Delaware rule in Delaware

2023Bancorporation v. Le Beau, 737 A.2d at 513, 521 (Del. 1999). 6 Consistent with Daubert, Delaware courts apply a five-step test to determine the admissibility of scientific or technical expert testimony.19 That test examines whether: (a) the witness is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education; (b) the evidence is relevant; (c) the expert’s opinion is based upon information reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field; (d) The expert testimony will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; and (e) the e

2023Bancorporation v. Le Beau, 737 A.2d at 513, 521 (Del. 1999). 6 Consistent with Daubert, Delaware courts apply a five-step test to determine the admissibility of scientific or technical expert testimony.19 That test examines whether: (a) the witness is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education; (b) the evidence is relevant; (c) the expert’s opinion is based upon information reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field; (d) The expert testimony will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; and (e) the e

2023Holdings LLC, 27 A.3d 531, 535 (Del. 2011). 4 unless “under no reasonable interpretation of the facts alleged could the complaint state a claim for which relief might be granted.”26 Delaware’s motion to dismiss standard is “minimal.”27 It asks “whether there is a possibility of recovery.”28 The Court, however, need not “accept conclusory allegations unsupported by specific facts or . . . draw unreasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.”29 The Court may reject “every strained interpretation of the allegations proposed by the plaintiff.”30 “The complaint generally defines the unive

2022Under the Delaware standard, dismissal is inappropriate “unless the plaintiff would not be entitled to recover under any 19 reasonably conceivable set of circumstances.” Id. at 535 .

2014This appeal followed. (7) We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude expert testimony as a finding of fact for abuse of discretion.3 “This Court reviews de novo the Superior Court’s grant or denial of summary judgment ‘to determine whether, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the moving party has demonstrated that there are no material issues of fact in dispute and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’”4 (8) In Brett v. Berkowitz, we held that an expert witness in a legal malpractice action must “be familiar with the ap

2014This appeal followed. (7) We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude expert testimony as a finding of fact for abuse of discretion.3 “This Court reviews de novo the Superior Court’s grant or denial of summary judgment ‘to determine whether, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the moving party has demonstrated that there are no material issues of fact in dispute and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’”4 (8) In Brett v. Berkowitz, we held that an expert witness in a legal malpractice action must “be familiar with the ap

2020LLC, 27 A.3d 531, 536 (Del. 2011). - 25 - could not recover under any reasonably conceivable set of circumstances susceptible of proof.68 The operative test here is one of “reasonable conceivability.”69 This standard asks whether there is a “possibility” of recovery. 70 And Delaware’s test is more lenient than the federal “plausibility” pleading standard, which invites judges to “‘determin[e] whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief’ and ‘draw on . . . judicial experience and common sense.’”71 So this Court does not assess a claim’s plausibility.72 When a defendant invokes Rule

2014See Cambium Ltd. v. Trilantic Capital P’rs III L.P., 36 A.3d 348 , 2012 WL 172844, at *2 (Del.

2014This appeal followed. (7) We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude expert testimony as a finding of fact for abuse of discretion.3 “This Court reviews de novo the Superior Court’s grant or denial of summary judgment ‘to determine whether, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the moving party has demonstrated that there are no material issues of fact in dispute and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’”4 (8) In Brett v. Berkowitz, we held that an expert witness in a legal malpractice action must “be familiar with the ap

2014This appeal followed. (7) We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude expert testimony as a finding of fact for abuse of discretion.3 “This Court reviews de novo the Superior Court’s grant or denial of summary judgment ‘to determine whether, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the moving party has demonstrated that there are no material issues of fact in dispute and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’”4 (8) In Brett v. Berkowitz, we held that an expert witness in a legal malpractice action must “be familiar with the ap

2014This appeal followed. (7) We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude expert testimony as a finding of fact for abuse of discretion.3 “This Court reviews de novo the Superior Court’s grant or denial of summary judgment ‘to determine whether, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the moving party has demonstrated that there are no material issues of fact in dispute and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’”4 (8) In Brett v. Berkowitz, we held that an expert witness in a legal malpractice action must “be familiar with the ap

2014This appeal followed. (7) We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude expert testimony as a finding of fact for abuse of discretion.3 “This Court reviews de novo the Superior Court’s grant or denial of summary judgment ‘to determine whether, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the moving party has demonstrated that there are no material issues of fact in dispute and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’”4 (8) In Brett v. Berkowitz, we held that an expert witness in a legal malpractice action must “be familiar with the ap

2008Rev. 1399 , 1421-28 (2005) (["Professor Bain-bridge’s] approach is consistent with the Delaware doctrine that the [business judgment] rule is a presumption that courts will not interfere with, or second-guess, decision making by directors.”). 43 .Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812 (Del. 1984) (”[U]nder the business judgment rule director liability is predicated upon concepts of gross negligence.”). 44 .

2008Rev. 1399 , 1421-28 (2005) (["Professor Bain-bridge’s] approach is consistent with the Delaware doctrine that the [business judgment] rule is a presumption that courts will not interfere with, or second-guess, decision making by directors.”). 43 .Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812 (Del. 1984) (”[U]nder the business judgment rule director liability is predicated upon concepts of gross negligence.”). 44 .

2025He has not identified a specific provision of the UCC that states principles of common law and equity may supplant Section 9-108 or a decision from any jurisdiction holding that a debtor was equitably estopped from challenging the validity of a purported security interest.193 This court has also failed to find any such case that follows the Delaware standard for allowing common law or equitable defenses.194 192 Pl.’s Opening Br. 40. 193 See Def.’s Answering Br. 36–39. 194 The court did identify caselaw from Montana authorizing the defense of “equitable estoppel as it may pertain to [UCC] claim

2025He has not identified a specific provision of the UCC that states principles of common law and equity may supplant Section 9-108 or a decision from any jurisdiction holding that a debtor was equitably estopped from challenging the validity of a purported security interest.193 This court has also failed to find any such case that follows the Delaware standard for allowing common law or equitable defenses.194 192 Pl.’s Opening Br. 40. 193 See Def.’s Answering Br. 36–39. 194 The court did identify caselaw from Montana authorizing the defense of “equitable estoppel as it may pertain to [UCC] claim

2025Whether that is a substantive difference or whether that, regardless, converts this to a de facto arrest, I can see your Honor’s point. 13 Nevertheless, the State argues that Swanson’s transport did not exceed the scope of a Terry stop because “there is no absolute bar against transport” and the transport “was necessary because police could not test Swanson’s DNA on the street.”45 Delaware courts have recognized that “[i]n limited circumstances, the police may transport a suspect from one location to another without probable cause as part of an investigatory detention when the transportation i

2025Whether that is a substantive difference or whether that, regardless, converts this to a de facto arrest, I can see your Honor’s point. 13 Nevertheless, the State argues that Swanson’s transport did not exceed the scope of a Terry stop because “there is no absolute bar against transport” and the transport “was necessary because police could not test Swanson’s DNA on the street.”45 Delaware courts have recognized that “[i]n limited circumstances, the police may transport a suspect from one location to another without probable cause as part of an investigatory detention when the transportation i

2024Reese’s acceptance of the Delaware plea was a condition of the global agreement.72 Counsel’s decision to disregard the State’s routine bail request was consistent with 69 United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984) (“The presumption that counsel's assistance is essential requires us to conclude that a trial is unfair if the accused is denied counsel at a critical stage of his trial.

2024Similarly, if counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing, then there has been a denial of Sixth Amendment rights that makes the adversary process itself presumptively unreliable.”). 70 Id. at 661 ; see also State v. Lambert, 278 A.3d 71 , 75 (Del.

2024See, e.g., In re Langmeier, 466 A.2d 386, 402-03 (Del.

2024Co., LLC v. EV3, Inc., 937 A.2d 1275, 1286 (Del. 2007) (“Where, as here, the Superior Court’s Rules of Civil Procedure closely track the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, cases interpreting the federal rules are persuasive authority for our construction purposes.”).

2024Co., LLC v. EV3, Inc., 937 A.2d 1275, 1286 (Del. 2007) (“Where, as here, the Superior Court’s Rules of Civil Procedure closely track the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, cases interpreting the federal rules are persuasive authority for our construction purposes.”).

2024The Record does not Suggest that the Cause of Mr. West’s Injury was Unknown The Supreme Court of Delaware’s decision in Brown v. E.I. duPont de Nemours and Co., Inc. discusses Delaware’s standard for tolling a statute of limitations when the cause of an injury is entirely unknowable.82 In Brown, the Supreme Court of Delaware tolled the statute of limitations because “legal injuries” were not sustained until the plaintiffs could attribute a particular injury to its cause.83 The plaintiffs in Brown alleged that the exposure of pregnant mothers to Benlate caused birth defects in their children.84

2024The Record does not Suggest that the Cause of Mr. West’s Injury was Unknown The Supreme Court of Delaware’s decision in Brown v. E.I. duPont de Nemours and Co., Inc. discusses Delaware’s standard for tolling a statute of limitations when the cause of an injury is entirely unknowable.82 In Brown, the Supreme Court of Delaware tolled the statute of limitations because “legal injuries” were not sustained until the plaintiffs could attribute a particular injury to its cause.83 The plaintiffs in Brown alleged that the exposure of pregnant mothers to Benlate caused birth defects in their children.84

2024Causation Experts’ Op. at 13–37. 64 Tumlinson, 81 A.3d at 1270 . 65 Id. at 1273 (stating that it is improper to consider the law of a foreign forum when the admissibility of evidence is a Delaware issue). 66 Barrera, 2019 WL 2331090 , at *11. 15 analysis does not bar admissibility of the expert opinion on human disease;67 • Delaware law holds that statistical significance is “not necessary to prove causality”;68 • Delaware does not recognize a “threshold dose” requirement as part of the general causation analysis; an issue discussed below;69 • epidemiological studies are not required as a thre

2024New Castle Cnty., 56 A.3d 1000, 1007 (Del. 2012) (observing that an interpretation of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure that closely tracks a Delaware rule “provide[s] persuasive guidance” in interpreting the Delaware rule); Appriva S’holder Litig.

2024New Castle Cnty., 56 A.3d 1000, 1007 (Del. 2012) (observing that an interpretation of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure that closely tracks a Delaware rule “provide[s] persuasive guidance” in interpreting the Delaware rule); Appriva S’holder Litig.

2024Causation Experts’ Op. at 13–37. 64 Tumlinson, 81 A.3d at 1270 . 65 Id. at 1273 (stating that it is improper to consider the law of a foreign forum when the admissibility of evidence is a Delaware issue). 66 Barrera, 2019 WL 2331090 , at *11. 15 analysis does not bar admissibility of the expert opinion on human disease;67 • Delaware law holds that statistical significance is “not necessary to prove causality”;68 • Delaware does not recognize a “threshold dose” requirement as part of the general causation analysis; an issue discussed below;69 • epidemiological studies are not required as a thre

2024Causation Experts’ Op. at 13–37. 64 Tumlinson, 81 A.3d at 1270 . 65 Id. at 1273 (stating that it is improper to consider the law of a foreign forum when the admissibility of evidence is a Delaware issue). 66 Barrera, 2019 WL 2331090 , at *11. 15 analysis does not bar admissibility of the expert opinion on human disease;67 • Delaware law holds that statistical significance is “not necessary to prove causality”;68 • Delaware does not recognize a “threshold dose” requirement as part of the general causation analysis; an issue discussed below;69 • epidemiological studies are not required as a thre

2023Mar. 24, 2014) (reasoning that the issue of standing was jurisdictional where a party is arguing “the court lacks the authority to grant the relief requested by the plaintiff.”). 56 The Court will apply Delaware’s Rule 12(b)(6) pleading standard to Plaintiffs’ claims for violations of Article I, Section 1 of the Delaware Constitution. 15 courts, not the “plausibility” threshold articulated in the United States Supreme Court decisions, Ashcroft v. Iqbal57 and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly.58 The Delaware Superior Court, however, is “split as to whether to apply [the Delaware or federal pleadin

2023Mar. 24, 2014) (reasoning that the issue of standing was jurisdictional where a party is arguing “the court lacks the authority to grant the relief requested by the plaintiff.”). 56 The Court will apply Delaware’s Rule 12(b)(6) pleading standard to Plaintiffs’ claims for violations of Article I, Section 1 of the Delaware Constitution. 15 courts, not the “plausibility” threshold articulated in the United States Supreme Court decisions, Ashcroft v. Iqbal57 and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly.58 The Delaware Superior Court, however, is “split as to whether to apply [the Delaware or federal pleadin