitation period provided under OCGA § 34-9-104 (b), the ALJ held that "[s]ince it is obvious that claimant had continual back pain from his work related injury of 1982 and that he had some degree of permanent partial disability, the WC-2 suspending payment of income benefits for total disability did not represent final payment of income benefits due." The ALJ apparently relied upon Holt's Bakery v. Hutchinson, 177 Ga. App. 154 (3) ( 338 SE2d 742 ) (1985), wherein this Court ruled that where there is evidence | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Glover v. Donaldson
green
2 sentences1983Glover v. Donaldson, 243 Ga. 479 ( 254 SE2d 857 ) (1979). 1983Glover v. Donaldson, 243 Ga. 479 ( 254 SE2d 857 ) (1979). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Dishinger v. Suburban Coach Co.
green
2 sentences1982Had the bus here involved been marked ‘school bus,’ as required by law, this would have been notice to the defendant, [Rucker], to stop, and the injury sustained by [Jeffrey] would probably not have occurred, certainly not, had [Rucker] obeyed the law and stopped his car...” Dishinger, 84 Ga. App. at 505 , supra. Once MARTA’s violation of the statute had been established, the only remaining issues concerning MARTA’s ultimate liability for Jeffrey’s injuries consisted of whether MARTA’s negligence was a proximate cause of those injuries (Peek v. Miller, 119 Ga. App. 138, 139 (4) ( 166 SE2d 377 1982Had the bus here involved been marked ‘school bus,’ as required by law, this would have been notice to the defendant, [Rucker], to stop, and the injury sustained by [Jeffrey] would probably not have occurred, certainly not, had [Rucker] obeyed the law and stopped his car...” Dishinger, 84 Ga. App. at 505 , supra. Once MARTA’s violation of the statute had been established, the only remaining issues concerning MARTA’s ultimate liability for Jeffrey’s injuries consisted of whether MARTA’s negligence was a proximate cause of those injuries (Peek v. Miller, 119 Ga. App. 138, 139 (4) ( 166 SE2d 377 | 1 | 1982–1982 |