Kozel factors in Florida

2025Ham, 891 So. 2d at 496 (quoting Kozel, 629 So. 2d at 818 ); see also Ballard v. Bank of Am., N.A., 310 So. 3d 999 , 1001 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020) ("Where counsel is 'involved in the conduct to be sanctioned, a Kozel analysis is required before dismissal is used as a sanction.' " (quoting Chappelle v. S. Fla. Guardianship Program, Inc., 169 So. 3d 291, 295 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015))).

2025Ham, 891 So. 2d at 496 (quoting Kozel, 629 So. 2d at 818 ); see also Ballard v. Bank of Am., N.A., 310 So. 3d 999 , 1001 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020) ("Where counsel is 'involved in the conduct to be sanctioned, a Kozel analysis is required before dismissal is used as a sanction.' " (quoting Chappelle v. S. Fla. Guardianship Program, Inc., 169 So. 3d 291, 295 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015))).

2026The Nguyens also sought clarification of the order of dismissal because it did not expressly state that it was "with prejudice." The 4 Nguyens acknowledged that the trial court was not required to consider the six factors described in Kozel v. Ostendorf, 629 So. 2d 817, 818 (Fla. 1993),2 and did not commit reversible error by dismissing the case without consideration of the factors unless "the practical effect of the [dismissal is] with prejudice."3 However, the Nguyens argued that where a dismissal has the effect of being with prejudice based on the expiration of the statute of limitations, a

2026The Nguyens also sought clarification of the order of dismissal because it did not expressly state that it was "with prejudice." The 4 Nguyens acknowledged that the trial court was not required to consider the six factors described in Kozel v. Ostendorf, 629 So. 2d 817, 818 (Fla. 1993),2 and did not commit reversible error by dismissing the case without consideration of the factors unless "the practical effect of the [dismissal is] with prejudice."3 However, the Nguyens argued that where a dismissal has the effect of being with prejudice based on the expiration of the statute of limitations, a

2026See also Pixton v. Williams Scotsman, Inc., 924 So. 2d 37, 39-40 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (“[a] trial court’s failure to consider the Kozel factors in determining whether dismissal is appropriate is, by itself, a basis for remand for application of the correct standard.”); see also Smith v. City of Panama, 951 So. 2d 959, 962 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (holding that if the trial court concludes on remand that the conduct of the appellants or their counsel warrants dismissal of the action with prejudice, it shall enter an order containing findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to each of the

2026See also Pixton v. Williams Scotsman, Inc., 924 So. 2d 37, 39-40 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (“[a] trial court’s failure to consider the Kozel factors in determining whether dismissal is appropriate is, by itself, a basis for remand for application of the correct standard.”); see also Smith v. City of Panama, 951 So. 2d 959, 962 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (holding that if the trial court concludes on remand that the conduct of the appellants or their counsel warrants dismissal of the action with prejudice, it shall enter an order containing findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to each of the

2026See also Pixton v. Williams Scotsman, Inc., 924 So. 2d 37, 39-40 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (“[a] trial court’s failure to consider the Kozel factors in determining whether dismissal is appropriate is, by itself, a basis for remand for application of the correct standard.”); see also Smith v. City of Panama, 951 So. 2d 959, 962 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (holding that if the trial court concludes on remand that the conduct of the appellants or their counsel warrants dismissal of the action with prejudice, it shall enter an order containing findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to each of the

2026See also Pixton v. Williams Scotsman, Inc., 924 So. 2d 37, 39-40 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (“[a] trial court’s failure to consider the Kozel factors in determining whether dismissal is appropriate is, by itself, a basis for remand for application of the correct standard.”); see also Smith v. City of Panama, 951 So. 2d 959, 962 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (holding that if the trial court concludes on remand that the conduct of the appellants or their counsel warrants dismissal of the action with prejudice, it shall enter an order containing findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to each of the

2024Mary's, Inc., 67 So. 3d 422, 424 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) ("[B]ecause the trial court failed to expressly set forth an analysis 1 Nothing herein shall be construed as a comment on the merits of whether the dismissal with prejudice was an appropriate sanction. 2 of the Kozel factors prior to dismissal, we reverse and remand for written findings on that order.").

2024Mary's, Inc., 67 So. 3d 422, 424 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) ("[B]ecause the trial court failed to expressly set forth an analysis 1 Nothing herein shall be construed as a comment on the merits of whether the dismissal with prejudice was an appropriate sanction. 2 of the Kozel factors prior to dismissal, we reverse and remand for written findings on that order.").

2026Mellon v. Sandhill, 202 So. 3d 944, 945 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016) ("[I]n order to preserve as error the failure of the trial court to set forth its Kozel analysis in the order of dismissal, the [a]ppellant was obligated to bring the matter to the trial court's attention by filing a timely motion for rehearing or clarification with a specific request for inclusion of the Kozel factor analysis in an amended order."); Bank of Am., N.A. v. Ribaudo, 199 So. 3d 407, 409 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016).

2025See Sanderson v. Karch, 257 So. 3d 1091, 1091 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018) (affirming due to appellant’s failure to raise Kozel issue during the hearing or in a motion for rehearing or reconsideration); see also Bank of Am., N.A. v. Ribaudo, 199 So. 3d 407 , 408–09 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (same).

2018In conducting this analysis, the trial court “must make express findings of fact concerning each of the Kozel factors.” Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Cagigas, 85 So. 3d 1181, 1182 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012); see also Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Avila-Gonzalez, 164 So. 3d 90, 93 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) (“This Court has also recognized that [Kozel] findings must be included in the trial court’s order.”).

2018In conducting this analysis, the trial court “must make express findings of fact concerning each of the Kozel factors.” Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Cagigas, 85 So. 3d 1181, 1182 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012); see also Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Avila-Gonzalez, 164 So. 3d 90, 93 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) (“This Court has also recognized that [Kozel] findings must be included in the trial court’s order.”).

2015See Ham v. Dunmire, 891 So.2d 492, 496 (Fla.2004) (“Express findings are required to ensure that the trial judge has consciously determined that the failure was more than a mistake, neglect, or inadvertence, and to assist the reviewing court to the extent the record is susceptible to more than one interpretation.”); BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P. v. Ellison, 141 So.3d 1290, 1291 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (quoting Ham) (“[FJailure to consider the Kozel factors in determining whether dismissal was appropriate is, by itself, a basis for remand for application of the correct standard.”); Smith v. City o

2015Cf. BAC Home Loans Serv., L.P. v. Ellison, 141 So.3d 1290, 1291 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (reversing order dismissing foreclosure action without prejudice for counsel’s failure to appear at hearing where court failed to hold hearing to determine whether counsel acted willfully and failed to consider Kozel factors before dismissing action).

2026Mellon v. Sandhill, 202 So. 3d 944, 945 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016) ("[I]n order to preserve as error the failure of the trial court to set forth its Kozel analysis in the order of dismissal, the [a]ppellant was obligated to bring the matter to the trial court's attention by filing a timely motion for rehearing or clarification with a specific request for inclusion of the Kozel factor analysis in an amended order."); Bank of Am., N.A. v. Ribaudo, 199 So. 3d 407, 409 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016).

2025Mellon v. Sandhill, 202 So. 3d 944, 945 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016) (“[I]n order to preserve as error the failure of the trial court to set forth its Kozel analysis in the order of dismissal, the Appellant was obligated to bring the matter to the trial court’s attention by filing a timely motion for rehearing or clarification with a specific request for inclusion of the Kozel factor analysis in an amended order.”); see also A-1 Pro.

2016Mary’s, Inc., 67 So.3d 422, 427 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (quoting Ham v. Dunmire, 891 So.2d 492, 500 (Fla.2004)); see also Portofino Prof'l Ctr. v. Prime Homes at Portofino, 133 So.3d 1112, 1114 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) (“It is well established that a court must first consider each of the Kozel factors before it may dismiss a cause as a sanction.”); Heritage Circle Condo.

2016Mary’s, Inc., 67 So.3d 422, 427 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (quoting Ham v. Dunmire, 891 So.2d 492, 500 (Fla.2004)); see also Portofino Prof'l Ctr. v. Prime Homes at Portofino, 133 So.3d 1112, 1114 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) (“It is well established that a court must first consider each of the Kozel factors before it may dismiss a cause as a sanction.”); Heritage Circle Condo.

2017Lucie Ass’n v. Dellatore, 165 So. 3d 731, 735 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015)) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2016See id. at 293-95 (reversing and remanding for failure to consider Kozel factors where issue was raised in timely motion for reconsideration); see also Dellatore, 165 So.3d at 733-36 (reversing and remanding in part for failure to consider Kozel factors where issue was raised in timely motion for rehearing); Heritage Circle Condo.

2015While we have not specifically adopted the Kozel factors in this context, in Crews v. Shadbume, this court noted that although Kozel did not specifically involve rule 1.070(j), equally applicable in this context is the Kozel court’s finding that “ ‘to dismiss the case based solely on the attorney’s neglect unduly punishes the litigant and espouses a policy that this Court does not want to promote’ ” and that “dismissal ‘should be reserved for those aggravating circumstances in which a lesser sanction would fail to achieve a just result.’ ” 637 So.2d 979, 981 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (quoting Kozel,

2015While we have not specifically adopted the Kozel factors in this context, in Crews v. Shadbume, this court noted that although Kozel did not specifically involve rule 1.070(j), equally applicable in this context is the Kozel court’s finding that “ ‘to dismiss the case based solely on the attorney’s neglect unduly punishes the litigant and espouses a policy that this Court does not want to promote’ ” and that “dismissal ‘should be reserved for those aggravating circumstances in which a lesser sanction would fail to achieve a just result.’ ” 637 So.2d 979, 981 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (quoting Kozel,

2014See Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Parada, 139 So.3d 406, 406 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) (finding the trial court erred in dismissing a foreclosure action as a sanction for discovery violations “because the trial court failed to make the express factual findings required under Kozel” and because “the factors of willfulness, responsibility and prejudice” were not considered); Portofino Prof'l Ctr. v. Prime Homes at Portofino, 133 So.3d 1112, 1114 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) (concluding that “a court must first consider each of the Kozel factors before it may dismiss a cause as a sanction,” and then should “in

2014See Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Parada, 139 So.3d 406, 406 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) (finding the trial court erred in dismissing a foreclosure action as a sanction for discovery violations “because the trial court failed to make the express factual findings required under Kozel” and because “the factors of willfulness, responsibility and prejudice” were not considered); Portofino Prof'l Ctr. v. Prime Homes at Portofino, 133 So.3d 1112, 1114 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) (concluding that “a court must first consider each of the Kozel factors before it may dismiss a cause as a sanction,” and then should “in

2025Ham, 891 So. 2d at 496 (quoting Kozel, 629 So. 2d at 818 ); see also Ballard v. Bank of Am., N.A., 310 So. 3d 999 , 1001 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020) ("Where counsel is 'involved in the conduct to be sanctioned, a Kozel analysis is required before dismissal is used as a sanction.' " (quoting Chappelle v. S. Fla. Guardianship Program, Inc., 169 So. 3d 291, 295 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015))).

2025Ham, 891 So. 2d at 496 (quoting Kozel, 629 So. 2d at 818 ); see also Ballard v. Bank of Am., N.A., 310 So. 3d 999 , 1001 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020) ("Where counsel is 'involved in the conduct to be sanctioned, a Kozel analysis is required before dismissal is used as a sanction.' " (quoting Chappelle v. S. Fla. Guardianship Program, Inc., 169 So. 3d 291, 295 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015))).

2024See Ham v. Dunmire, 891 So. 2d 492, 500 (Fla. 2004) (“[F]ailure to consider the Kozel factors in determining whether dismissal was appropriate is, by itself, a basis for remand for application of the correct standard.”); Buroz- Henriquez v. De Buroz, 19 So. 3d 1140, 1141 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009) (“It is well established that before a court may dismiss a cause or default a party as a 1 “Generally, when an order dismisses a complaint ‘without prejudice,’ that language signifies that the order is not a final order.” Al-Hakim v. Big Lots Stores, Inc., 161 So. 3d 568, 569 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014).

2024See Ham v. Dunmire, 891 So. 2d 492, 500 (Fla. 2004) (“[F]ailure to consider the Kozel factors in determining whether dismissal was appropriate is, by itself, a basis for remand for application of the correct standard.”); Buroz- Henriquez v. De Buroz, 19 So. 3d 1140, 1141 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009) (“It is well established that before a court may dismiss a cause or default a party as a 1 “Generally, when an order dismisses a complaint ‘without prejudice,’ that language signifies that the order is not a final order.” Al-Hakim v. Big Lots Stores, Inc., 161 So. 3d 568, 569 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014).

2016See, e.g., Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. LGC, 107 So.3d 486, 487 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013); Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Waldorf, 92 So.3d 857, 857 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012); Hawthorne v. Wesley, 82 So.3d 1183, 1184 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012); Rohlwing v. Myakka River Real Props., Inc., 884 So.2d 402, 403 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); see also Montage Grp., Ltd. v. Athle-Tech Comput.

2016See, e.g., Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. LGC, 107 So.3d 486, 487 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013); Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Waldorf, 92 So.3d 857, 857 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012); Hawthorne v. Wesley, 82 So.3d 1183, 1184 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012); Rohlwing v. Myakka River Real Props., Inc., 884 So.2d 402, 403 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); see also Montage Grp., Ltd. v. Athle-Tech Comput.

2014See, e.g., Ham v. Dunmire, 891 So.2d 492, 500 (Fla.2004) (“[Fjailure to consider the Kozel factors in determining whether dismissal was appropriate is, by itself, a basis for remand for application of the correct standard.”); Fla. Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc. v. State, 832 So.2d 911, 914 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (holding that the trial court should not have dismissed the complaint without specifically addressing the Kozel factors); Crews v. Shadburne, 637 So.2d 979, 981 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (“ ‘[T]o dismiss the case based solely on the attorney’s neglect unduly punishes the litigant and espouses a pol

2014See, e.g., Ham v. Dunmire, 891 So.2d 492, 500 (Fla.2004) (“[Fjailure to consider the Kozel factors in determining whether dismissal was appropriate is, by itself, a basis for remand for application of the correct standard.”); Fla. Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc. v. State, 832 So.2d 911, 914 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (holding that the trial court should not have dismissed the complaint without specifically addressing the Kozel factors); Crews v. Shadburne, 637 So.2d 979, 981 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (“ ‘[T]o dismiss the case based solely on the attorney’s neglect unduly punishes the litigant and espouses a pol

2014See Kruger v. Kruger, 124 So.3d 1033, 1035 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013); Alvarado v. Snow White & the Seven Dwarfs, Inc., 8 So.3d 388, 389 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009).

2009Alvarado v. Snow White & The Seven Dwarfs, Inc., 8 So.3d 388 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009) (reversing and remanding dismissal for findings on all six Kozel factors); Coconut Grove Playhouse, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder, Inc., 935 So.2d 597 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (quashing order tantamount to default and remanding for trial court to make express findings).

2025Ass’n., Inc., 372 So. 3d 1278 , 1278 (6th DCA 2023) (citing to Sandhill for the proposition that “to preserve [ a] trial court error in Kozel context, appellant needed to raise absence of trial court analysis in motion for rehearing”); Sanderson v. Karch, 257 So. 3d 1091, 1091 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018) (citing to Ribaudo for the proposition that trial court’s alleged errors and failing to consider Kozel factors before dismissing a complaint could not be reviewed on appeal due to the sanctioned party’s failure to “raise either of these issues at the hearing on the motion to dismiss or by subsequently

2025See Sanderson v. Karch, 257 So. 3d 1091, 1091 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018) (affirming due to appellant’s failure to raise Kozel issue during the hearing or in a motion for rehearing or reconsideration); see also Bank of Am., N.A. v. Ribaudo, 199 So. 3d 407 , 408–09 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (same).

2025See Carbonell v. Glade, 394 So. 3d 679 , 681 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024) (“We review the orders striking pleadings and entering default judgment . . . under an abuse of discretion standard.”); Prater v. Comprehensive Health Ctr., LLC, 185 So. 3d 559, 560 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016) (“[T]here was not competent substantial evidence to support the trial court’s conclusions that each of the Kozel factors had been met, including the absence of record support for a finding that the actions of [Plaintiff’s] counsel were willful, deliberate or contumacious, and a finding that [Plaintiff’s] counsel had been previously s

2025See Carbonell v. Glade, 394 So. 3d 679 , 681 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024) (“We review the orders striking pleadings and entering default judgment . . . under an abuse of discretion standard.”); Prater v. Comprehensive Health Ctr., LLC, 185 So. 3d 559, 560 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016) (“[T]here was not competent substantial evidence to support the trial court’s conclusions that each of the Kozel factors had been met, including the absence of record support for a finding that the actions of [Plaintiff’s] counsel were willful, deliberate or contumacious, and a finding that [Plaintiff’s] counsel had been previously s

2025See Burkett v. Burkett, 155 So. 3d 478, 478 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (“Without a transcript, we cannot know what 3 evidence the court heard beyond the documents that were filed in the record, and we cannot know what issues were preserved for review.”); Erdman v. Bloch, 65 So. 3d 62, 66 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) (“If the court had made the [Kozel] findings in the order, the absence of a transcript would have prevented review . . . .”).

2025See Burkett v. Burkett, 155 So. 3d 478, 478 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (“Without a transcript, we cannot know what 3 evidence the court heard beyond the documents that were filed in the record, and we cannot know what issues were preserved for review.”); Erdman v. Bloch, 65 So. 3d 62, 66 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) (“If the court had made the [Kozel] findings in the order, the absence of a transcript would have prevented review . . . .”).

2023See also Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. v. Avila-Gonzalez, 164 So. 3d 90, 93 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) (“This Court has also recognized that [Kozel] findings must be included in the trial court's order.”) The need to 3 analyze, and make express findings of fact regarding, each of the Kozel factors “generally requires the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing.” Sombrero Beach Rd., LLC, 260 So. 3d at 428 .

2023See also Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. v. Avila-Gonzalez, 164 So. 3d 90, 93 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) (“This Court has also recognized that [Kozel] findings must be included in the trial court's order.”) The need to 3 analyze, and make express findings of fact regarding, each of the Kozel factors “generally requires the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing.” Sombrero Beach Rd., LLC, 260 So. 3d at 428 .

2016See, e.g., Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. LGC, 107 So.3d 486, 487 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013); Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Waldorf, 92 So.3d 857, 857 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012); Hawthorne v. Wesley, 82 So.3d 1183, 1184 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012); Rohlwing v. Myakka River Real Props., Inc., 884 So.2d 402, 403 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); see also Montage Grp., Ltd. v. Athle-Tech Comput.

2016See, e.g., Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. LGC, 107 So.3d 486, 487 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013); Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Waldorf, 92 So.3d 857, 857 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012); Hawthorne v. Wesley, 82 So.3d 1183, 1184 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012); Rohlwing v. Myakka River Real Props., Inc., 884 So.2d 402, 403 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); see also Montage Grp., Ltd. v. Athle-Tech Comput.

2016Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. v. Lippi, 78 So.3d 81, 86 (Fla. 6th DCA 2012) (“[T]he lower court’s failure to consider the Kozel factors when deciding whether to dismiss a case with prejudice, by itself, is sufficient reason to remand the matter for application of the propeir standard.”); see also Bennett v. Tenet St.

2016Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. v. Lippi, 78 So.3d 81, 86 (Fla. 6th DCA 2012) (“[T]he lower court’s failure to consider the Kozel factors when deciding whether to dismiss a case with prejudice, by itself, is sufficient reason to remand the matter for application of the propeir standard.”); see also Bennett v. Tenet St.

2016Ass’n v. State, Fla. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof'l Regulation, Div. of Condos., Timeshares & Mobile Homes, 121 So.3d 1141 , 1144 n. 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (concluding that the appellant had sufficiently preserved the Kozel issue where, despite the fact that there was never a hearing on appellee’s motion for default for failure to comply with discovery requests, appellant had “raise[d] Kozel factual matters” in a timely motion for rehearing).

2016Ass’n v. State, Fla. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof'l Regulation, Div. of Condos., Timeshares & Mobile Homes, 121 So.3d 1141 , 1144 (Fla. 4th *74 DCA 2013) (“Neither the trial court’s order striking [appellant's pleadings and entering a default nor the final judgment contain any findings of willful and deliberate disregard of the court’s order, nor do they make any factual findings regarding the Kozel factors.”); Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Cagigas, 85 So.3d 1181, 1182 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) (“Here, thé .trial court dismissed [plaintifffs complaint as a sanction.

2026Co. v. Sombrero Beach Rd., LLC, 260 So. 3d 424 , 428–29 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) (noting that evidentiary hearing is “generally” required in order for trial court to make express findings of fact concerning all Kozel factors, but that order finding dismissal appropriate under Kozel will be upheld where trial court “include[s] in its written order findings of fact with respect to each Kozel factor, and also individualized findings with regards to the conduct of those individuals the lower court intends to sanction”). 2

2024In evaluating the factors set forth in Kozel, moreover, “the trial court 6 ‘must make express findings of fact concerning each of the Kozel factors.’” Sombrero Beach Rd., LLC, 260 So. 3d at 428 (quoting Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr.

2026The Nguyens sought clarification as to the applicability of Kozel and whether the practical effect of the dismissal was with prejudice. 2 See Kozel, 629 So. 2d at 818 (defining six factors a trial court must consider in deciding whether a dismissal with prejudice is appropriate). 3 The Nguyens quoted Federal National Mortgage Ass'n v. Linner, 193 So. 3d 1010 , 1013 n.5 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) (citing Portofino Professional Center. v. Prime Homes at Portofino, 133 So. 3d 1112, 1113 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014)), for this proposition. 4 The Nguyens again quoted Linner for this proposition.

2017We align our position with that of the Second District in Federal National Mortgage Ass’n v. Linner, 193 So.3d 1010, 1012-13 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016), and held that an involuntary dismissal without prejudice does not require a consideration of the Kozel factors.

2023Ham v, Dunmire, 891 So. 2d 492, 496 (Fla. 2004); Reaction Rehab, LLC v. Fletcher, 2023 WL 5597392 , at *2 (Fla. 3d DCA Aug. 30, 2023) (“To ensure that such a severe sanction is warranted and that a client is not disproportionately punished for the conduct of its attorney, the Florida Supreme Court established six factors that a trial court must consider before dismissing a case with prejudice as a sanction.”); Alsina v. Gonzalez, 83 So. 3d 962, 965 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (remanding to the trial court to consider the Kozel factors after the trial court struck pleadings and dismissed the case when

2023Ham v, Dunmire, 891 So. 2d 492, 496 (Fla. 2004); Reaction Rehab, LLC v. Fletcher, 2023 WL 5597392 , at *2 (Fla. 3d DCA Aug. 30, 2023) (“To ensure that such a severe sanction is warranted and that a client is not disproportionately punished for the conduct of its attorney, the Florida Supreme Court established six factors that a trial court must consider before dismissing a case with prejudice as a sanction.”); Alsina v. Gonzalez, 83 So. 3d 962, 965 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (remanding to the trial court to consider the Kozel factors after the trial court struck pleadings and dismissed the case when

2021Further, because Appellees did not notice the hearing as an evidentiary hearing, the trial court stated several times during the hearing that the record did not provide it the background to address several of the Kozel factors. 1 In Kozel, the Supreme Court articulated a six-factor analysis to determine whether a dismissal with prejudice is an appropriate sanction due to an attorney’s behavior: 1) whether the attorney’s disobedience was willful, deliberate, or contumacious, rather than an act of neglect or inexperience; 2) whether the attorney has been previously sanctioned; 3) whether the cli

2021Further, because Appellees did not notice the hearing as an evidentiary hearing, the trial court stated several times during the hearing that the record did not provide it the background to address several of the Kozel factors. 1 In Kozel, the Supreme Court articulated a six-factor analysis to determine whether a dismissal with prejudice is an appropriate sanction due to an attorney’s behavior: 1) whether the attorney’s disobedience was willful, deliberate, or contumacious, rather than an act of neglect or inexperience; 2) whether the attorney has been previously sanctioned; 3) whether the cli

2016See, e.g., Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. LGC, 107 So.3d 486, 487 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013); Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Waldorf, 92 So.3d 857, 857 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012); Hawthorne v. Wesley, 82 So.3d 1183, 1184 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012); Rohlwing v. Myakka River Real Props., Inc., 884 So.2d 402, 403 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); see also Montage Grp., Ltd. v. Athle-Tech Comput.

2016See, e.g., Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. LGC, 107 So.3d 486, 487 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013); Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Waldorf, 92 So.3d 857, 857 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012); Hawthorne v. Wesley, 82 So.3d 1183, 1184 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012); Rohlwing v. Myakka River Real Props., Inc., 884 So.2d 402, 403 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); see also Montage Grp., Ltd. v. Athle-Tech Comput.