13 Illinois opinions name it 1 courts 1978–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Enochgreen2 sentences2026People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988). 2004See Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d at 199 , 522 N.E.2d at 1136 (review is permissible if the error affects a substantial right or if the evidence is closely balanced). | 3 | 3 |
People v. Herrongreen2 sentences2025An offender under the age of 18 years at the time of the commission of the offense covered by this paragraph (2) shall be sentenced under Section 5-4.5-105 of the Unified Code of Corrections [Unified Code].” Id. ¶ 41 Defendant did not preserve this issue for review but asks us to review the matter under the plain error doctrine. “[Th]e plain-error doctrine bypasses normal forfeiture principles and allows a reviewing court to consider unpreserved error when either (1) the evidence is close, regardless of the seriousness of the error, or (2) the error is serious, regardless of the closeness of t 2024See Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 187 . | 2 | 2 |
People v. Eppingergreen2 sentences2016See People v. Eppinger, 2013 IL 114121, ¶ 19 (the first step in plain-error review is to determine whether error occurred). ¶ 91 Illinois Rule of Evidence 803(2) provides that an excited utterance is not excluded by the hearsay rule. 2016See People v. Eppinger, 2013 IL 114121, ¶ 19 (the first step in plain-error review is to determine whether error occurred). ¶ 91 Illinois Rule of Evidence 803(2) provides that an excited utterance is not excluded by the hearsay rule. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Sargentgreen2 sentences2011The State does not contest plain-error review and concedes two of the three residential-burglary convictions should be vacated because they are based on the same entry. ¶ 25 The plain-error doctrine permits a reviewing court to consider unpreserved error under the following two scenarios: "(1) a clear or obvious error occurred and the evidence is so closely balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the error, or (2) a clear or obvious error occurred and that error is so serious that it affected the fairness of 2011The State does not contest plain-error review and concedes two of the three residential-burglary convictions should be vacated because they are based on the same entry. ¶ 25 The plain-error doctrine permits a reviewing court to consider unpreserved error under the following two scenarios: "(1) a clear or obvious error occurred and the evidence is so closely balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the error, or (2) a clear or obvious error occurred and that error is so serious that it affected the fairness of | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Medley
green
1 sentence2025An offender under the age of 18 years at the time of the commission of the offense covered by this paragraph (2) shall be sentenced under Section 5-4.5-105 of the Unified Code of Corrections [Unified Code].” Id. ¶ 41 Defendant did not preserve this issue for review but asks us to review the matter under the plain error doctrine. “[Th]e plain-error doctrine bypasses normal forfeiture principles and allows a reviewing court to consider unpreserved error when either (1) the evidence is close, regardless of the seriousness of the error, or (2) the error is serious, regardless of the closeness of t | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Cloutier
green
2 sentences1995(See Cloutier, 156 Ill.2d at 507 , 190 Ill.Dec. at 756 , 622 N.E.2d at 786 .) However, due to the potential for unfairness, we elect to review the matter under the plain error doctrine pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 615(a) (134 Ill.2d R. 615(a)). 1995(See Cloutier, 156 Ill.2d at 507 , 190 Ill.Dec. at 756 , 622 N.E.2d at 786 .) However, due to the potential for unfairness, we elect to review the matter under the plain error doctrine pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 615(a) (134 Ill.2d R. 615(a)). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
The People v. Montgomery
green
2 sentences1995In People v. Montgomery (1971), 47 Ill.2d 510 , 268 N.E.2d 695 , the supreme court repudiated the then-prevailing practice which obligated the trial judge to admit evidence of all prior convictions for impeachment purposes, concluding instead that admission was discretionary if (1) the crime is punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year (a felony), or (2) the crime involved dishonesty or false statement regardless of the punishment, unless (3) in either case the judge determines that the probative value of the evidence of the crime is substantially outweighed by the danger of un 1995In People v. Montgomery (1971), 47 Ill.2d 510 , 268 N.E.2d 695 , the supreme court repudiated the then-prevailing practice which obligated the trial judge to admit evidence of all prior convictions for impeachment purposes, concluding instead that admission was discretionary if (1) the crime is punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year (a felony), or (2) the crime involved dishonesty or false statement regardless of the punishment, unless (3) in either case the judge determines that the probative value of the evidence of the crime is substantially outweighed by the danger of un | 1 | 1995–1995 |
People v. Williams
green
2 sentences1995In People v. Montgomery (1971), 47 Ill.2d 510 , 268 N.E.2d 695 , the supreme court repudiated the then-prevailing practice which obligated the trial judge to admit evidence of all prior convictions for impeachment purposes, concluding instead that admission was discretionary if (1) the crime is punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year (a felony), or (2) the crime involved dishonesty or false statement regardless of the punishment, unless (3) in either case the judge determines that the probative value of the evidence of the crime is substantially outweighed by the danger of un 1995In People v. Montgomery (1971), 47 Ill.2d 510 , 268 N.E.2d 695 , the supreme court repudiated the then-prevailing practice which obligated the trial judge to admit evidence of all prior convictions for impeachment purposes, concluding instead that admission was discretionary if (1) the crime is punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year (a felony), or (2) the crime involved dishonesty or false statement regardless of the punishment, unless (3) in either case the judge determines that the probative value of the evidence of the crime is substantially outweighed by the danger of un | 1 | 1995–1995 |
People v. Phillips
green
2 sentences1992App. 3d 700, 703 (defendant did not object to impact statement by victim’s therapist)), and the fact that a victim impact statement affects the fundamental fairness of the hearing (People v. Phillips (1989), 127 Ill. 2d 499, 536 ), we may relax the waiver rule and review the matter under the plain error doctrine ( 127 Ill. 2d at 536 ). 1992App. 3d 700, 703 (defendant did not object to impact statement by victim’s therapist)), and the fact that a victim impact statement affects the fundamental fairness of the hearing (People v. Phillips (1989), 127 Ill. 2d 499, 536 ), we may relax the waiver rule and review the matter under the plain error doctrine ( 127 Ill. 2d at 536 ). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
People v. Zeisler
green
2 sentences1991(People v. Zeisler (1988), 125 Ill. 2d 42 , 531 N.E.2d 24 ; People v. Bryant (1989), 128 Ill. 2d 448 , 539 N.E.2d 1221 .) Moreover, this court may examine this matter under the plain error doctrine (134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a)) and does so here. 1991(People v. Zeisler (1988), 125 Ill. 2d 42 , 531 N.E.2d 24 ; People v. Bryant (1989), 128 Ill. 2d 448 , 539 N.E.2d 1221 .) Moreover, this court may examine this matter under the plain error doctrine (134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a)) and does so here. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
People v. Bryant
green
2 sentences1991(People v. Zeisler (1988), 125 Ill. 2d 42 , 531 N.E.2d 24 ; People v. Bryant (1989), 128 Ill. 2d 448 , 539 N.E.2d 1221 .) Moreover, this court may examine this matter under the plain error doctrine (134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a)) and does so here. 1991(People v. Zeisler (1988), 125 Ill. 2d 42 , 531 N.E.2d 24 ; People v. Bryant (1989), 128 Ill. 2d 448 , 539 N.E.2d 1221 .) Moreover, this court may examine this matter under the plain error doctrine (134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a)) and does so here. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
People v. Flynn
green
2 sentences1990App. 3d at 323 .) On appeal, the court considered this matter under the plain-error doctrine and held that the trial court’s failure to respond to this and one other jury question constituted reversible error. ( 172 Ill. 1990App. 3d at 323-24 .) The court noted possible prejudice in that the jury could have inferred that defendant pleaded guilty to the missing charge or the trial court displayed leniency. 172 Ill. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
People v. Rehbein
neutral
1 sentence1978People v. Rehbein (1977), 54 Ill. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.